To set aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward- (a)by the ward who has attained majority. (b)by the ward’s legal representative- Three years When the ward attains majority. i) When the ward dies within three years from the date of attaining majority. Three years When the ward attains majority. ii) When the ward dies before attaining majority.” Three years When the ward dies.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1782 OF 2019 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 21091 of 2010) MURUGAN & ORS. …APPELLANTS Vs. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. This is the plaintiff’s appeal challenging the… Read More To set aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward- (a)by the ward who has attained majority. (b)by the ward’s legal representative- Three years When the ward attains majority. i) When the ward dies within three years from the date of attaining majority. Three years When the ward attains majority. ii) When the ward dies before attaining majority.” Three years When the ward dies.

“Whether an assessee who sets up a new industry of a kind mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 80-IC of the Act and starts availing exemption of 100 per cent tax under sub-section (3) of Section 80-IC (which is admissible for five years) can start claiming the exemption at the same rate of 100% beyond the period of five years on the ground that the assessee has now carried out substantial expansion in its manufacturing unit?” = 24.The aforesaid discussion leads us to the following conclusions: (a) Judgment dated 20th August, 2018 in Classic Binding Industries case omitted to take note of the definition ‘initial assessment year’ contained in Section 80-IC itself and instead based its conclusion on the definition contained in Section 80-IB, which does not apply in these cases. The definitions of ‘initial assessment year’ in the two sections, viz. Sections 80-IB and 80-IC are materially different. The definition of ‘initial assessment year’ under Section 80-IC has made all the difference. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the aforesaid judgment does not lay down the correct law. (b) An undertaking or an enterprise which had set up a new unit between 7th January, 2003 and 1st April, 2012 in State of Himachal 25 Pradesh of the nature mentioned in clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 80-IC, would be entitled to deduction at the rate of 100% of the profits and gains for five assessment years commencing with the ‘initial assessment year’. For the next five years, the admissible deduction would be 25% (or 30% where the assessee is a company) of the profits and gains. (c) However, in case substantial expansion is carried out as defined in clause (ix) of sub-section (8) of Section 80-IC by such an undertaking or enterprise, within the aforesaid period of 10 years, the said previous year in which the substantial expansion is undertaken would become ‘initial assessment year’, and from that assessment year the assessee shall been entitled to 100% deductions of the profits and gains. (d) Such deduction, however, would be for a total period of 10 years, as provided in sub-section (6). For example, if the expansion is carried out immediately, on the completion of first five years, the assessee would be entitled to 100% deduction again for the next five years. On the other hand, if substantial expansion is undertaken, say, in 8th year by an assessee such an assessee would be entitled to 100% deduction for the first five years, deduction @ 25% of the profits and gains for the next two years and @ 100% again from 8th year as this year becomes ‘initial assessment year’ once again. 26 However, this 100% deduction would be for remaining three years, i.e., 8th, 9th and 10th assessment years. 25.In view of the aforesaid, we affirm the judgment of the High Court on this issue and dismiss all these appeals of the Revenue. Likewise, appeals filed by the assessees are hereby allowed.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1784 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23172 OF 2018) PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX SHIMLA …..APPELLANT(S) VERSUS M/S. AARHAM SOFTRONICS …..RESPONDENT(S) W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1785 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23176… Read More “Whether an assessee who sets up a new industry of a kind mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 80-IC of the Act and starts availing exemption of 100 per cent tax under sub-section (3) of Section 80-IC (which is admissible for five years) can start claiming the exemption at the same rate of 100% beyond the period of five years on the ground that the assessee has now carried out substantial expansion in its manufacturing unit?” = 24.The aforesaid discussion leads us to the following conclusions: (a) Judgment dated 20th August, 2018 in Classic Binding Industries case omitted to take note of the definition ‘initial assessment year’ contained in Section 80-IC itself and instead based its conclusion on the definition contained in Section 80-IB, which does not apply in these cases. The definitions of ‘initial assessment year’ in the two sections, viz. Sections 80-IB and 80-IC are materially different. The definition of ‘initial assessment year’ under Section 80-IC has made all the difference. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the aforesaid judgment does not lay down the correct law. (b) An undertaking or an enterprise which had set up a new unit between 7th January, 2003 and 1st April, 2012 in State of Himachal 25 Pradesh of the nature mentioned in clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 80-IC, would be entitled to deduction at the rate of 100% of the profits and gains for five assessment years commencing with the ‘initial assessment year’. For the next five years, the admissible deduction would be 25% (or 30% where the assessee is a company) of the profits and gains. (c) However, in case substantial expansion is carried out as defined in clause (ix) of sub-section (8) of Section 80-IC by such an undertaking or enterprise, within the aforesaid period of 10 years, the said previous year in which the substantial expansion is undertaken would become ‘initial assessment year’, and from that assessment year the assessee shall been entitled to 100% deductions of the profits and gains. (d) Such deduction, however, would be for a total period of 10 years, as provided in sub-section (6). For example, if the expansion is carried out immediately, on the completion of first five years, the assessee would be entitled to 100% deduction again for the next five years. On the other hand, if substantial expansion is undertaken, say, in 8th year by an assessee such an assessee would be entitled to 100% deduction for the first five years, deduction @ 25% of the profits and gains for the next two years and @ 100% again from 8th year as this year becomes ‘initial assessment year’ once again. 26 However, this 100% deduction would be for remaining three years, i.e., 8th, 9th and 10th assessment years. 25.In view of the aforesaid, we affirm the judgment of the High Court on this issue and dismiss all these appeals of the Revenue. Likewise, appeals filed by the assessees are hereby allowed.

the professional mis-conduct of IO Puran Singh Mehra (since retired from service), it is most respectfully submitted that even though he filed the charge sheet against the actual culprits, he did not carry out investigation with professional rigour, as brought out in para 9 supra. In view of the above, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue directions to the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh/Director General of Police, (U.P.) to initiate departmental action against him.

1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 188 OF 2015 SMT. SUNITA DEVI AND ANR. ….. PETITIONERS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ….. RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T S.ABDUL NAZEER, J. Smt. Seema Garg, daughter-in-law of petitioner No.1, and her two children… Read More the professional mis-conduct of IO Puran Singh Mehra (since retired from service), it is most respectfully submitted that even though he filed the charge sheet against the actual culprits, he did not carry out investigation with professional rigour, as brought out in para 9 supra. In view of the above, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue directions to the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh/Director General of Police, (U.P.) to initiate departmental action against him.

undue sympathy = High Court had been in error in extending undue sympathy and in awarding the punishment of the rigorous imprisonment for the period already undergone i.e., 3 months and 21 days for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. In our view, there was absolutely no reason for the High Court to interfere with the punishment awarded by the Trial Court, being that of rigorous imprisonment for 3 years. 22. For what has been discussed hereinabove, this appeal succeeds and is allowed; the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 27.11.2012 is set aside and that of the Trial Court dated 06.01.1998 is restored. The respondent shall surrender before the Court concerned within a period of 4 weeks from today and shall undergo the remaining 15 part of the sentence. In case he fails to surrender within the period aforesaid, the Trial Court will take necessary steps to ensure that he serves out the remaining part of sentence, of course, after due adjustment of the period already undergone.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.319 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 1837 of 2015) The State of Madhya Pradesh Appellant(s) VS. Suresh Respondent(s) JUDGMENT Dinesh Maheshwari., J Leave granted. In this appeal, the appellant-State of Madhya Pradesh has called in question the judgment and order dated… Read More undue sympathy = High Court had been in error in extending undue sympathy and in awarding the punishment of the rigorous imprisonment for the period already undergone i.e., 3 months and 21 days for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. In our view, there was absolutely no reason for the High Court to interfere with the punishment awarded by the Trial Court, being that of rigorous imprisonment for 3 years. 22. For what has been discussed hereinabove, this appeal succeeds and is allowed; the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 27.11.2012 is set aside and that of the Trial Court dated 06.01.1998 is restored. The respondent shall surrender before the Court concerned within a period of 4 weeks from today and shall undergo the remaining 15 part of the sentence. In case he fails to surrender within the period aforesaid, the Trial Court will take necessary steps to ensure that he serves out the remaining part of sentence, of course, after due adjustment of the period already undergone.

common object = both the Courts below have found that the appellants have common object in burning the hut of the deceased and also attacking the deceased with aruvals (sickles) in view of the role of the deceased in the affairs of Panchayat against caste Hindus. Therefore, appellants other than Ravi (A-1) and Singaravelu (A-2) cannot be treated differently to convict them for the offences under Section 326 read with Section 149 IPC as all the accused were part of the unlawful assembly which has taken the life of the deceased in a murderous attack on the fateful morning of 13.03.1994.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1266 OF 2010 MAHENDRAN ………APPELLANT Versus THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU ………RESPONDENT WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1260 OF 2010 RAVI @GOPU AND ORS. ………APPELLANTS Versus STATE REP. BY THE DEPUTY ………RESPONDENT SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE J U D G M E N T… Read More common object = both the Courts below have found that the appellants have common object in burning the hut of the deceased and also attacking the deceased with aruvals (sickles) in view of the role of the deceased in the affairs of Panchayat against caste Hindus. Therefore, appellants other than Ravi (A-1) and Singaravelu (A-2) cannot be treated differently to convict them for the offences under Section 326 read with Section 149 IPC as all the accused were part of the unlawful assembly which has taken the life of the deceased in a murderous attack on the fateful morning of 13.03.1994.

a student of Medicine, has instituted these proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking a direction to the first respondent to compensate her for the loss of an academic year. = There can be no manner of doubt that the petitioner is entitled to be compensated for the loss of a valuable year which was occasioned by the misdemeanors of the first respondent. A student who has been deprived of a valuable year in pursuing her studies, cannot be left in the lurch. It is in this background, that the explanation that the complaints made by the father of the petitioner were withdrawn only because there was an urgent need to obtain a refund of the fee, to enable the petitioner to secure admission to the Amrita Institute of Medical Sciences must be understood. Middle class parents do not have the luxury of resources. We must form a robust understanding of the circumstances in which the father of the petitioner withdrew his complaint. The Committee has in fact recorded a finding of fact that the withdrawal was not 13 voluntary and was occasioned by the serious impediment in receiving a refund of fees. Hence, the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of the principle which was formulated in the orders of this Court dated 29 August 2018 and 4 October 2018. Since the issue has been remitted back to the Committee by a coordinate bench, following the norm of judicial discipline, we are inclined to follow the same course of action. The petitioner would be at liberty to pursue her claim before the Committee in terms of Clause 1 of the order dated 29 August 2018 passed by this Court as clarified by the subsequent order dated 4 October 2018. We request the Admissions Committee to take a decision expeditiously and within a period of three months of the receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. All the rights and contentions of the parties are kept open

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No.1247 OF 2018 RIYA GEORGE PETITIONER VERSUS KANNUR MEDICAL COLLEGE AND ORS RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J 1 The petitioner, who is a student of Medicine, has instituted these proceedings under Article 32… Read More a student of Medicine, has instituted these proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking a direction to the first respondent to compensate her for the loss of an academic year. = There can be no manner of doubt that the petitioner is entitled to be compensated for the loss of a valuable year which was occasioned by the misdemeanors of the first respondent. A student who has been deprived of a valuable year in pursuing her studies, cannot be left in the lurch. It is in this background, that the explanation that the complaints made by the father of the petitioner were withdrawn only because there was an urgent need to obtain a refund of the fee, to enable the petitioner to secure admission to the Amrita Institute of Medical Sciences must be understood. Middle class parents do not have the luxury of resources. We must form a robust understanding of the circumstances in which the father of the petitioner withdrew his complaint. The Committee has in fact recorded a finding of fact that the withdrawal was not 13 voluntary and was occasioned by the serious impediment in receiving a refund of fees. Hence, the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of the principle which was formulated in the orders of this Court dated 29 August 2018 and 4 October 2018. Since the issue has been remitted back to the Committee by a coordinate bench, following the norm of judicial discipline, we are inclined to follow the same course of action. The petitioner would be at liberty to pursue her claim before the Committee in terms of Clause 1 of the order dated 29 August 2018 passed by this Court as clarified by the subsequent order dated 4 October 2018. We request the Admissions Committee to take a decision expeditiously and within a period of three months of the receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. All the rights and contentions of the parties are kept open

contempt petitions are before us, having been filed by Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd. [“Ericsson”] against Reliance Communications Ltd. [“RCom”], Reliance Telecom Ltd. [“RTL”], and Reliance Infratel Ltd. [“RITL”] [hereinafter, collectively referred to as the “Reliance Companies” or “Companies”].=we are of the view that the contempt of this Court needs to be purged by payment of the sum of INR 550 crore together with interest till date. As stated by the letter dated 21.01.2019, subject to any calculation error, an amount of INR 453 crore must be paid to Ericsson in addition to the deposit of INR 118 crore made in the Registry of this Court. The Registry of this Court is directed to pay over the sum of INR 118 crore to Ericsson within a period of one week from today. The RCom group is directed to purge the contempt of this Court by payment to Ericsson of the sum of INR 41 453 crore within a period of four weeks from today. In default of such payment, the Chairmen who have given undertakings to this Court will suffer three months’ imprisonment. In addition to the aforesaid sum being paid, a fine amounting to INR 1 crore for each Company must also be paid to the Registry of this Court within four weeks from today. This sum will be paid over to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. In default of payment of such fine, the Chairmen of these Companies will suffer one month’s imprisonment

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL/INHERENT JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 845 OF 2018 RELIANCE COMMUNICATION LIMITED & ORS. …..PETITIONERS VERSUS STATE BANK OF INDIA & ORS. …..RESPONDENTS WITH CONTEMPT PETN. (C) NO. 1838 OF 2018 IN W.P. (C) NO. 845 OF 2018 CONTEMPT PETN. (C) NO. 55 OF 2019 IN… Read More contempt petitions are before us, having been filed by Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd. [“Ericsson”] against Reliance Communications Ltd. [“RCom”], Reliance Telecom Ltd. [“RTL”], and Reliance Infratel Ltd. [“RITL”] [hereinafter, collectively referred to as the “Reliance Companies” or “Companies”].=we are of the view that the contempt of this Court needs to be purged by payment of the sum of INR 550 crore together with interest till date. As stated by the letter dated 21.01.2019, subject to any calculation error, an amount of INR 453 crore must be paid to Ericsson in addition to the deposit of INR 118 crore made in the Registry of this Court. The Registry of this Court is directed to pay over the sum of INR 118 crore to Ericsson within a period of one week from today. The RCom group is directed to purge the contempt of this Court by payment to Ericsson of the sum of INR 41 453 crore within a period of four weeks from today. In default of such payment, the Chairmen who have given undertakings to this Court will suffer three months’ imprisonment. In addition to the aforesaid sum being paid, a fine amounting to INR 1 crore for each Company must also be paid to the Registry of this Court within four weeks from today. This sum will be paid over to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. In default of payment of such fine, the Chairmen of these Companies will suffer one month’s imprisonment