The High Court in the judgment under challenge has also taken the view that the impugned sale Notification dated 26.06.2012 is invalid for infraction of Rule 5 and Rule 8(5) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, in as much as the bank did not obtain any valuation report of the property before resorting to the impugned auction sale. The Rules in question read as follows. “5. Valuation of movable secured assets.- After taking possession under sub-rule (1) of rule 4 and in any case before sale, the authorised officer shall obtain the estimated value of the movable secured assets and thereafter, if considered necessary, fix in consultation with the secured creditor, the reserve price of the assets to be sold in realisation of the dues of the secured creditor.” “8. Sale of immovable secured assets.- (5) Before effecting sale of the immovable property referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 9, the authorised officer shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor, fix the reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or any part of such immovable secured asset by any of the following methods: 21. Our attention had been specifically drawn to the stand of the appellant-Bank before the High Court in the counter filed (paragraph 20). Taking into account the averments made in the said affidavit, we find that the sale proclamation had mentioned a reserve price of Rs. 275 lacs and the property had been actually sold by auction at Rs. 416 lacs. That apart, the valuation report dated 14.06.2012 of the approved valuer valuing the property at Rs. 341.15 lacs has also been placed before us by way of an additional document which we are inclined to take on record. The requirements under Rule 5 and Rule 8(5) have, therefore, been complied with and the sale proclamation and the sale effected pursuant thereto cannot be invalidated on the above ground. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order passed by the High Court has to be set aside which we hereby do. The appeals are consequently allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 11247 OF 2016 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.36973 of 2012) UCO BANK AND ANR.                                   APPELLANT(s) VERSUS DIPAK DEBBARMA & ORS.        … Read More The High Court in the judgment under challenge has also taken the view that the impugned sale Notification dated 26.06.2012 is invalid for infraction of Rule 5 and Rule 8(5) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, in as much as the bank did not obtain any valuation report of the property before resorting to the impugned auction sale. The Rules in question read as follows. “5. Valuation of movable secured assets.- After taking possession under sub-rule (1) of rule 4 and in any case before sale, the authorised officer shall obtain the estimated value of the movable secured assets and thereafter, if considered necessary, fix in consultation with the secured creditor, the reserve price of the assets to be sold in realisation of the dues of the secured creditor.” “8. Sale of immovable secured assets.- (5) Before effecting sale of the immovable property referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 9, the authorised officer shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor, fix the reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or any part of such immovable secured asset by any of the following methods: 21. Our attention had been specifically drawn to the stand of the appellant-Bank before the High Court in the counter filed (paragraph 20). Taking into account the averments made in the said affidavit, we find that the sale proclamation had mentioned a reserve price of Rs. 275 lacs and the property had been actually sold by auction at Rs. 416 lacs. That apart, the valuation report dated 14.06.2012 of the approved valuer valuing the property at Rs. 341.15 lacs has also been placed before us by way of an additional document which we are inclined to take on record. The requirements under Rule 5 and Rule 8(5) have, therefore, been complied with and the sale proclamation and the sale effected pursuant thereto cannot be invalidated on the above ground. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order passed by the High Court has to be set aside which we hereby do. The appeals are consequently allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

Under Section 4(1)(c)(ii) of the Act, the percentage of permanent disability needs to be assessed only by a qualified medical practitioner. There is no case for the respondents that the doctor who issued the disability certificate is not a qualified medical practitioner, as defined under the Act. Thus, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner has passed the order based on the certificate of disability issued by the doctor and which has been duly proved before the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner. Under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-appreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11114-11119 OF 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 6696-6701 of 2015) GOLLA RAJANNA ETC. ETC. … APPELLANT (S) VERSUS THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER AND ANOTHER, ETC. ETC. … RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.: Leave granted. The appellants are… Read More Under Section 4(1)(c)(ii) of the Act, the percentage of permanent disability needs to be assessed only by a qualified medical practitioner. There is no case for the respondents that the doctor who issued the disability certificate is not a qualified medical practitioner, as defined under the Act. Thus, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner has passed the order based on the certificate of disability issued by the doctor and which has been duly proved before the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner. Under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-appreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.

The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred in Section 340(1) of the CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution.= (AMARSANG NATHAJI AS HIMSELF AND AS KARTA AND MANAGER Vs. HARDIK HARSHADBHAI PATEL AND ORS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11120   OF 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 13749 of 2016) AMARSANG NATHAJI AS HIMSELF AND AS KARTA AND MANAGER                        …  APPELLANT (S) VERSUS HARDIK HARSHADBHAI PATEL AND OTHERS    … Read More The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred in Section 340(1) of the CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution.= (AMARSANG NATHAJI AS HIMSELF AND AS KARTA AND MANAGER Vs. HARDIK HARSHADBHAI PATEL AND ORS

(1) All proceedings of Disciplinary Authority after submission of the inquiry report dated 29.12.2007 including punishment order dated 25.8.2009 and Appellate order dated 10.12.2009 are set aside. (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall forward the inquiry report as per Rule 15(2) of 1965 Rules. The writ petitioner be allowed 15 days’ time to submit his representation to the inquiry report. (3) After receipt of representation of the writ petitioner to the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority may proceed and take a decision in accordance with Rule 15 of 1965 Rules. (4) The Disciplinary Authority shall complete the proceedings and pass appropriate orders within a period of three months from the date of receipt of representation of the writ petitioner to the inquiry report.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.10913 OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 25742 OF 2015) H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD. …. APPELLANT VERSUS MAHESH DAHIYA …. RESPONDENT JUDGMENT ASHOK BHUSHAN. J Leave granted. 2. This Appeal has been filed by H. P. State Electricity Board, questioning the… Read More (1) All proceedings of Disciplinary Authority after submission of the inquiry report dated 29.12.2007 including punishment order dated 25.8.2009 and Appellate order dated 10.12.2009 are set aside. (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall forward the inquiry report as per Rule 15(2) of 1965 Rules. The writ petitioner be allowed 15 days’ time to submit his representation to the inquiry report. (3) After receipt of representation of the writ petitioner to the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority may proceed and take a decision in accordance with Rule 15 of 1965 Rules. (4) The Disciplinary Authority shall complete the proceedings and pass appropriate orders within a period of three months from the date of receipt of representation of the writ petitioner to the inquiry report.

Section 12 of the Adoption Act, it is crystal clear that the property which had been vested in the widow and three daughters of late Shri Sharnappa Gaded in 1957 would not be disturbed because of adoption of defendant no.1, which had taken place on 9th February, 1971. Thus, Smt. Sharnappa had become absolute owner of 1/4th share and Smt. Nagamma, the mother of the plaintiff had also become an owner of 1/4th share of the property belonging to late Shri Sharnappa Gaded.SAHEB REDDY Vs. SHARANAPPA & ORS.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 901 OF 2014 Saheb Reddy ….Appellant VERSUS Sharanappa and Ors ….Respondents J U D G M E N T ANIL R. DAVE, J. 1. The appellant – original defendant no.1 is aggrieved by the judgment dated 15th December, 2011 of the High… Read More Section 12 of the Adoption Act, it is crystal clear that the property which had been vested in the widow and three daughters of late Shri Sharnappa Gaded in 1957 would not be disturbed because of adoption of defendant no.1, which had taken place on 9th February, 1971. Thus, Smt. Sharnappa had become absolute owner of 1/4th share and Smt. Nagamma, the mother of the plaintiff had also become an owner of 1/4th share of the property belonging to late Shri Sharnappa Gaded.SAHEB REDDY Vs. SHARANAPPA & ORS.

Whether the members of the Managing Committees of co-operative societies (against whom proceedings under Section 107 of the Gujarat Co- operative Societies Act, 1961 are pending) have a right to participate in the election process of an Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee constituted under the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963. VINESHKUMAR MAVJIBHAI PARMAR Vs. DETHALI GOPALAK VIVIDH KARYAKARI SAHAKARI MANDALI LTD. AND ORS.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s).3888 OF 2015 VINESHKUMAR MAVJIBHAI PARMAR …Appellant(s) VERSUS DETHALI GOPALAK VIVIDH KARYAKARI SAHAKARI MANDALI LTD. AND ORS. …Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3889 OF 2015 CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3890 OF 2015 CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3891 OF 2015 CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3892 OF 2015… Read More Whether the members of the Managing Committees of co-operative societies (against whom proceedings under Section 107 of the Gujarat Co- operative Societies Act, 1961 are pending) have a right to participate in the election process of an Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee constituted under the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963. VINESHKUMAR MAVJIBHAI PARMAR Vs. DETHALI GOPALAK VIVIDH KARYAKARI SAHAKARI MANDALI LTD. AND ORS.

The suit is filed only on invocation of the Corporate Guarantee which on its terms is unconditional.IDBI TRUSTEESHIP SERVICES LTD. Vs. HUBTOWN LTD.-

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO._10860_ of 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.31439 OF 2015) IDBI TRUSTEESHIP SERVICES LTD. …APPELLANT VERSUS HUBTOWN LTD. …RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T R.F. Nariman, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The present appeal arises out of a Summons… Read More The suit is filed only on invocation of the Corporate Guarantee which on its terms is unconditional.IDBI TRUSTEESHIP SERVICES LTD. Vs. HUBTOWN LTD.-