Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. = Declaration of registered gift deed as void after 22 years of execution is barred by limitation and suit is liable to be rejected eventhough the plaintiff not asked for cancelaltion of deed to cover limitation =It is the case of the plaintiff that the gift deed was a showy deed of gift and therefore the same is not binding on him. However, it is required to be noted that for approximately 22 years, neither the plaintiff nor his brother (who died on 15.12.2002) claimed at any point of time that the gift deed was showy deed of gift. One of the executants of the gift deed – brother of the plaintiff during his lifetime never claimed that the gift deed was a showy deed of gift. It was the appellant hereinoriginal defendant who filed the suit in the year 2001 for partition and the said suit was filed against his brothers to which the plaintiff was joined as defendant No. 10. It appears that the summon of the suit filed by the defendant being T.S. (Partition) Suit No. 203 of 2001 was served upon the defendant No.10­ plaintiff herein in the year 2001 itself. Despite the same, he instituted the present suit in the year 2003. Even from the averments in the plaint, it appears that during these 22 years i.e. the period from 1981 till 2001/2003, the suit property was mortgaged by the appellant herein­original defendant and the mortgage deed was executed by the defendant. Therefore, considering the averments in the plaint and the bundle of facts stated in the plaint, we are of the opinion that by clever drafting 18 the plaintiff has tried to bring the suit within the period of limitation which, otherwise, is barred by law of limitation. Therefore, considering the decisions of this Court in the case of T. Arivandandam (supra) and others, as stated above, and as the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation, the plaint is required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. 7.1 At this stage, it is required to be noted that, as such, the plaintiff has never prayed for any declaration to set aside the gift deed. We are of the opinion that such a prayer is not asked cleverly. If such a prayer would have been asked, in that case, the suit can be said to be clearly barred by limitation considering Article 59 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, only a declaration is sought to get out of the provisions of the Limitation Act, more particularly, Article 59 of the Limitation Act. The aforesaid aspect has also not been considered by the High Court as well as the learned trial Court. Now, so far as the application on behalf of the original plaintiff and even the observations made by the learned trial Court as well as the High Court that the question with respect to the limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, which can be decided only after the parties lead the evidence is concerned, as observed and held by this Court in the cases of Sham Lal alias Kuldip (supra); N.V. Srinivas Murthy (supra) as well as in the case of Ram Prakash Gupta (supra), considering the averments in the plaint if it is found that the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation, the same can be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2960 OF 2019 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20068 of 2013] Raghwendra Sharan Singh .. Appellant Versus Ram Prasanna Singh (Dead) by LRs .. Respondent J U D G M E N T M. R. Shah, J. Application for substitution… Read More Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. = Declaration of registered gift deed as void after 22 years of execution is barred by limitation and suit is liable to be rejected eventhough the plaintiff not asked for cancelaltion of deed to cover limitation =It is the case of the plaintiff that the gift deed was a showy deed of gift and therefore the same is not binding on him. However, it is required to be noted that for approximately 22 years, neither the plaintiff nor his brother (who died on 15.12.2002) claimed at any point of time that the gift deed was showy deed of gift. One of the executants of the gift deed – brother of the plaintiff during his lifetime never claimed that the gift deed was a showy deed of gift. It was the appellant hereinoriginal defendant who filed the suit in the year 2001 for partition and the said suit was filed against his brothers to which the plaintiff was joined as defendant No. 10. It appears that the summon of the suit filed by the defendant being T.S. (Partition) Suit No. 203 of 2001 was served upon the defendant No.10­ plaintiff herein in the year 2001 itself. Despite the same, he instituted the present suit in the year 2003. Even from the averments in the plaint, it appears that during these 22 years i.e. the period from 1981 till 2001/2003, the suit property was mortgaged by the appellant herein­original defendant and the mortgage deed was executed by the defendant. Therefore, considering the averments in the plaint and the bundle of facts stated in the plaint, we are of the opinion that by clever drafting 18 the plaintiff has tried to bring the suit within the period of limitation which, otherwise, is barred by law of limitation. Therefore, considering the decisions of this Court in the case of T. Arivandandam (supra) and others, as stated above, and as the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation, the plaint is required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. 7.1 At this stage, it is required to be noted that, as such, the plaintiff has never prayed for any declaration to set aside the gift deed. We are of the opinion that such a prayer is not asked cleverly. If such a prayer would have been asked, in that case, the suit can be said to be clearly barred by limitation considering Article 59 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, only a declaration is sought to get out of the provisions of the Limitation Act, more particularly, Article 59 of the Limitation Act. The aforesaid aspect has also not been considered by the High Court as well as the learned trial Court. Now, so far as the application on behalf of the original plaintiff and even the observations made by the learned trial Court as well as the High Court that the question with respect to the limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, which can be decided only after the parties lead the evidence is concerned, as observed and held by this Court in the cases of Sham Lal alias Kuldip (supra); N.V. Srinivas Murthy (supra) as well as in the case of Ram Prakash Gupta (supra), considering the averments in the plaint if it is found that the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation, the same can be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC.

inadvertent mistake cannot be refused to be corrected when the mistake is apparent from the reading of the plaint.= Procedure should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice by any oppressive or punitive use. The Court held as under:- “17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well-recognised exceptions to this principle are: (i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of noncompliance; (ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it; (iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous; (iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court; (v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.” 5 (2006) 1 SCC 75 6 11. Thus, we find that it was an inadvertent mistake in the plaint which trial court should have allowed to be corrected so as to permit the Private Limited Company to sue as Plaintiff as the original Plaintiff has filed suit as Director of the said Private Limited Company. Therefore, the order declining to correct the memo of parties cannot be said to be justified in law. 12. Consequently, the orders passed by the High Court dated 20.08.2018 and by the trial court on 23.01.2018 are set-aside and the application filed by the Plaintiff to amend the plaint is allowed with no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2431 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P (C) No. 2792 of 2019) Varun Pahwa ……..Appellant Versus Mrs. Renu Chaudhary ……..Respondent J U D G M E N T Hemant Gupta, J. Leave granted. The Order dated 20.08.2018 passed by the High Court… Read More inadvertent mistake cannot be refused to be corrected when the mistake is apparent from the reading of the plaint.= Procedure should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice by any oppressive or punitive use. The Court held as under:- “17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well-recognised exceptions to this principle are: (i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of noncompliance; (ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it; (iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous; (iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court; (v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.” 5 (2006) 1 SCC 75 6 11. Thus, we find that it was an inadvertent mistake in the plaint which trial court should have allowed to be corrected so as to permit the Private Limited Company to sue as Plaintiff as the original Plaintiff has filed suit as Director of the said Private Limited Company. Therefore, the order declining to correct the memo of parties cannot be said to be justified in law. 12. Consequently, the orders passed by the High Court dated 20.08.2018 and by the trial court on 23.01.2018 are set-aside and the application filed by the Plaintiff to amend the plaint is allowed with no order as to costs.

nomination of a Director = the appellants also sought a declaration that clause 3 (2) (iii) of the Scheme, 1970 be struck down as being ultra vires the Constitution. = Learned counsel for the appellants then submitted that once the employee is nominated to the Board of Directors­may be from different categories specified under Section 9, then no distinction should be made between them while prescribing the qualification and disqualification. 14 31) This submission has also no merit. A mere reading of Section 9(3) clause (a) to (i) would go to show that the Board of Directors consists of persons coming from different fields. There cannot, therefore, be a uniform qualification or/and disqualification for such persons. Indeed, the qualifications and disqualifications are bound to vary from category to category and would depend on the post, experience and the stream from where a person is being nominated as a Director. Moreover, the qualification and disqualification has to be seen prior to his/her becoming a Director and not after his/her appointment as a Director. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no good ground to interfere with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court, which rightly dismissed the appellants’ writ petition, and upheld Clause 3(2)(iii) of the Scheme as being legal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.5570 OF 2014 Fed. of Bank of India Staff Unions & Anr. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Union of India & Anr. …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated… Read More nomination of a Director = the appellants also sought a declaration that clause 3 (2) (iii) of the Scheme, 1970 be struck down as being ultra vires the Constitution. = Learned counsel for the appellants then submitted that once the employee is nominated to the Board of Directors­may be from different categories specified under Section 9, then no distinction should be made between them while prescribing the qualification and disqualification. 14 31) This submission has also no merit. A mere reading of Section 9(3) clause (a) to (i) would go to show that the Board of Directors consists of persons coming from different fields. There cannot, therefore, be a uniform qualification or/and disqualification for such persons. Indeed, the qualifications and disqualifications are bound to vary from category to category and would depend on the post, experience and the stream from where a person is being nominated as a Director. Moreover, the qualification and disqualification has to be seen prior to his/her becoming a Director and not after his/her appointment as a Director. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no good ground to interfere with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court, which rightly dismissed the appellants’ writ petition, and upheld Clause 3(2)(iii) of the Scheme as being legal.

application for enrolment as an advocate = suppression that was alleged against the Appellant at the time of seeking enrolment in the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh pertains to his being in Government service in the State of Himachal Pradesh and his involvement in a criminal case. Subsequent acquittal cannot come to the rescue of the Appellant. Section 26 of the Advocates Act, 1961 confers power on the Bar Council of India to remove the name of a person who entered on the Roll of Advocates by misrepresentation. It is in exercise of this power that the enrollment of the Appellant was cancelled. The first order that was passed by the Bar Council cancelling his enrolment as an advocate was confirmed by this Court. The repeated attempts made by the Appellant later amount to an abuse of process. The Appellant would be better advised not to indulge in pursuing the matter pertaining to 5 his enrollment as Advocate

Non -Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No .294 of2007 ANAND KUMAR SHARMA …. Appellant Versus BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA THROUGH SECRETARY & ANOTHER ….Respondents W I T H CIVIL APPEAL No._2426-2427 of 2019 [ Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil)…6383-6384/2019 CC Nos. 10531 – 10532 of 2013] ANAND KUMAR… Read More application for enrolment as an advocate = suppression that was alleged against the Appellant at the time of seeking enrolment in the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh pertains to his being in Government service in the State of Himachal Pradesh and his involvement in a criminal case. Subsequent acquittal cannot come to the rescue of the Appellant. Section 26 of the Advocates Act, 1961 confers power on the Bar Council of India to remove the name of a person who entered on the Roll of Advocates by misrepresentation. It is in exercise of this power that the enrollment of the Appellant was cancelled. The first order that was passed by the Bar Council cancelling his enrolment as an advocate was confirmed by this Court. The repeated attempts made by the Appellant later amount to an abuse of process. The Appellant would be better advised not to indulge in pursuing the matter pertaining to 5 his enrollment as Advocate