A.P. Fire Subordinate Service Rules and A.P. State and Subordinate Service Rules. In our view, these Rules do not empower the State to make the classification as was sought be done by the State for determining the inter se seniority of SFOs in this case. 31) In our opinion, taking into account the three undisputed facts mentioned above and the Rules governing the probation and the seniority, there was neither any justifiable basis for creation of such classification nor it satisfied the requirement of the Rules which governed determination of their inter se seniority. In other words, firstly, when the respondents successfully cleared their probation, secondly, when the respondents cleared two tests, thirdly, when the Government itself exempted the respondents from appearing in the third test, and lastly, when the Rules did not provide for creation of two classes between the employees working in one Cadre (SFO), then in our view, there was no justification on the part of the Government to have issued G.O. dated 22.05.2012 for determination of inter se seniority by making classification. 32) Our view also finds support from the view recently taken by this bench in the judgment rendered in Civil Appeal No.9856-9860 of 2016 R. Venkata Ramudu and Another Etc. vs. State of A.P. & Ors. decided on 27.09.2016.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 795 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.35697/2013) S. Sreedhar Reddy & Ors. …….Appellant(s) VERSUS Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. ……Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. 796 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.36680/2013) K. Madhusudhan Rao & Ors. …….Appellant(s)… Read More A.P. Fire Subordinate Service Rules and A.P. State and Subordinate Service Rules. In our view, these Rules do not empower the State to make the classification as was sought be done by the State for determining the inter se seniority of SFOs in this case. 31) In our opinion, taking into account the three undisputed facts mentioned above and the Rules governing the probation and the seniority, there was neither any justifiable basis for creation of such classification nor it satisfied the requirement of the Rules which governed determination of their inter se seniority. In other words, firstly, when the respondents successfully cleared their probation, secondly, when the respondents cleared two tests, thirdly, when the Government itself exempted the respondents from appearing in the third test, and lastly, when the Rules did not provide for creation of two classes between the employees working in one Cadre (SFO), then in our view, there was no justification on the part of the Government to have issued G.O. dated 22.05.2012 for determination of inter se seniority by making classification. 32) Our view also finds support from the view recently taken by this bench in the judgment rendered in Civil Appeal No.9856-9860 of 2016 R. Venkata Ramudu and Another Etc. vs. State of A.P. & Ors. decided on 27.09.2016.

the validity of admission granted to the petitioner by respondent No.3 (C.M. Medical College & Hospital – for short the College) to the MBBS course. In our opinion, the admission granted by the College to the petitioner was unjustified and therefore his admission is set aside.= The question before this Court is not who is to be blamed for the present state of affairs – whether it is the students or the College or the State of Chhattisgarh. The question is really whether the rule of law should prevail or not. In our opinion, the answer is unambiguously in the affirmative. The College and the State of Chhattisgarh have not adhered to the law with the result that the petitioner became a victim of circumstances giving him a cause of action to proceed against the College and the State of Chhattisgarh being a victim of their maladministration. The plight of the petitioner is unfortunate but it cannot be helped.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 677 OF 2016 Rishabh Choudhary .….Petitioner versus Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents WITH WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 862 OF 2016 Sandeep Kumar & Anr. ….Petitioners versus State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. ….Respondents J U D G M E N T… Read More the validity of admission granted to the petitioner by respondent No.3 (C.M. Medical College & Hospital – for short the College) to the MBBS course. In our opinion, the admission granted by the College to the petitioner was unjustified and therefore his admission is set aside.= The question before this Court is not who is to be blamed for the present state of affairs – whether it is the students or the College or the State of Chhattisgarh. The question is really whether the rule of law should prevail or not. In our opinion, the answer is unambiguously in the affirmative. The College and the State of Chhattisgarh have not adhered to the law with the result that the petitioner became a victim of circumstances giving him a cause of action to proceed against the College and the State of Chhattisgarh being a victim of their maladministration. The plight of the petitioner is unfortunate but it cannot be helped.

As against the case of total exclusion and absolute deprivation of a chance to be considered as in the case of Deepak Agarwal (supra), in the instant case certain additional posts have been included in the feeder cadre, thereby expanding the zone of consideration. It is not as if the writ petitioners or similarly situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now had to compete with some more candidates. In any case, since there was no accrued right nor was there any mandate that vacancies must be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arose, the State was well within its rights to stipulate that the vacancies be filled in accordance with the Rules as amended. Secondly, the process to amend the Rules had also begun well before the Notification dated 24.11.2011. In our view, the instant case is fully covered by the law laid down by this Court in Deepak Agrawal (supra) and the High Court was completely in error in allowing the writ petition and in dismissing the writ appeals.

Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 691-693 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) Nos. 21462-64 OF 2013) State of Tripura & Ors. ….Appellants Versus Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty & Ors. …. Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 694-698 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) Nos. 21465-69 OF 2013)… Read More As against the case of total exclusion and absolute deprivation of a chance to be considered as in the case of Deepak Agarwal (supra), in the instant case certain additional posts have been included in the feeder cadre, thereby expanding the zone of consideration. It is not as if the writ petitioners or similarly situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now had to compete with some more candidates. In any case, since there was no accrued right nor was there any mandate that vacancies must be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arose, the State was well within its rights to stipulate that the vacancies be filled in accordance with the Rules as amended. Secondly, the process to amend the Rules had also begun well before the Notification dated 24.11.2011. In our view, the instant case is fully covered by the law laid down by this Court in Deepak Agrawal (supra) and the High Court was completely in error in allowing the writ petition and in dismissing the writ appeals.

It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the “rule in force” on the date the consideration took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiah case lays down any particular time-frame, within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appellants has been taken away by the amendment.”

Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 691-693 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) Nos. 21462-64 OF 2013) State of Tripura & Ors. ….Appellants Versus Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty & Ors. …. Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 694-698 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) Nos. 21465-69 OF 2013)… Read More It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the “rule in force” on the date the consideration took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiah case lays down any particular time-frame, within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appellants has been taken away by the amendment.”

the last seen theory built up on the evidence of P.W.5 and P.W.7 leaves a significant margin of time during which the crime could have been committed by somebody other than the accused. The said fact must go to the benefit of the accused. In this regard, it may be recollected that P.W.5 and P.W.7 have deposed that they had last seen the accused person in the early morning of the date of the occurrence i.e. 12.09.1991 and that they were going away to some other place. Even if the evidence of P.W.12 is to be accepted, all it can be said is that the evidence of the said witness read with the evidence of P.W.5 and P.W.7 disclose that the accused persons were seen in the vicinity of the neighbourhood of the crime little before the same was committed. By itself, the said circumstance cannot lead to any conclusion consistent with the guilt of the accused. 12. The above circumstance, if coupled with the recovery of the ornaments of the deceased from the possession of the accused, at best, create a highly suspicious situation; but beyond a strong suspicion nothing else would follow in the absence of any other circumstance(s) which could suggest the involvement of the accused in the offence/offences alleged. Even with the aid of the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the charge of murder cannot be brought home unless there is some evidence to show that the robbery and the murder occurred at the same time i.e. in the course of the same transaction. No such evidence is forthcoming. 13. In view of what has been found above, we do not see as to how the charge against the accused/appellant under Section 302 IPC can be held to be proved. The learned trial court as well as the High Court, therefore, seems to be erred in holding the accused guilty for the said offence. However, on the basis of the presumption permissible under Illustration (a) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, it has to be held that the conviction of the accused appellant under Section 392 IPC is well founded.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1460 OF 2011 RAJ KUMAR @ RAJU …APPELLANT VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) …RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T RANJAN GOGOI, J. 1. The accused appellant had been convicted by the learned trial Court for the offence punishable under Section… Read More the last seen theory built up on the evidence of P.W.5 and P.W.7 leaves a significant margin of time during which the crime could have been committed by somebody other than the accused. The said fact must go to the benefit of the accused. In this regard, it may be recollected that P.W.5 and P.W.7 have deposed that they had last seen the accused person in the early morning of the date of the occurrence i.e. 12.09.1991 and that they were going away to some other place. Even if the evidence of P.W.12 is to be accepted, all it can be said is that the evidence of the said witness read with the evidence of P.W.5 and P.W.7 disclose that the accused persons were seen in the vicinity of the neighbourhood of the crime little before the same was committed. By itself, the said circumstance cannot lead to any conclusion consistent with the guilt of the accused. 12. The above circumstance, if coupled with the recovery of the ornaments of the deceased from the possession of the accused, at best, create a highly suspicious situation; but beyond a strong suspicion nothing else would follow in the absence of any other circumstance(s) which could suggest the involvement of the accused in the offence/offences alleged. Even with the aid of the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the charge of murder cannot be brought home unless there is some evidence to show that the robbery and the murder occurred at the same time i.e. in the course of the same transaction. No such evidence is forthcoming. 13. In view of what has been found above, we do not see as to how the charge against the accused/appellant under Section 302 IPC can be held to be proved. The learned trial court as well as the High Court, therefore, seems to be erred in holding the accused guilty for the said offence. However, on the basis of the presumption permissible under Illustration (a) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, it has to be held that the conviction of the accused appellant under Section 392 IPC is well founded.

The sale/purchase price has to be adjudged on a combined consideration of the tax invoice or bill of sale as the case may be along with the accounts reflecting the trade discount and the actual price paid. The first proviso has thus to be so read down, as above, to be in consonance with the true intendment of the legislature and to achieve as well the avowed objective of correct determination of the taxable turnover. The contrary interpretation accorded by the High Court being in defiance of logic and the established axioms of interpretation of statutes is thus unacceptable and is negated. The appeals are thus allowed in the above terms. No costs.

[REPORTABLE] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10955-10971 OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos.28309-28325/2013) M/S. SOUTHERN MOTORS .…APPELLANT Versus STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT WITH Civil Appeal Nos. 10972-10978 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 27752-27758 of 2014) J U D G M… Read More The sale/purchase price has to be adjudged on a combined consideration of the tax invoice or bill of sale as the case may be along with the accounts reflecting the trade discount and the actual price paid. The first proviso has thus to be so read down, as above, to be in consonance with the true intendment of the legislature and to achieve as well the avowed objective of correct determination of the taxable turnover. The contrary interpretation accorded by the High Court being in defiance of logic and the established axioms of interpretation of statutes is thus unacceptable and is negated. The appeals are thus allowed in the above terms. No costs.

“245H (1A) An immunity granted to a person under sub-section (1) shall stand withdrawn if such person fails to pay any sum specified in the order of settlement passed under sub-section (4) of Section 245D within the time specified in such order or within such further time as may be allowed by the Settlement Commission, or fails to comply with any other condition subject to which the immunity was granted and thereupon the provisions of this Act shall apply as if such immunity had not been granted.”

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 418 OF 2017 (ARISING FROM SLP(C) NO. 5366/2016) SANDEEP SINGH APPELLANT(S) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J. Leave granted. 2. The surviving grievance is only with regard to the immunity from… Read More “245H (1A) An immunity granted to a person under sub-section (1) shall stand withdrawn if such person fails to pay any sum specified in the order of settlement passed under sub-section (4) of Section 245D within the time specified in such order or within such further time as may be allowed by the Settlement Commission, or fails to comply with any other condition subject to which the immunity was granted and thereupon the provisions of this Act shall apply as if such immunity had not been granted.”