this being a simple suit for grant of permanent injunction between the two private parties in relation to the land which was subject matter of the State Ceiling Laws, was liable to be dismissed on the short ground apart from many others as detailed above that any order that may be passed by the Civil Court would adversely affect and interfere in the rights of the State under the Act, which had not been impleaded as party defendant. = It is a settled principle of law that in order to claim prohibitory (temporary or permanent) injunction, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prima facie prove apart from establishing other two ingredients, namely, irreparable loss and injury that his possession over the suit land is “legal”. In this case, it was not so and nor it could be for the simple reason that as far back on 21.08.1976, the Tribunal had already declared the land held by the plaintiff to be in excess of the ceiling limits prescribed under the Act. In these circumstances, the plaintiff was neither holding the land nor could he be held to be in its lawful possession so as to enable him to exercise any ownership rights against any other private party over the suit land. The appellant had then very limited rights left to exercise under the Act in relation to the suit land and such rights were available to him only against the State= in order to limit filing of such frivolous suits by the private parties in relation to agricultural land which are subjected to the State ceiling laws, the State of M.P. amended the Code of Civil Procedure by Act No. 29 of 1984 w.e.f. 14.8.84. By this State amendment, Rule 3-B was added in Order 1 Rule 10 making it obligatory upon the plaintiff to implead the State as party defendant along with private party defendant in every such suit. The amendment further provides that so long as the plaintiff does not implead the State as party defendant in the suit, the Court will not proceed with the trial of the Suit. The object behind introducing such amendment was to give notice to the State of filing of such suit by the holder of the agricultural land which would enable the State to defend their rights, which had accrued in State’s favour in the land under the Act. In the absence of any such rule in operation in the State of A.P., the State remained unnoticed of the suit proceedings, which continued in Courts for last more than two decades. Before parting, we consider it apposite to state that the appellant and the respondents made frantic efforts to somehow retain the suit land to them and keep the land away from the clutches of The Act. With this aim in view, they got the suit land involved in this litigation since 1976. All this was done without notice to the State Authorities. We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to take up the case of the appellant on its Board and pass appropriate consequential order, if necessary under the Act keeping in view the order dated 21.08.1976 of the Tribunal passed in CC No. 2311/VKD/75 and take all remedial steps as are necessary in relation to the land held by the appellant including the suit land.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.5817 OF 2012

Agnigundala Venkata Ranga

Rao                                    ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Indukuru Ramachandra Reddy

(Dead) by LRs. & Ors.            .…Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1)    This appeal by certificate is filed by the plaintiff against the

final judgment and  order  dated  28.10.2011  of  the  High  Court  of

Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No.4141 of 2003

whereby  the  High  Court  allowed  the  appeal   preferred   by   the

defendants(respondents herein) and reversed  the  final  judgment  and

decree  dated  22.09.2003  of  the  Additional  Senior  Civil   Judge,

Narasaraopet in Original Suit No. 98 of 1998.

2)    In order to appreciate the issue involved in the  appeal,  which

lies in a narrow compass, it is necessary to state few relevant  facts

taken from the appeal paper books.

3)    The appellant is the plaintiff whereas the respondents  are  the

defendants in the civil suit out of which this appeal arises.

4)    The subject  matter  of  this  appeal  is  an  agriculture  land

measuring Ac.13.38 cents in Survey No.  436  and  Ac.  9.38  cents  in

Survey No. 826 (total land-22 acres 76 cents) situated in -Agnigundala

Village of Ipur Mandal, District Guntur  Andhra  Pradesh  (hereinafter

referred to as the “suit land”).

5)    The appellant owned several acres of  agriculture  lands,  which

also included the suit land. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms  (Ceiling

on Agricultural Holdings) Act,  1973   (for  short,   “the  Act”)  was

enacted on  01.01.1973.   It  came  into  force  on  01.01.1975.   The

appellant being a  “person” as defined under Section 3(o) of  the  Act

and was holding the land in excess of the limits prescribed under  the

Act filed a declaration in respect of his holding before the  Tribunal

as required under Section 7 of the Act. During  the  pendency  of  his

case before the Tribunal, the appellant sold the suit land  vide  sale

deed dated 16.07.1975 to the respondents. The sale deed,  inter  alia,

recited that the appellant has also delivered possession of  the  suit

land to the respondents. Respondent No. 1 then mortgaged the suit land

along with his other lands to the State Bank  of  India  and  obtained

loan wherein the appellant had stood as the guarantor.

6)     The  Tribunal,  on  21.08.1976,   passed   an   order   in   CC

No.2311/VKD/75 under Section 7 of the Act and held inter alia that the

appellant was holding the land in excess of the limits  prescribed  in

the Act. It was further held that so far as the transfer of  the  suit

land made by the appellant in favour of the respondents vide sale deed

dated 16.07.1975 is concerned,  the  same  was  void  because  it  was

effected by the appellant after the Act had come into force which  was

prohibited under Section 7(2) read with Section 17  of  the  Act.  The

appellant was, therefore, directed to surrender the excess  land  held

by him in favour of the State as provided in the Act.

7)    In 1995-1998, i.e., almost after 2 decades from the date of  the

order of the Tribunal (21.08.1976), another litigation  began  between

the appellant and the respondents in relation to the suit  land.  This

was under the provisions of the Andhra  Pradesh  Rights  in  Land  and

Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 (for short, “the Act of 1971 “)  wherein

the issue was whose name – the appellant or the respondents be entered

in the Pass Book in relation  to  the  suit  land  as  Pattadar.  This

litigation  ended  in  appellant’s  favour  by  the  orders   of   the

revisionary Court.

8)    On 29.10.1998, i.e., almost after 22 years from the date of  the

Tribunal’s  order  (21.08.1976)  the  appellant  filed  a  civil  suit

(O.S.No. 98/1998) against the respondents before the Additional Senior

Civil Judge, Narsaraopet out of which this appeal arises. The suit was

for permanent injunction in relation to  the  suit  land  against  the

respondents. It was essentially founded on the  allegations  that  the

appellant is the owner of the  suit  land  to  the  exclusion  of  all

persons including the respondents, who have no right to  interfere  in

the appellant’s possession over the suit land. It was averred that the

appellant has been and continues to remain in possession of  the  suit

land and since  the  respondents  are  threatening  the  appellant  to

dispossess him from the suit land, hence he was  constrained  to  file

the civil suit seeking permanent injunction  against  the  respondents

restraining them from interfering in appellant’s  peaceful  possession

over the suit land.

9)    The respondents  filed   written  statement.   They  denied  the

appellant’s claim and set up a title in themselves over the suit land.

It was contended that the respondents purchased the  suit  land  from

the appellant vide sale deed dated 16.07.1975 and since then they have

been in its possession. It  was  contended  that  the  respondents  on

purchase of the suit land obtained the loan from S.B.I  and  mortgaged

it with the Bank by way of security for the loan taken.  It  was  also

contended that the appellant is estopped from raising  any  contention

once he sold the suit land to the respondents and stake any claim over

the suit land.

10)   The Trial Court, on the basis of pleadings,  framed  two  issues

viz., (1) whether the plaintiff (appellant) is in lawful possession of

the suit land; and (2) whether the plaintiff (appellant)  is  entitled

for injunction as prayed for?

11)   The Trial Court vide judgment/decree  dated  22.09.2003  decreed

the plaintiff’s suit. It was held that the sale made by the  appellant

to the respondent of the suit land vide sale deed dated 16.07.1975 (Ex-

B-1) is null and void being in contravention of Section 17 of the Act.

It was held that such sale, even if made, did not  convey  any  right,

title and interest in respondents’ favour. It was  further  held  that

the plaintiff is in lawful possession of the suit land as he was  able

to prove his actual possession on the basis of evidence adduced by him

and hence was  entitled  to  seek  permanent  injunction  against  the

respondents  restraining  the  respondents  not  to   dispossess   the

appellant from the suit land.

12)   Felt aggrieved, the defendants (respondents) filed first  appeal

before the High Court. By impugned  judgment  and  order,  the  Single

Judge of the High Court allowed the appeal and while setting aside the

judgment/decree of the Trial Court dismissed the suit.  The  plaintiff

(respondent before the High Court) then orally prayed  to  the  Single

Judge to grant leave to file appeal to this Court (Supreme  Court)  as

provided under Article 134-A(b)  of  the  Constitution.   The   Single

Judge granted “leave” to the plaintiff as prayed.  This  is  how  this

appeal is brought before this Court on the strength of the certificate

granted by the High Court.

13)   Heard Mr. V.V.S.Rao, learned senior counsel  for  the  appellant

and  Mr.  B.  Adinarayana  Rao,  learned  senior   counsel   for   the

respondents.  We also perused the written  submissions  filed  by  the

parties.

14)   Learned senior counsel  for  the  appellant  (plaintiff),  while

assailing the legality  and  correctness  of  the  impugned  judgment,

contended that the High Court (Single Judge) erred  in  reversing  the

judgment/decree passed by the  Trial  Court.  The  submission  of  the

learned counsel, in substance, was that  the  judgment  of  the  Trial

Court, which had rightly  decreed  the  appellant’s  suit,  should  be

restored. It is this submission, which learned counsel  elaborated  by

pointing out various provisions of the two Acts and the  exhibits  and

findings of the two courts below.

15)   In reply, learned senior counsel for the  respondents  supported

the impugned judgment and contended  that  no  case  is  made  out  to

interfere in the impugned  order  and  hence  appeal  deserves  to  be

dismissed.

16)   Before we consider the merits of the case,  it  is  apposite  to

deal with one question which though arises, was not argued by pointing

out the relevant provisions governing the question.

17)   As mentioned above,  this  appeal  is  filed  on  a  certificate

granted by the High Court (Single Judge) on the oral application  made

by the appellant immediately after the pronouncement of  the  impugned

judgment as provided under Article 134-A of  the  Constitution.    The

order granting certificate is a part of the impugned judgment  in  its

concluding Para which reads thus:

“Learned counsel for the respondent seeks leave of this Court to

prefer an appeal against this judgment.

Accordingly, leave is granted.”

18)   What is the true interpretation of Articles 133 and 134-A of the

Constitution and who can grant the certificate of fitness to appeal to

the Supreme Court remains no more res integra. It is  settled  by  the

decision of this Court in  State Bank  of  India  &  Anr.  Vs.  S.B.I.

Employees’ Union & Anr., 1987 (4) SCC 370.

19)   The facts of this case and the one  involved  in  the  SBI  case

(supra) are somewhat similar  wherein  Their  Lordships  examined  the

issue as to whether the certificate granted by the High Court  (Single

Judge) satisfied the requirements contained in Articles 133 and 134-A.

Justice Venkataramiah (as His Lordship then was and later became  CJI)

speaking for the Bench held thus:

2. The certificate  contemplated  under  Article  134-A  of  the

Constitution can only be a certificate which is referred  to  in

clause (1) of Article 132 or in clause (1) of Article 133 or  in

sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 134 of the Constitution.

This is quite obvious from the language of Article 134-A of  the

Constitution. This case  does  not  fall  either  under  Article

132(1) or under sub-clause (c) of Article 134(1) as  it  neither

involves a substantial question of law as to the  interpretation

of the Constitution nor it is a criminal proceeding. It can only

fall, if at all,  under  Article  133(1)  of  the  Constitution.

Article 133 of the Constitution reads thus:

“133. (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any

judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of  a

High Court in the territory of  India  if  the  High  Court

certifies under Article 134-A—

(a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of

general importance; and

(b) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question

needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.

(2) Notwithstanding anything  in  Article  132,  any  party

appealing to the Supreme Court under clause (1) may urge as

one of the  grounds  in  such  appeal  that  a  substantial

question  of  law  as  to  the   interpretation   of   this

Constitution has been wrongly decided.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in  this  article,  no  appeal

shall, unless Parliament by law otherwise provides, lie  to

the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final  order

of one judge of a High Court.”

3. Clause (3) of Article 133 says that notwithstanding  anything

in that article  no  appeal  shall,  unless  Parliament  by  law

otherwise provides, lie to the Supreme Court from the  judgment,

decree or final order of one judge of the High Court. Before the

introduction of Article 134-A of the Constitution by the  Forty-

fourth Amendment  of  the  Constitution  there  was  no  express

provision in Articles 132,  133  and  134  of  the  Constitution

regarding the time and manner in  which  an  application  for  a

certificate under any of those articles could be made before the

High Court. There was also a doubt as to the power of  the  High

Court to issue  a  certificate  suo  motu  under  any  of  those

articles. Article 134-A  was  enacted  to  make  good  the  said

deficiencies. Article 134-A does not constitute  an  independent

provision under  which  a  certificate  can  be  issued.  It  is

ancillary  to  Article  132(1),  Article  133(1)   and   Article

134(1)(c) of the Constitution. That is the reason for the use of

words “if the High  Court  certifies  under  Article  134-A”  in

Article 132(1) and Article 133(1) and for the use of  the  words

certifies under Article 134-A in  Article  134(1)(c).  The  High

Court can issue a certificate only when it is satisfied that the

conditions in Article 132 or Article 133 or Article 134  of  the

Constitution as the case may be are satisfied.  In  the  instant

case such a certificate could not have been issued by reason  of

clause (3) of Article 133 of the  Constitution  by  the  learned

Single Judge.

4. The fact that in a similar case a certificate had been issued

by a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of  two  judges

in a case decided by the Division  Bench  did  not  empower  the

Single Judge to issue the certificate under  Article  133(1)  of

the Constitution in a  case  decided  by  him.  The  restriction

placed by clause (3) of Article 133 of  the  Constitution  could

not be got over by relying upon the order of the Division Bench.

5. We, therefore,  revoke  the  certificate.  This  petition  of

appeal may, however, be treated  as  a  special  leave  petition

under Article 136 of the Constitution and posted for preliminary

hearing.”

20)   In our considered opinion, the  law  laid  down  in  S.B.I  case

(supra) would squarely apply to  the  case  at  hand  because  in  the

instant case also,  the  impugned  judgment  and  the  certificate  of

fitness to file an appeal was passed by the  Single Judge of the  High

Court.

21)   As held in S.B.I. case, such certificate/leave  could  not  have

been issued/granted by the  Single Judge by reason of  clause  (3)  of

Article 133 of the Constitution. In other words, the Single  Judge  of

the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant certificate in  the  light

of restrictions  contained  in  clause  (3)  of  Article  133  of  the

Constitution.

22)   We, therefore, revoke the certificate  granted  by  the   Single

Judge of the High Court.  However, this appeal is treated as a special

leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution as  was  done  by

this Court in S.B.I case (supra).  Leave is accordingly granted.

23)    Coming now to the merits of the case, the short question, which

arises for consideration in this appeal and  which  was  also  debated

before the two Courts below, is who was in possession of the suit land-

the appellant or the respondents on the date of filing  of  the  suit

and whether the appellant (plaintiff) was entitled to claim  permanent

injunction against the respondents(defendants) in relation to the suit

land.

24)   The  Trial  Court  held  the  appellant  (plaintiff)  to  be  in

possession  of  the  suit  land  and  accordingly  granted   permanent

injunction restraining the respondents (defendants)  from  interfering

in the appellant’s possession over the  suit  land  whereas  the  High

Court in an appeal filed by the respondents reversed  the  finding  of

the Trial Court and dismissed the suit giving rise to filing  of  this

appeal by the plaintiff on certificate.

25)   One cannot dispute the legal proposition being well settled that

the question as to who is  in  possession  of  the  suit  property  is

essentially a question of  fact.  Such  question  is  required  to  be

decided on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in  support

of their respective  contentions.  Once  the  Trial  Court  renders  a

finding either way and the same  is  then  appreciated  by  the  first

appellate Court  in  exercise  of  its  appellate  jurisdiction,  such

finding is usually held binding on the second appellate Court and this

Court.

26)   It is only when such finding of fact is found to be against  the

pleading or evidence or any provision of law or when it is found to be

so perverse or/and arbitrary to the extent that no judicial person  of

an average capacity can ever record, the same would not be binding  on

the higher Courts and may in appropriate case call for interference.

27)   Coming to the facts of  the  case,  we  are  of  the  considered

opinion, that the appellant (plaintiff) simply abused the  process  of

law in filing the suit for permanent injunction  in  relation  to  the

suit land against the respondents.  The  suit,  in  our  opinion,  was

misconceived and deserved  dismissal  on  facts  and  in  law  on  the

grounds, which are indeed apparent on the face of the  record  of  the

case as mentioned below.

28)   Firstly, the legal effect of the coming into force  of  the  Act

was that on and after 01.01.1975 (notified date), the appellant  being

the holder of agriculture lands had no right to sell  or/and  transfer

the suit land whether for consideration or otherwise. In other  words,

the sale/transfer of agriculture land by the holder of  the  land  was

prohibited on and after -01.01.1975 by virtue of the provisions of the

Act. In this view of the matter, the sale made by the  appellant  vide

sale deed dated 16.07.1975 in favour of the respondents in relation to

the suit land was null and void.

29)    Secondly, the Tribunal having rightly held in the  order  dated

21.08.1976 that  the  sale  deed  dated  16.07.1975  executed  by  the

appellant in favour of the respondents was null and  void  because  it

was made in contravention of the provisions of the Act  and  secondly,

having held that the appellant’s total holding was in  excess  of  the

ceiling limits prescribed in the Act, the suit land was not  available

to the appellant for its disposal. Indeed its disposal could  be  done

only  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Act   with   the

intervention of the State.

30)   That apart, one of the legal effects that ensued consequent upon

passing of the order by the Tribunal dated  21.08.1976  was  that  the

character of the suit land had changed. It was then in the  nature  of

“surrendered” or  “deemed surrendered” land in favour of the State  as

prescribed under Sections 10 and 11 and other  related  provisions  of

the Act.

31)   Thirdly, the litigation, which had ensued during 1995-98 between

the appellant and the respondents under  “The Act of 1971″ in relation

to the entries of their  names  in  the  revenue  record  (Pass  Book)

pertaining to the suit land was neither of any consequence and nor was

of any significance and nor had any impact on the present  litigation.

It was for the reason that Section 28 of the Act that gives overriding

effect to the provisions of the Act  on  all  those  laws,  which  are

inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, had applied to this case.

The Act of 1971 is one such law and, therefore, any order passed under

the Act of 1971 in relation to the suit land was of no  avail  to  any

party and nor it could have been made basis for determining the  issue

of possession of any party over the suit land  while  considering  the

grant of injunction.

32)   In other words, no benefit of  the  order(s),  even  if  passed,

under  the Act 1971 could be taken by the parties either  way  against

each other in these proceedings by virtue of Section 28  of  the  Act.

Moreover, in our considered view, no proceedings under  the  Act  1971

could either be initiated or be pursued by  the  appellant/respondents

in relation to the suit  land  after  the  Act  had  come  into  force

(01.01.1975). Even the proceedings under the Act of 1971 were  subject

to the final outcome of the proceedings under the Act.

33)   Fourthly, the appellant did not come to  the  Civil  Court  with

clean hands inasmuch as he suppressed the material fact  that  he  had

already sold the suit land much prior to filing of  the  Suit  to  the

respondents and, therefore, had no subsisting  interest  in  the  suit

land. Indeed filing of the civil suit by  the  appellant  (29.10.1998)

almost after 22 years from the date of passing of  the  order  by  the

Tribunal (21.08.1976) was totally uncalled for.  In  fact,  it  was  a

collusive suit filed to frustrate the rights of the  State  which  had

accrued in State’s favour in the suit land  by  virtue  of  the  order

dated 21.08.1976 read with the provisions of the Act.  Such  frivolous

suit, in our considered opinion, deserved rejection at its threshold.

34)   Fifthly, the Trial Court and the High Court having held  on  the

strength of Tribunal’s finding recorded in the order 21.08.1976  which

has attained finality that the appellant was not the owner of the suit

land, the respondents  too  did  not  acquire  any  right,  title  and

interest in the suit land through sale deed dated 16.07.1975. It being

a settled principle of law that  a  person  can  transfer  only  those

rights, which he has in the property and cannot transfer  any  rights,

which he does not have would apply to this case.

35)   In other words, when the appellant was  prohibited  to  transfer

any of his rights, title and interest in the suit land  by  virtue  of

the provisions of the Act to any person – a fortiori, the  respondents

too could not acquire any rights, title and interest in the suit  land

through sale deed dated 16.07.1975 from the appellant and he too  was,

therefore, in the same position like that of the appellant.

36)   Seventhly, once the appellant’s rights in the  suit  land  stood

determined by the Tribunal vide its order dated 21.08.1976  under  the

Act, there did not arise any occasion to hold the appellant to  be  in

“lawful possession” of the suit land on the date of filing of the suit

(29.10.98) for considering grant of  injunction  over  the  suit  land

against the respondents.

37)    It is a settled  principle  of  law  that  in  order  to  claim

      prohibitory (temporary or permanent) injunction, it is  necessary  for

      the plaintiff to prima facie prove apart from establishing  other  two

      ingredients, namely, irreparable loss and injury that  his  possession

      over the suit land is “legal”.  In this case, it was not so and nor it

      could be for the simple reason that as far  back  on  21.08.1976,  the

      Tribunal had already declared the land held by the plaintiff to be  in

      excess of the ceiling  limits  prescribed  under  the  Act.  In  these

      circumstances, the plaintiff was neither holding the land nor could he

      be held to be in its lawful possession so as to enable him to exercise

      any ownership rights against any other private  party  over  the  suit

      land. The appellant had then very  limited  rights  left  to  exercise

      under the Act in relation to  the  suit  land  and  such  rights  were

      available to him only against the State. Such is not the case here.

38)   Lastly,  this  being  a  simple  suit  for  grant  of  permanent

      injunction between the two private parties in  relation  to  the  land

      which was subject matter of the State Ceiling Laws, was liable  to  be

      dismissed on the short ground apart from many others as detailed above

      that any order that may be passed by the Civil Court  would  adversely

      affect and interfere in the rights of the State under the  Act,  which

      had not been impleaded as party defendant.

39)   Learned counsel  for  the  appellant  took  us  to  the  various

documents including orders of the Revenue authorities to show that  it

was the plaintiff who was in possession of the suit land on  the  date

of filing of the suit as was rightly held  by  the  Trial  Court  and,

therefore, this Court should restore the finding of the Trial Court.

40)    We are afraid we cannot re-appreciate  the  documentary  or/and

oral evidence again in our appellate jurisdiction. Firstly,  it is not

permissible for want of any case made out to that effect and secondly,

it is not considered necessary in the  light  of  what  we  have  held

above.

41)   Learned counsel for the appellant  placed  reliance  on  several

decisions in support of his submission such as Nagubai  Ammal  &  Ors.

vs. B. Shama Rao & Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593,  Bhagwati  Prasad  vs.  Shri

Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735, Pinninti Kishtamma &  Ors.  vs.  Duvvada

Parasuram Chowdary & Ors. 2010 (2) SCC 452, State of  Tamil  Nadu  vs.

Ramalinga Samigal Madam, 1985 (4) SCC 10, Annamreddi  Bodayya  &  Anr.

vs. Lokanarapu Ramaswamy(Dead) by L.Rs. 1984 Suppl SCC  391,  Anathula

Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy(D) by L.Rs., 2008 (4)  SCC  594,  Rajendra

Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (1998) 7 SCC  654  and  Karnail

Singh vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (1995) Suppl(3) SCC  376.  We  have

perused  these  decisions  and  find  no  quarrel  with  the   general

proposition of law laid down therein. In our view, all  the  decisions

cited are distinguishable on facts and hence have  no  application  to

the facts of this case.

42)   It is pertinent to mention that in order to limit filing of such

      frivolous suits by the private parties  in  relation  to  agricultural

      land which are subjected to the State ceiling laws, the State of  M.P.

      amended the Code of Civil Procedure by  Act  No.  29  of  1984  w.e.f.

      14.8.84. By this State amendment, Rule 3-B was added in Order  1  Rule

      10 making it obligatory upon the plaintiff to  implead  the  State  as

      party defendant along with private party defendant in every such suit.

      The amendment further provides that so long as the plaintiff does  not

      implead the State as party defendant in the suit, the Court  will  not

      proceed with the trial of the Suit. The object behind introducing such

      amendment was to give notice to the State of filing of  such  suit  by

      the holder of the agricultural land which would enable  the  State  to

      defend their rights, which had accrued in State’s favour in  the  land

      under the Act.

43)   In the absence of any such rule in operation  in  the  State  of

      A.P., the State remained unnoticed  of  the  suit  proceedings,  which

      continued in Courts for last more than two decades.

44)   In view  of  foregoing  discussion,  we  uphold  the  conclusion

arrived at by the High Court  on  our  reasoning  given  supra.  As  a

consequence, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.

45)   Before parting, we  consider  it  apposite  to  state  that  the

      appellant and the respondents made frantic efforts to  somehow  retain

      the suit land to them and keep the land away from the clutches of  The

      Act.  With this aim in view, they got the suit land involved  in  this

      litigation since 1976. All this was done without notice to  the  State

      Authorities.

46)   We, therefore,  direct the Tribunal to take up the case  of  the

      appellant on its Board and pass appropriate  consequential  order,  if

      necessary under the Act keeping in view the order dated 21.08.1976  of

      the Tribunal passed in  CC No. 2311/VKD/75 and take all remedial steps

      as are necessary in  relation  to  the  land  held  by  the  appellant

      including the suit land.

47)   Registry is directed to  send  a  copy  of  this  order  to  the

concerned Tribunal.

……………………………………….J.

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

……………………………………..J.

[NAVIN SINHA]

New Delhi;

April 13, 2017