“poetic licence”, = creativity and necessity of freedom of expression = A writer or an author, while choosing a mode of expression, be it a novel or a novella, an epic or an anthology of poems, a play or a playlet, a short story or a long one, an essay or a statement of description or, for that matter, some other form, has the right to exercise his liberty to the fullest unless it falls foul of any prescribed law that is constitutionally valid. It is because freedom of expression is extremely dear to a civilized society. = If books are banned on such allegations, there can be no creativity. Such interference by constitutional courts will cause the death of art. True it is, the freedom enjoyed by an author is not absolute, but before imposition of any restriction, the duty of the Court is to see whether there is really something that comes within the ambit and sweep of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. What is true to poetry is applicable to novels or any creative writing. It has to be kept uppermost in mind that the imagination of a writer has to enjoy freedom. It cannot be asked to succumb to specifics. That will tantamount to imposition. A writer should have free play with words, like a painter has it with colours. The passion of imagination cannot be directed. True it is, the final publication must not run counter to law but the application of the rigours of law has to also remain alive to the various aspects that have been accepted by the authorities of the Court. The craftsmanship of a writer deserves respect by acceptation of the concept of objective perceptibility. “ ― I may disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it” becomes the laser beam for guidance when one talks about freedom of expression.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 904 OF 2018 N. Radhakrishnan …Petitioner(s) @ Radhakrishnan Varenickal VERSUS Union of India and others …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, CJI A writer or an author, while choosing a mode of expression, be it… Read More “poetic licence”, = creativity and necessity of freedom of expression = A writer or an author, while choosing a mode of expression, be it a novel or a novella, an epic or an anthology of poems, a play or a playlet, a short story or a long one, an essay or a statement of description or, for that matter, some other form, has the right to exercise his liberty to the fullest unless it falls foul of any prescribed law that is constitutionally valid. It is because freedom of expression is extremely dear to a civilized society. = If books are banned on such allegations, there can be no creativity. Such interference by constitutional courts will cause the death of art. True it is, the freedom enjoyed by an author is not absolute, but before imposition of any restriction, the duty of the Court is to see whether there is really something that comes within the ambit and sweep of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. What is true to poetry is applicable to novels or any creative writing. It has to be kept uppermost in mind that the imagination of a writer has to enjoy freedom. It cannot be asked to succumb to specifics. That will tantamount to imposition. A writer should have free play with words, like a painter has it with colours. The passion of imagination cannot be directed. True it is, the final publication must not run counter to law but the application of the rigours of law has to also remain alive to the various aspects that have been accepted by the authorities of the Court. The craftsmanship of a writer deserves respect by acceptation of the concept of objective perceptibility. “ ― I may disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it” becomes the laser beam for guidance when one talks about freedom of expression.

Rizwan Alam Siddique was in police custody pursuant to an order passed by the Magistrate granting his police custody in connection with FIR No.I­31 vide order dated 17th March, 2018 and which police remand was to enure till 23rd March, 2018. Further, without challenging the stated order of the Magistrate, a writ petition was filed limited to the relief of habeas corpus. In that view of the matter, it was not a case of continued illegal detention but the incumbent was in judicial custody by virtue of an order passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate, which was in force, granting police remand during investigation of a criminal case. Resultantly, no writ of habeas corpus could be issued. = Reverting to the prayer for expunging the scathing observations made in the impugned judgment, in particular paragraphs 4­6, reproduced earlier, it is submitted that the said observations were wholly unwarranted as the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police who was present in Court, 12 could not have given concession to release Rizwan Alam Siddique in the teeth of a judicial order passed by the Magistrate directing police remand until 23rd March, 2018. -The High Court ought not to have made scathing observations even against the Investigating Officer without giving him opportunity to offer his explanation on affidavit. – since no writ of habeas corpus could be issued in the fact situation of the present case, the High Court should have been loath to enter upon the merits of the arrest in absence of any challenge to the judicial order passed by the Magistrate granting police custody till 23rd March, 2018 and more particularly for reasons mentioned in that order of the Magistrate.- In a somewhat similar situation, this Court in State represented by Inspector of Police and Ors. Vs. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate3 deprecated passing of disparaging and strong remarks by the High Court against the Investigating Officer and about the investigation done by them. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in expunging the observations made in paragraphs 4 to 6 of the impugned judgment against the concerned police officials in the facts of the present case. – As aforesaid, even though this appeal succeeds, since the respondent’s husband Rizwan Alam Siddique has already been released after the impugned judgment, the Investigating Officer may proceed against him in connection with the stated crime registered as FIR No.I­31/2018 strictly in accordance with law and not merely because the impugned order has been set aside. We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion regarding the guilt or otherwise of the respondent’s husband or correctness of the charges levelled against him.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1124 OF 2018 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.2846/2018) The State of Maharashtra & Ors. …..Appellant(s) :Versus: Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellants have assailed the decision of… Read More Rizwan Alam Siddique was in police custody pursuant to an order passed by the Magistrate granting his police custody in connection with FIR No.I­31 vide order dated 17th March, 2018 and which police remand was to enure till 23rd March, 2018. Further, without challenging the stated order of the Magistrate, a writ petition was filed limited to the relief of habeas corpus. In that view of the matter, it was not a case of continued illegal detention but the incumbent was in judicial custody by virtue of an order passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate, which was in force, granting police remand during investigation of a criminal case. Resultantly, no writ of habeas corpus could be issued. = Reverting to the prayer for expunging the scathing observations made in the impugned judgment, in particular paragraphs 4­6, reproduced earlier, it is submitted that the said observations were wholly unwarranted as the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police who was present in Court, 12 could not have given concession to release Rizwan Alam Siddique in the teeth of a judicial order passed by the Magistrate directing police remand until 23rd March, 2018. -The High Court ought not to have made scathing observations even against the Investigating Officer without giving him opportunity to offer his explanation on affidavit. – since no writ of habeas corpus could be issued in the fact situation of the present case, the High Court should have been loath to enter upon the merits of the arrest in absence of any challenge to the judicial order passed by the Magistrate granting police custody till 23rd March, 2018 and more particularly for reasons mentioned in that order of the Magistrate.- In a somewhat similar situation, this Court in State represented by Inspector of Police and Ors. Vs. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate3 deprecated passing of disparaging and strong remarks by the High Court against the Investigating Officer and about the investigation done by them. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in expunging the observations made in paragraphs 4 to 6 of the impugned judgment against the concerned police officials in the facts of the present case. – As aforesaid, even though this appeal succeeds, since the respondent’s husband Rizwan Alam Siddique has already been released after the impugned judgment, the Investigating Officer may proceed against him in connection with the stated crime registered as FIR No.I­31/2018 strictly in accordance with law and not merely because the impugned order has been set aside. We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion regarding the guilt or otherwise of the respondent’s husband or correctness of the charges levelled against him.

Contempt of court = not unknown that such unauthorised structures could be and were reconstructed overnight after the demolition work is undertaken by the officials. That was done by unscrupulous persons clandestinely and without notice. = the High Court took suo motu action as it was prima facie convinced that unauthorised construction was carried out in Sainik Farms despite the direction contained in order dated November 3, 1997 in C.W.P. No.7441 of 1993. = The report of the Committee of advocates, however, was based on the site visit made in January, 2001 after a gap of more than 6 months from 7th June, 2000 and 3 months from 14th September, 2000 when the demolition was actually carried out. The factual position stated in the said report, therefore, may not be the actual position as obtained on the date of demolition i.e. 7th June, 2000 and 14th September, 2000. It is not unknown that such unauthorised structures could be and were reconstructed overnight after the demolition work is undertaken by the officials. That was done by unscrupulous persons clandestinely and without notice. The factual position stated in the reply affidavit filed by the appellant also reveals that continuous follow-up action was being taken in respect of unauthorised structures including those which were demolished. Furthermore, the appellant was transferred from the concerned ward w.e.f. 27th September, 2000 and any development or illegal activity unfolding after that date cannot 11 be attributed to the appellant. All these aspects have not been considered by the High Court. – In our opinion, it is not possible to hold that the demolition work undertaken on 7th June, 2000 and 14th September 2000 was not in conformity with the position reflected in the contemporaneous office submissions/record and photographs submitted by the appellant to his superior authority.- As a matter of fact, the appellant ought to succeed on the singular ground that the High Court unjustly proceeded against him without framing formal charges or furnishing such charges to him; and moreso because filing of affidavit by the appellant was supported by contemporaneous official record, which cannot be termed as an attempt to obstruct the due course of administration of justice. Accordingly, this appeal ought to succeed.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 684 OF 2006 R. S. Sehrawat … Appellant(s) :Versus: Rajeev Malhotra & Ors. …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. 1. The instant appeal under Section 19 (1) (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act,… Read More Contempt of court = not unknown that such unauthorised structures could be and were reconstructed overnight after the demolition work is undertaken by the officials. That was done by unscrupulous persons clandestinely and without notice. = the High Court took suo motu action as it was prima facie convinced that unauthorised construction was carried out in Sainik Farms despite the direction contained in order dated November 3, 1997 in C.W.P. No.7441 of 1993. = The report of the Committee of advocates, however, was based on the site visit made in January, 2001 after a gap of more than 6 months from 7th June, 2000 and 3 months from 14th September, 2000 when the demolition was actually carried out. The factual position stated in the said report, therefore, may not be the actual position as obtained on the date of demolition i.e. 7th June, 2000 and 14th September, 2000. It is not unknown that such unauthorised structures could be and were reconstructed overnight after the demolition work is undertaken by the officials. That was done by unscrupulous persons clandestinely and without notice. The factual position stated in the reply affidavit filed by the appellant also reveals that continuous follow-up action was being taken in respect of unauthorised structures including those which were demolished. Furthermore, the appellant was transferred from the concerned ward w.e.f. 27th September, 2000 and any development or illegal activity unfolding after that date cannot 11 be attributed to the appellant. All these aspects have not been considered by the High Court. – In our opinion, it is not possible to hold that the demolition work undertaken on 7th June, 2000 and 14th September 2000 was not in conformity with the position reflected in the contemporaneous office submissions/record and photographs submitted by the appellant to his superior authority.- As a matter of fact, the appellant ought to succeed on the singular ground that the High Court unjustly proceeded against him without framing formal charges or furnishing such charges to him; and moreso because filing of affidavit by the appellant was supported by contemporaneous official record, which cannot be termed as an attempt to obstruct the due course of administration of justice. Accordingly, this appeal ought to succeed.

the appellant was travelling in a tractor bearing Registration No.KA-15-T-2011 as a Coolie = the appellant did make an unsuccessful attempt to persuade us to take a view that the permanent disability should be reckoned as 67% to the whole body. However, after going through the evidence of the doctor who had treated the appellant and the medical records, we find that the assessment made by the tribunal about the extent of permanent disability at 60% to the whole body seems to be a possible view. We are not inclined 10 to disturb the said finding and also because it has been justly affirmed by the High Court, being concurrent finding of fact

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8278-8279 OF 2018 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.1116-1117/2018) Shivaraj .…Appellant(s) :Versus: Rajendra & Anr. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. 1. These appeals are directed against the common judgment and order passed by the High Court… Read More the appellant was travelling in a tractor bearing Registration No.KA-15-T-2011 as a Coolie = the appellant did make an unsuccessful attempt to persuade us to take a view that the permanent disability should be reckoned as 67% to the whole body. However, after going through the evidence of the doctor who had treated the appellant and the medical records, we find that the assessment made by the tribunal about the extent of permanent disability at 60% to the whole body seems to be a possible view. We are not inclined 10 to disturb the said finding and also because it has been justly affirmed by the High Court, being concurrent finding of fact

Whether in a given case, the Collector has transgressed the limits of his own jurisdiction is a matter which can be addressed in a challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. = In view of the above, the ground urged by the appellant that the Collector ought to have enquired into the validity of the signatures of 10 members, who subsequently filed affidavits stating that their signatures were obtained by fraud, had been justly negatived by the High Court. Hence, the impugned judgment does not warrant any interference.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2623 OF 2018 Smt. Kavita …..Appellant(s) :Versus: The State of Uttar Pradesh through Secretary & Ors. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 3rd August,… Read More Whether in a given case, the Collector has transgressed the limits of his own jurisdiction is a matter which can be addressed in a challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. = In view of the above, the ground urged by the appellant that the Collector ought to have enquired into the validity of the signatures of 10 members, who subsequently filed affidavits stating that their signatures were obtained by fraud, had been justly negatived by the High Court. Hence, the impugned judgment does not warrant any interference.

whether Section 50(1) was required to be complied with when charas was recovered only from the bag of the appellant and no charas was found on his person = From Exhibit-3, it can be discerned that the appellant was informed of his legal right to be searched in the presence of a magistrate or a gazetted officer. The appellant opted for the latter alternative. Exhibit-4 is a record of the events after the arrival of PW-4 on the scene. After the arrival of PW-4, the appellant was once again asked by him, whether he wished to be searched in the presence of a gazetted officer or a magistrate. This was the second option which was presented to him. When he reiterated his desire to be searched before a gazetted officer, PW-4 inquired of the appellant whether he wished to search PW-2 before his own search was conducted by PW-2. The appellant agreed to search PW-2. Only the personal belongings of PW-2 were found by the appellant. It was only after this that a search of the appellant was conducted and charas recovered. Before the appellant’s search was conducted, both PW2 and PW-4 on different occasions apprised the appellant of his legal right to be searched either in the presence of a gazetted officer or a magistrate. The options given by both PW-2 and PW-4 were unambiguous. Merely because the appellant was given an option of searching PW-2 before the latter conducted his search, would not vitiate the search.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 459 OF 2017 SK RAJU @ ABDUL HAQUE @ JAGGA …..APPELLANT Versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL …..RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud 1 The present appeal, by special leave, is directed against a judgment… Read More whether Section 50(1) was required to be complied with when charas was recovered only from the bag of the appellant and no charas was found on his person = From Exhibit-3, it can be discerned that the appellant was informed of his legal right to be searched in the presence of a magistrate or a gazetted officer. The appellant opted for the latter alternative. Exhibit-4 is a record of the events after the arrival of PW-4 on the scene. After the arrival of PW-4, the appellant was once again asked by him, whether he wished to be searched in the presence of a gazetted officer or a magistrate. This was the second option which was presented to him. When he reiterated his desire to be searched before a gazetted officer, PW-4 inquired of the appellant whether he wished to search PW-2 before his own search was conducted by PW-2. The appellant agreed to search PW-2. Only the personal belongings of PW-2 were found by the appellant. It was only after this that a search of the appellant was conducted and charas recovered. Before the appellant’s search was conducted, both PW2 and PW-4 on different occasions apprised the appellant of his legal right to be searched either in the presence of a gazetted officer or a magistrate. The options given by both PW-2 and PW-4 were unambiguous. Merely because the appellant was given an option of searching PW-2 before the latter conducted his search, would not vitiate the search.

whether the appellants are bound to implement the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission in respect of the respondent/employees. = We make it clear that in case Appellant No.1 has extended the benefit of the pay revision Regulations of 2001, despite the exclusion in the Notification dated 27.04.2006, to those employees where the prerevised pay scales had not been applied, the respondent/employees belonging to the Rewa Society will not be discriminated. 5. As far as implementation of recommendations of Sixth and Seventh Pay Commissions are concerned, there cannot be any dispute. The benefits will be extended to the employees of the REC Societies with effect from the date the benefits of the Sixth and Seventh Pay Commissions have been given to the employees of Appellant No.1. If there is any arrears to be paid in this regard, the same shall be paid within three months from today.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 9146-9148/2018 (ARISING FROM SLP(C) No(s).5285-5287/2016) M.P. POORVA KSHETRA VIDYUT VITARAN CO. LTD. & ORS. APPELLANT(s) VERSUS UMA SHANKAR DWIVEDI RESPONDENT(s) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J. Leave granted. 2. The moot question is whether the appellants are bound… Read More whether the appellants are bound to implement the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission in respect of the respondent/employees. = We make it clear that in case Appellant No.1 has extended the benefit of the pay revision Regulations of 2001, despite the exclusion in the Notification dated 27.04.2006, to those employees where the prerevised pay scales had not been applied, the respondent/employees belonging to the Rewa Society will not be discriminated. 5. As far as implementation of recommendations of Sixth and Seventh Pay Commissions are concerned, there cannot be any dispute. The benefits will be extended to the employees of the REC Societies with effect from the date the benefits of the Sixth and Seventh Pay Commissions have been given to the employees of Appellant No.1. If there is any arrears to be paid in this regard, the same shall be paid within three months from today.