whether a dispute raised by the said employee for setting aside his removal from service on the ground that it was an act of victimization and for reinstatement in service with back wages was one ‘touching the management or business of the society’, within the contemplation of the Co-operative Societies Act. This Court held that the expression ‘any dispute’ referred to in section 96 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 did not cover a dispute of the kind raised by the respondent employee against the bank. As a result, this appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the Division Bench judgment, on which reliance is placed by the High Court in the impugned judgment, is overruled. As a consequence, it is held that the petition filed by the respondent before the Cooperative Court is not maintainable. It would, however, be open to the respondent to file a civil suit. Needless to mention, in such a civil suit filed by the respondent, he would be at liberty to file application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to save the limitation.

The practice of omnibus marking of S. 164 statement of witness deserves to be deprecated. The relevant portion of such prior statements of living persons used for contradiction or corroboration U/s. 145/157 of the Evidence Act deserves to be marked separately and specifically. 12. The practice of whole sale marking of confession statement of accused persons for introduction of the relevant statement admissible under S. 27 of Evidence Act deserves to be deprecated. Ideally the admissible portion and that portion alone, must be extracted in the recovery memos (Mahazar or Panch – different nomenclature used in different parts of the land) within inverted commas. Otherwise the relevant portion alone written separately must be proved by the Investigating Officer. Back door access to inadmissible evidence by marking the entire confession statement in the attempt to prove the admissible portion under S. 27 of Evidence Act should be strictly avoided.

whether A3, A4, A14, A15 and A18 are liable to be convicted under Section 302/149 IPC. Taking into account the fact that the incident occurred in the year 1993, that they attacked the deceased with sticks causing simple injuries on non-vital parts, their conviction under Section 326/149 IPC will meet the ends of justice. The Trial Court convicted A4 under Section 324/149 IPC and sentenced for imprisonment for 2 years along with his conviction under Section 302/149 IPC. The High Court acquitted A4 under Section 302/149 IPC and reduced the sentence under Section 324/149 IPC to 1 year. A4 was separated from A3, A14, A15 and A18 only on the ground that PW3 spoke about his presence. Otherwise, the role ascribed to A4 is the same as that of A3, A14, A15 and A18. In the result A3 Majeed, A4 Ummer alias Podi Ummer, A14 Balaji, A15 Muraleedharan and A18 Hasheem alias Muhammed Hasheem are sentenced to 7 years imprisonment under Section 326/149 IPC.

On the other hand, according to the learned Amicus, permitting such vehicles to be sold or registered on or after 1st April, 2017 would constitute a health hazard to millions of our country men and women by adding to the air pollution levels in the country (which are already quite alarming).The manufacturers of such vehicles were fully aware that eventually from 1st April, 2017 they would be required to manufacture only BS-IV compliant vehicles but for reasons that are not clear, they chose to sit back and declined to take sufficient pro-active steps. Accordingly, for detailed reasons that will follow, we direct that: (a) On and from 1st April, 2017 such vehicles that are not BS-IV compliant shall not be sold in India by any manufacturer or dealer, that is to say that such vehicles whether two wheeler, three wheeler, four wheeler or commercial vehicles will not be sold in India by any manufacturer or dealer on and from 1st April, 2017. (b) All the vehicle registering authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are prohibited for registering such vehicles on and from 1st April, 2017 that do not meet BS-IV emission standards, except on proof that such a vehicle has already been sold on or before 31st March, 2017. As mentioned above, detailed reasons for the above order will be given in due course.

we find merit in the argument of the Appellant that the parties be relegated before the High Court for a fresh consideration of the second appeal on its own merit in accordance with law and more so, the substantial questions of law formulated by the Appellant which are as under:- “i. Whether the tenancy of Respondent No. 1 and 2 as created w.e.f. 01.09.1975 in respect of Suit premises No. 47, UB, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi – 11006 jointly in their name can be said to be joint tenancy as contemplated in the judgment AIR 1988 SC 1470 “S.C. Pandey versus G.C. Paul” which were passed in the context of joint tenancy conferred on the body of the legal heir of deceased or not? ii. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court was duty bound to address all issues and give finding therein after re-appraisal of the facts and was not competent to uphold the finding summarily as sought to be done by the judgment dated 03.02.2005 or not? iii. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court was duty bound to deal with other issues except Issue No. 6? iv. Whether the Judgment/Decree of the Ld. Appellate Court dated 03.02.2005 was perverse and in breach of its jurisdiction as the appellate court by not giving independent finding passed on re-appraisal of pleading and evidence on record? v. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court upholding other issues ought to have passed such further direction for passing of the preliminary decree of rendition of account to its logical end as appointment of Local Commissioner and its terms set lapsed by then or not?”

fraud vitiates all contracts or agreements = Even if we were to ignore the false claim set up by Respondent No.1 that she had obtained the tenancy rights on this land from K.P. Gopinathan in the year 1962, admittedly when she was only 10 years old and at that time K.P. Gopinathan was not the owner of the property as his father K.P. Choyi was still alive, yet we cannot ignore the fact that in the year 1988 Respondent No.1 was having a valid licence to run an aluminium industry and was employing 9 persons. Therefore, Respondent No.1 cannot claim to fall under the category of “landless agricultural labourer”. Therefore, she had obtained the assignment order by totally mis-representing the facts and had played fraud on the authorities. The law is well settled that fraud vitiates all contracts or agreements. This is a case where fraud is writ large. It is evident that assignment was obtained in total contravention of Section 96 of the Act and, therefore, Rule 29(8) was also applicable. Hence, we are not in agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.

whether The Deed of Lease would be renewed on expiry of the same- bare perusal of the aforesaid section makes it very clear that the Municipality has no authority to grant a lease for a period exceeding 10 years without prior permission of the State Government. In the present case, the State Government had only granted permission to lease the land till the year 2012. Therefore, the appellant has no inherent right to claim that fresh lease be granted in its favour. Another factor which has to be considered is that the original lease was granted for running an oil mill and as on date admittedly there is no oil mill situated on the land. The leased property is a public property leased out at a very meagre rent. It cannot be utilised for a purpose other than the purpose for which it was leased out. True it is that the appellant may have been permitted to raise construction on the leased land but it is obvious that the construction to be raised should have connection with the original business of the company i.e. running an oil mill. The appellant has raised a huge commercial complex earning crores of rupees but is paying only a few hundred rupees to the Municipality. We are of the considered view that the appellant is not entitled to claim that lease deed must be renewed in his favour. The High Court of Gujarat was perfectly justified in holding that the appellant cannot claim that he is entitled to renewal of the lease deed as a matter of right. The finding of the High Court that the appellant is earning huge profits by way of rent is not denied. It has also been stated that the land is required by the Municipality for educational purposes.

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Month: March 2017