1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 524 of 2019 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl) No 2001 of 2012) The State of Madhya Pradesh …Appellant Versus Uday Singh …Respondent With Criminal Appeal No. 525 of 2019 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl) No 5413 of 2013) The State of Madhya… Read More whether it is the Authorised Officer under that Act or the Magistrate under the CrPC who is vested with the power to order interim release of forest produce seized under the Act. = Our analysis of the amendments brought by MP Act 25 of 1983 to the Indian Forest Act 1927 leads to the conclusion that specific provisions have been made for the seizure and confiscation of forest produce and of tools, boats, vehicles and articles used in the commission of offences. Upon a seizure under Section 52(1), the officer effecting the seizure has to either produce the property before the Authorised Officer or to make a report of the seizure under sub-section (2) of Section 52. Upon being satisfied that a forest offence has been committed, the Authorised Officer is empowered, for reasons to be recorded, to confiscate the forest produce together with the tools, vehicles, boats and articles used in its commission. Before confiscating any property under sub-section (3), the Authorised Officer is required to send an intimation of the initiation of the proceedings for the confiscation of the property to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence. Where it is intended to immediately launch a criminal proceeding, a report of the seizure is made to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence. The order of confiscation under Section 52(3) is subject to an appeal under Section 52-A and a revision under Section 52-B. Subsection (5) of Section 52-B imparts finality to the order of the Court of Sessions in revision notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in the CrPC and provides that it shall not be called into question before any court. Section 52-C stipulates that on the receipt of an intimation by the Magistrate under sub-section (4) of Section 52, no court, tribunal or authority, other than an Authorised Officer, an Appellate Authority or Court of Sessions (under Sections 52, 52-A and 52-B) shall have jurisdiction to pass orders with regard to possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of the property in regard to which confiscation proceedings have been initiated. Sub-section (1) of Section 52-C has a non obstante provision which operates notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Forest Act 1927 or in any other law for the time being in force. The only saving is in respect of an officer duly empowered by the State government for directing the immediate release of a property seized under Section 52, as provided in Section 31 Hence, upon the receipt of an intimation by the Magistrate of the initiation of confiscation proceedings under sub-section (4)(a) of Section 52, the bar of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 52-C is clearly attracted. The scheme contained in the amendments enacted to the Indian Forest Act 1927 in relation to the State of Madhya Pradesh, makes it abundantly clear that the direction which was issued by the High Court in the present case, in a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC, to the Magistrate to direct the interim release of the vehicle, which had been seized, was contrary to law. The jurisdiction under Section 451 of the CrPC was not available to the Magistrate, once the Authorised Officer initiated confiscation proceedings The Madhya Pradesh amendments to the Indian Forest Act 1927 are infused with a salutary public purpose. Protection of forests against depredation is a constitutionally mandated goal exemplified by Article 48A28 of the Directive Principles and the Fundamental Duty of every citizen incorporated in Article 51A(g)29. By isolating the confiscation of forest produce and the instruments utilised for the commission of an offence from criminal trials, the legislature intended to ensure that confiscation is an effective deterrent.
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No 2614 of 2019 (@SLP(C) No. 4297 of 2017) The Branch Manager National Insurance Co. Ltd. …Appellant Versus Smt. Mousumi Bhattacharjee & Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J. 1 The present appeal raises an… Read More whether a death due to malaria occasioned by a mosquito bite in Mozambique, constituted a death due to accident.= In a policy of insurance which covers death due to accident, the peril insured against is an accident: an untoward happening or occurrence which is unforeseen and unexpected in the normal course of human events. The death of the insured in the present case was caused by encephalitis malaria. The claim under the policy is founded on the hypothesis that there is an element of uncertainty about whether or when a person would be the victim of a mosquito bite which is a carrier of a vectorborne disease. The submission is that being bitten by a mosquito is an unforeseen eventuality and should be regarded as an accident. We do not agree with this submission. The insured was based in Mozambique. According to the World Health Organization’s World Malaria Report 2018, Mozambique, with a population of 29.6 million people, accounts for 5% of cases of malaria globally. It is also on record that one out of three people in Mozambique is afflicted with malaria. In light of these statistics, the illness of encephalitis malaria through a mosquito bite cannot be considered as an accident. It was neither unexpected nor unforeseen. It was not a peril insured against in the policy of accident insurance. We are hence of the view that the interpretation placed on the terms of the insurance policy was manifestly incorrect and that the impugned order of the National Commission is unsustainable.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos.77037704 OF 2009 V. Krishnamurthy & Anr. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. These appeals are directed against the final judgment and order dated 11.04.2008 passed by the High… Read More No mala fides – Resume order of land is correct – This plea of mala fides was based on political rivalry. = First, admittedly the land in question belongs to the State; Second, clause 4 of the allotment order empowers the State to resume the land either in the event of violation of any of the terms and conditions of the allotment order by the appellant or if it is required for public purpose, the State is entitled to exercise their right of resumption of the land; and Third, the State admittedly exercised the right of resumption of the land for a public purpose.A plea of mala fides, in our view, has no factual and legal foundation to sustain because we find that it is only based on the averment that since the appellant happened to be a member of the opposition party, the party in power at that time had taken the impugned action to resume the land against them. Such averments by itself do not constitute a plea of mala fides without there being any substantial material in its support. In our view, the appellants having failed to point out any legal infirmity in the resumption order except to take the plea based on mala fides, the Division Bench was right in upholding the resumption order as being legal and in conformity with clause 4 of the allotment order.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.526 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.8664 of 2014) Ganga Prasad Mahto ….Appellant(s) VERSUS State of Bihar & Anr. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the final judgment… Read More failed to prove the case of rape = First, the complainant was not examined by the Doctor after the alleged incident. Second, in absence of any medical examination done, the prosecution did not examine any doctor in the trial in support of their case; Third, it was not disputed that similar type of complaints were being made in past by the complainant against other persons also and such complaints were later found false; Fourth, it was also not disputed that there was enmity between the appellant and the husband of the prosecutrix, due to which their relations were not cordial; Fifth, it had also come in evidence that the prosecutrix was in habit of implicating all the persons by making wild allegations of such nature against those with whom she or/and her husband were having any kind of disputes; Sixth, there was no eye witness to the alleged incident and the one, who was cited as witness, i.e., PW2 was a chance witness on whose testimony, a charge of rape could not be established; and lastly, so far as PW1, husband of the complainant, is concerned, he admitted that he was away and returned to village the next day morning of the incident. In the light of the aforementioned seven reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case of rape alleged by the Complainant(PW3) against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, there is no evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the commission of the offence of rape by the appellant on PW3 and the evidence adduced is not sufficient to prove the case of rape against the appellant. Both the Courts below were, therefore, not justified in convicting the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. He was entitled for acquittal.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.3198 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11937 of 2017) CTO, Anti Evasion, Circle III, Rajasthan, Jaipur ….Appellant(s) VERSUS M/s Prasoon Enterprises, Jaipur ….Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL Nos.31993200 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.48374838 of 2017) CIVIL APPEAL Nos.32013202 OF 2019 (Arising… Read More wire ropes used in the Mobile Cranes are a part of the Mobile Cranes and thus fall in Entry 155 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act. = It is for this reason, we are of the considered opinion that the Mobile Crane Wire Rope is an essential part of the Mobile Crane and, therefore, falls in Entry 155 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act. It is, therefore, taxable at the rates prescribed for the goods specified in Entry 155.
NONREPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.3197 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 22909 of 2017) The Regional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Dinesh Singh ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted. This appeal is directed against… Read More Terimination of employement = In our opinion, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case coupled with the fact that there were several complaints, which were being regularly received by the appellant against the respondent during his tenure, and further the appellant having lost their confidence on the respondent and also the fact that the respondent was appointed temporarily under Rule 8 of the Regulations to take care of the appellant’s guest house and lastly, it is now almost 19 years that the respondent has been out of appellant’s services, we are of the view that the interest of justice would be met if a compensation of Rs.One Lakh (Rs.1,00,000/) is awarded to the respondent in full and final satisfaction in lieu of his right to claim reinstatement in the appellant’s services and also in lieu of all his service claims against the appellant. It will also balance the equities between the parties and will put to an end to this litigation
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7698 OF 2009 MODERN TRANSPORTATION CONSULTATION SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. ….. APPELLANT(S) VS. CENTRAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND ORGANISATION & ORS. ….. RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT Dinesh Maheshwari, J. In this appeal by special leave, the appellants (writ petitioners) have called… Read More whether the definition of “excluded employees” in Paragraph 2(f) as also the stipulation in Paragraphs 26 and 69 of the Scheme of 1952 refer to any provident fund or only to the Fund under the Scheme of 1952? = if a person is member of the Fund created thereunder i.e., under the Scheme of 1952 and withdraws all his accumulations therein, he may not be obliged to be a member of the same Fund under the Scheme of 1952 over again and could be treated as an “excluded employees”. However, such is not the relaxation granted in relation to an employee who was earlier a member of any other Fund but later on joins such an establishment where he would be entitled to membership of the Fund created under the Scheme of 1952. This framework of the provisions and stipulations appears to be best serving the interest of employees, while providing them with continued financial security.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No 3211 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (C) No 2810 of 2012) The Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi …Appellant(s) VERSUS Ram Kishan Dass …Respondent(s) WITH Civil Appeal No(s). 3214, 3212, 3213, 3228, 3230, 3215, 3229, 3216, 3219, 3220, 3217, 3221, 3218,… Read More whether the amendment which has been brought about by the legislature is intended to be clarificatory or to remove an ambiguity in the law must depend upon the context. = The provisions of Section 142(2C) of the Income Tax Act 1961, as they stood prior to the amendment which was enacted with effect from 1 April 2008 by the Finance Act, 2008 did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction and authority by the assessing officer to extend time for the submission of the audit report directed under subsection (2A), without an application by the assessee. We hold and declare that the amendment was intended to remove an ambiguity and is clarificatory in nature. As a consequence of our decision, we specifically overrule the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v Bishan Swaroop Ram Kishan Agro Pvt. Ltd.15 dated 27 May 2011.
1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 259 OF 2019 ASSOCIATION FOR CONSUMER WELFARE AND AID Appellant(s) VERSUS GRANITE GATE PROPERTIES PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1501 OF 2019 JUDGMENT Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J. Civil Appeal No. 259 of 2019 Admitted. By the… Read More whether a direction for the deletion of the second respondent was warranted. We may note the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellants to the effect that under Section 2(zk) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, the definition of the expression “promoter” would include the entity which is constructing the building as well as the entity which is selling the apartments or plots. Section 2(zk) reads as follows:- “(zk) “promoter” means,— (i) a person who constructs or causes to be constructed an independent building or a building consisting of apartments, or converts an existing building or a part thereof into apartments, for the purpose of selling all or some of the apartments to other persons and includes his assignees; or (ii) a person who develops land into a project, whether or not the person also constructs structures on any of the plots, for the purpose of selling to other persons all or some of the plots in the said project, whether with or without structures thereon; or (iii) any development authority or any other public body in respect of allottees of— (a) buildings or apartments, as the case may be, constructed by such authority or body on lands owned by them or placed at their disposal by the Government; or (b) plots owned by such authority or body or placed at their disposal by the Government, for the purpose of selling all or some of the apartments or plots; or 5 (iv) an apex State level co-operative housing finance society and a primary co-operative housing society which constructs apartments or buildings for its Members or in respect of the allottees of such apartments or buildings; or (v) any other person who acts himself as a builder, coloniser, contractor, developer, estate developer or by any other name or claims to be acting as the holder of a power of attorney from the owner of the land on which the building or apartment is constructed or plot is developed for sale; or (vi) such other person who constructs any building or apartment for sale to the general public. Explanation.— For the purposes of this clause, where the person who constructs or converts a building into apartments or develops a plot for sale and the persons who sells apartments or plots are different persons, both of them shall be deemed to be the promoters and shall be jointly liable as such for the functions and responsibilities specified, under this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder;” On the basis of the material which is on record, it is not possible for the Court to conclude at the present stage that the second respondent is unconnected with the project or has been impleaded as a party to the proceeding without any reason or basis. The issue as to whether, and if so, what relief can be ultimately granted in the consumer complaint is a matter which will be determined during the course of the hearing of the complaint. Consequently, we are of the view that on the basis of the averments contained in the complaint as well as on the material which has been placed on the record by the second respondent, an order for deletion was not warranted at this stage.