whether the prosecution succeeded in proving the existence of common object amongst the accused persons and whether the accused persons acted in prosecution of the common object and that the accused persons knew that the death was likely to be committed, to convict the accused under Section 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC.= Section 149 IPC consists of two parts:  The first part of the section means that there exists common object and that the offence has been committed in prosecution of the common object. In order that the offence may fall within the first part, the offence must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was member.  The second part of the section means that even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section149, if it can be shown that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed. What is important in each case is to find out if the offence was committed to accomplish the common object of the assembly or was the one which the members knew to be likely to be committed. Once the court finds that the ingredients of Section 149 IPC are fulfilled, every person who at the time of committing that offence was a member of the assembly has to be held guilty of that offence. After such a finding, it would not be open to the court to see as to who actually did the offensive act nor would it be open to the court to require the prosecution to prove which of the members did which of the above two ingredients. Before recording the conviction under Section 149 IPC, the essential ingredients of Section 141 IPC must be established. = Conviction of accused Nos. 4 to 10 [Selvam (A4), Antony Innasi (A5), Charles (A6), Jerone (A7), Edwinson (A8), Raj (A9) and Elizabethan (A10)] under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC is set aside and they are acquitted of the same.

  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 413 OF 2012 JOSEPH …Appellant Versus STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE ….Respondent With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.585 OF 2013 SAHAYAM AND ORS. ….Appellants Versus STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE AND ANR. ….Respondents And CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.662 OF 2016 EDWINSON …Appellant… Read More whether the prosecution succeeded in proving the existence of common object amongst the accused persons and whether the accused persons acted in prosecution of the common object and that the accused persons knew that the death was likely to be committed, to convict the accused under Section 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC.= Section 149 IPC consists of two parts:  The first part of the section means that there exists common object and that the offence has been committed in prosecution of the common object. In order that the offence may fall within the first part, the offence must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was member.  The second part of the section means that even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section149, if it can be shown that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed. What is important in each case is to find out if the offence was committed to accomplish the common object of the assembly or was the one which the members knew to be likely to be committed. Once the court finds that the ingredients of Section 149 IPC are fulfilled, every person who at the time of committing that offence was a member of the assembly has to be held guilty of that offence. After such a finding, it would not be open to the court to see as to who actually did the offensive act nor would it be open to the court to require the prosecution to prove which of the members did which of the above two ingredients. Before recording the conviction under Section 149 IPC, the essential ingredients of Section 141 IPC must be established. = Conviction of accused Nos. 4 to 10 [Selvam (A4), Antony Innasi (A5), Charles (A6), Jerone (A7), Edwinson (A8), Raj (A9) and Elizabethan (A10)] under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC is set aside and they are acquitted of the same.

whether any case on facts is made out for grant of bail by the accused or not.= No superior Court in hierarchical jurisdiction can issue such direction/mandamus to any subordinate Court commanding them to pass a particular order on any application filed by any party. The judicial independence of every Court in passing the orders in cases is well settled. It cannot be interfered with by any Court including superior Court.- It is for this reason, in our view, such directions were wholly uncalled for and should not have been given. This Court cannot countenance issuing of such direction by the High Court. In our view, at best, the High Court could have made an observation to the effect that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 (accused persons) are at liberty to approach the Sessions Judge for grant of bail and, if any application is filed, it would be decided by the Sessions Judge on its merits and in accordance with law expeditiously but not beyond it.We are, therefore, constrained to set aside the direction given by the High Court to the Sessions Judge to “consider and allow” the bail application made by respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in Sessions Trial Case No.44/2016 on the same day on which it was moved. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order to the extent indicated above is set aside. The Session Judge would now decide the application for bail, if made by Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, on its merits and in accordance with law, if not so far decided.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2178 OF 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.8030 of 2017) Madan Mohan ….Appellant(s) VERSUS State of Rajasthan & Ors. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal is filed by the Complainant… Read More whether any case on facts is made out for grant of bail by the accused or not.= No superior Court in hierarchical jurisdiction can issue such direction/mandamus to any subordinate Court commanding them to pass a particular order on any application filed by any party. The judicial independence of every Court in passing the orders in cases is well settled. It cannot be interfered with by any Court including superior Court.- It is for this reason, in our view, such directions were wholly uncalled for and should not have been given. This Court cannot countenance issuing of such direction by the High Court. In our view, at best, the High Court could have made an observation to the effect that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 (accused persons) are at liberty to approach the Sessions Judge for grant of bail and, if any application is filed, it would be decided by the Sessions Judge on its merits and in accordance with law expeditiously but not beyond it.We are, therefore, constrained to set aside the direction given by the High Court to the Sessions Judge to “consider and allow” the bail application made by respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in Sessions Trial Case No.44/2016 on the same day on which it was moved. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order to the extent indicated above is set aside. The Session Judge would now decide the application for bail, if made by Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, on its merits and in accordance with law, if not so far decided.

the appellants are not entitled for appointment, since their claim is highly belated. = to appoint the appellants to the post of Excise and Taxation Inspector, within a period of one month from today, without disturbing any appointments already made, while applying the principle of horizontal reservation. In order to avoid any future litigation, we make it clear that the appellants shall be entitled to seniority only from the date of joining the service.

  NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 21848-21850/2017 (ARISING FROM SLP (C) NOS.1842-1844 OF 2017) MANISH KATHURIA AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 21851/2017 (ARISING FROM SLP (C) NO.11010 OF 2017) J U D G M… Read More the appellants are not entitled for appointment, since their claim is highly belated. = to appoint the appellants to the post of Excise and Taxation Inspector, within a period of one month from today, without disturbing any appointments already made, while applying the principle of horizontal reservation. In order to avoid any future litigation, we make it clear that the appellants shall be entitled to seniority only from the date of joining the service.

declaration that the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976, the Standards of Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act, 1985 and the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977 are not applicable to services rendered in the premises of hotels/restaurants. = We are, therefore, of the view that neither the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 read with the enactment of 1985, or the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, would apply so as to interdict the sale of mineral water in hotels and restaurants at prices which are above the MRP.

  1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 21790 OF 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 28685/2015) FEDERATION OF HOTEL AND RESTAURANT ASSOCIATIONS OF INDIA Appellant VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 21791 OF 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 27629/2015)… Read More declaration that the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976, the Standards of Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act, 1985 and the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977 are not applicable to services rendered in the premises of hotels/restaurants. = We are, therefore, of the view that neither the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 read with the enactment of 1985, or the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, would apply so as to interdict the sale of mineral water in hotels and restaurants at prices which are above the MRP.

Section 2 of the Partition Act = whether the appellant, having not challenged the preliminary decree, may challenge the final decree. It is contended that the High Court could not have modified the preliminary decree. We find it difficult to appreciate this contention. No doubt, the preliminary decree was for partition by metes and bounds. But at the stage of final decree, the High Court, having regard to the peculiar facts of this case, addressed the question of impracticability of partitioning a small pathway which is around 6 feet wide by metes and bounds. The High Court has also referred to Section 2 of the Partition Act in that regard. In the facts of this case and having regard to the provision under Section 2 of the Partition Act, the view taken by the High Court cannot be faulted However, we find that the amount fixed by the High Court i.e. Rs.50,000/- for the total share, in our view, as on date is too low. Therefore, in the fitness of things and in the interest of justice it would only be just and proper to direct the respondent to pay a further sum of Rs.1,00,000/- in addition to what the High Court has already fixed. Ordered accordingly.

  NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 21804-21805/2017 (ARISING FROM SLP (C) NOS.7476-7477 OF 2015) S. ESABELLA PETITIONER(S) VERSUS C. THANKARAJAN RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J. Leave granted. 2. The appellant has approached this Court challenging the orders passed by the High… Read More Section 2 of the Partition Act = whether the appellant, having not challenged the preliminary decree, may challenge the final decree. It is contended that the High Court could not have modified the preliminary decree. We find it difficult to appreciate this contention. No doubt, the preliminary decree was for partition by metes and bounds. But at the stage of final decree, the High Court, having regard to the peculiar facts of this case, addressed the question of impracticability of partitioning a small pathway which is around 6 feet wide by metes and bounds. The High Court has also referred to Section 2 of the Partition Act in that regard. In the facts of this case and having regard to the provision under Section 2 of the Partition Act, the view taken by the High Court cannot be faulted However, we find that the amount fixed by the High Court i.e. Rs.50,000/- for the total share, in our view, as on date is too low. Therefore, in the fitness of things and in the interest of justice it would only be just and proper to direct the respondent to pay a further sum of Rs.1,00,000/- in addition to what the High Court has already fixed. Ordered accordingly.

Section 28A of The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – No doubt, the second application dated 27.05.2009 for re-fixation in light of the appellate court judgment is not maintainable. However, since the Collector is also at fault in deciding the application when the matter was pending in appeal, we are of the view that in the peculiar facts of the instant case, the application dated 31.12.1992 should be considered afresh. The Land Acquisition Collector is directed to consider afresh the Section 28A application dated 31.12.1992 and pass orders in the light of the judgment of the High Court dated 23.03.2009 in First Appeal Nos.569 and 570 of 1997 on the file of the High Court of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad. For enabling the Collector to pass orders as above, the order dated 25.10.2000 is set aside. However, the amounts already paid are to be duly adjusted.

  REPORTABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 21792 OF 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) No. 16449/2016) BHARATSING S/O GULABSINGH JAKHAD & ORS. … APPELLANT (S) VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. … RESPONDENT (S) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.: Leave granted. 2. What is… Read More Section 28A of The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – No doubt, the second application dated 27.05.2009 for re-fixation in light of the appellate court judgment is not maintainable. However, since the Collector is also at fault in deciding the application when the matter was pending in appeal, we are of the view that in the peculiar facts of the instant case, the application dated 31.12.1992 should be considered afresh. The Land Acquisition Collector is directed to consider afresh the Section 28A application dated 31.12.1992 and pass orders in the light of the judgment of the High Court dated 23.03.2009 in First Appeal Nos.569 and 570 of 1997 on the file of the High Court of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad. For enabling the Collector to pass orders as above, the order dated 25.10.2000 is set aside. However, the amounts already paid are to be duly adjusted.

the case of Mrs. Pritam (Plaintiff No.2) falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act insofar as it relates to the suit house.=“life interest” means an interest which determines on the termination of life. It is incapable of being transferred by such person to others being personal in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the “life interest” only during his/her lifetime which is extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case here. Her “life interest” in the suit house was extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016.- The facts of the case of Sadhu Singh were that the husband executed a Will in favour of his wife of his self-acquired property in 1968. Though he gave to wife absolute rights in the properties bequeathed but some restrictions were put on her right to sell/mortgage the properties and further it was mentioned in the Will that the said properties after wife’s death would go to testator’s nephew. Due to these restrictions put by the testator on his wife’s right to sell/mortgage, it was held that the wife received only the “life interest” in the properties by Will and such “life interest”, being a “restricted estate” within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the Act, did not enlarge and nor ripen into the absolute interest under Section 14(1) but remained a “life interest” i.e. “restricted estate” under Section 14(2) of the Act. It was held that such disposition made by the husband in favour of his wife was permissible in law in the light of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act. In our view, the facts of the case on hand are similar to the facts of Sadhu Singh’s case(supra) and, therefore, this case is fully covered by the law laid down in Sadhu Singh’s case.

  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 21784 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.32044/2016) Mr. Ranvir Dewan …Appellant(s) VERSUS Mrs. Rashmi Khanna & Anr. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is filed by… Read More the case of Mrs. Pritam (Plaintiff No.2) falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act insofar as it relates to the suit house.=“life interest” means an interest which determines on the termination of life. It is incapable of being transferred by such person to others being personal in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the “life interest” only during his/her lifetime which is extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case here. Her “life interest” in the suit house was extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016.- The facts of the case of Sadhu Singh were that the husband executed a Will in favour of his wife of his self-acquired property in 1968. Though he gave to wife absolute rights in the properties bequeathed but some restrictions were put on her right to sell/mortgage the properties and further it was mentioned in the Will that the said properties after wife’s death would go to testator’s nephew. Due to these restrictions put by the testator on his wife’s right to sell/mortgage, it was held that the wife received only the “life interest” in the properties by Will and such “life interest”, being a “restricted estate” within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the Act, did not enlarge and nor ripen into the absolute interest under Section 14(1) but remained a “life interest” i.e. “restricted estate” under Section 14(2) of the Act. It was held that such disposition made by the husband in favour of his wife was permissible in law in the light of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act. In our view, the facts of the case on hand are similar to the facts of Sadhu Singh’s case(supra) and, therefore, this case is fully covered by the law laid down in Sadhu Singh’s case.