IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.580 OF 2010 ASHWANI KUMAR & ANR. …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF PUNJAB ..RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT

concurrent findings of the courts below – no reason to interfere. – Second appellant took the plea of alibi – failed to discharge – non disclosing the name of lover of deceased by the accused is fatal to belive the case of accused /appellant No.1 given under Sec.313 – both courts below accepted the prosecution… Read More IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.580 OF 2010 ASHWANI KUMAR & ANR. …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF PUNJAB ..RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT

Non existance of document can not be declared as void = Once it is held that no sale certificate issued in favour of respondent No.4 (Md. Sattar @ Mokhan) by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, under the 1950 Act is forthcoming nor any entry in the official register is found in that regard, all persons claiming through him (including the appellant) must suffer the consequences of such a finding of fact. Notably, respondent No.4 (Md. Sattar @ Mokhan) has not claimed right in respect 17 of the suit property in any other capacity, and in that view of the matter, we fail to understand as to how Md. Sattar @ Mokhan, or any person claiming through him, could be permitted to question the validity of the sale certificate dated 7th August, 1965 issued by the Managing Officer in favour of respondent No.3 (Mainmum Nissa @ Kumani). 13. The appellant had placed emphasis on the finding rendered in the civil suit filed by the husband of respondent No.3, for permanent injunction against respondent No.4 (Md. Sattar @ Mokhan). However, we agree with the concurrent view taken by the authority concerned that the said finding will be of no avail to the appellant. For, respondent No.3 was not impleaded as a party in the said suit. 14. Suffice it to observe that the appellant, having failed to produce the sale certificate in favour of respondent No.4 (Md. Sattar @ Mokhan) issued by the Custodian of Evacuee Property under the 1950 Act, he cannot be heard to raise the issue of jurisdiction of the Managing Officer to deal with the subject property, including the validity of the sale certificate 18 issued in favour of respondent No.3. A deeper enquiry as to how the Managing Officer assumed jurisdiction to issue the sale certificate in favour of respondent No.3 would become relevant and essential only if the appellant was able to substantiate the fact, at least prima facie, that the suit property was, in fact, transferred in favour of respondent No.4 (Md. Sattar @ Mokhan) by the Custodian of Evacuee Property under the 1950 Act.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6384 OF 2010 Mahendra Pratap Dubey …..Appellant :Versus: Managing Officer, Evacuee Property & Ors. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. 1. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and order dated 26th February, 2007 passed… Read More Non existance of document can not be declared as void = Once it is held that no sale certificate issued in favour of respondent No.4 (Md. Sattar @ Mokhan) by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, under the 1950 Act is forthcoming nor any entry in the official register is found in that regard, all persons claiming through him (including the appellant) must suffer the consequences of such a finding of fact. Notably, respondent No.4 (Md. Sattar @ Mokhan) has not claimed right in respect 17 of the suit property in any other capacity, and in that view of the matter, we fail to understand as to how Md. Sattar @ Mokhan, or any person claiming through him, could be permitted to question the validity of the sale certificate dated 7th August, 1965 issued by the Managing Officer in favour of respondent No.3 (Mainmum Nissa @ Kumani). 13. The appellant had placed emphasis on the finding rendered in the civil suit filed by the husband of respondent No.3, for permanent injunction against respondent No.4 (Md. Sattar @ Mokhan). However, we agree with the concurrent view taken by the authority concerned that the said finding will be of no avail to the appellant. For, respondent No.3 was not impleaded as a party in the said suit. 14. Suffice it to observe that the appellant, having failed to produce the sale certificate in favour of respondent No.4 (Md. Sattar @ Mokhan) issued by the Custodian of Evacuee Property under the 1950 Act, he cannot be heard to raise the issue of jurisdiction of the Managing Officer to deal with the subject property, including the validity of the sale certificate 18 issued in favour of respondent No.3. A deeper enquiry as to how the Managing Officer assumed jurisdiction to issue the sale certificate in favour of respondent No.3 would become relevant and essential only if the appellant was able to substantiate the fact, at least prima facie, that the suit property was, in fact, transferred in favour of respondent No.4 (Md. Sattar @ Mokhan) by the Custodian of Evacuee Property under the 1950 Act.

mere non marking of documents as Exibits is only procedural lapse not fatal = First, the appellants had adduced sufficient evidence to prove the accident and the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, which resulted in death of Rajendra Prasad. 27. Second, the appellants filed material documents to prove the factum of the accident and the persons involved therein. 28. Third, the documents clearly established the identity of the Truck involved in the accident, the identity of the driver driving the truck, the identity of the owner of the Truck, the name of the insurer of the offending Truck, the period of coverage of insurance of the Truck, the details of the lodging of 13 FIR in the concerned police station in relation to the accident. 29. In our view, what more documents could be filed than the documents filed by the appellants to prove the factum of the accident and the persons involved therein. 30. Fourth, so far as the driver and owner of the Truck were concerned, both remained ex parte since inception and, therefore, neither contested the appellants’ claim petition nor entered into the witness box to rebut the allegations of the appellants made in the claim petition and the evidence. An adverse inference against both could be drawn. 31. Fifth, so far as the Insurance Company is concerned, they also did not examine any witness to rebut the appellants’ evidence. The Insurance Company could have adduced evidence by 14 examining the driver of the offending Truck as their witness but it was not done. 32. Sixth, on the other hand, the appellants examined three witnesses and thereby discharged their initial burden to prove the case. 33. Seventh, if the Court did not exhibit the documents despite the appellants referring them at the time of recording evidence then in such event, the appellants cannot be denied of their right to claim the compensation on such ground. In our opinion, it was nothing but a procedural lapse, which could not be made basis to reject the claim petition. It was more so when the appellants adduced oral and documentary evidence to prove their case and the respondents did nothing to counter them.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11042 OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 17321 of 2016) Vimla Devi & Ors. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS National Insurance Company Limited & Ors. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal… Read More mere non marking of documents as Exibits is only procedural lapse not fatal = First, the appellants had adduced sufficient evidence to prove the accident and the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, which resulted in death of Rajendra Prasad. 27. Second, the appellants filed material documents to prove the factum of the accident and the persons involved therein. 28. Third, the documents clearly established the identity of the Truck involved in the accident, the identity of the driver driving the truck, the identity of the owner of the Truck, the name of the insurer of the offending Truck, the period of coverage of insurance of the Truck, the details of the lodging of 13 FIR in the concerned police station in relation to the accident. 29. In our view, what more documents could be filed than the documents filed by the appellants to prove the factum of the accident and the persons involved therein. 30. Fourth, so far as the driver and owner of the Truck were concerned, both remained ex parte since inception and, therefore, neither contested the appellants’ claim petition nor entered into the witness box to rebut the allegations of the appellants made in the claim petition and the evidence. An adverse inference against both could be drawn. 31. Fifth, so far as the Insurance Company is concerned, they also did not examine any witness to rebut the appellants’ evidence. The Insurance Company could have adduced evidence by 14 examining the driver of the offending Truck as their witness but it was not done. 32. Sixth, on the other hand, the appellants examined three witnesses and thereby discharged their initial burden to prove the case. 33. Seventh, if the Court did not exhibit the documents despite the appellants referring them at the time of recording evidence then in such event, the appellants cannot be denied of their right to claim the compensation on such ground. In our opinion, it was nothing but a procedural lapse, which could not be made basis to reject the claim petition. It was more so when the appellants adduced oral and documentary evidence to prove their case and the respondents did nothing to counter them.

whether any case is made out on facts and in law for interfering in the quantum of sentence awarded to the appellant (Accused No. 2) by the High Court. = The seizure of the spirit from the house in question was held illegal and was, therefore, held to be an offence punishable under Section 55(a) of the Abkari Act. 14. Section 55(1) of the Abkari Act provides that for any offence other than an offence falling under clause (d) or clause (e), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to ten years and with fine, which shall not be less than Rs.One Lakh. 15. So far as the appellant’s case is concerned, it falls under clause (a), therefore, it is governed by Section 55 (1) of the Abkari Act. 16. From a mere reading of Section 55 (1), it is clear that insofar as the jail sentence is concerned, 5 it may vary and extend up to 10 years depending upon the facts of each case, but insofar as the fine amount is concerned, the Court has to impose the minimum amount of Rs. one lakh. 17. It is, therefore, mandatory for the Court to impose a fine while awarding jail sentence and secondly, it cannot be less than Rs. one lakh. However, the Court has discretion to impose fine more than Rs. one lakh depending upon the facts of each case. 18. It is not in dispute that the appellant has already undergone jail sentence of around 1 year and 3 months till date and he still continues to remain in jail. In other words, the appellant out of total jail sentence of 3 years awarded to him by the High Court has so far undergone for a period of one year approximately. It is also not in dispute that the 6 appellant was not involved in any other criminal case except the one in question. 19. Keeping in view the facts that the incident in question is of the year 2007; Second, the appellant has undergone jail sentence of 1 year 3 months out of three years total period of jail sentence awarded by the High Court; Third, the appellant was never involved in any criminal activity except the case at hand; and the last, out of three accused, one was given the benefit of doubt, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant has made out a case for interference in the quantum of sentence awarded to him by the High Court.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1409 OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 6224 of 2017) Santosh @ Santosh Kumar ….Appellant(s) VERSUS State of Kerala ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is filed against… Read More whether any case is made out on facts and in law for interfering in the quantum of sentence awarded to the appellant (Accused No. 2) by the High Court. = The seizure of the spirit from the house in question was held illegal and was, therefore, held to be an offence punishable under Section 55(a) of the Abkari Act. 14. Section 55(1) of the Abkari Act provides that for any offence other than an offence falling under clause (d) or clause (e), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to ten years and with fine, which shall not be less than Rs.One Lakh. 15. So far as the appellant’s case is concerned, it falls under clause (a), therefore, it is governed by Section 55 (1) of the Abkari Act. 16. From a mere reading of Section 55 (1), it is clear that insofar as the jail sentence is concerned, 5 it may vary and extend up to 10 years depending upon the facts of each case, but insofar as the fine amount is concerned, the Court has to impose the minimum amount of Rs. one lakh. 17. It is, therefore, mandatory for the Court to impose a fine while awarding jail sentence and secondly, it cannot be less than Rs. one lakh. However, the Court has discretion to impose fine more than Rs. one lakh depending upon the facts of each case. 18. It is not in dispute that the appellant has already undergone jail sentence of around 1 year and 3 months till date and he still continues to remain in jail. In other words, the appellant out of total jail sentence of 3 years awarded to him by the High Court has so far undergone for a period of one year approximately. It is also not in dispute that the 6 appellant was not involved in any other criminal case except the one in question. 19. Keeping in view the facts that the incident in question is of the year 2007; Second, the appellant has undergone jail sentence of 1 year 3 months out of three years total period of jail sentence awarded by the High Court; Third, the appellant was never involved in any criminal activity except the case at hand; and the last, out of three accused, one was given the benefit of doubt, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant has made out a case for interference in the quantum of sentence awarded to him by the High Court.

SUIT IS BARRED BY LIMITATION = plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs sought in the plaint even on the ground of limitation also. It is required to be noted that the agreement/agreement to sell and the general power of attorney were executed in the year 1987, on the basis of which the plaintiff had sought for the reliefs in the year 2004. Even, according to the plaintiff also, the title deed/sale deed in 13 favour of the original defendant no.1 executed by the developers M/s Ansal Properties was in the year 1994. Considering the evidence on record and even considering the case on behalf of the plaintiff, it appears that throughout the plaintiff was aware of the execution of the title deed/sale deed in favour of the original defendant no. 1 executed in the year 1994, still the suit has been instituted in the year 2004 only, i.e. after a period of 10 years. Nothing is on record that any steps were taken by the original plaintiff to get the sale deed executed in his favour and/or in favour of his nominee. Therefore, the suit has been instituted after a period of 17 years after the execution of the agreement/agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 and after a period of 10 years from the date of the title deed/sale deed in favour of the original defendant no. 1. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff is not entitled such reliefs, except of decree of recovery of amount paid to the original defendant no. 1.

1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.11070 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22667 of 2016] Rakesh Malhotra .. Appellant Versus Kamaljit Singh Sandhu & Ors. .. Respondents J U D G M E N T M. R. Shah, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Feeling aggrieved… Read More SUIT IS BARRED BY LIMITATION = plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs sought in the plaint even on the ground of limitation also. It is required to be noted that the agreement/agreement to sell and the general power of attorney were executed in the year 1987, on the basis of which the plaintiff had sought for the reliefs in the year 2004. Even, according to the plaintiff also, the title deed/sale deed in 13 favour of the original defendant no.1 executed by the developers M/s Ansal Properties was in the year 1994. Considering the evidence on record and even considering the case on behalf of the plaintiff, it appears that throughout the plaintiff was aware of the execution of the title deed/sale deed in favour of the original defendant no. 1 executed in the year 1994, still the suit has been instituted in the year 2004 only, i.e. after a period of 10 years. Nothing is on record that any steps were taken by the original plaintiff to get the sale deed executed in his favour and/or in favour of his nominee. Therefore, the suit has been instituted after a period of 17 years after the execution of the agreement/agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 and after a period of 10 years from the date of the title deed/sale deed in favour of the original defendant no. 1. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff is not entitled such reliefs, except of decree of recovery of amount paid to the original defendant no. 1.

temporary employees are entitled to minimum of the pay scales as long as they continue in service. = In view of the judgment in Jagjit Singh (supra), we are unable to uphold the view of the High Court that the Appellants-herein are not entitled to be paid the minimum of the pay sales. We are not called upon to adjudicate on the rights of the Appellants relating to the regularization of their services. We are concerned only with the principle laid down by this Court initially in Putti Lal (supra) relating to persons who are similarly situated 10 | P a g e to the Appellants and later affirmed in Jagjit Singh (supra) that temporary employees are entitled to minimum of the pay scales as long as they continue in service. 12. We express no opinion on the contention of the State Government that the Appellants are not entitled to the reliefs as they are not working on Group ‘D’ posts and that some of them worked for short periods in projects. 13. For the aforementioned reasons, we allow these Appeals and set aside the judgments of the High Court holding that the Appellants are entitled to be paid the minimum of the pay scales applicable to regular employees working on the same posts. The State of Uttar Pradesh is directed to make payment of the minimum of pay scales to the Appellants with effect from 1st December, 2018.

Non Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 10956 of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 1045 of 2016) Sabha Shanker Dube …. Appellant Versus Divisional Forest Officer & Ors. ….Respondents W I T H CIVIL APPEAL Nos._10957-10963 of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 1252-1258 of… Read More temporary employees are entitled to minimum of the pay scales as long as they continue in service. = In view of the judgment in Jagjit Singh (supra), we are unable to uphold the view of the High Court that the Appellants-herein are not entitled to be paid the minimum of the pay sales. We are not called upon to adjudicate on the rights of the Appellants relating to the regularization of their services. We are concerned only with the principle laid down by this Court initially in Putti Lal (supra) relating to persons who are similarly situated 10 | P a g e to the Appellants and later affirmed in Jagjit Singh (supra) that temporary employees are entitled to minimum of the pay scales as long as they continue in service. 12. We express no opinion on the contention of the State Government that the Appellants are not entitled to the reliefs as they are not working on Group ‘D’ posts and that some of them worked for short periods in projects. 13. For the aforementioned reasons, we allow these Appeals and set aside the judgments of the High Court holding that the Appellants are entitled to be paid the minimum of the pay scales applicable to regular employees working on the same posts. The State of Uttar Pradesh is directed to make payment of the minimum of pay scales to the Appellants with effect from 1st December, 2018.

Non refund of deposited amount on breach of contract can not be enforced through criminal law as it is only a civil dispute – FIR QUASHED -We, thus find that it is not possible to hold that the amount of Rs. One crore which was paid along with the development agreement as a deposit can be said to have been entrustment of property which has been dishonestly converted to his own use or disposed of in violation of any direction of law or contract by the Appellant. The Appellants have not used the amount nor misappropriated it contrary to any direction of law or contract which prescribes how the amount has to be dealt with. Going by the agreement dated 03.06.1993, the amount has to be returned upon the handing over of the constructed area of the owner which admittedly has not been done. Most significantly the Respondent No.2 has not demanded the return of the amount at any point of time. In fact, it is the specific contention of the Respondent No.2 that he has not demanded the amount because the agreement is still in subsistence. We do not see how it can be contended by any stretch of imagination that the Appellants have misappropriated the amount or 11 dishonestly used the amount contrary to any law or contract. In any case, we find that the dispute has the contours of a dispute of civil nature and does not constitute a criminal offence. 24. Having given our anxious consideration, we are of the view that assuming that there is a security deposit of Rs. One Crore and that he has misappropriated the dispute between the two parties can only be a civil dispute. We are of the opinion that the present case falls under the 1st, 3rd and 5th category set out in the para 102 of the judgment in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). In such a situation, the High Court erred in dismissing the petition of the Appellants filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.We find that the prosecution is mala fide, untenable and solely intended to harass the Appellants. We are forfeited in view of the Respondent not having made any attempt to recover the deposit of Rs. One Crore through a civil action.We have, therefore, no hesitation in quashing the FIR and the charge sheet filed against the Appellants. Hence, the FIR No.0139/2014 dated 20.08.2014 and charge sheet dated 03.08.2018 are hereby quashed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1395 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3730 of 2016] Anand Kumar Mohatta and Anr. ….Appellant(s) Versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Department of Home and Anr. …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T S.A. BOBDE, J. Leave… Read More Non refund of deposited amount on breach of contract can not be enforced through criminal law as it is only a civil dispute – FIR QUASHED -We, thus find that it is not possible to hold that the amount of Rs. One crore which was paid along with the development agreement as a deposit can be said to have been entrustment of property which has been dishonestly converted to his own use or disposed of in violation of any direction of law or contract by the Appellant. The Appellants have not used the amount nor misappropriated it contrary to any direction of law or contract which prescribes how the amount has to be dealt with. Going by the agreement dated 03.06.1993, the amount has to be returned upon the handing over of the constructed area of the owner which admittedly has not been done. Most significantly the Respondent No.2 has not demanded the return of the amount at any point of time. In fact, it is the specific contention of the Respondent No.2 that he has not demanded the amount because the agreement is still in subsistence. We do not see how it can be contended by any stretch of imagination that the Appellants have misappropriated the amount or 11 dishonestly used the amount contrary to any law or contract. In any case, we find that the dispute has the contours of a dispute of civil nature and does not constitute a criminal offence. 24. Having given our anxious consideration, we are of the view that assuming that there is a security deposit of Rs. One Crore and that he has misappropriated the dispute between the two parties can only be a civil dispute. We are of the opinion that the present case falls under the 1st, 3rd and 5th category set out in the para 102 of the judgment in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). In such a situation, the High Court erred in dismissing the petition of the Appellants filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.We find that the prosecution is mala fide, untenable and solely intended to harass the Appellants. We are forfeited in view of the Respondent not having made any attempt to recover the deposit of Rs. One Crore through a civil action.We have, therefore, no hesitation in quashing the FIR and the charge sheet filed against the Appellants. Hence, the FIR No.0139/2014 dated 20.08.2014 and charge sheet dated 03.08.2018 are hereby quashed.