section 149 of the IPC, once membership of an unlawful assembly is established, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to establish whether any specific overt act has been assigned to any accused. In other words, mere membership of the unlawful assembly is sufficient and every member of an unlawful assembly is vicariously liable for the acts done by others either in the prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or such which the members of the unlawful assembly knew were likely to be committed.”= The medical evidence on record through the testimony of PW10 Dr. Setalwad shows that injuries 2 to 5 and 7 though inflicted by sharp cutting weapons were deep upto the skin and were classified as injuries of general type. Injury No.1 according to the prosecution was attributed to accused No.1 who died during the pendency of the appeal. Injuries 6 to 8 are bruises and swellings which could be attributed to sticks. Though the injured Gelabhai was about 80 years of age on the date of incident, he did not suffer any serious or permanent injury and is still alive. At this length of time when 9 years have gone by, in our considered view, ends of justice would be met if the amount of compensation is increased while restoring the sentence imposed by the Trial Court. The Trial Court had directed payment of compensation to the tune of Rs.35,000/- each to be paid by original accused Nos.1 and 7. The record indicates that amount of Rs. 70,000/- has accordingly been deposited with the Trial Court. In the circumstances we deem it appropriate to maintain the order of conviction and sentence as imposed by the Trial Court subject to the modification that each of the appellants shall pay Rs.55,000/- by way of compensation to the injured Gelabhai. Such compensation shall be deposited by each of the appellant with the Trial Court within two months from today and the deposited amount shall be made over to the complainant. The amount of Rs.70,000/- deposited by original accused Nos.1 and 7 shall also be made over to the complainant. Original accused No.7 who had already deposited Rs.35,000/- shall now deposit the balance sum of Rs.20,000/-. In case of any failure to deposit the compensation as directed above, the appellants shall have to undergo sentence in default for a further period of one year.

Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.783-784 of 2016 Bharwad Navghanbhaj Jakshibhai & Ors. ……. Appellants Versus State of Gujarat .……. Respondent J U D G M E N T Uday Umesh Lalit, J. These appeals by special leave at the instance of original accused Nos.2 to 14, seek… Read More section 149 of the IPC, once membership of an unlawful assembly is established, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to establish whether any specific overt act has been assigned to any accused. In other words, mere membership of the unlawful assembly is sufficient and every member of an unlawful assembly is vicariously liable for the acts done by others either in the prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or such which the members of the unlawful assembly knew were likely to be committed.”= The medical evidence on record through the testimony of PW10 Dr. Setalwad shows that injuries 2 to 5 and 7 though inflicted by sharp cutting weapons were deep upto the skin and were classified as injuries of general type. Injury No.1 according to the prosecution was attributed to accused No.1 who died during the pendency of the appeal. Injuries 6 to 8 are bruises and swellings which could be attributed to sticks. Though the injured Gelabhai was about 80 years of age on the date of incident, he did not suffer any serious or permanent injury and is still alive. At this length of time when 9 years have gone by, in our considered view, ends of justice would be met if the amount of compensation is increased while restoring the sentence imposed by the Trial Court. The Trial Court had directed payment of compensation to the tune of Rs.35,000/- each to be paid by original accused Nos.1 and 7. The record indicates that amount of Rs. 70,000/- has accordingly been deposited with the Trial Court. In the circumstances we deem it appropriate to maintain the order of conviction and sentence as imposed by the Trial Court subject to the modification that each of the appellants shall pay Rs.55,000/- by way of compensation to the injured Gelabhai. Such compensation shall be deposited by each of the appellant with the Trial Court within two months from today and the deposited amount shall be made over to the complainant. The amount of Rs.70,000/- deposited by original accused Nos.1 and 7 shall also be made over to the complainant. Original accused No.7 who had already deposited Rs.35,000/- shall now deposit the balance sum of Rs.20,000/-. In case of any failure to deposit the compensation as directed above, the appellants shall have to undergo sentence in default for a further period of one year.

refund of paid excess excise duty= in the claim for refund of excess duty paid can be allowed only in case where the burden of duty has not been passed on to any other person, which includes the ultimate consumer as well = The respondent-Assessee is a 100 per cent Export Oriented Unit (EOU) manufacturing cotton yarn. The respondent filed an application for refund of an amount of Rs. 2,00,827/- on 14.08.2002 on the ground that it had paid excess excise duty at the rate of 18.11 per cent instead of 9.20 per cent. The Assessee initially passed on the duty incidence to its customers. Later the Assessee returned the excess duty amount to its buyers which was evidenced by a certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant on 02.08.2002. The refund claim was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolhapur Division vide an order dated 24.09.2002 on the ground that the Assessee did not submit either the credit notes or the Chartered Accountant’s certificate at the time of filing the refund application. Not satisfied with the genuineness of the documents the Deputy Commissioner rejected the refund claim. The Commissioner (Appeals) Central Excise, Pune allowed the appeal filed by the Assessee by taking note of the certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant and the credit notes dated 29.07.2002. The Appellate Authority accepted the Assessee’s contentions and held that there was no reason to doubt the genuineness of the documents produced. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeal of the Assessee and the said order was confirmed by the Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 06.10.2005. The said order of Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal was further confirmed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Central Excise Appeal No. 100 of 2008 filed by the Revenue. The Revenue has filed the above Civil Appeal challenging the validity of the judgment of the High Court in Central Excise Appeal No. 100 of 2008. Except for a factual dispute about the genuineness of the certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant and the credit notes raised by the Assessee regarding the return of the excess duty paid by the Assessee, there is no dispute in this case of the duty being passed on to any other person by the buyer. As it is clear that the Assessee has borne the burden of duty, it cannot be said that it is not entitled for the refund of the excess duty paid. In view of the facts of this case being different from Civil Appeal No. 7906 of 2002, the appeal preferred by the Revenue is dismissed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 7906 of 2002 Commissioner of Central Excise, Madras …. Appellant(s) Versus M/s Addison & Co. Ltd. … Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. 8488 of 2009 CIVIL APPEAL No. _________of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 25055 of 2009) CIVIL APPEAL No.… Read More refund of paid excess excise duty= in the claim for refund of excess duty paid can be allowed only in case where the burden of duty has not been passed on to any other person, which includes the ultimate consumer as well = The respondent-Assessee is a 100 per cent Export Oriented Unit (EOU) manufacturing cotton yarn. The respondent filed an application for refund of an amount of Rs. 2,00,827/- on 14.08.2002 on the ground that it had paid excess excise duty at the rate of 18.11 per cent instead of 9.20 per cent. The Assessee initially passed on the duty incidence to its customers. Later the Assessee returned the excess duty amount to its buyers which was evidenced by a certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant on 02.08.2002. The refund claim was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolhapur Division vide an order dated 24.09.2002 on the ground that the Assessee did not submit either the credit notes or the Chartered Accountant’s certificate at the time of filing the refund application. Not satisfied with the genuineness of the documents the Deputy Commissioner rejected the refund claim. The Commissioner (Appeals) Central Excise, Pune allowed the appeal filed by the Assessee by taking note of the certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant and the credit notes dated 29.07.2002. The Appellate Authority accepted the Assessee’s contentions and held that there was no reason to doubt the genuineness of the documents produced. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeal of the Assessee and the said order was confirmed by the Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 06.10.2005. The said order of Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal was further confirmed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Central Excise Appeal No. 100 of 2008 filed by the Revenue. The Revenue has filed the above Civil Appeal challenging the validity of the judgment of the High Court in Central Excise Appeal No. 100 of 2008. Except for a factual dispute about the genuineness of the certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant and the credit notes raised by the Assessee regarding the return of the excess duty paid by the Assessee, there is no dispute in this case of the duty being passed on to any other person by the buyer. As it is clear that the Assessee has borne the burden of duty, it cannot be said that it is not entitled for the refund of the excess duty paid. In view of the facts of this case being different from Civil Appeal No. 7906 of 2002, the appeal preferred by the Revenue is dismissed.

Constitutional validity of the provisions of Rule 3 and Rule 3A of Chapter XXIV of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952=right to practice as an Advocate is not an absolute right and it was only a statutory right which is controlled by the provisions of the Act.- The High Court has power to formulate rules for regulating proceedings inside the court. Such power should not be confused with the right to practice law. The court has supervisory power over the right of an Advocate to appear and conduct cases in the court.-the right to practice in the right to appear in courts are not synonymous. Under Section 34 of the Act, the High Court has power to make rules for regulating proceedings inside the court.We, thus, are of the opinion that Rules 3 and 3A of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 and perfectly valid, legal and do not violate the right of the appellant under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to cost.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6120 OF 2016 |JAMSHED ANSARI |…..APPELLANT(S) | |VERSUS | | |HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD & |…..RESPONDENT(S) | |ORS. | | J U D G M E N T A.K. SIKRI, J. The appellant has challenged the judgment dated 28.04.2015 passed… Read More Constitutional validity of the provisions of Rule 3 and Rule 3A of Chapter XXIV of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952=right to practice as an Advocate is not an absolute right and it was only a statutory right which is controlled by the provisions of the Act.- The High Court has power to formulate rules for regulating proceedings inside the court. Such power should not be confused with the right to practice law. The court has supervisory power over the right of an Advocate to appear and conduct cases in the court.-the right to practice in the right to appear in courts are not synonymous. Under Section 34 of the Act, the High Court has power to make rules for regulating proceedings inside the court.We, thus, are of the opinion that Rules 3 and 3A of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 and perfectly valid, legal and do not violate the right of the appellant under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to cost.

alleged supply of contraband ganja, by 11 CRPF personnel posted in the unit of the appellant and one AK-47 rifle with 3 magazines and 90 rounds of 7.62 ammunition issued in the name of one Lance Naik Man Bahadur, who was posted at the same battalion of which the appellant was the commandant went missing. According to the respondents, the loss occurred as a result of the verbal orders issued by the appellant, which action amounted to a violation of Rules 3(1)(i) & (iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the “CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964”).= .The appellant was serving as a regular Commandant of 61st Battalion, CRPF and at the time of incidents, was posted at Mantripukhri, Imphal. He is alleged to be involved in two cases.= The observation made by this Court in the case of Dr. Yashwant Trimbak (supra) to the extent that orders of sanction granted by the Governor are outside the scope of judicial review, is untenable in law. The same is contrary not only to the law laid down by this Court referred to supra, but also the provisions of Articles 77(2) & 166(2) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the same has no application to the fact situation for the reason that the President has exercised his statutory power for grant of sanction under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 to initiate the disciplinary action but not the executive action against the appellant. In the instant case, the action of the Disciplinary Authority is untenable in law for the reason that the interpretation of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 which is sought to be made by the learned ASG on behalf of the respondents amounts to deprivation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to the appellant under Part III of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we have to hold that the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the disciplinary authority after obtaining sanction from the President of India under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 are liable to be quashed.- For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the questions of law that arose for consideration of this Court in favour of the appellant=The Division Bench of the High Court erred in allowing the Writ Appeal Nos. 39 and 40 of 2011. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and accordingly, set aside. – we direct the Disciplinary Authority to continue the disciplinary proceedings and conclude them within six months in accordance with the relevant provisions of law as well as the principles of natural justice. If the same are not completed within the said time period by the disciplinary authority, the said liberty granted by this Court in this order to the respondents will not ensue to their benefit. The Appeals are partly allowed only to the extent of answering the legal questions framed and the impugned judgment and order is set aside to that extent with the above liberty given to the respondents. All the pending applications are disposed of. No costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.8323 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.30907 of 2013) BRAJENDRA SINGH YAMBEM …APPELLANT Versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. …RESPONDENTS WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.8324 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.10092 of 2014) J U D G M E N T V.… Read More alleged supply of contraband ganja, by 11 CRPF personnel posted in the unit of the appellant and one AK-47 rifle with 3 magazines and 90 rounds of 7.62 ammunition issued in the name of one Lance Naik Man Bahadur, who was posted at the same battalion of which the appellant was the commandant went missing. According to the respondents, the loss occurred as a result of the verbal orders issued by the appellant, which action amounted to a violation of Rules 3(1)(i) & (iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the “CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964”).= .The appellant was serving as a regular Commandant of 61st Battalion, CRPF and at the time of incidents, was posted at Mantripukhri, Imphal. He is alleged to be involved in two cases.= The observation made by this Court in the case of Dr. Yashwant Trimbak (supra) to the extent that orders of sanction granted by the Governor are outside the scope of judicial review, is untenable in law. The same is contrary not only to the law laid down by this Court referred to supra, but also the provisions of Articles 77(2) & 166(2) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the same has no application to the fact situation for the reason that the President has exercised his statutory power for grant of sanction under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 to initiate the disciplinary action but not the executive action against the appellant. In the instant case, the action of the Disciplinary Authority is untenable in law for the reason that the interpretation of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 which is sought to be made by the learned ASG on behalf of the respondents amounts to deprivation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to the appellant under Part III of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we have to hold that the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the disciplinary authority after obtaining sanction from the President of India under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 are liable to be quashed.- For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the questions of law that arose for consideration of this Court in favour of the appellant=The Division Bench of the High Court erred in allowing the Writ Appeal Nos. 39 and 40 of 2011. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and accordingly, set aside. – we direct the Disciplinary Authority to continue the disciplinary proceedings and conclude them within six months in accordance with the relevant provisions of law as well as the principles of natural justice. If the same are not completed within the said time period by the disciplinary authority, the said liberty granted by this Court in this order to the respondents will not ensue to their benefit. The Appeals are partly allowed only to the extent of answering the legal questions framed and the impugned judgment and order is set aside to that extent with the above liberty given to the respondents. All the pending applications are disposed of. No costs.

Service matter – physically handicapped category along with the necessary certificate. His first preference was for the post of Deputy Collector and second preference was for the post of Trade Tax Officer. The appellant was duly selected and placed at Sl.No.38 in the overall merit list. = The appellant filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court praying for appointment on the post of Deputy Collector. However, pending the writ petition, he joined as a Trade Tax Officer in November, 2004.=reservation which must be provided for, as a matter of law has been duly provided by the State which has in fact determined the roster point which was calculated for the number of posts that ought to have been reserved from the year 1997-1998 to 2009-2010 and have accordingly made appointments. It is another matter that the appellant has not been appointed thereto. In any case, we agree with the observation of the High Court that a direction to accommodate the appellant in the selection year 2001-2002 would create difficulties in the seniority of those who have been appointed every year since then, as observed earlier some of the Deputy Collectors who have been appointed may have got promoted. no merit in the appeal

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.10381 OF 2014 VIVEK SINGH …APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF U.P. & ANR. …RESPONDENTS 1 JUDGMENT S. A. BOBDE, J. On 29.01.2001, the U.P. Public Service Commission invited applications for filling up 800 posts through the Combined State/Upper Subordinate Service Examination 2001. Amongst others… Read More Service matter – physically handicapped category along with the necessary certificate. His first preference was for the post of Deputy Collector and second preference was for the post of Trade Tax Officer. The appellant was duly selected and placed at Sl.No.38 in the overall merit list. = The appellant filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court praying for appointment on the post of Deputy Collector. However, pending the writ petition, he joined as a Trade Tax Officer in November, 2004.=reservation which must be provided for, as a matter of law has been duly provided by the State which has in fact determined the roster point which was calculated for the number of posts that ought to have been reserved from the year 1997-1998 to 2009-2010 and have accordingly made appointments. It is another matter that the appellant has not been appointed thereto. In any case, we agree with the observation of the High Court that a direction to accommodate the appellant in the selection year 2001-2002 would create difficulties in the seniority of those who have been appointed every year since then, as observed earlier some of the Deputy Collectors who have been appointed may have got promoted. no merit in the appeal

strictly speaking, the writ petitioner has no legal right for allotment of a shop at Gazipur. However, since his claim has been under consideration since long, he could be considered with other eligible applicants, for allotment of shop, subject to a surplus shop being available.= Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the order of the Single Judge directing the appellant herein to allot a shop to the respondent- writ petitioner in Gazipur Mandi and also issue of category ‘B’ license to him under the provisions of Delhi Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1998.= writ petitioner supported the impugned order but submitted that there are available surplus shops at Gazipur market and the petitioner was willing to offer 10 per cent over and above the highest auction bid. He has filed a copy of the letter dated 29th June, 2016 in response to an application under the RTI which is as follows : “1. There are a total No. of 354 ‘B’ Category license holders in Gazipur Mandi, out of which, 309 license holders have been allotted new shops. Out of the above 21 license holders are in waiting list for shops under construction. 2. As many as 9 blocks are constructed and ready in Gazipur Mandi. It has 288 ‘B’ category shops. In 1 block 32 shops of ‘B’ Category are raised. 3. In block 10 which is under construction, 21 shops of ‘B’ category have already been allotted. 4. All the shops under construction and also those which are already constructed are under the Jurisdiction of the Office of the Parishad. The remaining shops are also under the jurisdiction of the Office of Parishad.”= it is clear that the respondent- writ petitioner is no longer to be displaced from his existing place of business. He was duly considered for the available shops in Okhla with the persons displaced from Phool Mandi, Darya Ganj who were eligible for an alternative allotment of shops, but he could not succeed. We have also noted the stand of the appellant that Gazipur Mandi shops are for the allotment of shops to persons who have been displaced from Shahadra, in which category the case of the respondent does not fall. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that he has been discriminated against or otherwise denied fairness in action. Thus, strictly speaking, the writ petitioner has no legal right for allotment of a shop at Gazipur. However, since his claim has been under consideration since long, he could be considered with other eligible applicants, for allotment of shop, subject to a surplus shop being available. we dispose of this appeal by modifying the impugned order to the effect that the case of the respondent, along with all eligible persons, be considered, subject to the availability of a shop, within six months, in accordance with law.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA civil APPELLATE JURISDICTION civil APPEAL NO.8267 OF 2016 (arising out of S.l.p. (civil) no. 11247 of 2016) delhi agricultural marketing board …APPELLANT VERSUS hakumat rai …RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. 1. leave granted. This appeal has been preferred against the… Read More strictly speaking, the writ petitioner has no legal right for allotment of a shop at Gazipur. However, since his claim has been under consideration since long, he could be considered with other eligible applicants, for allotment of shop, subject to a surplus shop being available.= Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the order of the Single Judge directing the appellant herein to allot a shop to the respondent- writ petitioner in Gazipur Mandi and also issue of category ‘B’ license to him under the provisions of Delhi Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1998.= writ petitioner supported the impugned order but submitted that there are available surplus shops at Gazipur market and the petitioner was willing to offer 10 per cent over and above the highest auction bid. He has filed a copy of the letter dated 29th June, 2016 in response to an application under the RTI which is as follows : “1. There are a total No. of 354 ‘B’ Category license holders in Gazipur Mandi, out of which, 309 license holders have been allotted new shops. Out of the above 21 license holders are in waiting list for shops under construction. 2. As many as 9 blocks are constructed and ready in Gazipur Mandi. It has 288 ‘B’ category shops. In 1 block 32 shops of ‘B’ Category are raised. 3. In block 10 which is under construction, 21 shops of ‘B’ category have already been allotted. 4. All the shops under construction and also those which are already constructed are under the Jurisdiction of the Office of the Parishad. The remaining shops are also under the jurisdiction of the Office of Parishad.”= it is clear that the respondent- writ petitioner is no longer to be displaced from his existing place of business. He was duly considered for the available shops in Okhla with the persons displaced from Phool Mandi, Darya Ganj who were eligible for an alternative allotment of shops, but he could not succeed. We have also noted the stand of the appellant that Gazipur Mandi shops are for the allotment of shops to persons who have been displaced from Shahadra, in which category the case of the respondent does not fall. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that he has been discriminated against or otherwise denied fairness in action. Thus, strictly speaking, the writ petitioner has no legal right for allotment of a shop at Gazipur. However, since his claim has been under consideration since long, he could be considered with other eligible applicants, for allotment of shop, subject to a surplus shop being available. we dispose of this appeal by modifying the impugned order to the effect that the case of the respondent, along with all eligible persons, be considered, subject to the availability of a shop, within six months, in accordance with law.

When the police were accused – No investigation be placed in their hands for investigation against the complainant – transfer the same to other than local police is justifiable = Similarly, in a recent judgment in Rubabbuddin Sheikh Vs. State of Gujarat16 the Supreme Court directed investigation to be entrusted to CBI as the Gujarat State Police personnel were some of the accused in the alleged fake encounter of Sohrabuddin. In Koganti Lakshmi Vs. State Government of Andhra Pradesh17, on a review of case law, this Court directed entrustment of investigation of a criminal case to the CBCID to ensure that fair and impartial investigation is held into the serious complaint of burglary/robbery allegedly committed in a Jewellary shop at Vijayawada. A perusal of the said report shows that respondent No.3 has failed to address himself to the core issue raised by the petitioners, viz., whether there is any reason for the petitioners to apprehend bias on the part of respondent No.4. Instead, respondent No.3 has solely relied upon the reports of the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Nandyal and respondent No.4. None of these officers have gone into the grievance of the petitioners and tried to redress the same. On a careful consideration of the facts of this case, it cannot be held that the apprehensions expressed by the petitioners are without any basis. I am, therefore, of the opinion that interests of justice would be served if the investigation is entrusted to an agency, other than the local Police, as serious allegations have been made against them. It is, however, made clear that this order shall not be understood as this Court expressing its conclusive opinion either on the professed innocence of the petitioners or on the allegations of the petitioners against respondent No.4 or the other local Police officials. On the premises as above, the Writ Petition is allowed. Respondent No.3 is directed to transfer Crime No.162 of 2008 on the file of respondent No.5-Police Station to C.B.C.I.D. for further investigation.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY Writ Petition No.3998 of 2009 21-07-2010 Shaik Abdulla Shareef and others. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Principal Secretary, Hyderabad, and others. Counsel for the Petitioners: Mr.P. Nagendra Reddy Counsel for Respondents: AGP for Home for R.1 to R.5. None for R.6. :ORDER: This writ petition is… Read More When the police were accused – No investigation be placed in their hands for investigation against the complainant – transfer the same to other than local police is justifiable = Similarly, in a recent judgment in Rubabbuddin Sheikh Vs. State of Gujarat16 the Supreme Court directed investigation to be entrusted to CBI as the Gujarat State Police personnel were some of the accused in the alleged fake encounter of Sohrabuddin. In Koganti Lakshmi Vs. State Government of Andhra Pradesh17, on a review of case law, this Court directed entrustment of investigation of a criminal case to the CBCID to ensure that fair and impartial investigation is held into the serious complaint of burglary/robbery allegedly committed in a Jewellary shop at Vijayawada. A perusal of the said report shows that respondent No.3 has failed to address himself to the core issue raised by the petitioners, viz., whether there is any reason for the petitioners to apprehend bias on the part of respondent No.4. Instead, respondent No.3 has solely relied upon the reports of the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Nandyal and respondent No.4. None of these officers have gone into the grievance of the petitioners and tried to redress the same. On a careful consideration of the facts of this case, it cannot be held that the apprehensions expressed by the petitioners are without any basis. I am, therefore, of the opinion that interests of justice would be served if the investigation is entrusted to an agency, other than the local Police, as serious allegations have been made against them. It is, however, made clear that this order shall not be understood as this Court expressing its conclusive opinion either on the professed innocence of the petitioners or on the allegations of the petitioners against respondent No.4 or the other local Police officials. On the premises as above, the Writ Petition is allowed. Respondent No.3 is directed to transfer Crime No.162 of 2008 on the file of respondent No.5-Police Station to C.B.C.I.D. for further investigation.