Month: November 2016

We find the principles laid down in sections 305, 306 and 387 are quite reasonable. Reasonable compensation is payable by the Corporation for building or part thereof excluding the land under proviso to section 305(1) and compensation for inclusion of land in public street is payable under section 306(3) of the Act. We do not find any ground so as to read down the provisions. We refrain to comment upon the submission with respect to the granting additional FAR is not acceptable to some appellants, as it is not the stage of dealing with compensation how the total indemnification is to be made, whether FAR is acceptable to the appellants or not, cannot be decided at this stage. It need not be decided at this stage whether they have a right to leave the FAR and claim monetary compensation alone which is to be adjudged by the concerned authorities within the pale of the provisions contained in sections 305, 306 read with section 387 of the Act of 1956. How the compensation is to be worked out at the appropriate stage, is the outcome of the authorities concerned and the job of the arbitrator/District Court, as the case may be. The appellants are at liberty to raise the question with respect to the adequacy of compensation and how the provision of section 387 has to be interpreted and what would be the just compensation at the appropriate stage of determination of compensation.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11307 OF 2016 [Arising out of SLP [C] No.30998 of 2010] Ravindra Ramchandra Waghmare …. Appellant Vs. Indore Municipal Corporation & Ors. ….Respondents WITH Civil Appeal No. 11308 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP [C] No. 31541/2011), Civil Appeal Nos.11309-11316 of 2016… Read More We find the principles laid down in sections 305, 306 and 387 are quite reasonable. Reasonable compensation is payable by the Corporation for building or part thereof excluding the land under proviso to section 305(1) and compensation for inclusion of land in public street is payable under section 306(3) of the Act. We do not find any ground so as to read down the provisions. We refrain to comment upon the submission with respect to the granting additional FAR is not acceptable to some appellants, as it is not the stage of dealing with compensation how the total indemnification is to be made, whether FAR is acceptable to the appellants or not, cannot be decided at this stage. It need not be decided at this stage whether they have a right to leave the FAR and claim monetary compensation alone which is to be adjudged by the concerned authorities within the pale of the provisions contained in sections 305, 306 read with section 387 of the Act of 1956. How the compensation is to be worked out at the appropriate stage, is the outcome of the authorities concerned and the job of the arbitrator/District Court, as the case may be. The appellants are at liberty to raise the question with respect to the adequacy of compensation and how the provision of section 387 has to be interpreted and what would be the just compensation at the appropriate stage of determination of compensation.

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Both the above suits were clubbed together. Evidence was recorded in Original Suit No.32/1974, whereupon, it was held, that the appellant was a cultivating tenant in respect of the above agricultural land, long prior to the notified date (-17.01.1959), and that, the appellant had occupancy rights over the above land, prior to taking over of the ‘Inam Estates’ by the State Government, under the 1948 Act. And further that, with effect from the notified date – 17.01.1959, the relationship of landlord and tenant, between the erstwhile landowner Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu – respondent no.1, and the ryot stood terminated. And that, the appellant was entitled to a “ryotwari patta” for the suit land. This determination was recorded in Original Suit No.32/74, consequent upon the appellant being able to establish the above position, through the evidence of an “archaka” and a “trustee” (P.W.2 and P.W.3 respectively), of the temple in question. The appellant was also able to demonstrate, that the appellant and his predecessors-in-interest, were cultivating tenants of the suit land, long prior to the notified date – 17.01.1959. It is in the aforesaid view of the matter, that Original Suit No.32/1974 came to be decreed. 11. As against the above, the Estate Officer, Devasthanam, could not establish the execution of the alleged rent deed (kadapa), dated 29.11.1970, in favour of the appellant. And as such, the Devasthanam could not establish the relationship of landlord and tenant, between Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu and the appellant, as alleged. It was therefore, that Suit No.73/1974 was dismissed. The judgment and decree in Original Suit Nos.32/1974 and 73/1974 were passed on 31.10.1977. It is not a matter of dispute between the rival parties, that the aforesaid determination attained finality between the parties.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11306 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.14895 of 2010) Dokiseela Ramulu …….Appellant versus Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu and others …….Respondents J U D G M E N T Jagdish Singh Khehar, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The present controversy admittedly relates to… Read More Both the above suits were clubbed together. Evidence was recorded in Original Suit No.32/1974, whereupon, it was held, that the appellant was a cultivating tenant in respect of the above agricultural land, long prior to the notified date (-17.01.1959), and that, the appellant had occupancy rights over the above land, prior to taking over of the ‘Inam Estates’ by the State Government, under the 1948 Act. And further that, with effect from the notified date – 17.01.1959, the relationship of landlord and tenant, between the erstwhile landowner Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu – respondent no.1, and the ryot stood terminated. And that, the appellant was entitled to a “ryotwari patta” for the suit land. This determination was recorded in Original Suit No.32/74, consequent upon the appellant being able to establish the above position, through the evidence of an “archaka” and a “trustee” (P.W.2 and P.W.3 respectively), of the temple in question. The appellant was also able to demonstrate, that the appellant and his predecessors-in-interest, were cultivating tenants of the suit land, long prior to the notified date – 17.01.1959. It is in the aforesaid view of the matter, that Original Suit No.32/1974 came to be decreed. 11. As against the above, the Estate Officer, Devasthanam, could not establish the execution of the alleged rent deed (kadapa), dated 29.11.1970, in favour of the appellant. And as such, the Devasthanam could not establish the relationship of landlord and tenant, between Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu and the appellant, as alleged. It was therefore, that Suit No.73/1974 was dismissed. The judgment and decree in Original Suit Nos.32/1974 and 73/1974 were passed on 31.10.1977. It is not a matter of dispute between the rival parties, that the aforesaid determination attained finality between the parties.

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The authorities could not and should not have relied upon said enquiry report as basis in fresh enquiry for holding the appellant guilty of the charge and to award punishment of withholding of pension and gratuity. In the circumstances, we do not find that there was sufficient reason for the respondent authorities to exercise the powers under Rule 43 (b) read with Rule 139 of Bihar Pension Rules as neither there was pecuniary loss to the State, nor the present case is of a grave misconduct on the part of the appellant. 13. For the reasons as discussed above, we are inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. Therefore, the appeal is allowed. The orders dated 24.09.1997 and 17.06.1998, passed by the respondent authorities shall stand quashed. No order as to costs.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3829 OF 2011 Bindeshwari Chaudhary … Appellant Versus State of Bihar & Ors. … Respondents J U D G M E N T Prafulla C. Pant, J. This appeal is directed against judgment and order dated 20.05.2008, passed by High Court of Judicature… Read More The authorities could not and should not have relied upon said enquiry report as basis in fresh enquiry for holding the appellant guilty of the charge and to award punishment of withholding of pension and gratuity. In the circumstances, we do not find that there was sufficient reason for the respondent authorities to exercise the powers under Rule 43 (b) read with Rule 139 of Bihar Pension Rules as neither there was pecuniary loss to the State, nor the present case is of a grave misconduct on the part of the appellant. 13. For the reasons as discussed above, we are inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. Therefore, the appeal is allowed. The orders dated 24.09.1997 and 17.06.1998, passed by the respondent authorities shall stand quashed. No order as to costs.

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the recovery of the contraband i.e. Poppy Husk from the conscious possession of the accused persons. That the samples were properly sampled, sealed and forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory through Malkhana also stands established. The certificate of the Chemical Examiner, FSL to the effect that the seal of the samples was found intact and that the same tallied with the specimen seals also rules out the possibility of any tampering therewith. The fact that the contraband was recovered from the car while the same was being driven by one of the accused persons in the company of the other also authenticate the charge of their conscious possession thereof. The haul of six bags of Poppy Husk is substantial so much so that it negates even the remote possibility of the same being planted by the police. Furthermore no evidence with regard to bias or malice against the Investigating Agency has been adduced. (19) In the wake of the above, we are of the unhesitant opinion in the face of the evidence on record, that the prosecution has been able to prove the charge against the accused persons beyond all reasonable doubt. The Courts below have appreciated the materials on record in the correct legal and factual perspectives and the findings recorded do not merit any interference. The appeal is thus dismissed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1096 OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (CRIMINAL) NO.6093 OF 2015) DILBAGH SINGH .…APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF PUNJAB ….RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T AMITAVA ROY, J. (1) Heard Ms. Aparna Jha, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.… Read More the recovery of the contraband i.e. Poppy Husk from the conscious possession of the accused persons. That the samples were properly sampled, sealed and forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory through Malkhana also stands established. The certificate of the Chemical Examiner, FSL to the effect that the seal of the samples was found intact and that the same tallied with the specimen seals also rules out the possibility of any tampering therewith. The fact that the contraband was recovered from the car while the same was being driven by one of the accused persons in the company of the other also authenticate the charge of their conscious possession thereof. The haul of six bags of Poppy Husk is substantial so much so that it negates even the remote possibility of the same being planted by the police. Furthermore no evidence with regard to bias or malice against the Investigating Agency has been adduced. (19) In the wake of the above, we are of the unhesitant opinion in the face of the evidence on record, that the prosecution has been able to prove the charge against the accused persons beyond all reasonable doubt. The Courts below have appreciated the materials on record in the correct legal and factual perspectives and the findings recorded do not merit any interference. The appeal is thus dismissed.

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On a consideration of the totality of the circumstances attendant on the case, we are of the opinion that the conviction of the appellants under Section 304-Part 1 read with Sections 147,148,149 IPC, as recorded by the High Court, is justified. However, in our view, having regard to the singular facts and circumstances, we are inclined to reduce the sentence for the offence under Section 304-Part I/149 IPC to rigorous imprisonment for 7 years. The other sentences are hereby affirmed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPE2LLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1157 OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (CRIMINAL) NO.8415 OF 2016) RAM AUTAR & ORS. .…APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF U.P. ….RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T AMITAVA ROY, J. (1) Leave granted. (2) The appellants hereby assail the affirmation… Read More On a consideration of the totality of the circumstances attendant on the case, we are of the opinion that the conviction of the appellants under Section 304-Part 1 read with Sections 147,148,149 IPC, as recorded by the High Court, is justified. However, in our view, having regard to the singular facts and circumstances, we are inclined to reduce the sentence for the offence under Section 304-Part I/149 IPC to rigorous imprisonment for 7 years. The other sentences are hereby affirmed.

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Rajasthan High Court in R. S. Shekhawat’s case as noted above has permitted the contractor to approach the mining department for refund of the amount which was deducted from the bill in event they successfully prove that minerals used by them were minerals for which royalty was already paid. The aforesaid directions clearly protected the interest of the contractors and we are of the view that the appellant’s interests are amply protected with the aforesaid directions issued by Rajasthan High Court. 42. We, however, deem it appropriate to give liberty to the appellant to approach the mining engineer, Respondent No. 2 by a written representation giving details of amount deducted from its bills or amount withheld along with the details of minerals used by contractors with details of proof to establish that minerals used were minerals for which royalty was paid as per 1986 rules. The Mining Engineer/Assistant Mining Engineer, the Respondent No. 2 may consider the representation and take an appropriate and reasoned decision expeditiously preferably within three months of submission of the representation and, in event it is found that appellant is entitled to refund of any amount, appropriate consequential action may be taken. 43. The Civil Appeal is disposed of with the above directions.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11259 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C)No. 12882 OF 2009) MANBHAR DEVI AGARWAL …….PETITIONER(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS ……RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. Leave Granted. 2. This appeal has been filed against… Read More Rajasthan High Court in R. S. Shekhawat’s case as noted above has permitted the contractor to approach the mining department for refund of the amount which was deducted from the bill in event they successfully prove that minerals used by them were minerals for which royalty was already paid. The aforesaid directions clearly protected the interest of the contractors and we are of the view that the appellant’s interests are amply protected with the aforesaid directions issued by Rajasthan High Court. 42. We, however, deem it appropriate to give liberty to the appellant to approach the mining engineer, Respondent No. 2 by a written representation giving details of amount deducted from its bills or amount withheld along with the details of minerals used by contractors with details of proof to establish that minerals used were minerals for which royalty was paid as per 1986 rules. The Mining Engineer/Assistant Mining Engineer, the Respondent No. 2 may consider the representation and take an appropriate and reasoned decision expeditiously preferably within three months of submission of the representation and, in event it is found that appellant is entitled to refund of any amount, appropriate consequential action may be taken. 43. The Civil Appeal is disposed of with the above directions.

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where acquittal has been made, while entertaining an appeal over an order of acquittal if two views are possible on making proper appreciation of available evidence the view going in favour of accused have to given importance. It is well settled that in case where an order of acquittal has been made on improper and erroneous appreciation of evidence, it is always open to the court of appeal to make proper and reasonable appreciation evidence and differ from the order of acquittal and in such event, it shall never hesitate in reversing the same. Ultimately, the High Court concluded: “…From scanning of the entire prosecution evidence and having regard to submission of the respective parties, we are constrained to hold that the learned trial Court was totally wrong both in law and, in fact, in making its observation that the FIR was antedated and anti timed and a manipulated one. The trial Court also erred in law by discarding the FIR for delay in dispatching the same in the Court of the Magistrate.” 37. We are of the opinion that the findings and conclusion recorded by the High Court are based on the correct appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any error.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 298 OF 2006 ANJAN DASGUPTA …….APPELLANT VERSUS THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. ……RESPONDENT JUDGMENT ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 16.02.2006 of Calcutta High Court, by which judgment, the High Court reversed the… Read More where acquittal has been made, while entertaining an appeal over an order of acquittal if two views are possible on making proper appreciation of available evidence the view going in favour of accused have to given importance. It is well settled that in case where an order of acquittal has been made on improper and erroneous appreciation of evidence, it is always open to the court of appeal to make proper and reasonable appreciation evidence and differ from the order of acquittal and in such event, it shall never hesitate in reversing the same. Ultimately, the High Court concluded: “…From scanning of the entire prosecution evidence and having regard to submission of the respective parties, we are constrained to hold that the learned trial Court was totally wrong both in law and, in fact, in making its observation that the FIR was antedated and anti timed and a manipulated one. The trial Court also erred in law by discarding the FIR for delay in dispatching the same in the Court of the Magistrate.” 37. We are of the opinion that the findings and conclusion recorded by the High Court are based on the correct appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any error.

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The High Court in the judgment under challenge has also taken the view that the impugned sale Notification dated 26.06.2012 is invalid for infraction of Rule 5 and Rule 8(5) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, in as much as the bank did not obtain any valuation report of the property before resorting to the impugned auction sale. The Rules in question read as follows. “5. Valuation of movable secured assets.- After taking possession under sub-rule (1) of rule 4 and in any case before sale, the authorised officer shall obtain the estimated value of the movable secured assets and thereafter, if considered necessary, fix in consultation with the secured creditor, the reserve price of the assets to be sold in realisation of the dues of the secured creditor.” “8. Sale of immovable secured assets.- (5) Before effecting sale of the immovable property referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 9, the authorised officer shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor, fix the reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or any part of such immovable secured asset by any of the following methods: 21. Our attention had been specifically drawn to the stand of the appellant-Bank before the High Court in the counter filed (paragraph 20). Taking into account the averments made in the said affidavit, we find that the sale proclamation had mentioned a reserve price of Rs. 275 lacs and the property had been actually sold by auction at Rs. 416 lacs. That apart, the valuation report dated 14.06.2012 of the approved valuer valuing the property at Rs. 341.15 lacs has also been placed before us by way of an additional document which we are inclined to take on record. The requirements under Rule 5 and Rule 8(5) have, therefore, been complied with and the sale proclamation and the sale effected pursuant thereto cannot be invalidated on the above ground. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order passed by the High Court has to be set aside which we hereby do. The appeals are consequently allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 11247 OF 2016 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.36973 of 2012) UCO BANK AND ANR.                                   APPELLANT(s) VERSUS DIPAK DEBBARMA & ORS.        … Read More The High Court in the judgment under challenge has also taken the view that the impugned sale Notification dated 26.06.2012 is invalid for infraction of Rule 5 and Rule 8(5) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, in as much as the bank did not obtain any valuation report of the property before resorting to the impugned auction sale. The Rules in question read as follows. “5. Valuation of movable secured assets.- After taking possession under sub-rule (1) of rule 4 and in any case before sale, the authorised officer shall obtain the estimated value of the movable secured assets and thereafter, if considered necessary, fix in consultation with the secured creditor, the reserve price of the assets to be sold in realisation of the dues of the secured creditor.” “8. Sale of immovable secured assets.- (5) Before effecting sale of the immovable property referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 9, the authorised officer shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor, fix the reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or any part of such immovable secured asset by any of the following methods: 21. Our attention had been specifically drawn to the stand of the appellant-Bank before the High Court in the counter filed (paragraph 20). Taking into account the averments made in the said affidavit, we find that the sale proclamation had mentioned a reserve price of Rs. 275 lacs and the property had been actually sold by auction at Rs. 416 lacs. That apart, the valuation report dated 14.06.2012 of the approved valuer valuing the property at Rs. 341.15 lacs has also been placed before us by way of an additional document which we are inclined to take on record. The requirements under Rule 5 and Rule 8(5) have, therefore, been complied with and the sale proclamation and the sale effected pursuant thereto cannot be invalidated on the above ground. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order passed by the High Court has to be set aside which we hereby do. The appeals are consequently allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

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Under Section 4(1)(c)(ii) of the Act, the percentage of permanent disability needs to be assessed only by a qualified medical practitioner. There is no case for the respondents that the doctor who issued the disability certificate is not a qualified medical practitioner, as defined under the Act. Thus, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner has passed the order based on the certificate of disability issued by the doctor and which has been duly proved before the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner. Under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-appreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11114-11119 OF 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 6696-6701 of 2015) GOLLA RAJANNA ETC. ETC. … APPELLANT (S) VERSUS THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER AND ANOTHER, ETC. ETC. … RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.: Leave granted. The appellants are… Read More Under Section 4(1)(c)(ii) of the Act, the percentage of permanent disability needs to be assessed only by a qualified medical practitioner. There is no case for the respondents that the doctor who issued the disability certificate is not a qualified medical practitioner, as defined under the Act. Thus, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner has passed the order based on the certificate of disability issued by the doctor and which has been duly proved before the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner. Under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-appreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.

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