As the injuries inflicted on the deceased in the sudden fight between the deceased and the accused party. There was no premeditation. One injury was caused to the deceased by farsi blow on the head which indicates that the appellant has not taken undue advantage of the deceased. The 4 manner the occurrence and the injury inflicted on the deceased attract Exception 4 to Section 300. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the conviction of the appellant is modified under Section 304 Part-I IPC and the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone. In the result, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is modified as conviction Section 304 Part-I IPC and sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2301 OF 2009 BHAGIRATH …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T R. BANUMATHI,J. 1. This appeal arises out of the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No.… Read More As the injuries inflicted on the deceased in the sudden fight between the deceased and the accused party. There was no premeditation. One injury was caused to the deceased by farsi blow on the head which indicates that the appellant has not taken undue advantage of the deceased. The 4 manner the occurrence and the injury inflicted on the deceased attract Exception 4 to Section 300. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the conviction of the appellant is modified under Section 304 Part-I IPC and the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone. In the result, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is modified as conviction Section 304 Part-I IPC and sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him.

service matter = We are of the opinion that it was virtually a case of fraud, at least on three counts. First, by creating ex-cadre post of Executive Engineer only for respondent No.1 and giving him that post when he was much junior to many others. Second, encadrement of respondent No.1 as Executive Engineer by showing that there were thirteen posts when, in fact, there were only ten posts of Executive Engineer on that date. This was done obviously with the purpose of accommodating him. Third, the promotion was given when respondent No.1 was not even eligible as per Rules as he had not put in minimum service of five years. Fraud vitiates every action and cannot be kept under the carpet on the ground that the action challenged was belated, more so when there is a reasonable explanation for such delay. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 25770 of 2015 Page 19 of 20 29. We, accordingly allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment dated August 07, 2015 of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore the judgment of the learned Single Judge. No order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 10662 OF 2018 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 25770 OF 2015) AJIT KR. BHUYAN AND OTHERS …..APPELLANT(S) VERSUS DEBAJIT DAS AND OTHERS …..RESPONDENT(S) W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 10663 OF 2018 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 29168 OF… Read More service matter = We are of the opinion that it was virtually a case of fraud, at least on three counts. First, by creating ex-cadre post of Executive Engineer only for respondent No.1 and giving him that post when he was much junior to many others. Second, encadrement of respondent No.1 as Executive Engineer by showing that there were thirteen posts when, in fact, there were only ten posts of Executive Engineer on that date. This was done obviously with the purpose of accommodating him. Third, the promotion was given when respondent No.1 was not even eligible as per Rules as he had not put in minimum service of five years. Fraud vitiates every action and cannot be kept under the carpet on the ground that the action challenged was belated, more so when there is a reasonable explanation for such delay. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 25770 of 2015 Page 19 of 20 29. We, accordingly allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment dated August 07, 2015 of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore the judgment of the learned Single Judge. No order as to costs.

(i) Whether there is an “operational debt” as defined exceeding Rs 1 lakh? (See Section 4 of the Act) (ii) Whether the documentary evidence furnished with the application shows that the aforesaid debt is due and payable and has not yet been paid? and (iii) Whether there is existence of a dispute between the parties or the record of the pendency of a suit or arbitration proceeding filed before the receipt of the demand notice of the unpaid operational debt in relation to such dispute? If any one of the aforesaid conditions is lacking, the application would have to be rejected. Apart from the above, the adjudicating authority must follow the mandate of Section 9, as outlined above, and in particular the mandate of Section 9(5) of the Act, and admit or reject the application, as the case may be, depending upon the factors mentioned in Section 9(5) of the Act.= once the operational creditor has filed an application, which is otherwise complete, the adjudicating authority must reject the application under Section 9(5)(2)(d) if notice of dispute has been received by the operational creditor or there is a record of dispute in the information utility. It is clear that such notice must bring to the notice of the operational creditor the “existence” of a dispute or the fact that a suit or arbitration proceeding relating to a dispute is pending between the parties. Therefore, all that the adjudicating authority is to see at this stage is whether there is a plausible contention which requires further investigation and that the “dispute” is not a patently feeble legal argument or an assertion of fact unsupported by evidence. It is important to separate the grain from the chaff and to reject a spurious defence which is mere bluster. However, in doing so, the Court does not need to be satisfied that the defence is likely to succeed. The Court does not at this stage examine the merits of the dispute except to the extent indicated above. So long as a dispute truly exists in fact and is not spurious, hypothetical or illusory, the adjudicating authority has to reject the application.” Civil Appeal No. 9597 of 2018 Page 18 of 19 The aforesaid principle squarely applied to the present case. 16. As a result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated September 04, 2018 passed by the NCLAT.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9597 OF 2018 TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF ANDHRA PRADESH LIMITED …..APPELLANT(S) VERSUS EQUIPMENT CONDUCTORS AND CABLES LIMITED …..RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T A.K. SIKRI, J. The order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (for short, ‘NCLAT)… Read More (i) Whether there is an “operational debt” as defined exceeding Rs 1 lakh? (See Section 4 of the Act) (ii) Whether the documentary evidence furnished with the application shows that the aforesaid debt is due and payable and has not yet been paid? and (iii) Whether there is existence of a dispute between the parties or the record of the pendency of a suit or arbitration proceeding filed before the receipt of the demand notice of the unpaid operational debt in relation to such dispute? If any one of the aforesaid conditions is lacking, the application would have to be rejected. Apart from the above, the adjudicating authority must follow the mandate of Section 9, as outlined above, and in particular the mandate of Section 9(5) of the Act, and admit or reject the application, as the case may be, depending upon the factors mentioned in Section 9(5) of the Act.= once the operational creditor has filed an application, which is otherwise complete, the adjudicating authority must reject the application under Section 9(5)(2)(d) if notice of dispute has been received by the operational creditor or there is a record of dispute in the information utility. It is clear that such notice must bring to the notice of the operational creditor the “existence” of a dispute or the fact that a suit or arbitration proceeding relating to a dispute is pending between the parties. Therefore, all that the adjudicating authority is to see at this stage is whether there is a plausible contention which requires further investigation and that the “dispute” is not a patently feeble legal argument or an assertion of fact unsupported by evidence. It is important to separate the grain from the chaff and to reject a spurious defence which is mere bluster. However, in doing so, the Court does not need to be satisfied that the defence is likely to succeed. The Court does not at this stage examine the merits of the dispute except to the extent indicated above. So long as a dispute truly exists in fact and is not spurious, hypothetical or illusory, the adjudicating authority has to reject the application.” Civil Appeal No. 9597 of 2018 Page 18 of 19 The aforesaid principle squarely applied to the present case. 16. As a result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated September 04, 2018 passed by the NCLAT.

under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 = Possession of the flat was offered to the Respondent – Purchaser in December 2015 after obtaining the Completion Certificate for the building. Even though the Agreement provided for delivery of possession by 31.10.2013, the delay occurred because of various legal impediments in timely completion of the project because of various Orders passed by the National Green Tribunal. The delay ought to be computed from 6 months after 31.10.2013, i.e. from 01.05.2014 by taking into consideration, the 6 months grace period provided in the Agreement. Furthermore, the period of Interest should close on April 2016 when the Full Occupancy Certificate was obtained as per the admission of the Respondent – Purchaser herself in Para 4(j) of the Consumer Complaint, wherein she has admitted that the Appellant – Builder had obtained the Completion Certificate as late as April 2016. The Respondent – Purchaser could not have any further grievance after April 2016 with respect to delay in handing over possession. The Respondent – Purchaser ought not to be allowed to reap the benefits of her own delay in taking possession.

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6649­50 OF 2018 M/s. Supertech Ltd. …Appellant Versus Rajni Goyal …Respondent J U D G M E N T INDU MALHOTRA, J. 1. The present Civil Appeals have been filed under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act, 19861 to challenge the… Read More under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 = Possession of the flat was offered to the Respondent – Purchaser in December 2015 after obtaining the Completion Certificate for the building. Even though the Agreement provided for delivery of possession by 31.10.2013, the delay occurred because of various legal impediments in timely completion of the project because of various Orders passed by the National Green Tribunal. The delay ought to be computed from 6 months after 31.10.2013, i.e. from 01.05.2014 by taking into consideration, the 6 months grace period provided in the Agreement. Furthermore, the period of Interest should close on April 2016 when the Full Occupancy Certificate was obtained as per the admission of the Respondent – Purchaser herself in Para 4(j) of the Consumer Complaint, wherein she has admitted that the Appellant – Builder had obtained the Completion Certificate as late as April 2016. The Respondent – Purchaser could not have any further grievance after April 2016 with respect to delay in handing over possession. The Respondent – Purchaser ought not to be allowed to reap the benefits of her own delay in taking possession.

remission in terms of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code = the appellant has so far undergone more than 14 years of jail sentence and he still remains in Jail undergoing his sentence. 4 9. In our opinion, if that were the case then the State can be directed to consider the appellant’s case for his remission in terms of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the “Cr.P.C.”) read with Rules. In other words, the appellant is eligible for his release by the State in terms of the Rules in accordance with law depending upon a case made out by him. The State can always pass appropriate orders on appellant’s release provided a case to that effect as provided in the Rules is made out. 10. We, therefore, grant liberty to the appellant to apply to the State Government for consideration of his case for release as provided in Cr.P.C. read with the Rules provided the appellant is able to prove that he has completed the mandatory period of his sentence as prescribed in the Cr.P.C./Rules and 5 satisfy all necessary conditions to the satisfaction of the State. 11. The Jail Authorities would do the needful on behalf of the appellant and will accordingly forward his application along with necessary details to the Competent Authority of the State.

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 863 OF 2012 RAJENDRA SINGH …..Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the accused against the final judgment and order dated 3.11.2003 passed by… Read More remission in terms of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code = the appellant has so far undergone more than 14 years of jail sentence and he still remains in Jail undergoing his sentence. 4 9. In our opinion, if that were the case then the State can be directed to consider the appellant’s case for his remission in terms of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the “Cr.P.C.”) read with Rules. In other words, the appellant is eligible for his release by the State in terms of the Rules in accordance with law depending upon a case made out by him. The State can always pass appropriate orders on appellant’s release provided a case to that effect as provided in the Rules is made out. 10. We, therefore, grant liberty to the appellant to apply to the State Government for consideration of his case for release as provided in Cr.P.C. read with the Rules provided the appellant is able to prove that he has completed the mandatory period of his sentence as prescribed in the Cr.P.C./Rules and 5 satisfy all necessary conditions to the satisfaction of the State. 11. The Jail Authorities would do the needful on behalf of the appellant and will accordingly forward his application along with necessary details to the Competent Authority of the State.

whether due to their tendering the resignation, or on attaining the age of superannuation or for any other reasons, their right to continue in occupation of the flats 10 came to an end. Their possession in the flats became unlawful and unauthorized. They were under contractual and legal obligation to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the flats to their employer i.e. the University so as to enable the University to allot the flats to other employees who were eligible for allotment. 21. It is not in dispute that the writ petitioners (respondent nos. 4 and 5) had retired long back from their services and yet they retained unlawful possession of the flats in question. 22. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that respondent nos. 4 and 5 (writ petitioners) were in unauthorized occupation of the flats from the date they ceased to be in the employment of the 11 University and hence were liable to be evicted from the flats and were also liable to pay penal rent to the University for their use and occupation till the date of their eviction. So far it has not been done. 23. We are not impressed by the submission of the learned Senior counsel for the respondent nos. 4 and 5 (writ petitioners) when he contended that since the writ petitioners (Respondent Nos. 4 and 5) deposited some money with the Board for allotment of the flats in their personal capacity pursuant to the decision of the University taken by them in that behalf, a right had accrued in their favour to remain in occupation of the flats even after they had ceased to be in the employment of the University in their individual rights. 12 24. This submission is wholly untenable and deserves rejection for more than one reason. 25. First, It is not in dispute that the University had withdrawn its decision to allot the flats to its employees immediately and also warned them not to enter into any transaction with the Board directly in relation to the flats, else they will have to face the disciplinary action. This was sufficient indication to the employees not to deal with the Board in any manner in their individual capacity: Second, it is also not in dispute that the University even after cancellation of the initial allotment order went on paying monthly installments in lump sum to the Board and the Board in turn also went on accepting the money as and when paid by the University. The acceptance of payment from the University subsequent to 13 cancellation by the Board amounted to revocation of the cancellation order and resulted in restoration of the initial allotment made in favour of the University: Third, the issue in the writ petitions was between the writ petitioners (employees) and the University because the writ petitioners had come into possession of the flats through the University. They had, therefore, no independent cause of action in relation to the issue of flats qua the Board; Fourth, the writ petitioners did not file any suit for specific performance of contract against the Board for enforcement of their alleged independent contractual right in relation to the flats. Their alleged disputes qua the Board in relation to flats, therefore, could not have been gone into in these proceedings: Fifth, in any event, mere payment of 14 Rs.10,000/­ to the Board by the writ petitioners contrary to the directions issued by the University did not create any independent right in their favour and nor such payment even if made by the employees impaired the rights of the University in any manner in relation to the allotment of flats qua Board and lastly, the cancellation having been revoked on account of acceptance of payment from the University by the Board, the original allotment dated 05.07.1976 stood restored in favour of the University .

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.8113 OF 2009 THE VICE CHANCELLOR, RANCHI UNIVERSITY & ORS. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS JHARKHAND STATE HOUSING BOARD & ORS. …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated… Read More whether due to their tendering the resignation, or on attaining the age of superannuation or for any other reasons, their right to continue in occupation of the flats 10 came to an end. Their possession in the flats became unlawful and unauthorized. They were under contractual and legal obligation to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the flats to their employer i.e. the University so as to enable the University to allot the flats to other employees who were eligible for allotment. 21. It is not in dispute that the writ petitioners (respondent nos. 4 and 5) had retired long back from their services and yet they retained unlawful possession of the flats in question. 22. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that respondent nos. 4 and 5 (writ petitioners) were in unauthorized occupation of the flats from the date they ceased to be in the employment of the 11 University and hence were liable to be evicted from the flats and were also liable to pay penal rent to the University for their use and occupation till the date of their eviction. So far it has not been done. 23. We are not impressed by the submission of the learned Senior counsel for the respondent nos. 4 and 5 (writ petitioners) when he contended that since the writ petitioners (Respondent Nos. 4 and 5) deposited some money with the Board for allotment of the flats in their personal capacity pursuant to the decision of the University taken by them in that behalf, a right had accrued in their favour to remain in occupation of the flats even after they had ceased to be in the employment of the University in their individual rights. 12 24. This submission is wholly untenable and deserves rejection for more than one reason. 25. First, It is not in dispute that the University had withdrawn its decision to allot the flats to its employees immediately and also warned them not to enter into any transaction with the Board directly in relation to the flats, else they will have to face the disciplinary action. This was sufficient indication to the employees not to deal with the Board in any manner in their individual capacity: Second, it is also not in dispute that the University even after cancellation of the initial allotment order went on paying monthly installments in lump sum to the Board and the Board in turn also went on accepting the money as and when paid by the University. The acceptance of payment from the University subsequent to 13 cancellation by the Board amounted to revocation of the cancellation order and resulted in restoration of the initial allotment made in favour of the University: Third, the issue in the writ petitions was between the writ petitioners (employees) and the University because the writ petitioners had come into possession of the flats through the University. They had, therefore, no independent cause of action in relation to the issue of flats qua the Board; Fourth, the writ petitioners did not file any suit for specific performance of contract against the Board for enforcement of their alleged independent contractual right in relation to the flats. Their alleged disputes qua the Board in relation to flats, therefore, could not have been gone into in these proceedings: Fifth, in any event, mere payment of 14 Rs.10,000/­ to the Board by the writ petitioners contrary to the directions issued by the University did not create any independent right in their favour and nor such payment even if made by the employees impaired the rights of the University in any manner in relation to the allotment of flats qua Board and lastly, the cancellation having been revoked on account of acceptance of payment from the University by the Board, the original allotment dated 05.07.1976 stood restored in favour of the University .

suit for declaration and partition – auction purchaser of brother’s share claimed adverse possession- records shows joint possession – no adverse possession proved – plaintiff entitled for decree= it is well settled that in an auction purchase, the auction purchaser does not acquire any right over the property higher than that of the judgment debtor. Since the principles of res judicata between co­ defendants are not applicable in this case, and since a mere admission does not operate as an estoppel, such admission does not create or pass any title in favour of the defendant’s father and consequently to the defendant. On the other hand, it is apparent that the defendant’s father had right over only half of the property in question, which he had purchased. 14. The Division Bench has rightly negated the contention of the defendant relating to adverse possession. From the evidence on record, the trial Court and the Division Bench of the High Court have come to the conclusion that the defendant has failed to prove that he and his predecessor ­in ­interest had possession over the entire property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs and their predecessor. No material is found on record which emphatically discloses that the physical delivery of possession of the property was given to the auction purchaser by evicting or in exclusion of all the persons including the plaintiffs’ father and the plaintiffs. In the absence of such material, the Trial Court and the Division Bench have rightly concluded that there was symbolic delivery of 22 possession in favour of the auction purchaser. However, the subsequent documents show joint possession of the plaintiffs and the defendant. Even now the names of both the parties are found in the revenue records. The documents do not show exclusive possession of either of the parties, but would indicate that they are in joint possession. Exhibits A­7, A­8 and A­9 are the pattas which disclose the names of both the parties in the revenue records. Even the house tax receipts are in the name of the plaintiffs’ predecessor. ‘A schedule’ property has already been subjected to partition inter se among the plaintiffs after the death of Narayanswamy Mudaliar and the allotment of property in question, i.e. ‘A Schedule’ has been made in favour of the second plaintiff as per Exhibit A­40. The aforementioned records and certain other material on record would negative the contention of the defendant relating to adverse possession. The plaintiffs have proved satisfactorily that they are the owners of ‘A Schedule’ property, i.e., 50% of the property partitioned in 1912, which had ultimately fallen in the share of Mr. Narayanaswamy (grandfather of plaintiffs) as mentioned supra.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5276 OF 2008 Govindammal (Dead) By Lrs. and Ors. …Appellants Versus Vaidiyanathan and Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. The legal representatives of the original defendant in O.S No.45/85 on the file of the… Read More suit for declaration and partition – auction purchaser of brother’s share claimed adverse possession- records shows joint possession – no adverse possession proved – plaintiff entitled for decree= it is well settled that in an auction purchase, the auction purchaser does not acquire any right over the property higher than that of the judgment debtor. Since the principles of res judicata between co­ defendants are not applicable in this case, and since a mere admission does not operate as an estoppel, such admission does not create or pass any title in favour of the defendant’s father and consequently to the defendant. On the other hand, it is apparent that the defendant’s father had right over only half of the property in question, which he had purchased. 14. The Division Bench has rightly negated the contention of the defendant relating to adverse possession. From the evidence on record, the trial Court and the Division Bench of the High Court have come to the conclusion that the defendant has failed to prove that he and his predecessor ­in ­interest had possession over the entire property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs and their predecessor. No material is found on record which emphatically discloses that the physical delivery of possession of the property was given to the auction purchaser by evicting or in exclusion of all the persons including the plaintiffs’ father and the plaintiffs. In the absence of such material, the Trial Court and the Division Bench have rightly concluded that there was symbolic delivery of 22 possession in favour of the auction purchaser. However, the subsequent documents show joint possession of the plaintiffs and the defendant. Even now the names of both the parties are found in the revenue records. The documents do not show exclusive possession of either of the parties, but would indicate that they are in joint possession. Exhibits A­7, A­8 and A­9 are the pattas which disclose the names of both the parties in the revenue records. Even the house tax receipts are in the name of the plaintiffs’ predecessor. ‘A schedule’ property has already been subjected to partition inter se among the plaintiffs after the death of Narayanswamy Mudaliar and the allotment of property in question, i.e. ‘A Schedule’ has been made in favour of the second plaintiff as per Exhibit A­40. The aforementioned records and certain other material on record would negative the contention of the defendant relating to adverse possession. The plaintiffs have proved satisfactorily that they are the owners of ‘A Schedule’ property, i.e., 50% of the property partitioned in 1912, which had ultimately fallen in the share of Mr. Narayanaswamy (grandfather of plaintiffs) as mentioned supra.