whether the Division Bench was right in dismissing the appeals “as not pressed”. = In our opinion, neither there was any express prayer made by the MUDA and nor it could be inferred from the document relied on by the Division Bench at the instance of respondents (writ petitioners) for forming an opinion “not to press the appeal”. In other words, the opinion formed by the High Court for dismissing the appeals “as not pressed” had no basis. Such dismissal, in our view, certainly deprived the MUDA of their right to prosecute the appeals on merits.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9182­9188 OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.24560­24566 of 2018) (D.No.31403 of 2017) Mysore Urban Development Authority ….Appellant(s) VERSUS K.M. Chikkathayamma & Ors. ….Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.9190­9191 OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.24569­24570 of 2018) (D.No.30522 of 2017) J U… Read More whether the Division Bench was right in dismissing the appeals “as not pressed”. = In our opinion, neither there was any express prayer made by the MUDA and nor it could be inferred from the document relied on by the Division Bench at the instance of respondents (writ petitioners) for forming an opinion “not to press the appeal”. In other words, the opinion formed by the High Court for dismissing the appeals “as not pressed” had no basis. Such dismissal, in our view, certainly deprived the MUDA of their right to prosecute the appeals on merits.

whether the petitioners are entitled to complete the term of five years taking advantage of the amended provision which gives such Presiding Officers to continue until attaining the age of 65 years or to continue till they reach the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. This view of ours would negate the contention of the learned ASG that Section 6 as amended does not create any right. If such an interpretation is accepted, then even those persons appointed as Presiding Officers after September 01, 2016, can be denied the right to continue in service till 65 years. Judgment in GlaxoSmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd., which was relied upon by the learned ASG would have no application. That was a case where there was an amendment to Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was brought into force on August 21, 1994 and the Court held the same to be prospective in nature. It was further held that the provision which was applicable as on the date of termination of the appellant in that case would apply. Obviously, such a case has no application to the instant case.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 732 OF 2018 GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU …..PETITIONER(S) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …..RESPONDENT(S) WITH TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 301 OF 2017 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 304 OF 2017 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 303 OF 2017 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 305… Read More whether the petitioners are entitled to complete the term of five years taking advantage of the amended provision which gives such Presiding Officers to continue until attaining the age of 65 years or to continue till they reach the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. This view of ours would negate the contention of the learned ASG that Section 6 as amended does not create any right. If such an interpretation is accepted, then even those persons appointed as Presiding Officers after September 01, 2016, can be denied the right to continue in service till 65 years. Judgment in GlaxoSmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd., which was relied upon by the learned ASG would have no application. That was a case where there was an amendment to Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was brought into force on August 21, 1994 and the Court held the same to be prospective in nature. It was further held that the provision which was applicable as on the date of termination of the appellant in that case would apply. Obviously, such a case has no application to the instant case.

framing of substantial questions on both the issues as provided under Section 100(4) and (5) of the Code.= whether two Courts below were right in their respective jurisdiction in holding that the plaintiffs were able to prove their title over the suit land on the basis of evidence (oral/documentary) adduced by them and, if so, whether such finding should be upheld or not.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.5057 OF 2009 Narayana Gramani & Ors. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Mariammal & Ors. …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the plaintiffs against the final judgment and order dated 09.07.2007 passed by… Read More framing of substantial questions on both the issues as provided under Section 100(4) and (5) of the Code.= whether two Courts below were right in their respective jurisdiction in holding that the plaintiffs were able to prove their title over the suit land on the basis of evidence (oral/documentary) adduced by them and, if so, whether such finding should be upheld or not.

whether, in the State of Haryana, land notified under the provisions of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 (for short the PLP Act) is forest land or is required to be treated as forest land. If so, whether construction carried out by the applicant R. Kant & Co. on this land is in contravention of the notification dated 18th August, 1992 issued under the provisions of the PLP Act, the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and decisions of this Court. = Our answer to both the questions is in the affirmative.

IAs. 2310/2008 etc. in W.P. (C) NO. 4677 of 1985 etc. Page 1 of 81 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION I.A. No.2310/2008, I.A. Nos. 2378-2379/2009, I.A. No. 2269, I.A. No. 2270, I.A. No. 2393, I.A. Nos. 2381-2384 IN W.P. (C) No. 4677 OF 1985 M.C. Mehta ….Petitioner versus Union of… Read More whether, in the State of Haryana, land notified under the provisions of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 (for short the PLP Act) is forest land or is required to be treated as forest land. If so, whether construction carried out by the applicant R. Kant & Co. on this land is in contravention of the notification dated 18th August, 1992 issued under the provisions of the PLP Act, the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and decisions of this Court. = Our answer to both the questions is in the affirmative.

In view of the aforesaid findings, it is declared that insofar as Section 377 criminalises 51 consensual sexual acts of adults (i.e. persons above the age of 18 years who are competent to consent) in private, is violative of Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. It is, however, clarified that such consent must be free consent, which is completely voluntary in nature, and devoid of any duress or coercion. ii. The declaration of the aforesaid reading down of Section 377 shall not, however, lead to the reopening of any concluded prosecutions, but can certainly be relied upon in all pending matters whether they are at the trial, appellate, or revisional stages. iii. The provisions of Section 377 will continue to govern non-consensual sexual acts against adults, all acts of carnal intercouse against minors, and acts of beastiality. iv. The judgment in Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr. v. Naz Foundation & Ors.57 is hereby overruled for the reasons stated in paragraph 19.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 76 OF 2016 NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR & ORS. …Petitioner(s) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE …Respondent(s) WITH WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 572 OF 2016 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 88 OF 2018 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.… Read More In view of the aforesaid findings, it is declared that insofar as Section 377 criminalises 51 consensual sexual acts of adults (i.e. persons above the age of 18 years who are competent to consent) in private, is violative of Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. It is, however, clarified that such consent must be free consent, which is completely voluntary in nature, and devoid of any duress or coercion. ii. The declaration of the aforesaid reading down of Section 377 shall not, however, lead to the reopening of any concluded prosecutions, but can certainly be relied upon in all pending matters whether they are at the trial, appellate, or revisional stages. iii. The provisions of Section 377 will continue to govern non-consensual sexual acts against adults, all acts of carnal intercouse against minors, and acts of beastiality. iv. The judgment in Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr. v. Naz Foundation & Ors.57 is hereby overruled for the reasons stated in paragraph 19.

The scope of interference by the courts in regard to members of the armed forces is far more limited and narrow. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. The courts should be extremely slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no interference should be made

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 918 OF 2017 Maj. Amod Kumar …Petitioner Versus Union of India & Anr. …Respondents WITH WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 965/2017 AND WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1077/2017 J U D G E M E N T INDU MALHOTRA, J. 1. The… Read More The scope of interference by the courts in regard to members of the armed forces is far more limited and narrow. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. The courts should be extremely slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no interference should be made

“poetic licence”, = creativity and necessity of freedom of expression = A writer or an author, while choosing a mode of expression, be it a novel or a novella, an epic or an anthology of poems, a play or a playlet, a short story or a long one, an essay or a statement of description or, for that matter, some other form, has the right to exercise his liberty to the fullest unless it falls foul of any prescribed law that is constitutionally valid. It is because freedom of expression is extremely dear to a civilized society. = If books are banned on such allegations, there can be no creativity. Such interference by constitutional courts will cause the death of art. True it is, the freedom enjoyed by an author is not absolute, but before imposition of any restriction, the duty of the Court is to see whether there is really something that comes within the ambit and sweep of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. What is true to poetry is applicable to novels or any creative writing. It has to be kept uppermost in mind that the imagination of a writer has to enjoy freedom. It cannot be asked to succumb to specifics. That will tantamount to imposition. A writer should have free play with words, like a painter has it with colours. The passion of imagination cannot be directed. True it is, the final publication must not run counter to law but the application of the rigours of law has to also remain alive to the various aspects that have been accepted by the authorities of the Court. The craftsmanship of a writer deserves respect by acceptation of the concept of objective perceptibility. “ ― I may disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it” becomes the laser beam for guidance when one talks about freedom of expression.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 904 OF 2018 N. Radhakrishnan …Petitioner(s) @ Radhakrishnan Varenickal VERSUS Union of India and others …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, CJI A writer or an author, while choosing a mode of expression, be it… Read More “poetic licence”, = creativity and necessity of freedom of expression = A writer or an author, while choosing a mode of expression, be it a novel or a novella, an epic or an anthology of poems, a play or a playlet, a short story or a long one, an essay or a statement of description or, for that matter, some other form, has the right to exercise his liberty to the fullest unless it falls foul of any prescribed law that is constitutionally valid. It is because freedom of expression is extremely dear to a civilized society. = If books are banned on such allegations, there can be no creativity. Such interference by constitutional courts will cause the death of art. True it is, the freedom enjoyed by an author is not absolute, but before imposition of any restriction, the duty of the Court is to see whether there is really something that comes within the ambit and sweep of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. What is true to poetry is applicable to novels or any creative writing. It has to be kept uppermost in mind that the imagination of a writer has to enjoy freedom. It cannot be asked to succumb to specifics. That will tantamount to imposition. A writer should have free play with words, like a painter has it with colours. The passion of imagination cannot be directed. True it is, the final publication must not run counter to law but the application of the rigours of law has to also remain alive to the various aspects that have been accepted by the authorities of the Court. The craftsmanship of a writer deserves respect by acceptation of the concept of objective perceptibility. “ ― I may disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it” becomes the laser beam for guidance when one talks about freedom of expression.

Rizwan Alam Siddique was in police custody pursuant to an order passed by the Magistrate granting his police custody in connection with FIR No.I­31 vide order dated 17th March, 2018 and which police remand was to enure till 23rd March, 2018. Further, without challenging the stated order of the Magistrate, a writ petition was filed limited to the relief of habeas corpus. In that view of the matter, it was not a case of continued illegal detention but the incumbent was in judicial custody by virtue of an order passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate, which was in force, granting police remand during investigation of a criminal case. Resultantly, no writ of habeas corpus could be issued. = Reverting to the prayer for expunging the scathing observations made in the impugned judgment, in particular paragraphs 4­6, reproduced earlier, it is submitted that the said observations were wholly unwarranted as the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police who was present in Court, 12 could not have given concession to release Rizwan Alam Siddique in the teeth of a judicial order passed by the Magistrate directing police remand until 23rd March, 2018. -The High Court ought not to have made scathing observations even against the Investigating Officer without giving him opportunity to offer his explanation on affidavit. – since no writ of habeas corpus could be issued in the fact situation of the present case, the High Court should have been loath to enter upon the merits of the arrest in absence of any challenge to the judicial order passed by the Magistrate granting police custody till 23rd March, 2018 and more particularly for reasons mentioned in that order of the Magistrate.- In a somewhat similar situation, this Court in State represented by Inspector of Police and Ors. Vs. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate3 deprecated passing of disparaging and strong remarks by the High Court against the Investigating Officer and about the investigation done by them. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in expunging the observations made in paragraphs 4 to 6 of the impugned judgment against the concerned police officials in the facts of the present case. – As aforesaid, even though this appeal succeeds, since the respondent’s husband Rizwan Alam Siddique has already been released after the impugned judgment, the Investigating Officer may proceed against him in connection with the stated crime registered as FIR No.I­31/2018 strictly in accordance with law and not merely because the impugned order has been set aside. We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion regarding the guilt or otherwise of the respondent’s husband or correctness of the charges levelled against him.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1124 OF 2018 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.2846/2018) The State of Maharashtra & Ors. …..Appellant(s) :Versus: Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellants have assailed the decision of… Read More Rizwan Alam Siddique was in police custody pursuant to an order passed by the Magistrate granting his police custody in connection with FIR No.I­31 vide order dated 17th March, 2018 and which police remand was to enure till 23rd March, 2018. Further, without challenging the stated order of the Magistrate, a writ petition was filed limited to the relief of habeas corpus. In that view of the matter, it was not a case of continued illegal detention but the incumbent was in judicial custody by virtue of an order passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate, which was in force, granting police remand during investigation of a criminal case. Resultantly, no writ of habeas corpus could be issued. = Reverting to the prayer for expunging the scathing observations made in the impugned judgment, in particular paragraphs 4­6, reproduced earlier, it is submitted that the said observations were wholly unwarranted as the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police who was present in Court, 12 could not have given concession to release Rizwan Alam Siddique in the teeth of a judicial order passed by the Magistrate directing police remand until 23rd March, 2018. -The High Court ought not to have made scathing observations even against the Investigating Officer without giving him opportunity to offer his explanation on affidavit. – since no writ of habeas corpus could be issued in the fact situation of the present case, the High Court should have been loath to enter upon the merits of the arrest in absence of any challenge to the judicial order passed by the Magistrate granting police custody till 23rd March, 2018 and more particularly for reasons mentioned in that order of the Magistrate.- In a somewhat similar situation, this Court in State represented by Inspector of Police and Ors. Vs. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate3 deprecated passing of disparaging and strong remarks by the High Court against the Investigating Officer and about the investigation done by them. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in expunging the observations made in paragraphs 4 to 6 of the impugned judgment against the concerned police officials in the facts of the present case. – As aforesaid, even though this appeal succeeds, since the respondent’s husband Rizwan Alam Siddique has already been released after the impugned judgment, the Investigating Officer may proceed against him in connection with the stated crime registered as FIR No.I­31/2018 strictly in accordance with law and not merely because the impugned order has been set aside. We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion regarding the guilt or otherwise of the respondent’s husband or correctness of the charges levelled against him.