REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 1587-1636 OF 2017 SATISH KUMAR GUPTA ETC. ETC. …APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. ETC. …RESPONDENTS WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs.1637 OF 2017, 1638-1653 OF 2017, 1655-1658 OF 2017, 1659- 1663 OF 2017, 1664 OF 2017, 1665-1669 OF 2017, 1670-1675 OF 2017,… Read More whether a post-acquisition allottee of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act). If not, whether the impugned order permitting additional evidence and directing remand is sustainable.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 3048 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.27887/2010) Sk. Bhikan S/o Sk. Noor Mohd. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Mehamoodabee w/o Sk. Afzal & Ors. … Read More When the Court is called upon to interpret the documents and examine its effect, it involves questions of law. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the High Court to decide such questions on merits. = whether the suit property is self-acquired property of late Sk. Noor Mohammad and, if so, whether respondent No.1 was entitled to inherit the same as his legal representative in accordance with the shares defined in the Mohammedan Law and secondly, whether the suit property is self-acquired property of the appellant (defendant No.1) on the strength of documents filed by him and, if so, whether it has resulted in excluding respondent No.1 to claim any share in such property as an heir of Sk. Noor Mohammad, was required to be decided by framing substantial questions of law in the light of proved documents filed by defendant No.1 because it was his case that the suit property was his self-acquired property. The High Court unfortunately did not examine any document for deciding the ownership issue in relation to the suit property.
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3007-3008 OF 2017 [Arising out of SLP [C] Nos. 1483-1484 of 2015] Prabhakara Adiga … Appellant Vs. Gowri & Ors. … Read More executability of decree for permanent injunction against the legal representatives of judgment- debtor. = Resultantly, we allow the appeals, set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and hold that the direction issued by the executing court that an undertaking be furnished by the legal representatives to abide by the decree is proper, failing which the executing court would proceed in a permissible mode in accordance with law to enforce the decree under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32 CPC.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex, Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai – 600 018 ORA/82/2014/TM/CH TUESDAY THIS THE 1 st DAY OF MARCH, 2016. Hon’ble Shri Justice K.N. Basha …Chairman Hon’ble Shri Sanjeev Kumar Chaswal …Technical Member(Trademarks) M/s AKAR Enterprises, at No.63, 2nd Main Road, Bangalore-560 002. … Applicant (Represented by… Read More The case of the applicant is that they are carrying on business in manufacture and sale of salt since the year 1976 in the name and style as “AKAR Enterprises”. The trade mark “AKAR” with a particular artistic work, 2 design and get up and fonts for marketing of salt adopted by the applicant and has become distinctive on the ground of long and continuous use and acquired reputation and goodwill. The applicant had obtained the registration of the trade mark “AKAR” under No.556425 and 556426 in class 30. =there is enormous delay of 10 years in filing their present application in spite of knowing very well that the first respondent is continuously using the impugned trade mark “AKASH” right from the year 1999 and even as per their admission to the effect that they came to know about it from 14/03/2009 but they have not raised their little finger to file the present application and to take any action. It is seen that even the Civil Suit was filed only in the year 2009 in OS No.4431/2009 on the file of Additional City Civil Court, Bengaluru and the present application is filed only after nine years. It is pertinent to note that both the applicant and first respondent are having their business place in Bengaluru and also in the same area at New Tharagupet and such being the position it is unimaginable to state that the applicant came to know the use of impugned trade mark only in the year 2009. Considering all these aspects we are of the firm view that the first respondent is entitled to invoke the provision under section 33 in respect of the effect of acquiescence though the learned counsel for the applicant took pain to contend the present facts would not make out the case of acquiescence. In view of the above said reasons we are unable to countenance such contention. In view of the aforesaid reasons the ORA/82/2014/TM/CH is hereby dismissed.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex, Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai – 600 018 ORA/31/2015/PT/CH FRIDAY THIS THE 11TH DAY OF MARCH, 2016 Hon’ble Shri Justice K.N. Basha … Chairman Hon’ble Shri D.P.S. Parmar …Technical Member (Patents) M/S MYLAN LABORATORIES LTD., REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY MR. SANDEEP K. RATHOD, PLOT NO.34-A,… Read More “Revocation of the patent is sought on the grounds of lack of novelty, obviousness and insufficiency. The patentees have not filed a Counterstatement, and by their Agenmts’ letter dated 5 March 1981 indicated that they do not intend to contest the application and furthermore propose to allow the patent to lapse by non-payment of the renewal fee due on 27 July, 1981. Subsequently, the patentees have formally offered to surrender their patent, and no opposition to the surrender has been entered. Under the provisions of Section 29 of the Patents Act, 1977, the acceptance by the Comproller of an offer to surrender a patent does not result in the automatic termination of any revocation proceedings that may be in being, although it is clear that the rights existing prior to the date of acceptance of the offer are considerably impaired by the surrender. In the present case, it is manifest that the revocation is to be treated as undefended and accordingly, in dealing with the issues raised, I must assume that the truth of every statement made by the applicants in their statement of cases has been conceded, unless it is contradicted by facts elsewhere in the documents filed. Having reviewed the matter, I am satisfied that the applicants’ case at least in respect of prior publication and obviousness is of undoubted substance, and since in the circumstances the question of amendment does not arise, I therefore direct that the patent be revoked. It follows that no further action is necessary in relation to the offer to surrender the patent.” -Consequently the Controller of Patents, Patent Office, Chennai is directed to remove the impugned patent standing in the name of the first respondent “ICOS Corporation” under patent No.224314 within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the order copy of this Bench. Consequently the surrender proceedings pending before the Controller of Patents becomes infructuous
Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.483 of 2013 JAGMAL & ORS. …. Appellant(s) Versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T L. NAGESWARA RAO, J. By a judgment dated 06.01.2006 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Neem- Ka-Thana, District Sikar, the Appellants were convicted… Read More Right of Private Defence = there is substance in the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants regarding the right to private defence for the following reasons: It is recorded in the judgment of the High Court that the Public Prosecutor argued that the deceased was beaten outside the house which was corroborated by the site plan. The Investigating Officer stated in his evidence that there was a cross case lodged by Lal Chand in which a charge-sheet under Section 323, 324, 326 and 34 IPC was filed against Bahadur Mal and Vijay Singh @ Vijendra. The injury reports of the accused persons Exh.D-18, D-19 and D-21 were filed. Suggestions were made to prosecution witnesses Gita, Ram Chandra, Patasi and Bihari about the complainant party being aggressors. 7. In view of the above facts and circumstances, we hold that the conviction of the Appellants under Section 302 is unsustainable. However, we are convinced that the accused are guilty of causing the death of Virendra and they are liable for conviction for an offence punishable under Section 304 Part-I IPC. As we are informed that the Appellants have served a sentence of nearly 11 ½ years, we sentence them to the period already undergone. They may be set free, if they are not required in any other case
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 717 OF 2013 |JITENDER ARORA & ORS. |…..APPELLANT(S) | |VERSUS | | |SUKRITI ARORA & ORS. |…..RESPONDENT(S) | J U D G M E N T A.K. SIKRI, J. Marriage between appellant No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘appellant’) and… Read More Child Custody – whether she could shift to India, even temporarily for a year or so, as in that eventuality, the Court can consider giving custody of Vaishali to her for that period. However, she expressed her inability to do so. She wants custody of Vaishali on her own terms. She wants Vaishali to come to U.K. and live with her. Vaishali does not want to go to U.K. at all. This Court cannot take the risk of sending Vaishali to a foreign country, against the wishes of a mature girl like Vaishali, as it may prove to be a turbulent and tormenting experience for her. That would not be in her interest. We also had interaction with Vaishali in the Chambers earlier. On the date of hearing also, Vaishali was present in the Court and in front of her parents, she unequivocally expressed that she was happy with her father and wanted to continue in his company and did not want to go with her mother, much less to U.K. From the interaction, it is clearly discernible that she is a mature girl who is in a position to weigh the pros and cons of two alternatives and to decide as to which course of action is more suited to her. She has developed her personality and formed her opinion after considering all the attendant circumstances. Her intellectual characteristics are adequately developed. She is able to solve problems, think about her future and understands the long term effects of the decision which she has taken. We also find that she has been brought up in a conducive atmosphere. It, thus, becomes apparent that in the instant case, we are dealing with the custody of a child who is 15 years of age and has achieved sufficient level of maturity. Further, in spite of giving ample chances to the respondent by giving temporary custody of Vaishali to her, respondent has not been able to win over the confidence of Vaishali. We, therefore, feel that her welfare lies in the continued company of her father which appears to be in her best interest. The High Court in the impugned judgment had stated that since Vaishali was a minor girl, she needed company of her mother more to understand girly things. The High Court mentioned about the bond between girl child and mother in abstract and from there only the High Court came to the conclusion that it would be better to give the custody to the mother. The High Court did not go into the specific situation and circumstances of this case and did not make any objective assessment about the welfare of Vaishali. Many circumstances which we have narrated above were not taken note of. On the facts of the present case, we are convinced that custody of the child needs to be with father. She is already 15 years of age and within 3 years, she would be major and all this custody battle between her parents would come to an end. She would have complete freedom to decide the course of action she would like to adopt in her life. We, thus, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1398-1399 OF 2011 MEHMOODA GULSHAN … APPELLANTS (S) VERSUS JAVAID HUSSAIN MUNGLOO … RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.: Whether the requirement of the landlord for own occupation could also mean occupation by a member of the… Read More Whether the requirement of the landlord for own occupation could also mean occupation by a member of the family, in this case, the son, is the short question arising for consideration.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3962 OF 2016 |VIVEK SINGH |…..APPELLANT(S) | |VERSUS | | |ROMANI SINGH |…..RESPONDENT(S) | J U D G M E N T A.K. SIKRI, J. The appellant and the respondent tied matrimonial chord on November 25, 2007 as per Hindu rights and… Read More CUSTODY OF A CHILD – TO WHOM ? = Psychologist term it as ‘The Parental Alienation Syndrome'. It has at least two psychological destructive effects: (i) First, it puts the child squarely in the middle of a contest of loyalty, a contest which cannot possibly be won. The child is asked to choose who is the preferred parent. No matter whatever is the choice, the child is very likely to end up feeling painfully guilty and confused. This is because in the overwhelming majority of cases, what the child wants and needs is to continue a relationship with each parent, as independent as possible from their own conflicts. (ii) Second, the child is required to make a shift in assessing reality. One parent is presented as being totally to blame for all problems, and as someone who is devoid of any positive characteristics. Both of these assertions represent one parent’s distortions of reality. The aforesaid discussion leads us to feel that continuous company of the mother with Saesha, for some time, is absolutely essential. It may also be underlying that the notion that a child’s primary need is for the care and love of its mother, where she has been its primary care giving parent, is supported by a vast body of psychological literature. Empirical studies show that mother infant “bonding” begins at the child’s birth and that infants as young as two months old frequently show signs of distress when the mother is replaced by a substitute caregiver. An infant typically responds preferentially to the sound of its mother’s voice by four weeks, actively demands her presence and protests her absence by eight months, and within the first year has formed a profound and enduring attachment to her. Psychological theory hypothesizes that the mother is the center of an infant’s small world, his psychological homebase, and that she “must continue to be so for some years to come.” Developmental psychologists believe that the quality and strength of this original bond largely determines the child’s later capacity to fulfill her individual potential and to form attachments to other individuals and to the human community. No doubt, this presumption in favour of maternal custody as sound child welfare policy, is rebuttable and in a given case, it can be shown that father is better suited to have the custody of the child. Such an assessment, however, can be only after level playing field is granted to both the parents. That has not happened in the instant case so far. It is also to be emphasised that her mother is a teacher in a prestigious Kendriya Vidyala school. Saesha is herself a school going child at primary level. If Saesha is admitted in the same school where her mother is teaching, not only Saesha would be under full care and protection of the mother, she would also be in a position to get better education and better guidance of a mother who herself is a teacher.- No doubt, this presumption in favour of maternal custody as sound child welfare policy, is rebuttable and in a given case, it can be shown that father is better suited to have the custody of the child. Such an assessment, however, can be only after level playing field is granted to both the parents. We, thus, find that the factors in favour of respondent are weightier than those in favour of the appellant which have been noted above. It is a fit case where respondent deserves a chance to have the custody of child Saesha for the time being, i.e., at least for one year, and not merely visitation rights.