Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code = If we do not place confidence in the deposition of PW4 and PW5 then the case would depend upon the credibility of PW2, the prosecutrix. The incident is alleged to have taken place near a path which has been admitted by the prosecutrix and her aunt PW3 as common path. If indeed the prosecutrix has raised hue and cry as in the case reported in 2013 (9) SCC 113, it is very unlikely that the labourers who are supposed to haunt the common path could not hear it. There is a case of the appellant that the evidence would make out a case of consensual sex. It is true that in the High Court, it is recorded that there is no case of consensual sexual intercourse as such argued but we have to decide the case on the basis of evidence. We would think in the circumstances of this case that the appellant cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 376. It would indeed be unsafe to convict him based on the testimony of the prosecutrix. He would certainly be 24 entitled to the benefit of doubt which is created by the very circumstances which we have referred.The trial Court, in fact, has proceeded to rely upon the testimony of prosecutrix about the appellant threatening her that in case she discloses the incident to anyone she will be killed by the accused. This apparently is related to the incident in December, 1999. In fact, the appellant was specifically charged with criminal intimidation allegedly done on 10/07/2000. The appellant was so charged in alleged furtherance of common intention along with co-accused. The trial Court has also proceeded to convict the coaccused relying on the evidence of the prosecutrix.The High Court has acquitted the co-accused of the charge of criminal intimidation. We have noted that there is no specific charge even framed against the appellant under Section 506 in regard to the alleged incident which took place in December, 1999 and the charge in fact relates only to the acts alleged to have been committed on 10/07/2000.In such circumstances, the appeal is allowed. We set aside the order of conviction and sentence of the appellant by the courts below.


Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.M. Joseph

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2393 OF 2010
PARKASH CHAND …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
K.M. JOSEPH, J.

  1. This is a criminal appeal by special leave
    challenging the order dated 11.5.2010 passed by the
    High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal
    Appeal No.615 of 2002 affirming the conviction of the
    appellant under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian
    Penal Code. In short, the case of the prosecution is
    as follows:
    In December, 1999, the appellant committed rape upon
    P.W.2. It is also the further case that P.W.2 was
    intimidated by the appellant and another co-accused.
    2
    The appellant was charged under Sections 376 and 506
    IPC read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
    and co-accused was charged under Section 506 read
    with Section 34 of the IPC. The trial Court found
    the case in favour of the prosecution and after
    convicting the appellant and co-accused sentenced
    the appellant to simple imprisonment for 7 years and
    a fine of Rs.10,000/- with default sentence for the
    offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. He
    was also sentenced for 2 years for the offence
    punishable under Section 506 IPC. Both the
    sentences were to run concurrently. The co-accused
    stands acquitted by the High court whereas the
    appeal filed by the appellant was unsuccessful.
  2. We heard learned counsel for the parties. The
    learned counsel for the appellant would point out that
    PW2, the prosecutrix was above the age of 16 years.
    Learned counsel for the appellant would seek to
    extricate the appellant from culpability on the score
    that the case of the prosecutrix is based on the FIR
    which is lodged 7 months after the alleged commission
    3
    of the rape. There is delay of 7 months in lodging the
    FIR just as in the case of Vijayan v. State of Kerala
    2008 (14)SCC 763. In this case also the prosecutrix
    was pregnant at the time of filing the complaint. The
    FIR was filed on 17.7.2000. whereas the incident is
    alleged to have taken place in December, 1999. He
    points out that it is allegedly filed after the
    prosecutrix told PW1 who accompanied her to Deputy
    Commissioner Office, Chamba. It is pointed out that
    according to the prosecution on 17.7.2000 when she came
    to Chamba to get medicines, she allegedly disclosed the
    incident to PW1 and appellant has been implicated
    thereafter. It is the case of the appellant that P.W.1
    is a resident of the same village and that P.W.1 has
    spoken about having met the prosecutrix even earlier
    but nothing about the alleged rape was disclosed.
  3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondentState would point out that there was ample evidence in
    the form of testimony of the prosecutrix. Besides that
    learned counsel also drew our attention to the evidence
    of PW4 before whom the appellant himself made an extra
    4
    judicial confession. So also attention was drawn to
    the evidence of PW5.
  4. PW5 has also deposed that the appellant requested
    him with folded hands for compromise as he has
    committed wrong with PW2, the prosecutrix and he wanted
    to keep her and her child as his own.
  5. The first question we have to consider is the
    impact of delay of nearly 7 months in lodging the
    complaint with the police. The appellant seeks support
    mainly from the judgment of this Court in the case of
    Vijayan v. State of Kerala 2008 (14)SCC 763. The High
    court in the impugned judgment has on the other hand
    relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in
    State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shree Kant Shekari AIR
    2004 SC 4404. Therein, this Court has essentially
    relied upon the principles about the impact of delay as
    noticed by it in the judgment of this Court in
    Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa reported in 2003 (8)
    SCC 590 wherein rape was committed on a girl whose
    5
    mental ability was undeveloped. This is what the court
    had to say about the fact of delay.
    “……………In any event, delay per se is not
    a mitigating circumstance for the
    accused when accusations of rape are
    involved. Delay in lodging the first
    information report cannot be used as a
    ritualistic formula for discarding
    prosecution case and doubting its
    authenticity. It only puts the court on
    guard to search for and consider if any
    explanation has been offered for the
    delay. Once it is offered, the Court is
    to only see whether it is satisfactory
    or not. In a case if the prosecution
    fails to satisfactorily explain the
    delay and there is possibility of
    embellishment or exaggeration in the
    prosecution version on account of such
    delay, it is a relevant factor. On the
    other hand, satisfactory explanation of
    the delay is weighty enough to reject
    the plea of false implication or
    vulnerability of prosecution case. As
    the factual scenario shows, the victim
    was totally unaware of the catastrophe
    which had befallen her. That being so,
    6
    the mere delay in lodging of the first
    information report does not in any way
    render prosecution version brittle.”
  6. In Vijayan case (supra) the prosecutrix who was
    aged about 17 years was the neighbor of the accused.
    In her testimony the prosecutrix set up the case that
    accused has raped her when no one else was there in the
    house and she was raped in the house. The accusedappellant was alleged to have been told that she need
    not worry as he will marry her. She did not give any
    complaint either to her parents and police in view of
    the promise. She became pregnant and while she was
    carrying a child of 7 months, she requested the accused
    to marry her. The accused declined. Thereafter a
    complaint was filed after 7 months. On these facts
    this court noted that no complaint or grievance was
    made either to the police or the parents thereto. The
    explanation for delay in lodging the FIR was noted
    namely that the accused promised to marry her and
    7
    therefore the FIR was not filed. The Court held as
    follows:
    “…………In cases where the sole testimony of
    the prosecutrix is available, it is very
    dangerous to convict the accused, specially
    when the prosecutrix could venture to wait
    for seven months for filing the FIR for
    rape. This leaves the accused totally
    defenceless. Had the prosecutrix lodged
    the complaint soon after the incident,
    there would have been some supporting
    evidence like the medical report or any
    other injury on the body of the prosecutrix
    so as to show the sign of rape. If the
    prosecutrix has willingly submitted herself
    to sexual intercourse and waited for seven
    months for filing the FIR it will be very
    hazardous to convict on such sole oral
    testimony. Moreover, no DNA test was
    conducted to find out whether the child was
    born out of the said incident of rape and
    that the appellant-accused was responsible
    for the said child. In the face of lack of
    any other evidence, it is unsafe to convict
    the accused.”
    8
  7. In the case of Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala
    reported in 2013 (9) SCC 113, on 17.9.1997 at about
    8.30 a.m. it was alleged the prosecutrix was raped at a
    site which was by the side of a public road. It was
    the case of the prosecutrix that she tried to make hue
    and cry but was silenced by the accused by stating that
    he would marry her. Even after this incident he had
    sexual intercourse on more than one occasion. The
    prosecutrix became pregnant, gave birth to a child and
    accused did not keep his promise to marry her. It is
    thereafter that on 26.7.1998 nearly 10 months after the
    alleged rape that a case was registered. This Court
    referred the Vijayan’s case (supra), took note of the
    place being on the side of a public road, the aspect of
    delayed filing of the report and also the behavior of
    the parents of the prosecutrix in not approaching the
    family members of the accused for marrying the
    prosecutrix and instead lodging the report. The Court
    also found that having regard to the site, if the
    prosecutrix has made any resistance or made hue and cry
    9
    it would have attracted large number of people from the
    locality. The appeal filed by the accused was allowed.
  8. It is in the background of the aforesaid principle
    that we must examine the question. P.W. 2 prosecutrix
    has undoubtedly stated that her parents had died and
    she was left without any brother and sister. She was
    brought up by her uncle and aunt. She studied upto 9th
    class. On 5.12.1999 while she was coming back at about
    5-6 p.m. the appellant who is also the resident of the
    same village and who is related to her as brother in
    village relation caught hold of her and started
    dragging her towards the lonely place in the bushes and
    committed rape. She raised hue and cry but nobody was
    there at the place of occurrence. The appellant showed
    her knife and threatened her to do away with her life
    in case she disclose the incident to anybody. She
    stated that she was so frightened and ashamed due to
    which she did not disclose the incident to anyone.
    After staying with her maternal grandmother when she
    came back she knew about becoming pregnant. Her aunt
    enquired about her womb looking bigger and she told her
    10
    about the incident. Aunt sent her to the home of her
    maternal grandmother. The incident came to be
    disclosed by her aunt to P.W.4 who is also maternal
    uncle of the prosecutrix. A ‘baradari’ was called.
    She was also present. The appellant though called, did
    not appear. On 9.7.2000, persons including P.W.4 and
    appellant came there and the latter told her that he is
    prepared to take her and child to accompany him and
    that he would get her and her child recorded as his
    wife and child. She accompanied the appellant by
    making to understand by matrimonial uncle P.W.4. She
    stayed there for one day and two nights. It is
    thereafter the accused refused to keep her at his house
    and the co-accused also threatened that they will not
    keep her in the house and nor would get the child
    recorded. In short, she was turned out. She stated
    that she requested the accused not to turn her out as
    she was pregnant. On 17.7.2000 when she came to Chamba
    for getting the medicines, she met P.W.1 the person
    whom she described as brother and she told him the
    whole incident. She also asked to get the matter
    11
    reported at the police. It is thereafter that the
    complaint was lodged. She states in her cross
    examination that it is correct that the path is a
    common village path and people used to pass through the
    said path. She stated there was none at that time.
    She would say that it is correct that the labourers
    used to go their house after finishing their labour
    work. She made cries at the time when the accused
    caught hold of her by showing a knife. She stated that
    she had gone to the house of appellant of her own free
    will. She volunteered to say that the accusedappellant had giving assurance that she is his wife and
    was carrying his child in her womb. She disclosed that
    she told her grandmother about the rape and that she
    was turned out by the uncle. The grandmother (Nani)
    told her to go to the house of the accused-appellant.
    It was out of fear that she did not disclose to anyone.
    She states that P.W.1 met her for the first time at
    Chamba and the incident was also disclosed to him for
    the first time. She admits knowing the accused since
    her childhood but denied having either played with him
    12
    or studied with him. She states that when she went to
    the house of the appellant, she slept with him during
    the night. She stated that she had told the petition
    writer that the appellant took her forcibly at the
    point of knife and threatened to kill her with the
    same. She was confronted with the petition wherein it
    was not so recorded. In the petition to the police
    also it is her statement she has stated so but it was
    found not recorded.
  9. We may also notice also the deposition of P.W.1 to
    whom according to her, she disclosed for the first time
    in July, 2000 and with whom she lodged a complaint. He
    stated that it was disclosed by her to him that the
    appellant committed rape when she was coming back to
    her house after purchasing medicines. He admits that
    the uncle of the prosecutrix is alive and he has not
    lodged any complaint. He admits that village Dugli to
    which place prosecutrix had gone in December, 1999 to
    purchase article is scattered within a radius of one
    kilometer. He would say that he got drafted in Exhibit
    P.A. that prosecutrix had disclosed to him that the
    13
    appellant had threatened her with knife/dagger in case
    she disclosed the incident to anyone. He stated that
    this fact was not got drafted in Exhibit P.A.
  10. P.W.3 is not only married to uncle of the
    prosecutrix but is also the elder sister of her own
    mother. She has inter alia stated that when PW.2 after
    staying at her maternal grandmother’s house for 3
    months and thereafter after coming back after 21/22
    days, on noticing that her womb was getting bigger and
    on her being questioned about it, she disclosed what
    happened in December, 1999 namely, the rape committed
    by the appellant. She also stated that out of fear as
    well as feeling ashamed this was not disclosed to
    anyone. Again, PW 2 was sent back to her maternal
    grandmother’s house who is none other than the mother
    of PW 3. At that time PW 2 was six months pregnant.
    PW 3 would further state that Rattan Chand (who was in
    fact examined as PW 4) who is maternal uncle of the
    prosecutrix and who is having in laws in her village
    visited her house. She claims to have thereupon
    disclosed about the rape to him. The prosecutrix was
    14
    thereupon called back from her maternal grandmother’s
    house. A baradari was called. The appellant did not
    attend. Thereafter she speaks about her coming to know
    that prosecutrix went with the appellant and stayed
    with him and was turned out later on. In Cross
    Examination she would state that the prosecutrix was
    carrying pregnancy of 6 months when the baradari
    meeting was called. She disclaims knowledge of the
    outcome in the meeting. She admits that the stomach
    would start bulging out in 4 months pregnancy. In
    further cross she would state that prosecutrix
    continued for 15 days at her house after the disclosure
    about carrying the child of the appellant and
    thereafter she went to maternal grandmother’s house.
    She admits that she and her husband (namely, uncle of
    prosecutrix) did not lodge any report either with the
    Pradhan or the Police. The prosecutrix was brought up
    by them from the age of about 2 ½ years. In regard to
    the path she denied that there is only path in between
    Bhogi and Dugli village. She states there are two to
    15
    three other paths. She, however, admits that this
    path is a common path.
  11. PW 4 Rattan Chand however, has a different
    version about how he came to know about the matter. He
    would state that prosecutrix is related to him. On
    5.7.2000 she came to his house at village Panjah. On
    inquiry about her womb being bigger than normal she
    told him about the forcible sexual intercourse
    committed by the appellant in December, 1999 and about
    her being threatened with the help of a knife not to
    disclose it to anyone. He further states two days
    thereafter, namely on, 7.7.2000 he came to the house of
    his in-laws in village Bhoga and this fact was
    disclosed to the Panchayat member Bhola Ram who
    suggested a ‘Baradari’ meeting. In the said baradari
    meeting Loki Nand, Kishan Chand, Balo Ram and the
    prosecutrix was also there. As the appellant and his
    family members did not attend the meeting, the meeting
    could not take place. He further states that it was
    subsequently decided to report to the matter to the
    Police. Two days thereafter, namely, on 9.7.2000 at
    16
    about 9/10 p.m., appellant and, PW 5 came to his
    father-in-law. They wanted to have special talk with
    him. It is thereupon that he says that the appellant
    requested him with folded hands that since he was the
    maternal uncle of the prosecutrix that he has committed
    wrong with her by committing forcible sexual
    intercourse due to which she became pregnant and the
    foetus in her womb belongs to him. He wanted to take
    the prosecutrix to his house and wanted to keep her as
    his wife and also unborn child and to get them recorded
    in the Panchayat Register if they were ready to send
    her as his wife. Under compelling circumstances and
    having no other way it was decided to send the
    prosecutrix as his wife. The prosecutrix was not ready
    to go as his wife but she was made to understand and
    then she went to the house of the accused-appellant.
    She was taken on the same night. She stayed for one
    day and two nights. Then she was turned out. In cross
    examination he states that he did not report the matter
    to any authority when the prosecutrix disclosed the
    incident to him. After ‘baradari’ meeting the
    17
    prosecutrix started living with her Nani. He further
    states that the accused-appellant visited his house on
    5.7.2000 and at that time Sahib Singh (PW 5), Khelku
    Devi and the prosecutrix was also present. The
    appellant was accompanied by PW 5.
  12. He admits that his statement was recorded by
    the police. He states that he did not state to the
    police that the prosecutrix told him that the appellant
    had met her on the way and that he had committed
    forcible sexual intercourse with her.
    He further states as follows:
    “It is correct that I have not stated
    the aforesaid facts to the Police as it
    was not disclosed to me by the
    prosecutrix”.
    No doubt, thereafter it is found that he states as
    follows:
    “I have not stated to the Police that
    the Prosecutrix told me that the
    appellant took her to the bushes on the
    point of knife on the pretext that the
    18
    prosecutrix had already stated the said
    fact to the police”.
  13. In his deposition P.W.5 would state that on
    9.7.2000 at about 8.00 p.m. while he was coming back,
    the appellant and the co-accused met him. The
    appellant requested him with folded hands by taking him
    into a side and told him that compromise be got
    effected with the prosecutrix because he has committed
    wrong with her and the child in her womb is his
    offspring. However, in cross examination he would
    state as follows:
    “Witness Rattan Chand told me that the
    accused person want to effect compromise
    with the prosecutrix. Accused Prakash
    Chand had no talk with me regarding the
    aforesaid fact. Similarly, no talk took
    place with me and accused Chakknu on the
    said fact. It is correct that Rattan
    Chand told me about the compromise by
    the accused person with the
    prosecutrix.”
    19
  14. There is admittedly a delay of 7 months in
    lodging the FIR in the case of alleged rape. If the
    case is reported immediately apart from the inherent
    strength of the case flowing from genuineness
    attributable to such promptitude, the perceptible
    advantage would be the medical examination to which the
    prosecutrix can be subjected and the result of such
    examination in a case where there is a resistance. It
    is the case of the prosecution that she raised hue and
    cry and therefore apparently she would have resisted.
    Possibly, a medical examination may have revealed signs
    of any resistance or injuries. In this case the High
    Court has proceeded on the basis of testimony of the
    prosecutrix and sought to fortify it by the extra
    judicial confession made before PW4 and PW5.
  15. As far as PW 4 is concerned, his evidence is
    based on the prosecutrix going to him on 05/07/2000 and
    revealing to him what had happened allegedly in
    December 1999 whereas PW3, the maternal aunt of the
    prosecutrix clearly says that after prosecutrix told
    20
    her about the alleged rape and when PW4 came to visit
    the same village where his in-laws also resides at that
    juncture on 07/07/2000, the factum of the alleged rape
    was disclosed to him and he came to know on the said
    basis. This is a completely different version from
    what PW4 has spoken. If PW3 is to be believed, then
    knowledge about the alleged incident was gained by
    P.W.4 only on 07/07/2000 and that too from PW3 instead
    he sets up the case that on 05/07/2000 the prosecutrix
    went to his house and told him about the same. In
    fact, even the prosecutrix in her version has no such
    case. Rather, the prosecutrix would say that the
    incident was disclosed by P.W.3 to P.W.4. This
    completely falsifies the version of P.W.4 that on
    5.7.2000 the prosecutrix went and told him about the
    incident including about the threat of using the knife.
    P.W.4 as we have noted in further cross examination
    would state that he did not tell the police on the
    basis that she had not told him about it. This would
    again show that version of P.W.4 that prosecutrix had
    went and told him about the incident, cannot be
    21
    believed. No doubt, P.W. 4 seeks to state that he did
    not tell the Police about what the prosecutrix told him
    thinking that prosecutrix would have told the police
    about it. It does not appear to be safe. In such
    circumstances, it may not be safe to draw support from
    the alleged extra judicial confession alleged to have
    been made by the appellant to him.
  16. As far as P.W.5 who again has been believed by
    the courts, we would notice that in the cross
    examination he categorically states that the appellant
    and also co-accused did not ask him for compromise.
    This is contrary to his version that on the way back to
    his home on 09/07/2000 he met him and he sought for a
    compromise. It is also to be noted that PW 4 has
    stated in his cross examination that PW5 had met him on
    05/07/2000 along with the appellant. This is not
    considered by the courts below. We have indulged in a
    closer look at the evidence in these proceedings having
    regard to the need to do so in view of the fact that
    the complaint itself is lodged after 7 months. If the
    22
    evidence adduced by the prosecution falls short of the
    test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is
    highly unreliable to act upon it even in an appeal by
    special leave, such a critical examination may not be
    unwarranted. See decision of this Court in Ganga Kumr
    Srivastava v. State of Bihar 2005 (6) SCC 211. Also
    when vital evidence is not appreciated, this Court can
    interfere. Furthermore, we notice that the trial
    court, in fact, proceeded on the basis that the
    prosecutrix was not a minor. The High Court finds on
    evidence that the prosecutrix was not a minor.
    Moreover, we notice that the High court has found as
    follows:
    “16. ………On 18-8-2000, the prosecutrix
    was again brought and was examined by
    him and the pregnancy of approximately
    36 weeks was detected. There is nothing
    in the MLC that the prosecutrix was
    habitual of sexual intercourse……”.
    However, we find in Exhibit PE which is the MLC dated
    18/08/2000, it is clearly stated under the head
    ‘opinion’ as follows:
    23
    “The pt. is used to habitual sexual
    intercourse”
  17. If we do not place confidence in the deposition
    of PW4 and PW5 then the case would depend upon the
    credibility of PW2, the prosecutrix. The incident is
    alleged to have taken place near a path which has been
    admitted by the prosecutrix and her aunt PW3 as common
    path. If indeed the prosecutrix has raised hue and cry
    as in the case reported in 2013 (9) SCC 113, it is very
    unlikely that the labourers who are supposed to haunt
    the common path could not hear it. There is a case of
    the appellant that the evidence would make out a case
    of consensual sex. It is true that in the High Court,
    it is recorded that there is no case of consensual
    sexual intercourse as such argued but we have to decide
    the case on the basis of evidence. We would think in
    the circumstances of this case that the appellant
    cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 376.
    It would indeed be unsafe to convict him based on the
    testimony of the prosecutrix. He would certainly be
    24
    entitled to the benefit of doubt which is created by
    the very circumstances which we have referred.
  18. As far as the charge against the appellant
    under Section 376 IPC is concerned, it reads as
    follows:
    “That in the month of December 1999 at
    about 5/6 PM at village Bhoga, you
    committed rape upon Kumari ……………at a
    place one kilometer away from Dugli
    towards Bhoga and thereby committed an
    offence punishable under Section 376 IPC
    and within my cognizance;
    And I hereby direct you accused be tried
    on the said charge by this court.”
    As far as the charge under Section 506 read with 34 IPC
    is concerned, it reads as follows:
    “That on 10.7.2000 at village Bhoga, you
    alongwith your co-accused in furtherance
    of common intention, criminally
    intimidated Kumari ……….to do away with
    her life and thereby committed an
    offence punishable under Section 506 IPC
    read with Section 34 IPC and within my
    cognizance;
    25
    And I hereby direct you accused be tried
    on the said charge by this Court.”
  19. The trial Court, in fact, has proceeded to rely
    upon the testimony of prosecutrix about the appellant
    threatening her that in case she discloses the incident
    to anyone she will be killed by the accused. This
    apparently is related to the incident in December,
  20. In fact, the appellant was specifically charged
    with criminal intimidation allegedly done on
    10/07/2000. The appellant was so charged in alleged
    furtherance of common intention along with co-accused.
    The trial Court has also proceeded to convict the coaccused relying on the evidence of the prosecutrix.
    The High Court has acquitted the co-accused of the
    charge of criminal intimidation. We have noted that
    there is no specific charge even framed against the
    appellant under Section 506 in regard to the alleged
    incident which took place in December, 1999 and the
    charge in fact relates only to the acts alleged to have
    been committed on 10/07/2000. Apart from the fact that
    there is no specific charge against the appellant in
    26
    regard to what happened in December, 1999, we are
    inclined to think that the appellant could not be
    convicted under Section 506 having regard to the
    circumstances which we have already discussed
    hereinbefore.
  21. In such circumstances, the appeal is allowed.
    We set aside the order of conviction and sentence of
    the appellant by the courts below. As the appellant is
    on bail, the bail bonds of the appellant stands
    discharged.
    …………………………….CJI.
    (Ranjan Gogoi)
    …………………………….J.
    (Sanjay Kishan Kaul)
    …………………………J.
    (K.M. Joseph)
    New Delhi;
    February 12, 2019