Section 149 of IPC. – common object of the unlawful assembly= It is trite law that the common object of the unlawful assembly has to be inferred from the membership, the weapons used and the nature of the injuries as well as other surrounding circumstances. Intention of members of unlawful assembly can be gathered by nature, number and location of injuries inflicted. In the instant case, repeated gun shots fired by Ram Chandra Sah on the person of deceased Ram Udgar Sah, and the injuries caused by lathis by other accused persons on the complainant and his second brother on their heads, clearly demonstrate the objective to cause murder of these persons. We, thus, do not find merit in this appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1143 OF 2010 |GANGA RAM SAH & ORS. |.....APPELLANT(S) | |VERSUS | | |STATE OF BIHAR |.....RESPONDENT(S)…

in Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16 : “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.” There is no dispute from the aforesaid proposition. However, in the instant case reasons have been mentioned in the rejection order and the nature of reports has also been sufficiently explained. Thus the rejection of seven different bids in the auction reflects that there was due application of mind by the concerned authority and rejection could not be said to be illegal, arbitrary or sans of reason.- Plaintiff came to the court for mandatory injunction, for issuance of allotment letter without payment of court fee also. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to pay the ad valorem court fee as prevailing and the valuation of the suit should not have been less than the bid amount of Rs.111.75 crores, as rightly held by the first appellate court. The plaintiff is directed to pay the ad valorem court fee not only before the trial court but also before the High Court. Plaintiff is directed to deposit the court fee within two months from today, as payable. 35. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the first appellate court is restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we impose costs of Rs.5 lakhs on the plaintiff/respondent to be deposited as : Rs.2.5 lakhs in the Advocates’ Welfare Fund and Rs.2.5 lakhs in the Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Fund within a period of two months from today.

ITEM NO.1A               COURT NO.9               SECTION IVB S U P R E M E  C O U…

Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code. As held by this Court in Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh and others[2], at paragraph-52: “52. The High Court, in our considered opinion, stepped into prohibited area of considering correctness of allegations and evidence in support of averments by entering into the merits of the case which would be permissible only at the stage of trial of the election petition and not at the stage of consideration whether the election petition was maintainable and dismissed the petition. The said action, therefore, cannot be upheld and the order deserves to be set aside.” As we have been taken through the averments in the election petition and we are satisfied that the petition has disclosed a cause of action, it is not necessary to remit the petition for a fresh enquiry in that regard. The appeal is however allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the election petition is remitted to the High Court to try it on merits expeditiously, and being one filed in the year 2013, preferably within a period of four months.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4080 OF 2014 KULDEEP SINGH PATHANIA … APPELLANTS (S) VERSUS BIKRAM SINGH JARYAL … RESPONDENT(S) J U…

in NTR University of Health Sciences, Vijaywada versus G. Babu Rajendra Prasad and Another (2003) 5 SCC 350 has held that how and in what manner reservation is granted, should be made a policy matter of decision for State. Such a policy decision normally would not be challenged. Following has been stated in Para 13 of the said judgment: “Article 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India provide for enabling provisions. By reason thereof the State would be entitled to either adopt a policy decision or make laws providing for reservations. How and in what manner the reservations should be made is a matter of policy decision of the State. Such a policy decision normally would not be open to challenge subject to its passing the test of reasonableness as also the requirements of the Presidential Order made in terms of Article 371-D of the Constitution of India.”

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION C.A. NO. 858 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 21587 OF 2013) UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ……..Petitioners…

in NTR University of Health Sciences, Vijaywada versus G. Babu Rajendra Prasad and Another (2003) 5 SCC 350 has held that how and in what manner reservation is granted, should be made a policy matter of decision for State. Such a policy decision normally would not be challenged. Following has been stated in Para 13 of the said judgment: “Article 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India provide for enabling provisions. By reason thereof the State would be entitled to either adopt a policy decision or make laws providing for reservations. How and in what manner the reservations should be made is a matter of policy decision of the State. Such a policy decision normally would not be open to challenge subject to its passing the test of reasonableness as also the requirements of the Presidential Order made in terms of Article 371-D of the Constitution of India.”

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION C.A. NO. 858 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 21587 OF 2013) UNION OF INDIA & ORS.  …

When we find that under one head, reasonable amount has been awarded and under another head, nothing has been awarded though it should have been so awarded and at the same time, we notice that eventual figure of the award of compensation payable to the claimants appears to be just and reasonable then in such eventuality, we do not consider it proper to interfere in such award in our appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. In other words, if by applying the tests and guidelines, we find that overall award of compensation is just and fair, then, in our view, such award deserves to be upheld in claimants’ favour. We find it to be so in the facts of this case having taken note of all relevant facts and circumstances of the case.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.3862 OF 2013 D.M., Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.  ……Appellant(s) VERSUS Swapna Nayak & Ors.        …

A.P. Fire Subordinate Service Rules and A.P. State and Subordinate Service Rules. In our view, these Rules do not empower the State to make the classification as was sought be done by the State for determining the inter se seniority of SFOs in this case. 31) In our opinion, taking into account the three undisputed facts mentioned above and the Rules governing the probation and the seniority, there was neither any justifiable basis for creation of such classification nor it satisfied the requirement of the Rules which governed determination of their inter se seniority. In other words, firstly, when the respondents successfully cleared their probation, secondly, when the respondents cleared two tests, thirdly, when the Government itself exempted the respondents from appearing in the third test, and lastly, when the Rules did not provide for creation of two classes between the employees working in one Cadre (SFO), then in our view, there was no justification on the part of the Government to have issued G.O. dated 22.05.2012 for determination of inter se seniority by making classification. 32) Our view also finds support from the view recently taken by this bench in the judgment rendered in Civil Appeal No.9856-9860 of 2016 R. Venkata Ramudu and Another Etc. vs. State of A.P. & Ors. decided on 27.09.2016.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 795 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.35697/2013) S. Sreedhar Reddy & Ors. …….Appellant(s) VERSUS Government…

the validity of admission granted to the petitioner by respondent No.3 (C.M. Medical College & Hospital – for short the College) to the MBBS course. In our opinion, the admission granted by the College to the petitioner was unjustified and therefore his admission is set aside.= The question before this Court is not who is to be blamed for the present state of affairs – whether it is the students or the College or the State of Chhattisgarh. The question is really whether the rule of law should prevail or not. In our opinion, the answer is unambiguously in the affirmative. The College and the State of Chhattisgarh have not adhered to the law with the result that the petitioner became a victim of circumstances giving him a cause of action to proceed against the College and the State of Chhattisgarh being a victim of their maladministration. The plight of the petitioner is unfortunate but it cannot be helped.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 677 OF 2016 Rishabh Choudhary .….Petitioner versus Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents WITH WRIT PETITION…

As against the case of total exclusion and absolute deprivation of a chance to be considered as in the case of Deepak Agarwal (supra), in the instant case certain additional posts have been included in the feeder cadre, thereby expanding the zone of consideration. It is not as if the writ petitioners or similarly situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now had to compete with some more candidates. In any case, since there was no accrued right nor was there any mandate that vacancies must be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arose, the State was well within its rights to stipulate that the vacancies be filled in accordance with the Rules as amended. Secondly, the process to amend the Rules had also begun well before the Notification dated 24.11.2011. In our view, the instant case is fully covered by the law laid down by this Court in Deepak Agrawal (supra) and the High Court was completely in error in allowing the writ petition and in dismissing the writ appeals.

Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 691-693 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) Nos. 21462-64 OF 2013) State of Tripura & Ors.…