REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1534 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.1439 of 2017) N. Harihara Krishnan … Appellant Versus J. Thomas … Respondent J U D G M E N T Chelameswar, J. 1. Leave Granted 2. M/s. Norton Granites & Spinners (P) Ltd. (hereafter… Read More Section 138 -to implead M/s DAKSHIN GRANITES PVT. LTD. – No impleading of company after barred by limitation and without complaining sec.138 statutory notice – not curable defect = (1) that a person drew a cheque on an account maintained by him with the banker; (2) that such a cheque when presented to the bank is returned by the bank unpaid; (3) that such a cheque was presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date it was drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier; (4) that the payee demanded in writing from the drawer of the cheque the payment of the amount of money due under the cheque to payee; and (5) such a notice of payment is made within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the information by the payee from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. It is obvious from the scheme of Section 138 that each one of the ingredients flows from a document which evidences the existence of such an ingredient. The only other ingredient which is required to be proved to establish the commission of an offence under Section 138 is that inspite of the demand notice referred to above, the drawer of the cheque failed to make the payment within a period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the demand.- failure to comply with any one of the steps contemplated under Section 138 would not provide “cause of action for prosecution”. Therefore, in the context of a prosecution under Section 138, the concept of taking cognizance of the offence but not the offender is not appropriate = whether the respondent had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint against DAKSHIN within the period prescribed under THE ACT is not examined by either of the courts below. As rightly pointed out, the application, which is the subject matter of the instant appeal purportedly filed invoking Section 319 CrPC, is only a device by which the respondent seeks to initiate prosecution against DAKSHIN beyond the period of limitation stipulated under the Act -No doubt Section 142 authorises the Court to condone the delay in appropriate cases. We find no reason to condone the delay. The justification advanced by the respondent that it is during the course of the trial, the respondent realized that the cheque in question was drawn on the account of DAKSHIN is a manifestly false statement. On the face of the cheque, it is clear that it was drawn on account of DAKSHIN. Admittedly the respondent issued a notice contemplated under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 to DAKSHIN. The judgment under appeal is contrary to the language of THE ACT as expounded by this Court in Aneeta Hada (supra) and, therefore, cannot be sustained. The judgment is, accordingly, set aside. The appeal is allowed.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11106 OF 2017 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) NO. 7149 OF 2015) Prem Prakash …. Appellant(s) Versus Santosh Kumar Jain & Sons (HUF) and Another …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T R.K. Agrawal, J. 1) Leave… Read More Section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 – Sub-tenancy or sub-letting =whether in the present facts and circumstances of the case the order of eviction passed by the High Court was just and proper?- In the present facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the original owner-respondent No. 1 herein has proved beyond doubt that the property is in exclusive possession of the sub-tenant and the appellant herein has not been able to deny the claim of sub-tenancy in favour of Respondent No. 2. The absence of evidence and failure to discharge the onus lay heavy on appellant and there could be no presumption other than that the suit premises had been sublet and parted with possession by the appellant herein to the Respondent No. 2.
1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO 494 OF 2012 JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.), AND ANR. ..Petitioners VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ..Respondents WITH T.C. (CIVIL) NO 151 OF 2013 T.C. (CIVIL) NO 152 OF 2013 W.P.(CIVIL) NO 833 OF 2013 W.P.(CIVIL) NO 829 OF 2013… Read More Aadhar Card – Right to Privacy
1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.10269 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.15862 of 2010) M/s. National Building Construction ….. Appellant Versus State of Maharashtra & Ors. ….. Respondents J U D G M E N T A.M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. The present appeal arises out… Read More contract works= correcting the typographical error in the CSR rates was not an act of modification of those rates as such. =That act cannot be construed as retrospective change introduced in the CSR by the respondents. The High Court has justly rejected this plea by giving an illustration that if the CSR rates were to be misprinted as Re.1 or Rs. 2 per cubic metre for the financial year 1981-82, the appellant would not have agreed to be bound by such rate. ; when the terms of contract are clear, no other facts are permitted to sway away the terms of contract =Trial Court was swayed away by the fact that the appellant was required to transport water from some distance via Kaccha Road for which the appellant was entitled to such claim. The High Court in paragraph 21 of the impugned judgment, however, considered the said claim of the appellant with reference to the contract document. In that, Clause “d” of tender Item No.8, pertaining to watering and mechanized compaction of earth work, clearly stated that the rates for earthwork raising are inclusive of watering and compaction at optimum moisture content. Further, in Clause “d” of Item No.8, it has been made amply clear that no extra payment for these items would be given.
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Original Civil Jurisdiction Writ Petition (C) No. 118 of 2016 Shayara Bano … Petitioner versus Union of India and others … Respondents with Suo Motu Writ (C) No. 2 of 2015 In Re: Muslim Women’s Quest For Equality versus Jamiat Ulma-I-Hind Writ Petition(C) No. 288 of 2016 Aafreen… Read More Triple Talaq – – A Land Mark Judgment of Full Bench
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No…8381 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.21772 of 2012) MANIPAL UNIVERSITY & ANR. …. Appellant(s) Versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T L. NAGESWARA RAO, J. Leave granted. The instant Appeal arises from a… Read More I. Whether the MCI is the competent authority/justified to issue direction disallowing the Appellant to make admissions in the NRI quota for three years? II. Whether the decision in PA Inamdar (supra) operates retrospectively with respect to the letter dated 08.02.2005? III. Whether the decision in PA Inamdar applies to Deemed Universities or only to private colleges?
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2841-2843 OF 2017 (@ S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 22616-22618 of 2016) Roger Shashoua & Others …Appellant(s) Versus Mukesh Sharma & Others …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Though innumerable facts have been graphically stated in the petitions seeking… Read More “seat of arbitration and venue of arbitration”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION SUO-MOTU CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1 OF 2017 IN THE MATTER OF: In Re, Hon’ble Shri Justice C.S. Karnan J U D G M E N T Jagdish Singh Khehar, CJI 1. The task at our hands is unpleasant. It concerns actions of a Judge of… Read More criminal contempt, committed by Shri Justice C.S. Karnan.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.12171219 OF 2017 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 26402642 of 2016] Ms. Eera Through… Read More interpretation of Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, “the POCSO Act”), and the primary argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the definition in Section 2(d) that defines “child” to mean any person below the age of 18 years, should engulf and embrace, in its connotative expanse, the “mental age” of a person or the age determined by the prevalent science pertaining to psychiatry so that a mentally retarded person or an extremely intellectually challenged person who even has crossed the biological age of 18 years can be included within the holistic conception of the term “child”.