Month: October 2016

surcharge has been levied under Section 5A of the said Act on the gross sales tax payable, without deducting the entry tax as required under Section 4 of the OET Act.= It is well settled that the objective of framing rules is to fill up the gaps in a statutory enactment so as to make the statutory provisions operative. Rules also clarify the provisions of an Act under which the same are framed. Section 4 of the OST Act is a charging Section attracting liability to pay Sales Tax “on sales and purchases effected”. Section 5 of the OST Act provides for rate of Sales Tax. Section 5A of the OST Act levies surcharge on the dealer which is nothing but an additional tax. Therefore, on a plain reading of the provisions under the OST Act as well as under the OET Act, a dealer is not entitled for reduction of the amount of entry tax from the amount of tax payable before the levy of surcharge under Section 5A of the OST Act. A harmonious reading of Rule 18 of the Rules as well as Sections 4, 5, 5-A of the OST Act reveals no conflict or inconsistency. The Rules are to be construed to have been made for furtherance of the cause for which the Statute is enacted and not for the purpose of bringing inconsistencies. 21) Section 5A of the OST Act is a self-contained provision and the surcharge, as already seen above, is leviable at the specified per centum of tax payable under the OST Act. Tax payable under the OST Act is independent of the provisions of OET Act. The assessment or quantification or computation of surcharge shall have to be made in accordance with the provisions of the OST Act. 22) Thus, on a conjoint reading of Section 5 of the OST Act, Section 4 of the OET Act and Rule 18 of the Rules, we are of the considered opinion that the amount of surcharge under Section 5A of the OST Act is to be levied before deducting the amount of entry tax paid by a dealer. 23) In view of the forgoing discussion, the impugned judgment and order dated 05.01.2007 passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. In the result, all the appeals are allowed; however, the parties shall bear their own cost.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5913-5920 OF 2008 Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors. …. Appellant(s) Versus M/s Bajaj Auto Ltd. & Anr. …. Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5921 OF 2008 J U D G M E N T R.K. Agrawal, J. 1) Challenge in… Read More surcharge has been levied under Section 5A of the said Act on the gross sales tax payable, without deducting the entry tax as required under Section 4 of the OET Act.= It is well settled that the objective of framing rules is to fill up the gaps in a statutory enactment so as to make the statutory provisions operative. Rules also clarify the provisions of an Act under which the same are framed. Section 4 of the OST Act is a charging Section attracting liability to pay Sales Tax “on sales and purchases effected”. Section 5 of the OST Act provides for rate of Sales Tax. Section 5A of the OST Act levies surcharge on the dealer which is nothing but an additional tax. Therefore, on a plain reading of the provisions under the OST Act as well as under the OET Act, a dealer is not entitled for reduction of the amount of entry tax from the amount of tax payable before the levy of surcharge under Section 5A of the OST Act. A harmonious reading of Rule 18 of the Rules as well as Sections 4, 5, 5-A of the OST Act reveals no conflict or inconsistency. The Rules are to be construed to have been made for furtherance of the cause for which the Statute is enacted and not for the purpose of bringing inconsistencies. 21) Section 5A of the OST Act is a self-contained provision and the surcharge, as already seen above, is leviable at the specified per centum of tax payable under the OST Act. Tax payable under the OST Act is independent of the provisions of OET Act. The assessment or quantification or computation of surcharge shall have to be made in accordance with the provisions of the OST Act. 22) Thus, on a conjoint reading of Section 5 of the OST Act, Section 4 of the OET Act and Rule 18 of the Rules, we are of the considered opinion that the amount of surcharge under Section 5A of the OST Act is to be levied before deducting the amount of entry tax paid by a dealer. 23) In view of the forgoing discussion, the impugned judgment and order dated 05.01.2007 passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. In the result, all the appeals are allowed; however, the parties shall bear their own cost.

advocatemmmohan

“Indirect Taxation”=Section 3-B undoubtedly commences with a non-obstante clause, but the provision has to be read harmoniously with sub-section (6) to Section 4-B. Any other interpretation would make sub-section (6) a dead letter, for if we accept the plea of the Revenue whenever there is violation or failure to abide with the “intendment”, Section 3-B would be invoked and applied, not sub-section(6) to Section 4-B. Section 3-B would apply when a false and wrong certificate or declaration is made. Sub-section (6) on the other hand, deals with cases where the dealer is unable to comply with the intendment, i.e., for some reason he is unable to sell the goods within the State, export them or sell them in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Intendment of the said nature has not been treated as false or wrong declaration as consequences have been prescribed in sub-section (6). It is essential to be stated that consistency and certainty in tax matters is necessary. In cases relating to “Indirect Taxation”, this principle is even more important. Clarity in this regard is a necessity and the interpretative vision should be same.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10430 OF 2016 (@ S.L.P. (Civil) No. 28962 of 2013) Commissioner of Commercial Tax, U.P. …Appellant Versus M/s Oswal Greentech Limited …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Leave granted. 2. The respondent, a dealer registered under… Read More “Indirect Taxation”=Section 3-B undoubtedly commences with a non-obstante clause, but the provision has to be read harmoniously with sub-section (6) to Section 4-B. Any other interpretation would make sub-section (6) a dead letter, for if we accept the plea of the Revenue whenever there is violation or failure to abide with the “intendment”, Section 3-B would be invoked and applied, not sub-section(6) to Section 4-B. Section 3-B would apply when a false and wrong certificate or declaration is made. Sub-section (6) on the other hand, deals with cases where the dealer is unable to comply with the intendment, i.e., for some reason he is unable to sell the goods within the State, export them or sell them in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Intendment of the said nature has not been treated as false or wrong declaration as consequences have been prescribed in sub-section (6). It is essential to be stated that consistency and certainty in tax matters is necessary. In cases relating to “Indirect Taxation”, this principle is even more important. Clarity in this regard is a necessity and the interpretative vision should be same.

advocatemmmohan

in Benson vs. State of Kerala – Criminal Appeal No.958 of 2016 (since disposed of on 03.10.2016) and the accompanying appeals, arising from the conviction of the appellant from his prosecution on the offences proved, this Court in the singular facts as involved and having regard to the duration of his incarceration and the remission earned by him, extended the benefit of such discretion and directed that the sentences awarded to him in those cases would run concurrently. It was noticeably recorded that the offences in the cases under scrutiny had been committed on the same day. The benefit of the discretion was accorded to the appellant therein referring as well to the observation in V.K. Bansal (supra) that it is difficult to lay down any straight jacket approach in the matter and that a direction that the subsequent sentence would run concurrently or not, would essentially depend on the nature of the offence or offences and the overall fact situation. Understandably, the appellant was required to serve the default sentence as awarded with the direction that if the fine imposed had not been deposited, the default sentence or sentences would run consecutively.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 988-989 OF 2016 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRL.) NOS.6226-27 OF 2016) SHYAM PAL .…APPELLANT VERSUS DAYAWATI BESOYA & ANR. ….RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T AMITAVA ROY, J. The instant appeals call in question the judgment and order dated… Read More in Benson vs. State of Kerala – Criminal Appeal No.958 of 2016 (since disposed of on 03.10.2016) and the accompanying appeals, arising from the conviction of the appellant from his prosecution on the offences proved, this Court in the singular facts as involved and having regard to the duration of his incarceration and the remission earned by him, extended the benefit of such discretion and directed that the sentences awarded to him in those cases would run concurrently. It was noticeably recorded that the offences in the cases under scrutiny had been committed on the same day. The benefit of the discretion was accorded to the appellant therein referring as well to the observation in V.K. Bansal (supra) that it is difficult to lay down any straight jacket approach in the matter and that a direction that the subsequent sentence would run concurrently or not, would essentially depend on the nature of the offence or offences and the overall fact situation. Understandably, the appellant was required to serve the default sentence as awarded with the direction that if the fine imposed had not been deposited, the default sentence or sentences would run consecutively.

advocatemmmohan

This Court in Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi, 2001 (8) SCC 233 at page 244 upheld the decision of a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court wherein it was decided that the jurisdiction of the High Court to try an election petition is not by way of constituting a special jurisdiction and conferring it upon the High Court. It is an extension of the original jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and decide the election disputes. It is clear from the above judgments of this Court that the inherent power of the High Court is not taken away when the election disputes are adjudicated. Section 53 (2) is a power conferred on the Returning Officer to declare a candidate elected when the number of candidates is equal to the number of seats to be filled. The power of the High Court is not fettered by Section 53 (2). The High Court has taken into consideration an anomalous situation that would arise by a candidate belonging to one party being declared elected after having crossed the floor. We are in agreement with the High Court and we do not intend to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2649 of 2016 SRI MAIREMBAM PRITHVIRAJ @ PRITHVIRAJ SINGH …. Appellant(s) Versus SHRI PUKHREM SHARATCHANDRA SINGH ….Respondent(s) With CIVIL APPEAL No. 2829 of 2016 PUKHREM SHARATCHANDRA SINGH …. Appellant(s) Versus SRI MAIREMBAM PRITHVIRAJ @ PRITHVIRAJ SINGH ….Respondent(s) J U D G M… Read More This Court in Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi, 2001 (8) SCC 233 at page 244 upheld the decision of a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court wherein it was decided that the jurisdiction of the High Court to try an election petition is not by way of constituting a special jurisdiction and conferring it upon the High Court. It is an extension of the original jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and decide the election disputes. It is clear from the above judgments of this Court that the inherent power of the High Court is not taken away when the election disputes are adjudicated. Section 53 (2) is a power conferred on the Returning Officer to declare a candidate elected when the number of candidates is equal to the number of seats to be filled. The power of the High Court is not fettered by Section 53 (2). The High Court has taken into consideration an anomalous situation that would arise by a candidate belonging to one party being declared elected after having crossed the floor. We are in agreement with the High Court and we do not intend to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court.

advocatemmmohan

in Pradeep Sharma vs. Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Dev. Authority & Anr. in Civil Appeal Nos.52- 53 of 2016 in almost identical circumstances directed the continuance of allotment made in favour of allottee subject to his paying the prevalent HUDA rate for the plot of land upon which he had constructed a house in Sector 64 of Faridabad in almost similar circumstances and in connivance with HUDA officials. It is true that the appellant has been a beneficiary of what is and can be said to be a fraudulent allotment yet keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case demolition of the house and restoration of the plot to HUDA may at this stage work rather harshly for him/them. The proper course, therefore, is to allow the allotment to continue subject to the appellant depositing the prevalent price of the plot at the rate of Rs.18,000/- per square meter as indicated above.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10418-10419 OF 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P (C) Nos.30067-30068 of 2013) Pratap Singh Yadav …Appellant Versus Haryana Urban Development Authority & Anr. …Respondents J U D G M E N T T.S. THAKUR, CJI. 1. Leave granted. 2. These appeals call in… Read More in Pradeep Sharma vs. Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Dev. Authority & Anr. in Civil Appeal Nos.52- 53 of 2016 in almost identical circumstances directed the continuance of allotment made in favour of allottee subject to his paying the prevalent HUDA rate for the plot of land upon which he had constructed a house in Sector 64 of Faridabad in almost similar circumstances and in connivance with HUDA officials. It is true that the appellant has been a beneficiary of what is and can be said to be a fraudulent allotment yet keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case demolition of the house and restoration of the plot to HUDA may at this stage work rather harshly for him/them. The proper course, therefore, is to allow the allotment to continue subject to the appellant depositing the prevalent price of the plot at the rate of Rs.18,000/- per square meter as indicated above.

advocatemmmohan

There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph, we have no hesitation in holding, that all the concerned temporary employees, in the present bunch of cases, would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (- at the lowest grade, in the regular pay- scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same post.

“REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 213 OF 2013 State of Punjab & Ors. … Appellants Versus Jagjit Singh & Ors. … Respondents WITH |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10356 OF 2016 |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 236 OF 2013 | |(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL).31676 CC NO. 15616| | |OF 2011)… Read More There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph, we have no hesitation in holding, that all the concerned temporary employees, in the present bunch of cases, would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (- at the lowest grade, in the regular pay- scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same post.

advocatemmmohan

The objective of Sec 5(2) of KGST Act is to assess the sale of branded goods by the brand name holder to the market and the inter se sale between the brand name holders is not intended to be covered by Sec. 5(2) of the KGST Act.= if the sale between the holding company and the subsidiary company, both having the right to use the same brand name, is at realistic price and the marketing company namely, the appellant-Company charged only usual margins in the trade, then there is no scope for ignoring the first sale, particularly, when the first seller was also the holder of the brand name and was free to market the products in the brand name. However, the evidence on record shows that the margin charged by the appellant-Company while making the further sale of product is unusually high. So the inter se sale between the groups of companies under the control of the same family was only to reduce tax liability and was rightly ignored by the assessing officer by levying tax under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act.- tax invoking Section 5(2) of the KGST Act was rightly levied on the appellant-Company for the relevant period as it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant-Company is the brand name holder of “Sansui”.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4283-4284 OF 2013 KAIL Ltd. (Formerly Kitchen Appliances India Ltd.) …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Kerala Represented thrgh. Jt. Commr. (Law) …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T R.K. Agrawal, J. 1) Challenge in the above said appeals is… Read More The objective of Sec 5(2) of KGST Act is to assess the sale of branded goods by the brand name holder to the market and the inter se sale between the brand name holders is not intended to be covered by Sec. 5(2) of the KGST Act.= if the sale between the holding company and the subsidiary company, both having the right to use the same brand name, is at realistic price and the marketing company namely, the appellant-Company charged only usual margins in the trade, then there is no scope for ignoring the first sale, particularly, when the first seller was also the holder of the brand name and was free to market the products in the brand name. However, the evidence on record shows that the margin charged by the appellant-Company while making the further sale of product is unusually high. So the inter se sale between the groups of companies under the control of the same family was only to reduce tax liability and was rightly ignored by the assessing officer by levying tax under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act.- tax invoking Section 5(2) of the KGST Act was rightly levied on the appellant-Company for the relevant period as it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant-Company is the brand name holder of “Sansui”.

advocatemmmohan

whether the action of the Society to cancel the allotment of the plot followed by execution of an Extinguishment Deed was a just action? That will have to be considered keeping in mind the provisions of the Act of 1960 and the Bye-laws of the Society which are binding on the members of the Society. The interplay of the provisions of the Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act and of the Co-operative Laws and the Bye Laws of the Society permitting cancellation of allotment of plot or the membership of the concerned member will have to be considered in appropriate proceedings. Whether the decision of the Society to cancel the allotment of plot made in favour of its member is barred by the law of Limitation Act, is again a matter to be tested in the proceedings before the Cooperative Forum where a dispute has been filed by the appellant, if the appellant pursues that contention.- the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra) was dealing with an express provision, as applicable to the State of Andhra Pradesh and in particular with regard to the registration of an Extinguishment Deed. In absence of such an express provision, in other State legislations, the Registering Officer would be governed by the provisions in the Act of 1908. Going by the said provisions, there is nothing to indicate that the Registering Officer is required to undertake a quasi judicial enquiry regarding the veracity of the factual position stated in the document presented for registration or its legality, if the tenor of the document suggests that it requires to be registered. The validity of such registered document can, indeed, be put in issue before a Court of competent jurisdiction.- the document in question no doubt is termed as an Extinguishment Deed. However, in effect, it is manifestation of the decision of the Society to cancel the allotment of the subject plot given to its member due to non fulfillment of the obligation by the member concerned. The subject document is linked to the decision of the Society to cancel the membership of the allottee of the plot given to him/her by the Housing Society. In other words, it is the decision of the Society, which the Society is entitled to exercise within the frame work of the governing cooperative laws and the Bye-laws which are binding on the members of the Society. The case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra), besides the fact that it was dealing with an express provision contained in the Statutory Rule, namely Rule 26 (k)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Rules 1960, was also not a case of a deed for cancellation of allotment of plot by the Housing Society. But, of a cancellation of the registered sale deed executed between private parties, which was sought to be cancelled unilaterally. Even for the latter reason the exposition in the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra) will have no application to the fact situation of the present case.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6673 OF 2014 Satya Pal Anand ……Appellant Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. …..Respondents J U D G M E N T A.M.KHANWILKAR, J. This appeal has been placed before a three Judges’ Bench in terms of order dated August 25, 2015,… Read More whether the action of the Society to cancel the allotment of the plot followed by execution of an Extinguishment Deed was a just action? That will have to be considered keeping in mind the provisions of the Act of 1960 and the Bye-laws of the Society which are binding on the members of the Society. The interplay of the provisions of the Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act and of the Co-operative Laws and the Bye Laws of the Society permitting cancellation of allotment of plot or the membership of the concerned member will have to be considered in appropriate proceedings. Whether the decision of the Society to cancel the allotment of plot made in favour of its member is barred by the law of Limitation Act, is again a matter to be tested in the proceedings before the Cooperative Forum where a dispute has been filed by the appellant, if the appellant pursues that contention.- the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra) was dealing with an express provision, as applicable to the State of Andhra Pradesh and in particular with regard to the registration of an Extinguishment Deed. In absence of such an express provision, in other State legislations, the Registering Officer would be governed by the provisions in the Act of 1908. Going by the said provisions, there is nothing to indicate that the Registering Officer is required to undertake a quasi judicial enquiry regarding the veracity of the factual position stated in the document presented for registration or its legality, if the tenor of the document suggests that it requires to be registered. The validity of such registered document can, indeed, be put in issue before a Court of competent jurisdiction.- the document in question no doubt is termed as an Extinguishment Deed. However, in effect, it is manifestation of the decision of the Society to cancel the allotment of the subject plot given to its member due to non fulfillment of the obligation by the member concerned. The subject document is linked to the decision of the Society to cancel the membership of the allottee of the plot given to him/her by the Housing Society. In other words, it is the decision of the Society, which the Society is entitled to exercise within the frame work of the governing cooperative laws and the Bye-laws which are binding on the members of the Society. The case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra), besides the fact that it was dealing with an express provision contained in the Statutory Rule, namely Rule 26 (k)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Rules 1960, was also not a case of a deed for cancellation of allotment of plot by the Housing Society. But, of a cancellation of the registered sale deed executed between private parties, which was sought to be cancelled unilaterally. Even for the latter reason the exposition in the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra) will have no application to the fact situation of the present case.

advocatemmmohan

“It is further clarified that in view of the disposal of this Appeal, in the circumstances mentioned above, the Appellant will be liable to pay interest at the prevailing Bank rate (without penal interest) as per Section 8 sub-section (5) of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Protection of Policy Holder Interest) Regulations, 2002. The disposal of this Appeal is without prejudice to other Appeals in which arguments have been closed.”= adjustment of equities between the parties on account of earlier interim order as well as the language used in the order dated 10th December, 2015. The exercise that needs to be undertaken is really one of modification of the order dated 10th December, 2015, necessitated because of obvious omission in supplying the date from which the interest should be calculated. Since the High Court did not grant any relief by way of interest and the petitioners did not challenge the said judgment and order, we find merit in the submission of learned Attorney General that interest will be payable only on or after 4th April, 2008 when this Court imposed certain restrictions on the petitioners’ right to lodge death claims or maturity claims for appropriate amounts. However, since the interim order of this Court has stood in the way of the petitioners from getting its money claims against LIC within due time and the money has remained with the LIC because of interim arrangement enforced by this Court, it will not be proper to reduce the bank rate as ordered already. Accordingly, we modify the last but one paragraph of final order dated 10th December, 2015 passed in Civil Appeal No.8543 of 2009. It shall be so read as to include a clause that the LIC will be liable to pay interest at the prevailing bank rate (without penal interest) from 30 days after the date of death or date of maturity relating to the life insurance policy concerned or from 4th April, 2008, whichever is later. This matter is disposed of accordingly. We hope and trust that the LIC will discharge its liabilities as per this order with promptitude and without any unnecessary delay.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION REVIEW PETITION(C) No.3538 of 2016 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.8543 OF 2009 Dravya Finance Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. …..Petitioners Versus S.K. Roy & Ors. …..Respondents J U D G M E N T Shiva Kirti Singh, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Although this petition… Read More “It is further clarified that in view of the disposal of this Appeal, in the circumstances mentioned above, the Appellant will be liable to pay interest at the prevailing Bank rate (without penal interest) as per Section 8 sub-section (5) of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Protection of Policy Holder Interest) Regulations, 2002. The disposal of this Appeal is without prejudice to other Appeals in which arguments have been closed.”= adjustment of equities between the parties on account of earlier interim order as well as the language used in the order dated 10th December, 2015. The exercise that needs to be undertaken is really one of modification of the order dated 10th December, 2015, necessitated because of obvious omission in supplying the date from which the interest should be calculated. Since the High Court did not grant any relief by way of interest and the petitioners did not challenge the said judgment and order, we find merit in the submission of learned Attorney General that interest will be payable only on or after 4th April, 2008 when this Court imposed certain restrictions on the petitioners’ right to lodge death claims or maturity claims for appropriate amounts. However, since the interim order of this Court has stood in the way of the petitioners from getting its money claims against LIC within due time and the money has remained with the LIC because of interim arrangement enforced by this Court, it will not be proper to reduce the bank rate as ordered already. Accordingly, we modify the last but one paragraph of final order dated 10th December, 2015 passed in Civil Appeal No.8543 of 2009. It shall be so read as to include a clause that the LIC will be liable to pay interest at the prevailing bank rate (without penal interest) from 30 days after the date of death or date of maturity relating to the life insurance policy concerned or from 4th April, 2008, whichever is later. This matter is disposed of accordingly. We hope and trust that the LIC will discharge its liabilities as per this order with promptitude and without any unnecessary delay.

advocatemmmohan