Respondent can not force the petitioner to implead joint tortfeasors as one of the parties to the M.V.O.P. = Now the law is well settled that the liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several. In case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation among tort feasors vis–vis claimant is not permissible. Admittedly, the petitioner is an insurer of the vehicle. The liability of the petitioner is coextensive with that of the owner/insured. It is the primary duty of the claimants to establish negligence and justify their claim. It is for the claimants to file the claim petition against the parties whom they consider as proper or necessary. Now the petitioner, in its written statement, pointed out that there are other parties who are to be impleaded in the claim petition filed by the claimants. In spite of the point raised by the petitioner herein in its written statement, if the claimants do not take necessary steps, they will be doing so at their own risk. It is not for the petitioner herein to force the claimants or the Court to implead some other parties in order to invite a finding on the role of the proposed party in the negligence which resulted in the accident. There is no material to show that the proposed parties are joint tort feasors. Even if it is assumed that some of the proposed parties are joint tort feasors, in their absence also a finding can be recorded with regard to the entitlement of the claimants and the petitioner herein can recover the amount which it was forced to part with due to the role of other joint tort feasors by initiating separate proceedings. But, the summary proceedings in a claim petition arising out of a motor vehicle accident cannot be enlarged and the Tribunal cannot be asked to give a finding with respect to the role of other parties in the accident. The reliance on United India Insurance Company Limited’s case (supra) is of no avail as that case arose out of an accident caused by Jayanthi Janatha Express hitting a passenger bus at the unmanned level crossing. The decision was rendered on the facts of that case only and it cannot be extended to the authorities like National Highways Authority of India Limited who undertake laying of the roads.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.427 of 2016 and Batch Dated 29-04-2016 HDFC ERGO General Insurance Company Ltd……Petitioner vs. Smt.Khawjabi and others…. Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: Learned Senior Counsel Sri Atul Nanda for A.Ramakrishna Reddy Counsel for the Respondents: Sri A.Sanjay Kishore Head Note : ?Cases referred 1.(2007) 5 SCC… Read More Respondent can not force the petitioner to implead joint tortfeasors as one of the parties to the M.V.O.P. = Now the law is well settled that the liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several. In case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation among tort feasors vis–vis claimant is not permissible. Admittedly, the petitioner is an insurer of the vehicle. The liability of the petitioner is coextensive with that of the owner/insured. It is the primary duty of the claimants to establish negligence and justify their claim. It is for the claimants to file the claim petition against the parties whom they consider as proper or necessary. Now the petitioner, in its written statement, pointed out that there are other parties who are to be impleaded in the claim petition filed by the claimants. In spite of the point raised by the petitioner herein in its written statement, if the claimants do not take necessary steps, they will be doing so at their own risk. It is not for the petitioner herein to force the claimants or the Court to implead some other parties in order to invite a finding on the role of the proposed party in the negligence which resulted in the accident. There is no material to show that the proposed parties are joint tort feasors. Even if it is assumed that some of the proposed parties are joint tort feasors, in their absence also a finding can be recorded with regard to the entitlement of the claimants and the petitioner herein can recover the amount which it was forced to part with due to the role of other joint tort feasors by initiating separate proceedings. But, the summary proceedings in a claim petition arising out of a motor vehicle accident cannot be enlarged and the Tribunal cannot be asked to give a finding with respect to the role of other parties in the accident. The reliance on United India Insurance Company Limited’s case (supra) is of no avail as that case arose out of an accident caused by Jayanthi Janatha Express hitting a passenger bus at the unmanned level crossing. The decision was rendered on the facts of that case only and it cannot be extended to the authorities like National Highways Authority of India Limited who undertake laying of the roads.

Section 10(2)(ii)(a) and 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Rent Control Act, bona-fide requirement – sublet the premises without permission , = On being shown Ex.P7 photographs, and on being asked whether the persons on the northern side of Ex.P7 Photograph, were the sub-lessees doing business, RW.1 stated that Saheli Suits was a shop run by him as its owner; and on Sundays he only opens his shop, but he did not know who was doing business in front of his shop on either side. As the respondent-tenant, in his evidence affidavit, had stated that he was carrying on business in the name and style of R.S. Enterprises, it is evident that Saheli Suits was not the name of his shop, and the business being carried on in the name and style of Saheli Suits, in the subject property, was by a third party and not the respondent-tenant. No evidence was adduced by the respondent-tenant to establish that Saheli Suits was a partnership firm of which he was a partner. The concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below, that the respondent-tenant had sublet the premises to Saheli Suits without permission of the petitioners-landlords, is based on the evidence on record, and does not necessitate interference in revision proceedings under Section 22 of the Act. Both on the ground of bona-fide requirement, and on the ground that the respondent-tenant had sublet the premises without permission of the petitioners-landlords, both the Courts below were justified in directing his eviction from the subject premises. The order under revision does not necessitate interference.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.2521 OF 2016 08-07-2016 Cheela Narayanarao and another..Petitioners R.Ajay Kumar. Respondent Counsel for petitioners: Sri J. Prabhakar, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri J. Venkateswara Reddy Counsel for respondent: Sri Manu HEAD NOTE: ? Citations: 1)(1990) 4 SCC 286 2)(1995) 6 SCC 580 3)AIR 1994… Read More Section 10(2)(ii)(a) and 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Rent Control Act, bona-fide requirement – sublet the premises without permission , = On being shown Ex.P7 photographs, and on being asked whether the persons on the northern side of Ex.P7 Photograph, were the sub-lessees doing business, RW.1 stated that Saheli Suits was a shop run by him as its owner; and on Sundays he only opens his shop, but he did not know who was doing business in front of his shop on either side. As the respondent-tenant, in his evidence affidavit, had stated that he was carrying on business in the name and style of R.S. Enterprises, it is evident that Saheli Suits was not the name of his shop, and the business being carried on in the name and style of Saheli Suits, in the subject property, was by a third party and not the respondent-tenant. No evidence was adduced by the respondent-tenant to establish that Saheli Suits was a partnership firm of which he was a partner. The concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below, that the respondent-tenant had sublet the premises to Saheli Suits without permission of the petitioners-landlords, is based on the evidence on record, and does not necessitate interference in revision proceedings under Section 22 of the Act. Both on the ground of bona-fide requirement, and on the ground that the respondent-tenant had sublet the premises without permission of the petitioners-landlords, both the Courts below were justified in directing his eviction from the subject premises. The order under revision does not necessitate interference.

Monitoring Investigation = Sample Voice – to avoid inculpatory meterial – it is just and necessary to brought the sample/modal text/script for verification of court before read out by accused = the only surviving issue for this Court is to ensure that the underlying process for drawing the voice samples is fair and reasonable, having due regard to the mandate of Article 21. On the one hand, it is not open to the accused to dictate the course of investigation. Hence, we do not find substance in the submission that the text which is to be read by the Appellants in the course of drawing their voice samples should contain no part of the inculpatory words which are a part of the disputed conversation. A commonality of words is necessary to facilitate a spectrographic examination. =FIR (FIR 240 of 2012) is that the Appellants demanded a sum of money to refrain from telecasting programmes on a television channel pertaining to the alleged involvement of a corporate entity in a wrongful activity pertaining to the allocation of coal blocks. The FIR was registered against the Appellants for offences under Sections 384, 511, 420 and 120B of the Penal code.= an application requesting the court to seek the consent of the Appellants for obtaining their voice samples at the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, CBI (CFSL-CBI) for the purpose of comparing it with a recording which had been made in the course of a sting operation.= The grievance of the Appellants was that they were being made to read out inculpatory material drawn from an audio recording of the alleged sting operation. The Appellants objected to do so and moved an application under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for monitoring the investigation and for a direction to the Investigating officer to provide material for the purpose of a voice sample “which does not contain any inculpatory statement” in the presence of a judicial magistrate. = whether or not a sample of words in such number as the expert may suggest would suffice for the experts to give their opinion by scientific voice sampling methods. Accordingly, a brief note has been filed on the record stating that: “That the experts of the Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) have informed that two separate texts/scripts have been prepared in the laboratory from each Speaker/Accused, which are different from the received transcripts. That the text/script prepared by the CFSL experts cannot be provided to the petitioners in advance as there is apprehension that the petitioner may practice the texts/scripts thereby adversely affecting the voice sampling examination. Accordingly it is submitted that the sample/modal text/script can only be supplied to the speakers/Accused if this Hon’ble Court deems it appropriate.” By an Order of this Court dated 1 July 2016, the Investigating officer was directed to file a transcript of the disputed conversation in a sealed cover. The Director CFSL-CBI, was called upon to file in a sealed cover a proposed passage of a written text which the Appellants shall be required to read out for the purpose of giving their voice samples using words, but not the sentences, appearing in the disputed conversation in such number as the Director/Scientific Officer may consider necessary for the purpose of comparison. We are of the view that the aforesaid directions which have been issued by this Court would allay the apprehension of the Appellants in regard to the fairness of the process involved in drawing the voice sample. Our directions ensure that the text which the Appellants would be called upon to read out for the purpose of drawing their voice samples will not have sentences from the inculpatory text. Similarly, permitting the text to contain words drawn from the disputed conversation would meet the legitimate concern of the investigating authorities for making a fair comparison. In pursuance of the directions issued by this Court the Investigating officer has filed in sealed cover: (i) transcripts of the disputed conversations; and (ii) a proposed passage of a written text required to be read out by the Appellants for the purpose of giving their voice samples. The passage contains words but not the sentences appearing in the disputed conversation. Having perused the contents of the sealed covers, we are satisfied that the Investigating officer has complied with our directions. We order accordingly.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 700-701 OF 2016 [Arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos.3009-3010 of 2015] SUDHIR CHAUDHARY ETC. ETC. …..APPELLANTS Versus STATE (NCT OF DELHI) …..RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T Dr. D Y CHANDRACHUD, J. Leave granted. 2 A judgment of the… Read More Monitoring Investigation = Sample Voice – to avoid inculpatory meterial – it is just and necessary to brought the sample/modal text/script for verification of court before read out by accused = the only surviving issue for this Court is to ensure that the underlying process for drawing the voice samples is fair and reasonable, having due regard to the mandate of Article 21. On the one hand, it is not open to the accused to dictate the course of investigation. Hence, we do not find substance in the submission that the text which is to be read by the Appellants in the course of drawing their voice samples should contain no part of the inculpatory words which are a part of the disputed conversation. A commonality of words is necessary to facilitate a spectrographic examination. =FIR (FIR 240 of 2012) is that the Appellants demanded a sum of money to refrain from telecasting programmes on a television channel pertaining to the alleged involvement of a corporate entity in a wrongful activity pertaining to the allocation of coal blocks. The FIR was registered against the Appellants for offences under Sections 384, 511, 420 and 120B of the Penal code.= an application requesting the court to seek the consent of the Appellants for obtaining their voice samples at the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, CBI (CFSL-CBI) for the purpose of comparing it with a recording which had been made in the course of a sting operation.= The grievance of the Appellants was that they were being made to read out inculpatory material drawn from an audio recording of the alleged sting operation. The Appellants objected to do so and moved an application under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for monitoring the investigation and for a direction to the Investigating officer to provide material for the purpose of a voice sample “which does not contain any inculpatory statement” in the presence of a judicial magistrate. = whether or not a sample of words in such number as the expert may suggest would suffice for the experts to give their opinion by scientific voice sampling methods. Accordingly, a brief note has been filed on the record stating that: “That the experts of the Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) have informed that two separate texts/scripts have been prepared in the laboratory from each Speaker/Accused, which are different from the received transcripts. That the text/script prepared by the CFSL experts cannot be provided to the petitioners in advance as there is apprehension that the petitioner may practice the texts/scripts thereby adversely affecting the voice sampling examination. Accordingly it is submitted that the sample/modal text/script can only be supplied to the speakers/Accused if this Hon’ble Court deems it appropriate.” By an Order of this Court dated 1 July 2016, the Investigating officer was directed to file a transcript of the disputed conversation in a sealed cover. The Director CFSL-CBI, was called upon to file in a sealed cover a proposed passage of a written text which the Appellants shall be required to read out for the purpose of giving their voice samples using words, but not the sentences, appearing in the disputed conversation in such number as the Director/Scientific Officer may consider necessary for the purpose of comparison. We are of the view that the aforesaid directions which have been issued by this Court would allay the apprehension of the Appellants in regard to the fairness of the process involved in drawing the voice sample. Our directions ensure that the text which the Appellants would be called upon to read out for the purpose of drawing their voice samples will not have sentences from the inculpatory text. Similarly, permitting the text to contain words drawn from the disputed conversation would meet the legitimate concern of the investigating authorities for making a fair comparison. In pursuance of the directions issued by this Court the Investigating officer has filed in sealed cover: (i) transcripts of the disputed conversations; and (ii) a proposed passage of a written text required to be read out by the Appellants for the purpose of giving their voice samples. The passage contains words but not the sentences appearing in the disputed conversation. Having perused the contents of the sealed covers, we are satisfied that the Investigating officer has complied with our directions. We order accordingly.

Delay – 669 days – No sufficient reasons – delay not condoned = As he did not file written statement within 90 days, he filed a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 669 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex-parte order. = no sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay of 669 days in making an application to set aside the ex-parte order. The delay is crucial, because the petitioner did not file the written statement within the time stipulated by law. The suit is for mere injunction and that the wife and son of the revision petitioner have been contesting the suit. Since the petitioner filed OS No.90 of 2010 in respect of the same property before the District Judge, Rajahmundry, though seeking distinct relief, as rightly held by the learned court below no sufficient cause has been shown to condone the inordinate delay in filing the petition to set aside the ex-parte order.

CRP 197 / 2016 CRPSR 13414 / 2015 CASE IS:DISPOSED PETITIONER RESPONDENT KAMADA SATHAYAPRASAD VS SMT. PENUPOTHU PRABHAVATHI & 2 OTHERS HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R. KANTHA RAO Civil Revision Petition No.197 of 2016 ORDER: Heard Sri Surendra Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri Narasimha Rao Davuluri, learned counsel for the 1 st respondent… Read More Delay – 669 days – No sufficient reasons – delay not condoned = As he did not file written statement within 90 days, he filed a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 669 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex-parte order. = no sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay of 669 days in making an application to set aside the ex-parte order. The delay is crucial, because the petitioner did not file the written statement within the time stipulated by law. The suit is for mere injunction and that the wife and son of the revision petitioner have been contesting the suit. Since the petitioner filed OS No.90 of 2010 in respect of the same property before the District Judge, Rajahmundry, though seeking distinct relief, as rightly held by the learned court below no sufficient cause has been shown to condone the inordinate delay in filing the petition to set aside the ex-parte order.

right to redeem the mortgage = So long as the mortgagor had a right to redeem the mortgage he can always pay off the mortgagee and get back possession. This position would continue so long as the property is not sold under a final decree for sale under the provisions of Order 34 C.P.C.

PETITIONER: MATHURALAL Vs. RESPONDENT: KESHAR BAI AND ANOTHER DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/02/1970 BENCH: MITTER, G.K. BENCH: MITTER, G.K. SIKRI, S.M. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA CITATION: 1971 AIR 310 1970 SCR (3) 724 1970 SCC (1) 454 CITATOR INFO : F 1989 SC 553 (7) ACT: Mortgage-Mortgagee given possession of mortgaged house–Leasing house to mortgagor under rent note… Read More right to redeem the mortgage = So long as the mortgagor had a right to redeem the mortgage he can always pay off the mortgagee and get back possession. This position would continue so long as the property is not sold under a final decree for sale under the provisions of Order 34 C.P.C.

sec.60 of T.P.Act – Right of redemption Section 13 [8]of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, ‘the SARFAESI Act’), = Be that as it may, sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act empowers any borrower to retrieve the secured asset by depositing all the dues together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer of the secured asset. In the event of any such payment being tendered by the borrower, the sale, even if has been conducted, but the title of which has not yet been transferred by the secured creditor in favour of the best bidder/highest bidder, then the secured creditor shall take no further steps to transfer or sell the secured asset- This is the salutary principle incorporated in the statute, based upon the legal principle that ‘the mortgagor has a right to redeem the mortgaged debt at any time before it is sold and title thereto is transferred in accordance with law’.- Supreme Court in Mathuralal v. Keshar Bai and another , in paragraphs 15 and 16, which is to the following effect: “15. ……………….So long as the mortgagor had a right to redeem the mortgage he can always pay off the mortgagee and get back possession. This position would continue so long as the property is not sold under a final decree for sale under the provisions of Order 34 C.P.C. 16. In our opinion the second contention put forward on behalf of the appellant has no force. The rights of a mortgagee do not merge in his rights under the preliminary decree for sale. As already mentioned, the mortgagee lost his right to recover the money by sale of the mortgaged property; otherwise his security remained intact and the mortgagor continued to have his right to redeem the property.”- Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, recognizing the right of redemption in the hands of the mortgagor. Therefore, all we need to observe in this case is that if the petitioner immediately approaches to deposit either the entire loan amount, which is outstanding, or at least such amount, which is equivalent to the highest bid offered at the auctions that were conducted on 14-03-2016, together with costs and incidental expenses incurred by the respondent bank for the securitization measures, including any interest payable to such highest/best bidder, which may not exceed 9 percent per annum on the monies so deposited, his right to redeem the property subsists. if the sale certificate has not yet been registered by the respondent bank in favour of the best bidder, it may not do so till 18.04.2016 05.00 P.M. before which time, the petitioner seeks to redeem his property.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO AND THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO WRIT PETITION No. 11711 OF 2016 Dated 11-04-2016 G.Yadaiah…. Petitioner Vs. State Bank of Hyderabad, Rep. by its Authorized Officer and another…..Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner:Sri D. Raghavulu Counsel for the 1st respondent: HEAD NOTE: ?Cases referred AIR 1971 Supreme… Read More sec.60 of T.P.Act – Right of redemption Section 13 [8]of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, ‘the SARFAESI Act’), = Be that as it may, sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act empowers any borrower to retrieve the secured asset by depositing all the dues together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer of the secured asset. In the event of any such payment being tendered by the borrower, the sale, even if has been conducted, but the title of which has not yet been transferred by the secured creditor in favour of the best bidder/highest bidder, then the secured creditor shall take no further steps to transfer or sell the secured asset- This is the salutary principle incorporated in the statute, based upon the legal principle that ‘the mortgagor has a right to redeem the mortgaged debt at any time before it is sold and title thereto is transferred in accordance with law’.- Supreme Court in Mathuralal v. Keshar Bai and another , in paragraphs 15 and 16, which is to the following effect: “15. ……………….So long as the mortgagor had a right to redeem the mortgage he can always pay off the mortgagee and get back possession. This position would continue so long as the property is not sold under a final decree for sale under the provisions of Order 34 C.P.C. 16. In our opinion the second contention put forward on behalf of the appellant has no force. The rights of a mortgagee do not merge in his rights under the preliminary decree for sale. As already mentioned, the mortgagee lost his right to recover the money by sale of the mortgaged property; otherwise his security remained intact and the mortgagor continued to have his right to redeem the property.”- Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, recognizing the right of redemption in the hands of the mortgagor. Therefore, all we need to observe in this case is that if the petitioner immediately approaches to deposit either the entire loan amount, which is outstanding, or at least such amount, which is equivalent to the highest bid offered at the auctions that were conducted on 14-03-2016, together with costs and incidental expenses incurred by the respondent bank for the securitization measures, including any interest payable to such highest/best bidder, which may not exceed 9 percent per annum on the monies so deposited, his right to redeem the property subsists. if the sale certificate has not yet been registered by the respondent bank in favour of the best bidder, it may not do so till 18.04.2016 05.00 P.M. before which time, the petitioner seeks to redeem his property.

u/sec. 55(1)(d) r/w 55(b) of the T.P.Act.,Section 55(6)(b) of the T.P.Act ,Section 73 of the T.P.Act. = Refund of amount paid under agreement of sale – charge – liability of legal heirs =Thus, the CCCAMP Nos.643 and 644 of 2015 are closed and both the appeals are held to be allowed in part and with costs, while confirming the trial Courts decree and judgment in refusing the relief of specific performance of the contract for sale and in granting the alternative relief for the refund of the amounts with interest, by modifying the amount and by modifying from what is awarded against the D.1 to against the D.1 personally also and against D.2 to D.7(R.2 to R.10) on the property of the mother of D.2 to D.7 in the hands of D.2 to D.7(Now R.2 to R.10) for the following:-The Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction Company Pvt.Ltd and judgment of another Bench of this Court in Mudureddipalle Sanjeeva Reddy Vs. Butturu Rama Mohan Reddy and also from the expression with reference to the provision similar to it in Rose Vs. Watson following the earlier expression in De Bernales Vs. Wood of right to refund of the amount is safeguarded by giving the purchaser of lien on the property and interest to be allowed from the time of purchase on the amount paid. It is further the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Shankri Vs. Milkhasingh held that the power of giving charge over the property covered by the contract for sale is not just kept by any agreement, but by operation of law from the moment of payment of the purchase amount- In Muniappa Vs. Subbaiah it is held on the scope of charge under Section 55(6)(b) of the T.P.Act as akin to the principle to apply to the enforcement of mortgage and substituted securities from the general principle of law in Section 73 of the T.P.Act.- which is to recover against the D.1-Developer personally also and also against the D.2 to D.7 with no personal liability but for on the estate of their mother D.L.Kanthamma which they succeeded, with charge over said property to realize the amount but for to say the executing Court if at all to invoke Section 52(2) C.P.C. for any personal liability against D.2 to D.7 if requirements to that extent satisfied) u/sec. 55(1)(d) r/w 55(b) of the T.P.Act.

HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO C.C.C.A.No. 111 of 2009 AND BATCH 22-04-2016 T.Pattabhi Rama Rao,…Appellant/Plaintiff Y.Yadava Rao and others.Respondents/defendants !Counsel for the Appellant in both the appeals: Sri S.Agastya Sharma, ^Counsel for respondents in both the appeals:Sri G.Madhusudhan Reddy, Sri C.V.Bhasker Reddy, Sri C.V.Mahesh Raje HEAD NOTE : — ? Cases referred: : 2008(5)… Read More u/sec. 55(1)(d) r/w 55(b) of the T.P.Act.,Section 55(6)(b) of the T.P.Act ,Section 73 of the T.P.Act. = Refund of amount paid under agreement of sale – charge – liability of legal heirs =Thus, the CCCAMP Nos.643 and 644 of 2015 are closed and both the appeals are held to be allowed in part and with costs, while confirming the trial Courts decree and judgment in refusing the relief of specific performance of the contract for sale and in granting the alternative relief for the refund of the amounts with interest, by modifying the amount and by modifying from what is awarded against the D.1 to against the D.1 personally also and against D.2 to D.7(R.2 to R.10) on the property of the mother of D.2 to D.7 in the hands of D.2 to D.7(Now R.2 to R.10) for the following:-The Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction Company Pvt.Ltd and judgment of another Bench of this Court in Mudureddipalle Sanjeeva Reddy Vs. Butturu Rama Mohan Reddy and also from the expression with reference to the provision similar to it in Rose Vs. Watson following the earlier expression in De Bernales Vs. Wood of right to refund of the amount is safeguarded by giving the purchaser of lien on the property and interest to be allowed from the time of purchase on the amount paid. It is further the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Shankri Vs. Milkhasingh held that the power of giving charge over the property covered by the contract for sale is not just kept by any agreement, but by operation of law from the moment of payment of the purchase amount- In Muniappa Vs. Subbaiah it is held on the scope of charge under Section 55(6)(b) of the T.P.Act as akin to the principle to apply to the enforcement of mortgage and substituted securities from the general principle of law in Section 73 of the T.P.Act.- which is to recover against the D.1-Developer personally also and also against the D.2 to D.7 with no personal liability but for on the estate of their mother D.L.Kanthamma which they succeeded, with charge over said property to realize the amount but for to say the executing Court if at all to invoke Section 52(2) C.P.C. for any personal liability against D.2 to D.7 if requirements to that extent satisfied) u/sec. 55(1)(d) r/w 55(b) of the T.P.Act.