REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2017-2020 OF 2019 (arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.1476-1479 of 2019) UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ETC. …APPELLANTS Vs. ANKUR GUPTA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. Leave granted. The contesting respondent Nos. 1 and… Read More Section 58 and 59 provides for two different mechanisms for adoption. As per Section 59(1), if an orphan or abandoned or surrendered child could not be placed with an Indian or non-resident Indian prospective adoptive parents despite the joint effort of the Specialised Adoption Agency and State Agency within sixty days from the date the child has been declared legally free for adoption, such child shall be free for inter-country adoption. Thus, sixty days period has to be elapsed from the date when the child has been declared legally free for adoption. In the present case, child was declared free for adoption on 14.12.2017 by Child Welfare Committee, Patna, Bihar. Before expiry of sixty days, child could not have been offered for adoption to parents, who are 22 eligible for adoption under Section 59. We are, however, not oblivious to the fact that respondent Nos.1 and 2 had been bonafide pursuing their applications for adoption, initially as resident Indians and thereafter even as overseas citizens of India. As per Section 57, both the respondent Nos.1 and 2 are fully eligible and competent to adopt the child. It was under the circumstances as noticed above that the child Shomya was offered to respondent Nos.1 and 2, who rightly communicated their acceptance and communicated with the child and are willing to take child in adoption and to take all care and provide good education to her. We have no doubt in the bonafide or the competence of respondent Nos.1 and 2 in their effort to take the child in adoption, but the statutory procedure and the statutory regime, which is prevalent as on date and is equally applicable to all aspirants, i.e., Indian prospective adoptive parents and prospective adoptive parents for inter-country adoption, cannot be lost sight. However, by virtue of Section 59(2), the respondent Nos.1 and 2 can at best may be given priority in inter-country adoption, they being 23 eligible overseas citizens of India and further due to consequences of events and facts as noticed above.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2024 of 2019 {Arising out of SLP(C) No.32721/2017} VINOD JAIN ….Appellant versus SANTOKBA DURLABHJI MEMORIAL HOSPITAL & ANR. ….Respondents J U D G M E N T SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. Leave granted. The sad demise of the wife of the appellant on… Read More Medical Negligence -vs- wrong diagnosis.= it could be termed as a case of wrong diagnosis and certainly not one of medical negligence. = whether her admittance and discharge from respondent No.1-Hospital was the sole, or even the most likely cause of her death. The death had been caused by a multiplicity of factors. In the end, we may also note that the medical certificate issued for the cause of death by Fortis Escorts Hospital cited septic shock due to multiple organ failure as the immediate cause of death, with her diabetic condition being an antecedent cause, as also the multiple malignancies, post chemotherapy and radiotherapy all contributing to her passing away. 17. We appreciate the pain of the appellant, but then, that by itself cannot be a cause for awarding damages for the passing away of his wife. We have sympathy for the appellant, but sympathy cannot translate into a legal remedy. 18. We cannot fault the reasoning of the NCDRC. Thus, the result is that the appeal is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Non -Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos._2049-2158 of 2019 [ Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.15001-15110 of 2013 ] K. Amarnath Reddy & Ors. …. Appellants Versus Chairman & Managing Director, A.P.S.P.D.C.L. & Ors. Etc. Etc. ….Respondents W I T H Civil Appeal Nos. 2159-2268 of 2019 [… Read More some of the eligible candidates have not been appointed till date. Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the DISCOMS fairly submitted that if persons who applied for selection as Junior Lineman in 2006 were not appointed due to condition 6(iv) (c) of the revised notification dated 20.10.2006, they shall be considered for appointment. Keeping in mind that appointments to the posts of Junior Linemen have been made long back and the services of those appointed were regularised, any interference with such appointments will cause irreparable loss to them apart from adversely affecting the smooth functioning of the A.P. TRANSCO and the DISCOMS. 13. Needless to say that, any future recruitment to the post of Junior Lineman shall be done strictly in accordance with the law.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1827 OF 2009 SUBHASH CHAND Appellant(s) Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB Respondent(s) JUDGMENT Dinesh Maheshwari, J. In this appeal, the appellant-accused has called in question the order dated 18.04.2009 in Criminal Revision No. 621 of 2009 whereby, the High Court of Punjab &… Read More convicted the accused-appellant for the offences under Sections 279 IPC and 304-A IPC; and awarded the punishment of 6 2 months’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- with default stipulation for the offence under Section 279 IPC and 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- with default stipulation for the offence under Section 304-A IPC. = just and adequate punishment do apply to the present case too; and we find no reason to reduce the punishment awarded or to extend the benefit of probation where a 15 year old boy lost his life due to the rash and negligent driving of the truck by the appellant and where, after causing the accident, the appellant fled from the site and was surrendered by his commandant more than 3 weeks later.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.180 OF 2019 Deep Narayan Chourasia ….Appellant(s) VERSUS State of Bihar ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated 14.11.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature… Read More whether we should set aside the entire impugned order or set aside only qua the sole appellant herein because the other four accused though suffered conviction under Section 302/149 IPC alike the appellant herein did not file any appeal against their conviction and secondly, the other accused ­ Kanhai Prasad Chourasia whose conviction and sentence under Section 302/149 IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act was upheld has also not filed any appeal in this Court.= It is a fundamental principle of law that an illegality committed by a Court cannot be allowed to be perpetuated against a person to a Lis merely because he did not bring such illegality to the notice of the Court and instead other person similarly placed in the Lis brought such illegality to the Court’s notice and succeed in his challenge. 31. It will be a travesty of justice delivery system where an accused, who is convicted of a lesser offence (Section 27 of the Arms Act alone) and was acquitted of a graver offence (Section 302/149 IPC) is made to suffer conviction for commission of a 15 graver offence (Section 302/149 IPC) without affording him of any opportunity to defend such charge at any stage of the appellate proceedings. 32. Needless to say, if the other four accused had filed the appeals in this Court, they too would have got the benefit of this order. A fortiori, merely because they did not file the appeals and the case is now remanded for re­hearing of the appeal at the instance of one accused, the benefit of re­hearing of the appeal cannot be denied to other co­accused. In other words, the non­appealing co­accused are also entitled to get benefit of the order of this Court and are, therefore, entitled for re­hearing of their appeals along with the present appellant.

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2013 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23249 of 2018) Shri Revansiddeshwar Pattan Sahakari Bank Niyamit ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Taluka Tokrekoli (Ambiga Samaji C Vikas Sangh Indi) (Earlier Gangamath Sangha) & Anr. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar… Read More Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, = when the plaintiff’s injunction application stood dismissed by the Trial Court and the same was not carried in appeal at his instance, the same could not have been revived by the High Court in a writ petition filed by the plaintiff. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court as the High Court neither examined the facts of the case properly nor the legal questions arising in the case, therefore such order is legally unsustainable.

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2012 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1873 of 2012) Vijay Hathising Shah & Anr. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Gitaben Parshottamdas Mukhi & Ors. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted. This appeal is filed against… Read More Amendement of plaint rejected = In our view, the Trial Court was right in rejecting the application. This we say for more than one reason. First, it was wholly belated; Second, respondent No.1(plaintiff) filed the application for amendment of the plaint when the trial in the suit was almost over and the case was fixed for final arguments; and Third, the suit could still be decided even without there being any necessity to seek any amendment in the plaint. In our view, 4 4 amendment in the plaint was not really required for determination of the issues in the suit.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1782 OF 2019 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 21091 of 2010) MURUGAN & ORS. …APPELLANTS Vs. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. This is the plaintiff’s appeal challenging the… Read More To set aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward- (a)by the ward who has attained majority. (b)by the ward’s legal representative- Three years When the ward attains majority. i) When the ward dies within three years from the date of attaining majority. Three years When the ward attains majority. ii) When the ward dies before attaining majority.” Three years When the ward dies.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1784 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23172 OF 2018) PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX SHIMLA …..APPELLANT(S) VERSUS M/S. AARHAM SOFTRONICS …..RESPONDENT(S) W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1785 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23176… Read More “Whether an assessee who sets up a new industry of a kind mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 80-IC of the Act and starts availing exemption of 100 per cent tax under sub-section (3) of Section 80-IC (which is admissible for five years) can start claiming the exemption at the same rate of 100% beyond the period of five years on the ground that the assessee has now carried out substantial expansion in its manufacturing unit?” = 24.The aforesaid discussion leads us to the following conclusions: (a) Judgment dated 20th August, 2018 in Classic Binding Industries case omitted to take note of the definition ‘initial assessment year’ contained in Section 80-IC itself and instead based its conclusion on the definition contained in Section 80-IB, which does not apply in these cases. The definitions of ‘initial assessment year’ in the two sections, viz. Sections 80-IB and 80-IC are materially different. The definition of ‘initial assessment year’ under Section 80-IC has made all the difference. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the aforesaid judgment does not lay down the correct law. (b) An undertaking or an enterprise which had set up a new unit between 7th January, 2003 and 1st April, 2012 in State of Himachal 25 Pradesh of the nature mentioned in clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 80-IC, would be entitled to deduction at the rate of 100% of the profits and gains for five assessment years commencing with the ‘initial assessment year’. For the next five years, the admissible deduction would be 25% (or 30% where the assessee is a company) of the profits and gains. (c) However, in case substantial expansion is carried out as defined in clause (ix) of sub-section (8) of Section 80-IC by such an undertaking or enterprise, within the aforesaid period of 10 years, the said previous year in which the substantial expansion is undertaken would become ‘initial assessment year’, and from that assessment year the assessee shall been entitled to 100% deductions of the profits and gains. (d) Such deduction, however, would be for a total period of 10 years, as provided in sub-section (6). For example, if the expansion is carried out immediately, on the completion of first five years, the assessee would be entitled to 100% deduction again for the next five years. On the other hand, if substantial expansion is undertaken, say, in 8th year by an assessee such an assessee would be entitled to 100% deduction for the first five years, deduction @ 25% of the profits and gains for the next two years and @ 100% again from 8th year as this year becomes ‘initial assessment year’ once again. 26 However, this 100% deduction would be for remaining three years, i.e., 8th, 9th and 10th assessment years. 25.In view of the aforesaid, we affirm the judgment of the High Court on this issue and dismiss all these appeals of the Revenue. Likewise, appeals filed by the assessees are hereby allowed.