whether the action of the Society to cancel the allotment of the plot followed by execution of an Extinguishment Deed was a just action? That will have to be considered keeping in mind the provisions of the Act of 1960 and the Bye-laws of the Society which are binding on the members of the Society. The interplay of the provisions of the Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act and of the Co-operative Laws and the Bye Laws of the Society permitting cancellation of allotment of plot or the membership of the concerned member will have to be considered in appropriate proceedings. Whether the decision of the Society to cancel the allotment of plot made in favour of its member is barred by the law of Limitation Act, is again a matter to be tested in the proceedings before the Cooperative Forum where a dispute has been filed by the appellant, if the appellant pursues that contention.- the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra) was dealing with an express provision, as applicable to the State of Andhra Pradesh and in particular with regard to the registration of an Extinguishment Deed. In absence of such an express provision, in other State legislations, the Registering Officer would be governed by the provisions in the Act of 1908. Going by the said provisions, there is nothing to indicate that the Registering Officer is required to undertake a quasi judicial enquiry regarding the veracity of the factual position stated in the document presented for registration or its legality, if the tenor of the document suggests that it requires to be registered. The validity of such registered document can, indeed, be put in issue before a Court of competent jurisdiction.- the document in question no doubt is termed as an Extinguishment Deed. However, in effect, it is manifestation of the decision of the Society to cancel the allotment of the subject plot given to its member due to non fulfillment of the obligation by the member concerned. The subject document is linked to the decision of the Society to cancel the membership of the allottee of the plot given to him/her by the Housing Society. In other words, it is the decision of the Society, which the Society is entitled to exercise within the frame work of the governing cooperative laws and the Bye-laws which are binding on the members of the Society. The case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra), besides the fact that it was dealing with an express provision contained in the Statutory Rule, namely Rule 26 (k)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Rules 1960, was also not a case of a deed for cancellation of allotment of plot by the Housing Society. But, of a cancellation of the registered sale deed executed between private parties, which was sought to be cancelled unilaterally. Even for the latter reason the exposition in the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra) will have no application to the fact situation of the present case.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6673 OF 2014 Satya Pal Anand ……Appellant Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. …..Respondents J U D G M E N T A.M.KHANWILKAR, J. This appeal has been placed before a three Judges’ Bench in terms of order dated August 25, 2015,… Read More whether the action of the Society to cancel the allotment of the plot followed by execution of an Extinguishment Deed was a just action? That will have to be considered keeping in mind the provisions of the Act of 1960 and the Bye-laws of the Society which are binding on the members of the Society. The interplay of the provisions of the Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act and of the Co-operative Laws and the Bye Laws of the Society permitting cancellation of allotment of plot or the membership of the concerned member will have to be considered in appropriate proceedings. Whether the decision of the Society to cancel the allotment of plot made in favour of its member is barred by the law of Limitation Act, is again a matter to be tested in the proceedings before the Cooperative Forum where a dispute has been filed by the appellant, if the appellant pursues that contention.- the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra) was dealing with an express provision, as applicable to the State of Andhra Pradesh and in particular with regard to the registration of an Extinguishment Deed. In absence of such an express provision, in other State legislations, the Registering Officer would be governed by the provisions in the Act of 1908. Going by the said provisions, there is nothing to indicate that the Registering Officer is required to undertake a quasi judicial enquiry regarding the veracity of the factual position stated in the document presented for registration or its legality, if the tenor of the document suggests that it requires to be registered. The validity of such registered document can, indeed, be put in issue before a Court of competent jurisdiction.- the document in question no doubt is termed as an Extinguishment Deed. However, in effect, it is manifestation of the decision of the Society to cancel the allotment of the subject plot given to its member due to non fulfillment of the obligation by the member concerned. The subject document is linked to the decision of the Society to cancel the membership of the allottee of the plot given to him/her by the Housing Society. In other words, it is the decision of the Society, which the Society is entitled to exercise within the frame work of the governing cooperative laws and the Bye-laws which are binding on the members of the Society. The case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra), besides the fact that it was dealing with an express provision contained in the Statutory Rule, namely Rule 26 (k)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Rules 1960, was also not a case of a deed for cancellation of allotment of plot by the Housing Society. But, of a cancellation of the registered sale deed executed between private parties, which was sought to be cancelled unilaterally. Even for the latter reason the exposition in the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra) will have no application to the fact situation of the present case.

“It is further clarified that in view of the disposal of this Appeal, in the circumstances mentioned above, the Appellant will be liable to pay interest at the prevailing Bank rate (without penal interest) as per Section 8 sub-section (5) of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Protection of Policy Holder Interest) Regulations, 2002. The disposal of this Appeal is without prejudice to other Appeals in which arguments have been closed.”= adjustment of equities between the parties on account of earlier interim order as well as the language used in the order dated 10th December, 2015. The exercise that needs to be undertaken is really one of modification of the order dated 10th December, 2015, necessitated because of obvious omission in supplying the date from which the interest should be calculated. Since the High Court did not grant any relief by way of interest and the petitioners did not challenge the said judgment and order, we find merit in the submission of learned Attorney General that interest will be payable only on or after 4th April, 2008 when this Court imposed certain restrictions on the petitioners’ right to lodge death claims or maturity claims for appropriate amounts. However, since the interim order of this Court has stood in the way of the petitioners from getting its money claims against LIC within due time and the money has remained with the LIC because of interim arrangement enforced by this Court, it will not be proper to reduce the bank rate as ordered already. Accordingly, we modify the last but one paragraph of final order dated 10th December, 2015 passed in Civil Appeal No.8543 of 2009. It shall be so read as to include a clause that the LIC will be liable to pay interest at the prevailing bank rate (without penal interest) from 30 days after the date of death or date of maturity relating to the life insurance policy concerned or from 4th April, 2008, whichever is later. This matter is disposed of accordingly. We hope and trust that the LIC will discharge its liabilities as per this order with promptitude and without any unnecessary delay.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION REVIEW PETITION(C) No.3538 of 2016 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.8543 OF 2009 Dravya Finance Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. …..Petitioners Versus S.K. Roy & Ors. …..Respondents J U D G M E N T Shiva Kirti Singh, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Although this petition… Read More “It is further clarified that in view of the disposal of this Appeal, in the circumstances mentioned above, the Appellant will be liable to pay interest at the prevailing Bank rate (without penal interest) as per Section 8 sub-section (5) of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Protection of Policy Holder Interest) Regulations, 2002. The disposal of this Appeal is without prejudice to other Appeals in which arguments have been closed.”= adjustment of equities between the parties on account of earlier interim order as well as the language used in the order dated 10th December, 2015. The exercise that needs to be undertaken is really one of modification of the order dated 10th December, 2015, necessitated because of obvious omission in supplying the date from which the interest should be calculated. Since the High Court did not grant any relief by way of interest and the petitioners did not challenge the said judgment and order, we find merit in the submission of learned Attorney General that interest will be payable only on or after 4th April, 2008 when this Court imposed certain restrictions on the petitioners’ right to lodge death claims or maturity claims for appropriate amounts. However, since the interim order of this Court has stood in the way of the petitioners from getting its money claims against LIC within due time and the money has remained with the LIC because of interim arrangement enforced by this Court, it will not be proper to reduce the bank rate as ordered already. Accordingly, we modify the last but one paragraph of final order dated 10th December, 2015 passed in Civil Appeal No.8543 of 2009. It shall be so read as to include a clause that the LIC will be liable to pay interest at the prevailing bank rate (without penal interest) from 30 days after the date of death or date of maturity relating to the life insurance policy concerned or from 4th April, 2008, whichever is later. This matter is disposed of accordingly. We hope and trust that the LIC will discharge its liabilities as per this order with promptitude and without any unnecessary delay.

Order VI rule 16 and Order VII rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for dismissal of the election petition contending that on account of deficiencies in the pleadings no triable issue(s) is disclosed to justify a regular trial of the allegations made. According to the appellant the election petition, in its entirety, had failed to disclose any cause of action whatsoever. Though some relief (details of which need not be noticed) was granted to the appellant by the High Court, three broad categories of allegations contained in the election petition were held to disclose triable issues. Hence a regular trial of the same was ordered by the High Court by the order under challenge. Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed. = Section 123(7) of the R.P. Act, Corrupt practice = The allegation in the Election Petition is that the post to which Jagjit Singh Suchu was transferred from the Punjab State Electricity Board was under the State Government and the assistance received by the returned candidate from the said person is while he was rendering service as Additional Superintending Engineer, namely, while he was performing the duties in the State Government. If that be so, the aforesaid issue also will have to go for a full trial as ordered by the High Court. ; efflux of time=The election took place in the year 2009. The life of the House for which the election took place has long expired. The third allegation is not one with regard to commission of any corrupt practice. Hence by efflux of time the said issue has become academic rendering it unnecessary for us to enter into any discussion on the said question.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.10353 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.14912 of 2011) NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU …APPELLANT VERSUS OM PARKASH SONI & ORS. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T RANJAN GOGOI,J 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellant before this Court is the… Read More Order VI rule 16 and Order VII rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for dismissal of the election petition contending that on account of deficiencies in the pleadings no triable issue(s) is disclosed to justify a regular trial of the allegations made. According to the appellant the election petition, in its entirety, had failed to disclose any cause of action whatsoever. Though some relief (details of which need not be noticed) was granted to the appellant by the High Court, three broad categories of allegations contained in the election petition were held to disclose triable issues. Hence a regular trial of the same was ordered by the High Court by the order under challenge. Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed. = Section 123(7) of the R.P. Act, Corrupt practice = The allegation in the Election Petition is that the post to which Jagjit Singh Suchu was transferred from the Punjab State Electricity Board was under the State Government and the assistance received by the returned candidate from the said person is while he was rendering service as Additional Superintending Engineer, namely, while he was performing the duties in the State Government. If that be so, the aforesaid issue also will have to go for a full trial as ordered by the High Court. ; efflux of time=The election took place in the year 2009. The life of the House for which the election took place has long expired. The third allegation is not one with regard to commission of any corrupt practice. Hence by efflux of time the said issue has become academic rendering it unnecessary for us to enter into any discussion on the said question.

Section 5 of the limitation Act.=delay of (3776) days in filing the aforementioned proposed first appeal suit =the plaintiff at the instance of the villagers had committed that he would not execute the decree.- It is hard to believe that the plaintiff, who had obtained a decree on merits, after a serious and long drawn contest, had made such a commitment. Further, even if any such commitment was said to have been made, still, the Government officer concerned should have approached the Assistant Government Pleader and ought to have obtained his opinion and ought to have got preferred a first appeal and ought to have got the settlement recorded in the said appeal.;The next cause urged for condonation of delay is that the record was misplaced and could not be traced till the execution petition reached an advanced stage of the evidence on the side of the judgment debtors/ Government. The said averment lays bare that even after the execution petition was filed, no sincere efforts were made by the officer and his staff concerned for tracing the file. Therefore, the reasons assigned ex facie appear to be not sufficient and valid reasons for condonation of the long delay of more than (3500) days.

CRP 200 / 2016 CRPSR 15960 / 2015 CASE IS:DISPOSED   PETITIONER RESPONDENT THE MANDAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, KONIJERLA & 3 ORS   VS BODAPOTHULA VENKAIAH & 2 ORS PET.ADV. : GP FOR ARBITRATION (TG) RESP.ADV. : RAMANA SUBJECT: C.P.C. DISTRICT:  KHAMMAM FILING DATE:  13-07-2015 POSTING STAGE :  FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS DISPOSED ON  18-03-2016 DISMISSED REG. DATE    :   13-01-2016 LISTING DATE :  18-03-2016 STATUS   :  CAV HON’BLE JUDGE(S):     M.SEETHARAMA MURTI    THE HON’BLE… Read More Section 5 of the limitation Act.=delay of (3776) days in filing the aforementioned proposed first appeal suit =the plaintiff at the instance of the villagers had committed that he would not execute the decree.- It is hard to believe that the plaintiff, who had obtained a decree on merits, after a serious and long drawn contest, had made such a commitment. Further, even if any such commitment was said to have been made, still, the Government officer concerned should have approached the Assistant Government Pleader and ought to have obtained his opinion and ought to have got preferred a first appeal and ought to have got the settlement recorded in the said appeal.;The next cause urged for condonation of delay is that the record was misplaced and could not be traced till the execution petition reached an advanced stage of the evidence on the side of the judgment debtors/ Government. The said averment lays bare that even after the execution petition was filed, no sincere efforts were made by the officer and his staff concerned for tracing the file. Therefore, the reasons assigned ex facie appear to be not sufficient and valid reasons for condonation of the long delay of more than (3500) days.

“caveatable interest”.= a person establishing prima facie interest in the estate of the testator should be permitted to maintain a caveat and contest a claim for probate. -Caveat. Any person intending to oppose the issuing of a grant of probate or letters of administration must either personally or by his attorney file a caveat in the Registry in Form No.12.= whether the caveator has a caveatable interest – The preliminary issue does not relate to the validity or legality of the Will sought to be probated but only to the issue whether the caveator has an interest for which he can maintain the caveat.- “the Court of Probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the document put forward as the last will and testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accordance with law and whether at the time of such execution the testator had sound disposing mind. The question whether a particular bequest is good or bad is not within the purview of the Probate Court.”- although the caveator Yasheel Jain did not file the original Will, the Division Bench has noted that he has filed a photocopy of the prior Will allegedly executed by the testator and has also produced the registered envelope through which such copy was sent to him by the testator along with the forwarding letter written by him. Upon such materials, the Division Bench recorded its prima facie satisfaction that the caveat should not be discharged. – whether Malati is really a lawful widow of the testator or not cannot be conclusively adjudicated in the probate proceedings and therefore, only a prima facie view was possible to decide whether her caveat should be discharged or not. We find ourselves in agreement with the views taken by the High Court in the impugned judgments. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed but with no order as to costs. 2016 Oct. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=44263

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.473 of 2009 Saroj Agarwalla (Dead) Thr. LR Abhishek Agrawalla …..Appellant Versus Yasheel Jain …..Respondent W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO.474 OF 2009 J U D G M E N T SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J. Both the appeals arise out of same… Read More “caveatable interest”.= a person establishing prima facie interest in the estate of the testator should be permitted to maintain a caveat and contest a claim for probate. -Caveat. Any person intending to oppose the issuing of a grant of probate or letters of administration must either personally or by his attorney file a caveat in the Registry in Form No.12.= whether the caveator has a caveatable interest – The preliminary issue does not relate to the validity or legality of the Will sought to be probated but only to the issue whether the caveator has an interest for which he can maintain the caveat.- “the Court of Probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the document put forward as the last will and testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accordance with law and whether at the time of such execution the testator had sound disposing mind. The question whether a particular bequest is good or bad is not within the purview of the Probate Court.”- although the caveator Yasheel Jain did not file the original Will, the Division Bench has noted that he has filed a photocopy of the prior Will allegedly executed by the testator and has also produced the registered envelope through which such copy was sent to him by the testator along with the forwarding letter written by him. Upon such materials, the Division Bench recorded its prima facie satisfaction that the caveat should not be discharged. – whether Malati is really a lawful widow of the testator or not cannot be conclusively adjudicated in the probate proceedings and therefore, only a prima facie view was possible to decide whether her caveat should be discharged or not. We find ourselves in agreement with the views taken by the High Court in the impugned judgments. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed but with no order as to costs. 2016 Oct. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=44263

whether Rent Act would apply even to the pending suits or it will be enforced only from the date when notification covering the area in-question is issued and, therefore, will have no effect on the suits which are already pending before the civil courts?= 2016 Oct. http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8194 OF 2016 RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. …..APPELLANT(S) VERSUS BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. …..RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T A.K. SIKRI, J. The appellants in this appeal are the landlords who had filed suit for eviction… Read More whether Rent Act would apply even to the pending suits or it will be enforced only from the date when notification covering the area in-question is issued and, therefore, will have no effect on the suits which are already pending before the civil courts?= 2016 Oct. http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp

Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995= there are about 250 large units and about 8000 small scale units in operation. These units produce about 350 bulk drugs, and as we have mentioned above more than 2000 formulations. The Drug Policy, 1994 also mentions that the production of bulk drugs in 1993-94 is in the region of Rs.1320 crores and for the same period the production of formulations is in the region of Rs. 6900 crores. In other words, not only is the drug industry in the country extremely large with heavy financial stakes but there is lot at stake in it not only for the industry but also for the consumers. For this reason, the Courts have to extremely cautious in interfering in any manner whatsoever with the working of the drug industry. Any interference by the Courts would have wide ranging repercussions not only in commercial terms but also for the people of the country.- Whether the notification dated 13th July, 1999 issued by the Central Government under Paragraph 7 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 prescribing the norms for conversion cost, packing charges and process loss of raw materials (other than packing materials in conversion) and packing and process loss of packing materials in packaging was issued mechanically and without any application of mind or is it valid in law? Our answer to this is that the notification is valid and that the notification was not issued mechanically or without any application of mind. Whether the notifications dated 12th July, 2000, 12th July, 2001, 12th July, 2002 and 11th July, 2003 issued by the Central Government under Paragraph 7 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 re-notifying the norms prescribed on 13th July, 1999 were issued mechanically, without any application of mind and without re-determining the norms every year as required by the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 and are they valid in law? Our answer is that the notifications are valid and were not issued mechanically or without any application of mind and that it was not necessary to re-determine the norms every year. Whether various notifications issued by the Central Government fixing the retail price or ceiling price of formulations under Paragraphs 8 and 9 (as the case may be) of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 without determining the norm for cost of packing material as required by Paragraph 7 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 are valid in law? Our answer is in the affirmative. Whether fixing the retail price of a formulation under Paragraph 8 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 without first fixing the sale price of a bulk drug under Paragraph 3 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 utilized in the manufacture of a formulation is valid in law? Our answer is in the affirmative. – 2016 Oct. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=44262

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 329 OF 2005 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .…APPELLANTS VERSUS M/S. CIPLA LTD. & ANR. .…RESPONDENTS WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4005 OF 2004 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ….APPELLANTS VERSUS M/S. MARTIN & HARRIS LABORATORIES LTD. & ANR. ….RESPONDENTS WITH CIVIL APPEAL… Read More Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995= there are about 250 large units and about 8000 small scale units in operation. These units produce about 350 bulk drugs, and as we have mentioned above more than 2000 formulations. The Drug Policy, 1994 also mentions that the production of bulk drugs in 1993-94 is in the region of Rs.1320 crores and for the same period the production of formulations is in the region of Rs. 6900 crores. In other words, not only is the drug industry in the country extremely large with heavy financial stakes but there is lot at stake in it not only for the industry but also for the consumers. For this reason, the Courts have to extremely cautious in interfering in any manner whatsoever with the working of the drug industry. Any interference by the Courts would have wide ranging repercussions not only in commercial terms but also for the people of the country.- Whether the notification dated 13th July, 1999 issued by the Central Government under Paragraph 7 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 prescribing the norms for conversion cost, packing charges and process loss of raw materials (other than packing materials in conversion) and packing and process loss of packing materials in packaging was issued mechanically and without any application of mind or is it valid in law? Our answer to this is that the notification is valid and that the notification was not issued mechanically or without any application of mind. Whether the notifications dated 12th July, 2000, 12th July, 2001, 12th July, 2002 and 11th July, 2003 issued by the Central Government under Paragraph 7 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 re-notifying the norms prescribed on 13th July, 1999 were issued mechanically, without any application of mind and without re-determining the norms every year as required by the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 and are they valid in law? Our answer is that the notifications are valid and were not issued mechanically or without any application of mind and that it was not necessary to re-determine the norms every year. Whether various notifications issued by the Central Government fixing the retail price or ceiling price of formulations under Paragraphs 8 and 9 (as the case may be) of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 without determining the norm for cost of packing material as required by Paragraph 7 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 are valid in law? Our answer is in the affirmative. Whether fixing the retail price of a formulation under Paragraph 8 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 without first fixing the sale price of a bulk drug under Paragraph 3 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 utilized in the manufacture of a formulation is valid in law? Our answer is in the affirmative. – 2016 Oct. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=44262