Whether the requirement of the landlord for own occupation could also mean occupation by a member of the family, in this case, the son, is the short question arising for consideration.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1398-1399 OF 2011 MEHMOODA GULSHAN … APPELLANTS (S) VERSUS JAVAID HUSSAIN MUNGLOO … RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.: Whether the requirement of the landlord for own occupation could also mean occupation by a member of the… Read More Whether the requirement of the landlord for own occupation could also mean occupation by a member of the family, in this case, the son, is the short question arising for consideration.

CUSTODY OF A CHILD – TO WHOM ? = Psychologist term it as ‘The Parental Alienation Syndrome'[4]. It has at least two psychological destructive effects: (i) First, it puts the child squarely in the middle of a contest of loyalty, a contest which cannot possibly be won. The child is asked to choose who is the preferred parent. No matter whatever is the choice, the child is very likely to end up feeling painfully guilty and confused. This is because in the overwhelming majority of cases, what the child wants and needs is to continue a relationship with each parent, as independent as possible from their own conflicts. (ii) Second, the child is required to make a shift in assessing reality. One parent is presented as being totally to blame for all problems, and as someone who is devoid of any positive characteristics. Both of these assertions represent one parent’s distortions of reality. The aforesaid discussion leads us to feel that continuous company of the mother with Saesha, for some time, is absolutely essential. It may also be underlying that the notion that a child’s primary need is for the care and love of its mother, where she has been its primary care giving parent, is supported by a vast body of psychological literature. Empirical studies show that mother infant “bonding” begins at the child’s birth and that infants as young as two months old frequently show signs of distress when the mother is replaced by a substitute caregiver. An infant typically responds preferentially to the sound of its mother’s voice by four weeks, actively demands her presence and protests her absence by eight months, and within the first year has formed a profound and enduring attachment to her. Psychological theory hypothesizes that the mother is the center of an infant’s small world, his psychological homebase, and that she “must continue to be so for some years to come.” Developmental psychologists believe that the quality and strength of this original bond largely determines the child’s later capacity to fulfill her individual potential and to form attachments to other individuals and to the human community. No doubt, this presumption in favour of maternal custody as sound child welfare policy, is rebuttable and in a given case, it can be shown that father is better suited to have the custody of the child. Such an assessment, however, can be only after level playing field is granted to both the parents. That has not happened in the instant case so far. It is also to be emphasised that her mother is a teacher in a prestigious Kendriya Vidyala school. Saesha is herself a school going child at primary level. If Saesha is admitted in the same school where her mother is teaching, not only Saesha would be under full care and protection of the mother, she would also be in a position to get better education and better guidance of a mother who herself is a teacher.- No doubt, this presumption in favour of maternal custody as sound child welfare policy, is rebuttable and in a given case, it can be shown that father is better suited to have the custody of the child. Such an assessment, however, can be only after level playing field is granted to both the parents. We, thus, find that the factors in favour of respondent are weightier than those in favour of the appellant which have been noted above. It is a fit case where respondent deserves a chance to have the custody of child Saesha for the time being, i.e., at least for one year, and not merely visitation rights.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3962 OF 2016 |VIVEK SINGH |…..APPELLANT(S) | |VERSUS | | |ROMANI SINGH |…..RESPONDENT(S) | J U D G M E N T A.K. SIKRI, J. The appellant and the respondent tied matrimonial chord on November 25, 2007 as per Hindu rights and… Read More CUSTODY OF A CHILD – TO WHOM ? = Psychologist term it as ‘The Parental Alienation Syndrome'[4]. It has at least two psychological destructive effects: (i) First, it puts the child squarely in the middle of a contest of loyalty, a contest which cannot possibly be won. The child is asked to choose who is the preferred parent. No matter whatever is the choice, the child is very likely to end up feeling painfully guilty and confused. This is because in the overwhelming majority of cases, what the child wants and needs is to continue a relationship with each parent, as independent as possible from their own conflicts. (ii) Second, the child is required to make a shift in assessing reality. One parent is presented as being totally to blame for all problems, and as someone who is devoid of any positive characteristics. Both of these assertions represent one parent’s distortions of reality. The aforesaid discussion leads us to feel that continuous company of the mother with Saesha, for some time, is absolutely essential. It may also be underlying that the notion that a child’s primary need is for the care and love of its mother, where she has been its primary care giving parent, is supported by a vast body of psychological literature. Empirical studies show that mother infant “bonding” begins at the child’s birth and that infants as young as two months old frequently show signs of distress when the mother is replaced by a substitute caregiver. An infant typically responds preferentially to the sound of its mother’s voice by four weeks, actively demands her presence and protests her absence by eight months, and within the first year has formed a profound and enduring attachment to her. Psychological theory hypothesizes that the mother is the center of an infant’s small world, his psychological homebase, and that she “must continue to be so for some years to come.” Developmental psychologists believe that the quality and strength of this original bond largely determines the child’s later capacity to fulfill her individual potential and to form attachments to other individuals and to the human community. No doubt, this presumption in favour of maternal custody as sound child welfare policy, is rebuttable and in a given case, it can be shown that father is better suited to have the custody of the child. Such an assessment, however, can be only after level playing field is granted to both the parents. That has not happened in the instant case so far. It is also to be emphasised that her mother is a teacher in a prestigious Kendriya Vidyala school. Saesha is herself a school going child at primary level. If Saesha is admitted in the same school where her mother is teaching, not only Saesha would be under full care and protection of the mother, she would also be in a position to get better education and better guidance of a mother who herself is a teacher.- No doubt, this presumption in favour of maternal custody as sound child welfare policy, is rebuttable and in a given case, it can be shown that father is better suited to have the custody of the child. Such an assessment, however, can be only after level playing field is granted to both the parents. We, thus, find that the factors in favour of respondent are weightier than those in favour of the appellant which have been noted above. It is a fit case where respondent deserves a chance to have the custody of child Saesha for the time being, i.e., at least for one year, and not merely visitation rights.

Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 imposes an obligation on the accused to explain as to what happened after they were last seen together

Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.130 of 2012 DILIP MALLICK …. Appellant Versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL ….Respondent J U D G M E N T L. NAGESWARA RAO, J. This Appeal is filed against the judgment dated 22.03.2010 of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in… Read More Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 imposes an obligation on the accused to explain as to what happened after they were last seen together

Not only the conduct of Mesco was unfair, third party rights had also intervened. Lawful method had been exercised for resumption of land and cancellation of letter of handing over the possession.=The High Court has totally misdirected itself in directing to lease out the balance land. The High Court has also ignored that certain intervening events have taken place and there was total failure on the part of Mesco to carry out its obligations. The High Court could not have issued the direction more so in the changed situation and in view of the defaults committed by Mesco. As a matter of fact, Mesco was never inclined to abide by the terms of the letter dated 4.7.2003. When resumption was made on 25.7.2003, a representation was submitted on 20.8.2003 by Mesco. In that, an attempt was made to dictate its own terms in the garb of prayer for payment. As a matter of fact, it is apparent from the conduct of Mesco that it had no justification at any point of time not to execute the lease deed. It was delaying the same for the reasons best known to it which was wholly impermissible conduct, particularly after taking possession. The breach was not remedied for several years much less for three months in which it was to be remedied. Thus, High Court misadventured into holding the action of IDCO of resumption of land to be illegal. There was no equitable or legal consideration in favour of the respondent herein and a writ is not issued to perpetuate an illegality. Not only the conduct of Mesco was unfair, third party rights had also intervened. Lawful method had been exercised for resumption of land and cancellation of letter of handing over the possession. Resultantly, the impugned order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside. The appeals are allowed. The writ petition stands dismissed. Cost of Rs.5 lakhs is directed to be paid by Mesco to IDCO within a period of two months from today.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2545 OF 2017 [Arising out of SLP [C] No.23563/2007] Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation … Appellant Vs. M/s. MESCO Kalinga Steel Ltd. & Ors. … Respondents With CA No. 2546 /2017 (@ SLP (C) No. 23759/2007 and CA No.2547/2017 (@ SLP (C)… Read More Not only the conduct of Mesco was unfair, third party rights had also intervened. Lawful method had been exercised for resumption of land and cancellation of letter of handing over the possession.=The High Court has totally misdirected itself in directing to lease out the balance land. The High Court has also ignored that certain intervening events have taken place and there was total failure on the part of Mesco to carry out its obligations. The High Court could not have issued the direction more so in the changed situation and in view of the defaults committed by Mesco. As a matter of fact, Mesco was never inclined to abide by the terms of the letter dated 4.7.2003. When resumption was made on 25.7.2003, a representation was submitted on 20.8.2003 by Mesco. In that, an attempt was made to dictate its own terms in the garb of prayer for payment. As a matter of fact, it is apparent from the conduct of Mesco that it had no justification at any point of time not to execute the lease deed. It was delaying the same for the reasons best known to it which was wholly impermissible conduct, particularly after taking possession. The breach was not remedied for several years much less for three months in which it was to be remedied. Thus, High Court misadventured into holding the action of IDCO of resumption of land to be illegal. There was no equitable or legal consideration in favour of the respondent herein and a writ is not issued to perpetuate an illegality. Not only the conduct of Mesco was unfair, third party rights had also intervened. Lawful method had been exercised for resumption of land and cancellation of letter of handing over the possession. Resultantly, the impugned order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside. The appeals are allowed. The writ petition stands dismissed. Cost of Rs.5 lakhs is directed to be paid by Mesco to IDCO within a period of two months from today.

Though the current pregnancy of the petitioner is about 24th weeks and endanger to the life and inevitable to the death of the fetus outside womb, we consider it appropriate to permit the petitioner to undergo termination of her pregnancy under the provisions of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. We order accordingly. The termination of pregnancy of petitioner no.1 will be performed by the Doctors of the hospital where she has undergone medical check-up. Further, termination of her pregnancy would be supervised by the above stated Medical Board who shall maintain complete record of the procedure which is to be performed on petitioner No.1 for termination of her pregnancy.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 81 OF 2017 Mrs. X AND ORS. PETITIONER(S) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS RESPONDENT(S) O R D E R Application for non-disclosure of names and detail of petitioner No. 1 and 2 is allowed. The Petitioner No. 1- Mrs. X… Read More Though the current pregnancy of the petitioner is about 24th weeks and endanger to the life and inevitable to the death of the fetus outside womb, we consider it appropriate to permit the petitioner to undergo termination of her pregnancy under the provisions of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. We order accordingly. The termination of pregnancy of petitioner no.1 will be performed by the Doctors of the hospital where she has undergone medical check-up. Further, termination of her pregnancy would be supervised by the above stated Medical Board who shall maintain complete record of the procedure which is to be performed on petitioner No.1 for termination of her pregnancy.

mere declaration without relief of recovery of possession was clearly not maintainable=The plaintiff, who was not in possession, had in the suit claimed only declaratory relief along with mandatory injunction. Plaintiff being out of possession, the relief of recovery of possession was a further relief which ought to have been claimed by the plaintiff. The suit filed by the plaintiff for a mere declaration without relief of recovery of possession was clearly not maintainable and the trial court has rightly dismissed the suit.=The decree of the High Court is also contradictory. The High Court has affirmed the findings that Defendant No. 1 is the owner of the Survey No. 188/1 and 188/3, whereas, by decreeing the suit for declaration and mandatory injunction the name of Defendant No. 1 is to be removed and replaced by plaintiff which is clearly erroneous and unsustainable. 38. In view of the above, judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. The High Court committed an error in reversing the judgments of the trial court and the First Appellate Court. In result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside and those of trial court and the First Appellate Court are restored.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2342 OF 2017 ARISING OUT OF SLP(C)NO. 21587 OF 2014 EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ARULMIGU CHOKKANATHA SWAMY KOIL TRUST VIRUDHUNAGAR …. APPELLANT VERSUS CHANDRAN & ORS …. RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T Ashok Bhushan, J. Leave granted 2. The defendant has… Read More mere declaration without relief of recovery of possession was clearly not maintainable=The plaintiff, who was not in possession, had in the suit claimed only declaratory relief along with mandatory injunction. Plaintiff being out of possession, the relief of recovery of possession was a further relief which ought to have been claimed by the plaintiff. The suit filed by the plaintiff for a mere declaration without relief of recovery of possession was clearly not maintainable and the trial court has rightly dismissed the suit.=The decree of the High Court is also contradictory. The High Court has affirmed the findings that Defendant No. 1 is the owner of the Survey No. 188/1 and 188/3, whereas, by decreeing the suit for declaration and mandatory injunction the name of Defendant No. 1 is to be removed and replaced by plaintiff which is clearly erroneous and unsustainable. 38. In view of the above, judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. The High Court committed an error in reversing the judgments of the trial court and the First Appellate Court. In result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside and those of trial court and the First Appellate Court are restored.