whether a dispute raised by the said employee for setting aside his removal from service on the ground that it was an act of victimization and for reinstatement in service with back wages was one ‘touching the management or business of the society’, within the contemplation of the Co-operative Societies Act. This Court held that the expression ‘any dispute’ referred to in section 96 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 did not cover a dispute of the kind raised by the respondent employee against the bank. As a result, this appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the Division Bench judgment, on which reliance is placed by the High Court in the impugned judgment, is overruled. As a consequence, it is held that the petition filed by the respondent before the Cooperative Court is not maintainable. It would, however, be open to the respondent to file a civil suit. Needless to mention, in such a civil suit filed by the respondent, he would be at liberty to file application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to save the limitation.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1488 OF 2017 |THE MAHARASHTRA STATE COOPERATIVE HOUSING | | |FINANCE CORPORATION LTD. |.....APPELLANT(S) | |VERSUS |…

The practice of omnibus marking of S. 164 statement of witness deserves to be deprecated. The relevant portion of such prior statements of living persons used for contradiction or corroboration U/s. 145/157 of the Evidence Act deserves to be marked separately and specifically. 12. The practice of whole sale marking of confession statement of accused persons for introduction of the relevant statement admissible under S. 27 of Evidence Act deserves to be deprecated. Ideally the admissible portion and that portion alone, must be extracted in the recovery memos (Mahazar or Panch – different nomenclature used in different parts of the land) within inverted commas. Otherwise the relevant portion alone written separately must be proved by the Investigating Officer. Back door access to inadmissible evidence by marking the entire confession statement in the attempt to prove the admissible portion under S. 27 of Evidence Act should be strictly avoided.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION SUO MOTU WRIT(CRL.) NO.1 OF 2017 IN RE: TO ISSUE CERTAIN GUIDELINES REGARDING INADEQUACIES AND DEFICIENCIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS O…

whether A3, A4, A14, A15 and A18 are liable to be convicted under Section 302/149 IPC. Taking into account the fact that the incident occurred in the year 1993, that they attacked the deceased with sticks causing simple injuries on non-vital parts, their conviction under Section 326/149 IPC will meet the ends of justice. The Trial Court convicted A4 under Section 324/149 IPC and sentenced for imprisonment for 2 years along with his conviction under Section 302/149 IPC. The High Court acquitted A4 under Section 302/149 IPC and reduced the sentence under Section 324/149 IPC to 1 year. A4 was separated from A3, A14, A15 and A18 only on the ground that PW3 spoke about his presence. Otherwise, the role ascribed to A4 is the same as that of A3, A14, A15 and A18. In the result A3 Majeed, A4 Ummer alias Podi Ummer, A14 Balaji, A15 Muraleedharan and A18 Hasheem alias Muhammed Hasheem are sentenced to 7 years imprisonment under Section 326/149 IPC.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.400 of 2006 KATTUKULANGARA MADHAVAN (DEAD) THR. LRS. .... Appellant(s) Versus MAJEED & ORS. ….Respondent(s) With CRIMINAL APPEAL…

On the other hand, according to the learned Amicus, permitting such vehicles to be sold or registered on or after 1st April, 2017 would constitute a health hazard to millions of our country men and women by adding to the air pollution levels in the country (which are already quite alarming).The manufacturers of such vehicles were fully aware that eventually from 1st April, 2017 they would be required to manufacture only BS-IV compliant vehicles but for reasons that are not clear, they chose to sit back and declined to take sufficient pro-active steps. Accordingly, for detailed reasons that will follow, we direct that: (a) On and from 1st April, 2017 such vehicles that are not BS-IV compliant shall not be sold in India by any manufacturer or dealer, that is to say that such vehicles whether two wheeler, three wheeler, four wheeler or commercial vehicles will not be sold in India by any manufacturer or dealer on and from 1st April, 2017. (b) All the vehicle registering authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are prohibited for registering such vehicles on and from 1st April, 2017 that do not meet BS-IV emission standards, except on proof that such a vehicle has already been sold on or before 31st March, 2017. As mentioned above, detailed reasons for the above order will be given in due course.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION I.A.NO. 487/2017, I.A. NO. 491/2017, I.A. NO. 494/2017, I.A. NO. 489/2017, I.A. NO. 495/2017 in Writ Petition(Civil) No.13029/1985 M.C.MEHTA ...PETITIONER(s)…

we find merit in the argument of the Appellant that the parties be relegated before the High Court for a fresh consideration of the second appeal on its own merit in accordance with law and more so, the substantial questions of law formulated by the Appellant which are as under:- “i. Whether the tenancy of Respondent No. 1 and 2 as created w.e.f. 01.09.1975 in respect of Suit premises No. 47, UB, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi – 11006 jointly in their name can be said to be joint tenancy as contemplated in the judgment AIR 1988 SC 1470 “S.C. Pandey versus G.C. Paul” which were passed in the context of joint tenancy conferred on the body of the legal heir of deceased or not? ii. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court was duty bound to address all issues and give finding therein after re-appraisal of the facts and was not competent to uphold the finding summarily as sought to be done by the judgment dated 03.02.2005 or not? iii. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court was duty bound to deal with other issues except Issue No. 6? iv. Whether the Judgment/Decree of the Ld. Appellate Court dated 03.02.2005 was perverse and in breach of its jurisdiction as the appellate court by not giving independent finding passed on re-appraisal of pleading and evidence on record? v. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court upholding other issues ought to have passed such further direction for passing of the preliminary decree of rendition of account to its logical end as appointment of Local Commissioner and its terms set lapsed by then or not?”

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4513-4514 OF_2017 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 29019-29020 of 2015) Gauri Shankar …. Appellant Versus Rakesh…

fraud vitiates all contracts or agreements = Even if we were to ignore the false claim set up by Respondent No.1 that she had obtained the tenancy rights on this land from K.P. Gopinathan in the year 1962, admittedly when she was only 10 years old and at that time K.P. Gopinathan was not the owner of the property as his father K.P. Choyi was still alive, yet we cannot ignore the fact that in the year 1988 Respondent No.1 was having a valid licence to run an aluminium industry and was employing 9 persons. Therefore, Respondent No.1 cannot claim to fall under the category of “landless agricultural labourer”. Therefore, she had obtained the assignment order by totally mis-representing the facts and had played fraud on the authorities. The law is well settled that fraud vitiates all contracts or agreements. This is a case where fraud is writ large. It is evident that assignment was obtained in total contravention of Section 96 of the Act and, therefore, Rule 29(8) was also applicable. Hence, we are not in agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURSIDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4535 OF 2017 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil ) No.23266 of 2014) Karunakaran .. Appellant(s) Versus…

whether The Deed of Lease would be renewed on expiry of the same- bare perusal of the aforesaid section makes it very clear that the Municipality has no authority to grant a lease for a period exceeding 10 years without prior permission of the State Government. In the present case, the State Government had only granted permission to lease the land till the year 2012. Therefore, the appellant has no inherent right to claim that fresh lease be granted in its favour. Another factor which has to be considered is that the original lease was granted for running an oil mill and as on date admittedly there is no oil mill situated on the land. The leased property is a public property leased out at a very meagre rent. It cannot be utilised for a purpose other than the purpose for which it was leased out. True it is that the appellant may have been permitted to raise construction on the leased land but it is obvious that the construction to be raised should have connection with the original business of the company i.e. running an oil mill. The appellant has raised a huge commercial complex earning crores of rupees but is paying only a few hundred rupees to the Municipality. We are of the considered view that the appellant is not entitled to claim that lease deed must be renewed in his favour. The High Court of Gujarat was perfectly justified in holding that the appellant cannot claim that he is entitled to renewal of the lease deed as a matter of right. The finding of the High Court that the appellant is earning huge profits by way of rent is not denied. It has also been stated that the land is required by the Municipality for educational purposes.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURSIDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4536 OF 2017 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil ) No.30727 of 2016) Kundla Press and Oil…

the auction notice under Section 85 of the Himachal Pradesh Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1973 (hereinafter be referred to as “the Act”) issued consequent to his failure to repay the two loans availed for purchase of a truck and establishing an industry for manufacture of steel trunks.- The Act provides for recovery of certain dues as arrears of land revenue by sending a certificate to the Collector, mentioning the sum due requesting that the sum together with costs may be recovered. The High Court erred in holding that the H.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 2000 repealing the earlier Act did not contain any provision that the remedy was without prejudice to the rights under any other law. The proceedings in a Suit and recovery under the Act as arrears of land revenue are under different laws governed by different procedures. A Suit is instituted in a Court of law and is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure while the proceedings under the Act are before the executive statutorily empowered. In C.C.E. vs. Ramdev Tobacco Company, (1991)(2)SCC 119, the distinction was noticed as follows :- “6…….There can be no doubt that ‘suit’ or ‘prosecution’ are those judicial or legal proceedings which are lodged in a court of law and not before any executive authority, even if a statutory one……” That the proceedings in a Suit could not be equated with a certificate proceeding was further noticed in ESI Corpn. vs. C.C. Santhakumar, (2007) 1 SCC 584, observing :- “25…….Therefore, it cannot be said that a proceeding for recovery as arrears of land revenue by issuing a certificate could be equated to either a suit, appeal or application in the court……” The High Court factually erred in holding that the trunk loan was time barred because the Appellant took no steps for recovery of the dues from 1996 till 2002 overlooking the Certificate dated 3.9.1994. In conclusion, it is held that the proceedings in a Suit are essentially different from proceedings under the Act. The withdrawal of the Suit was no bar to proceedings under the Act. There was no bar under the Act to the proceedings. There had been no abandonment of claim by the Appellant. It would be contrary to public policy to prevent the Appellant from recovering the loan. The recovery proceedings were not time barred. The order of the High Court is held to be unsustainable and is set aside. The auction notice dated 13.01.2005/15.01.2005 under Section 85 of the Act shall now proceed in accordance with law and be concluded at the earliest expeditiously.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.661 OF 2008 Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation … Appellant Versus Anil Garg and others … Respondents JUDGMENT NAVIN…

whether “premium” collected by the appellant-Company on its subscribed share capital is “capital employed in the business of the Company” within the meaning of Section 35D of the Act so as to enable the Company to claim deduction of the said amount as prescribed under Section 35D of the Act? = Section 35D(3) of the Act with which we are concerned in these appeals reads as under: “Where the aggregate amount of the expenditure referred to in sub- section(2) exceeds an amount calculated at two and one-half percent- (a) of the cost of the project, or where the assessee is an Indian company, at the option of the company, of the capital employed in the business of the company, the excess shall be ignored for the purpose of computing the deduction allowable under sub- section(1); [Provided that where the aggregate amount of expenditure referred to in sub- section(2) is incurred after the 31st day of March, 1998, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect as if for the words “two and one-half per cent”, the words “five percent” had been substituted.]* *Ins. by the Finance(No.2) Act, 1998(2) of 1998), sec,14(b)(w.e.f. 1-4- 1999)” 15) The expression “capital employed in the business of the company” is defined in the Explanation appended to the Section in clause (b) which reads as under: “(b) “capital employed in the business of the company” means- (i) in a case referred to in clause(i) of sub-section(1), the aggregate of the issued share capital, debentures and long term borrowings as on the last day of the previous year in which the business of the company commences; (ii) in a case referred to in clause(ii) of sub-section(1), the aggregate of the issued share capital, debentures and long term borrowings as on the last day of the previous year in which the extension of the industrial undertaking is completed or, as the case may be, the new industrial unit commences production or operation, in so far as such capita, debentures and long term borrowings have been issued or obtained in connection with the extension of the industrial undertaking or the setting up of the new industrial unit of the company;”- Section 78 of the Companies Act which deals with the “issue of shares at premium and discount” requires a Company to transfer the amount so collected as premium from the shareholders and keep the same in a separate account called “securities premium account”. It does not anywhere says that such amount be treated as part of capital of the company employed in the business for one or other purpose, as the case may be, even under the Companies Act. In the light of foregoing discussion, we find no merit in these appeals. The appeals thus fail and are accordingly dismissed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.2162 OF 2007 M/s Berger Paints India Ltd. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS C.I.T., Delhi-V …Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL No.2163 OF…

Latches in Investigation: (i) One of the major lacuna in the case is non- mentioning of the names of A2 & A5 by PW1 to the police at the earliest point of time. The High Court went wrong in observing that this will not amount to latches and it will not go to the root of the matter. These are the glaring defects which will virtually collapse the case of the prosecution. It is no doubt true that the FIR need not be an encyclopedia and also it need not contain all the details but when the names of A2 & A5 were not figured in the FIR it casts a doubt on the whole episode. According to the eyewitnesses, accused had inflicted major injuries and that was the reason for the death of the deceased. It is expected from a prudent man to disclose the names of accused. If the accused cannot be identified or not known to the PWs then it is not a serious thing to dwell upon but these people are very much known to PW1’s family. It therefore creates a serious doubt in the mind of the Court. (ii) The other glaring defect in the investigation is when A1 has sustained injuries and admittedly a complaint was given by his father, a duty is cast upon the prosecution to explain the injuries. The doctor has also categorically deposed about the injuries sustained by A1. These lapses on the part of Investigating Officer assume greater importance and prove to be fatal to the case of the prosecution. When the Investigating Officer deposed before the Court that the complaint given by A5’s father was investigated and he filed ‘B form’ and the case was closed, not marking the document is fatal to the case of prosecution. Investigating Officer further suppressed the fact that there was a direct evidence to seize the gun used by the deceased and register a complaint against the deceased under the relevant provisions of the Arms Act which is evident from the endorsement made on Exhibit P22. (iv) The Investigating Officer himself deposed that he had not seen the MOs and as per the punch witnesses also they were not seized. The Doctor (PW10) deposed that those articles were not placed before her and no opinion was sought. (v) PW2 was also an injured witness. According to the prosecution he was injured on 27-02-1991. But he went to the hospital on 08- 03-91 and the reasons for delay were left unexplained. It is settled law that mere latches on the part of Investigating Officer itself cannot be a ground for acquitting the accused. If that is the basis, then every criminal case will depend upon the will and design of the Investigating Officer. The Courts have to independently deal with the case and should arrive at a just conclusion beyond reasonable doubt basing on the evidence on record. Medical Evidence: When we look at the medical evidence, the Doctor (PW10) has categorically stated that the weapons were not sent to her. In the chief examination, it was stated that the injuries 1 & 4 on the body of the deceased are possible with chopper and club. But in the cross examination it was deposed that even if a person falls on a sharp object these injuries could happen. According to PW3, the deceased fell into the drain. As per the evidence of prosecution witnesses, accused by using the sharp edge of the weapon assaulted on the right side of the forehead but the Doctor’s evidence in this regard is that the deceased has not sustained incised wound on the forehead. PW10 further stated that if a person is assaulted with an object like MO4 it would result in fracture of frontal bone. (ii) The other ground is, when the father of A5 gave a complaint against the deceased’s family as the police filed ‘B form’ the same was closed and not filed before the Court. Apart from that, the direction of the Court to seize the gun of the deceased and file a case under the relevant provisions of the Arms Act was not brought to the notice of the Court. Non explanation of injuries on A5 is another major defect. Once there is a clear contradiction between the medical and the ocular evidence coupled with severe contradictions in the oral evidence, clear latches in investigation, then the benefit of doubt has to go to the accused. Going by the material on record, we disagree with the finding of the High Court that the ocular evidence and the medical evidence are in conformity with the case of prosecution to convict the accused. The High Court has brushed aside the vital defects involved in the prosecution case and in a very unconventional way convicted the accused. The Court should always make an endeavor to find the truth. A criminal offence is not only an offence against an individual but also against the society. There would be failure of justice if innocent man is punished. The Court should be able to perceive both sides i.e. the prosecution as well as the defence and in our considered opinion the judgment of the High Court suffers from several defects as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Hence we deem it appropriate to set aside the judgment of the High Court and re-affirm the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The accused shall be set at liberty provided they are not required in any other case. Accordingly the appeals are allowed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 635 OF 2006 KRISHNEGOWDA & ORS. ... APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARKALGUD POLICE ... RESPONDENT…