Regard being had to the above, we declare Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, insofar as it imposes two further conditions for release on bail, to be unconstitutional as it violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. All the matters before us in which bail has been denied, because of the presence of the twin conditions contained in Section 45, will now go back to the respective Courts which denied bail. All such orders are set aside, and the cases remanded to the respective Courts to be heard on merits, without application of the twin conditions contained in Section 45 of the 2002 Act.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL/APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 67 OF 2017 NIKESH TARACHAND SHAH …PETITIONER VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ANR. …RESPONDENTS WITH WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.103 OF 2017 WITH WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.144 OF 2017 WITH WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.152 OF 2017 WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2012… Read More Regard being had to the above, we declare Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, insofar as it imposes two further conditions for release on bail, to be unconstitutional as it violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. All the matters before us in which bail has been denied, because of the presence of the twin conditions contained in Section 45, will now go back to the respective Courts which denied bail. All such orders are set aside, and the cases remanded to the respective Courts to be heard on merits, without application of the twin conditions contained in Section 45 of the 2002 Act.

probation of will – “24. Caveat. – Any person intending to oppose the issuing of a grant of probate or letters of administration must either personally or by his Advocate acting on the Original Side file a caveat in the Registry in Form No.12. Notice of the filing of the caveat shall be given by the Registrar to the petitioner or his Advocate acting on the Original Side. (Form No.13). “25. Affidavit in support of caveat.—Where a caveat is entered after an application has been made for a grant of probate or letters of administration with or without the will annexed, the affidavit or affidavits in support shall be filed within eight days of the caveat being lodged, notwithstanding the long vacation. Such affidavit shall state the right and interest of caveator, and the grounds of the objections to the application.” – no hard and fast rule can be laid down. The existence of a caveatable interest would depend upon the fact situation of each case. In the instant case, the High Court found that the Appellant has caveatable interest, but the caveat filed by the Appellant was discharged on the ground that the affidavit filed in support thereof was bereft of an averment doubting the due execution of the Will dated 22.04.2013. For the reasons stated supra, we are satisfied that the affidavit filed in support of the caveat fulfils the condition of Rule 25.

1 Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos.19635-19636 of 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil ) Nos.28643-28644 of 2017) YASH VARDHAN MALL …. Appellant Versus TEJASH DOSHI ….Respondent J U D G M E N T L. NAGESWARA RAO, J. Leave granted. A Will was executed by Smt. Shrutika… Read More probation of will – “24. Caveat. – Any person intending to oppose the issuing of a grant of probate or letters of administration must either personally or by his Advocate acting on the Original Side file a caveat in the Registry in Form No.12. Notice of the filing of the caveat shall be given by the Registrar to the petitioner or his Advocate acting on the Original Side. (Form No.13). “25. Affidavit in support of caveat.—Where a caveat is entered after an application has been made for a grant of probate or letters of administration with or without the will annexed, the affidavit or affidavits in support shall be filed within eight days of the caveat being lodged, notwithstanding the long vacation. Such affidavit shall state the right and interest of caveator, and the grounds of the objections to the application.” – no hard and fast rule can be laid down. The existence of a caveatable interest would depend upon the fact situation of each case. In the instant case, the High Court found that the Appellant has caveatable interest, but the caveat filed by the Appellant was discharged on the ground that the affidavit filed in support thereof was bereft of an averment doubting the due execution of the Will dated 22.04.2013. For the reasons stated supra, we are satisfied that the affidavit filed in support of the caveat fulfils the condition of Rule 25.

SUIT FOR POSSESSION – DEFENCE AGREEMENT OF SALE – LONG STANDING POSSESSION BY CONSTRUCTING BUILDING- SUIT DISMISSED – 1. SUIT IS HIT BY SOCIETY ACT 2.NON-EXAMINATION OF WITNESS OF SALE DEED 3. ADVERSEPOSSESSION – APPEAL – REVERSED FIRST AND THIRD POINTS BUT DISMISSED ON SECOND POINT – HIGHCOURT – REVERSED THE FINDING OF APPEALLANT COURT ON SECOND POINT ALSO AND DECREED THE SUIT- APEX COURT CONFIRMED THE ORDERS OF HIGH COURT AND HLED THAT WITNESS IS NOT COMPULOSRY TO EXAMINE FOR PROVING SALE DEED- CLAIMED TITLE UNDER AGREEMENT OF SALE – NO BETTER TITLE THAN THE PLAINTIFF – NO ADVERSEPOSSESSION – PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED FOR POSSESSION examination of witness to prove sale deed is not compulsory – It is for the reasons that, firstly, the execution of the sale deed does not need any attesting witness like the gift deed, which requires at least two attesting witnesses at the time of its execution as per Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; and Secondly, Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which deals with the examination of the attesting witness to prove the execution of the document, does not apply to sale deed, which is 1 governed by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not in dispute that the appellant (defendant) in this case did not dispute the respondent’s vendor’s (Housing Society) title. On the other hand, she, in clear terms, admitted their title in her written statement. It is also not in dispute that the respondent entered in witness box and proved its execution and further did not raise any objection when the sale deed was being exhibited in evidence and indeed, rightly for want of any legal basis. 22) In the light of these admitted facts, we are of the view that the sale deed dated 29.12.1981 was duly proved by the respondent and was, therefore, rightly relied on by the High Court for passing a decree of possession against the appellant. It was, in our opinion, a clear case where the respondent had a better title of the suit land as against the 1 appellant, who had no title to the suit land. All that the appellant had was a plea of adverse possession which was not held proved.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 19625 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No. 27725/2014) Smt.Bayanabai Kaware …Appellant(s) VERSUS Rajendra S/o Baburao Dhote …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal is filed by the defendant… Read More SUIT FOR POSSESSION – DEFENCE AGREEMENT OF SALE – LONG STANDING POSSESSION BY CONSTRUCTING BUILDING- SUIT DISMISSED – 1. SUIT IS HIT BY SOCIETY ACT 2.NON-EXAMINATION OF WITNESS OF SALE DEED 3. ADVERSEPOSSESSION – APPEAL – REVERSED FIRST AND THIRD POINTS BUT DISMISSED ON SECOND POINT – HIGHCOURT – REVERSED THE FINDING OF APPEALLANT COURT ON SECOND POINT ALSO AND DECREED THE SUIT- APEX COURT CONFIRMED THE ORDERS OF HIGH COURT AND HLED THAT WITNESS IS NOT COMPULOSRY TO EXAMINE FOR PROVING SALE DEED- CLAIMED TITLE UNDER AGREEMENT OF SALE – NO BETTER TITLE THAN THE PLAINTIFF – NO ADVERSEPOSSESSION – PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED FOR POSSESSION examination of witness to prove sale deed is not compulsory – It is for the reasons that, firstly, the execution of the sale deed does not need any attesting witness like the gift deed, which requires at least two attesting witnesses at the time of its execution as per Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; and Secondly, Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which deals with the examination of the attesting witness to prove the execution of the document, does not apply to sale deed, which is 1 governed by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not in dispute that the appellant (defendant) in this case did not dispute the respondent’s vendor’s (Housing Society) title. On the other hand, she, in clear terms, admitted their title in her written statement. It is also not in dispute that the respondent entered in witness box and proved its execution and further did not raise any objection when the sale deed was being exhibited in evidence and indeed, rightly for want of any legal basis. 22) In the light of these admitted facts, we are of the view that the sale deed dated 29.12.1981 was duly proved by the respondent and was, therefore, rightly relied on by the High Court for passing a decree of possession against the appellant. It was, in our opinion, a clear case where the respondent had a better title of the suit land as against the 1 appellant, who had no title to the suit land. All that the appellant had was a plea of adverse possession which was not held proved.

under Rule 126L(2) of the Defence of India Rules, 19621 (hereinafter referred to as “the RULES”). They found 240 kilograms of gold (bars etc.) buried in the house and seized it.= Prior to the GOLD ACT, seizure and confiscation of gold were authorised by the RULES. Though, by virtue of the fiction created under Section 116, the confiscations adjudged under the RULES are deemed to be confiscations adjudged under the GOLD ACT, the Scheme and the limitations of such fiction are already explained earlier in para 29. Therefore, neither Section 73 nor the definition under Section 2(v), in our opinion, would be applicable for the confiscations adjudged under the RULES – pursuant to a seizure that took place before the commencement of the GOLD ACT.-The conclusion of the Tribunal that the fine in lieu of confiscation must be equal to the value of the gold as on the date of its seizure is not based on any principle of law. For the reasons already recorded by us earlier, the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the fine in lieu of confiscation must represent the value of the gold so confiscated as on the date (9.12.94) the appellant was given an option to pay the fine in lieu of confiscation. Even according to the said order of the Collector, the value of the gold as on that date was Rs.11.04 crores.- We find the submission wholly justified. We, therefore, deem it proper to direct that the appellant would be entitled to redeem the gold by paying not only the fine of Rs.11.04 crores but also the interest thereon calculated @ 10% p.a.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4711-4712 OF 2011 Gunwantlal Godawat … Appellant Versus Union of India & Another … Respondents J U D G M E N T Chelameswar, J. 1. On 3rd and 4th June, 1965, the residential premises of the appellant’s father were searched… Read More under Rule 126L(2) of the Defence of India Rules, 19621 (hereinafter referred to as “the RULES”). They found 240 kilograms of gold (bars etc.) buried in the house and seized it.= Prior to the GOLD ACT, seizure and confiscation of gold were authorised by the RULES. Though, by virtue of the fiction created under Section 116, the confiscations adjudged under the RULES are deemed to be confiscations adjudged under the GOLD ACT, the Scheme and the limitations of such fiction are already explained earlier in para 29. Therefore, neither Section 73 nor the definition under Section 2(v), in our opinion, would be applicable for the confiscations adjudged under the RULES – pursuant to a seizure that took place before the commencement of the GOLD ACT.-The conclusion of the Tribunal that the fine in lieu of confiscation must be equal to the value of the gold as on the date of its seizure is not based on any principle of law. For the reasons already recorded by us earlier, the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the fine in lieu of confiscation must represent the value of the gold so confiscated as on the date (9.12.94) the appellant was given an option to pay the fine in lieu of confiscation. Even according to the said order of the Collector, the value of the gold as on that date was Rs.11.04 crores.- We find the submission wholly justified. We, therefore, deem it proper to direct that the appellant would be entitled to redeem the gold by paying not only the fine of Rs.11.04 crores but also the interest thereon calculated @ 10% p.a.

without pleadings, no evidence or no arguments can be considered = First, the respondent (defendant) had not raised such plea in his written statement. In other words, the respondent did not set up such defense in the written statement. Second, the Trial Court, therefore, had no occasion to frame any issue on such plea for want of any factual foundation in the written statement. Third, the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, in these circumstances, had no occasion to record any finding on this plea either way. Fourth, in the light of these three reasonings, the High Court ought to have seen that such plea really did not arise for consideration because in 11 order that any question is involved in the case, the party concerned should lay its factual foundation in the pleading and invite finding on such plea. Fifth, the High Court failed to see the case set up by the respondent in his written statement. As mentioned above, the defense of the respondent was that he had denied the appellant’s title over the suit shop and then set up a plea of adverse possession contending that he has become the owner of the suit shop by virtue of adverse possession, which according to him, was from time immemorial. we are of the considered view that the Trial Court and First Appellate Court were justified in holding the appellant to be the owner of the suit shop, having purchased the same vide registered sale deed dated 20.09.1997 from its previous owner. It was also rightly held that the respondent was in possession 15 of the suit shop as an encroacher and failed to prove his adverse possession over the suit shop. These findings being concurrent findings of fact were binding on the High Court and, therefore, the second appeal should have been dismissed in limine as involving no substantial question of law.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 19421 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.22894/2014) Sri Shivaji Balaram Haibatti ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Sri Avinash Maruthi Pawar …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is filed by the… Read More without pleadings, no evidence or no arguments can be considered = First, the respondent (defendant) had not raised such plea in his written statement. In other words, the respondent did not set up such defense in the written statement. Second, the Trial Court, therefore, had no occasion to frame any issue on such plea for want of any factual foundation in the written statement. Third, the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, in these circumstances, had no occasion to record any finding on this plea either way. Fourth, in the light of these three reasonings, the High Court ought to have seen that such plea really did not arise for consideration because in 11 order that any question is involved in the case, the party concerned should lay its factual foundation in the pleading and invite finding on such plea. Fifth, the High Court failed to see the case set up by the respondent in his written statement. As mentioned above, the defense of the respondent was that he had denied the appellant’s title over the suit shop and then set up a plea of adverse possession contending that he has become the owner of the suit shop by virtue of adverse possession, which according to him, was from time immemorial. we are of the considered view that the Trial Court and First Appellate Court were justified in holding the appellant to be the owner of the suit shop, having purchased the same vide registered sale deed dated 20.09.1997 from its previous owner. It was also rightly held that the respondent was in possession 15 of the suit shop as an encroacher and failed to prove his adverse possession over the suit shop. These findings being concurrent findings of fact were binding on the High Court and, therefore, the second appeal should have been dismissed in limine as involving no substantial question of law.

Six FIRs were registered in different Police Stations in the State of Gujarat against six different Co-Operative Housing Societies for commission of various offences alleged to have been committed by the President, Office Bearers and other persons of the six Societies under Sections 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471,120-B and 477-A of the Indian Penal 2 Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) = Needless to say that when all the six cases are filed in the concerned Courts, they would be clubbed together and tried by one competent Court in accordance with law. = The parties are at liberty, at an appropriate stage, to move to the High Court with a prayer to club and then transfer all the six cases to one competent Court.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.1947-1956 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (Crl) Nos.1218-1227/2014) Chirag M. Pathak & Ors. Etc.Etc. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Dollyben Kantilal & Ors. ….Respondent(s) With Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos.869-878 of 2014 J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1)… Read More Six FIRs were registered in different Police Stations in the State of Gujarat against six different Co-Operative Housing Societies for commission of various offences alleged to have been committed by the President, Office Bearers and other persons of the six Societies under Sections 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471,120-B and 477-A of the Indian Penal 2 Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) = Needless to say that when all the six cases are filed in the concerned Courts, they would be clubbed together and tried by one competent Court in accordance with law. = The parties are at liberty, at an appropriate stage, to move to the High Court with a prayer to club and then transfer all the six cases to one competent Court.

. The selection of District & Sessions Judges in the Kerala Higher Judicial Service in the year 2015- Tej Prakash Pathak and others v. Rajesthan High Court and others2 has, however, specifically doubted the correctness of Manjusree (supra) on the point whether “….changing the rules of the game after the game was 2 (2013) 4 SCC 540 4 played…. is clearly impermissible” and has made a Reference to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. It is also relevant in this context to note that Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur At Imphal and Anr.3 which dealt with almost a similar issue was heard by a three Judge Bench in view of the difference of opinion and it has also since been posted along with Tej Prakash (supra) by order dated 10.08.2017. Hence, it is only appropriate to refer this matter also to the larger bench to be heard along with Tej Prakash (supra). Ordered accordingly.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 229 OF 2017 Sivanandan C.T. & Ors. … Petitioner (s) Versus High Court of Kerala & Ors. … Respondent (s) WITH WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 232 OF 2017, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 379 OF 2017, AND WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 618 OF… Read More . The selection of District & Sessions Judges in the Kerala Higher Judicial Service in the year 2015- Tej Prakash Pathak and others v. Rajesthan High Court and others2 has, however, specifically doubted the correctness of Manjusree (supra) on the point whether “….changing the rules of the game after the game was 2 (2013) 4 SCC 540 4 played…. is clearly impermissible” and has made a Reference to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. It is also relevant in this context to note that Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur At Imphal and Anr.3 which dealt with almost a similar issue was heard by a three Judge Bench in view of the difference of opinion and it has also since been posted along with Tej Prakash (supra) by order dated 10.08.2017. Hence, it is only appropriate to refer this matter also to the larger bench to be heard along with Tej Prakash (supra). Ordered accordingly.