whether the amendment which has been brought about by the legislature is intended to be clarificatory or to remove an ambiguity in the law must depend upon the context. = The provisions of Section 142(2C) of the Income Tax Act 1961, as they stood prior to the amendment which was enacted with effect from 1 April 2008 by the Finance Act, 2008 did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction and authority by the assessing officer to extend time for the submission of the audit report directed under subsection (2A), without an application by the assessee. We hold and declare that the amendment was intended to remove an ambiguity and is clarificatory in nature. As a consequence of our decision, we specifically overrule the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v Bishan Swaroop Ram Kishan Agro Pvt. Ltd.15 dated 27 May 2011.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No 3211 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (C) No 2810 of 2012) The Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi …Appellant(s) VERSUS Ram Kishan Dass …Respondent(s) WITH Civil Appeal No(s). 3214, 3212, 3213, 3228, 3230, 3215, 3229, 3216, 3219, 3220, 3217, 3221, 3218,… Read More whether the amendment which has been brought about by the legislature is intended to be clarificatory or to remove an ambiguity in the law must depend upon the context. = The provisions of Section 142(2C) of the Income Tax Act 1961, as they stood prior to the amendment which was enacted with effect from 1 April 2008 by the Finance Act, 2008 did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction and authority by the assessing officer to extend time for the submission of the audit report directed under subsection (2A), without an application by the assessee. We hold and declare that the amendment was intended to remove an ambiguity and is clarificatory in nature. As a consequence of our decision, we specifically overrule the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v Bishan Swaroop Ram Kishan Agro Pvt. Ltd.15 dated 27 May 2011.

whether a direction for the deletion of the second respondent was warranted. We may note the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellants to the effect that under Section 2(zk) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, the definition of the expression “promoter” would include the entity which is constructing the building as well as the entity which is selling the apartments or plots. Section 2(zk) reads as follows:- “(zk) “promoter” means,— (i) a person who constructs or causes to be constructed an independent building or a building consisting of apartments, or converts an existing building or a part thereof into apartments, for the purpose of selling all or some of the apartments to other persons and includes his assignees; or (ii) a person who develops land into a project, whether or not the person also constructs structures on any of the plots, for the purpose of selling to other persons all or some of the plots in the said project, whether with or without structures thereon; or (iii) any development authority or any other public body in respect of allottees of— (a) buildings or apartments, as the case may be, constructed by such authority or body on lands owned by them or placed at their disposal by the Government; or (b) plots owned by such authority or body or placed at their disposal by the Government, for the purpose of selling all or some of the apartments or plots; or 5 (iv) an apex State level co-operative housing finance society and a primary co-operative housing society which constructs apartments or buildings for its Members or in respect of the allottees of such apartments or buildings; or (v) any other person who acts himself as a builder, coloniser, contractor, developer, estate developer or by any other name or claims to be acting as the holder of a power of attorney from the owner of the land on which the building or apartment is constructed or plot is developed for sale; or (vi) such other person who constructs any building or apartment for sale to the general public. Explanation.— For the purposes of this clause, where the person who constructs or converts a building into apartments or develops a plot for sale and the persons who sells apartments or plots are different persons, both of them shall be deemed to be the promoters and shall be jointly liable as such for the functions and responsibilities specified, under this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder;” On the basis of the material which is on record, it is not possible for the Court to conclude at the present stage that the second respondent is unconnected with the project or has been impleaded as a party to the proceeding without any reason or basis. The issue as to whether, and if so, what relief can be ultimately granted in the consumer complaint is a matter which will be determined during the course of the hearing of the complaint. Consequently, we are of the view that on the basis of the averments contained in the complaint as well as on the material which has been placed on the record by the second respondent, an order for deletion was not warranted at this stage.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 259 OF 2019 ASSOCIATION FOR CONSUMER WELFARE AND AID Appellant(s) VERSUS GRANITE GATE PROPERTIES PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1501 OF 2019 JUDGMENT Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J. Civil Appeal No. 259 of 2019 Admitted. By the… Read More whether a direction for the deletion of the second respondent was warranted. We may note the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellants to the effect that under Section 2(zk) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, the definition of the expression “promoter” would include the entity which is constructing the building as well as the entity which is selling the apartments or plots. Section 2(zk) reads as follows:- “(zk) “promoter” means,— (i) a person who constructs or causes to be constructed an independent building or a building consisting of apartments, or converts an existing building or a part thereof into apartments, for the purpose of selling all or some of the apartments to other persons and includes his assignees; or (ii) a person who develops land into a project, whether or not the person also constructs structures on any of the plots, for the purpose of selling to other persons all or some of the plots in the said project, whether with or without structures thereon; or (iii) any development authority or any other public body in respect of allottees of— (a) buildings or apartments, as the case may be, constructed by such authority or body on lands owned by them or placed at their disposal by the Government; or (b) plots owned by such authority or body or placed at their disposal by the Government, for the purpose of selling all or some of the apartments or plots; or 5 (iv) an apex State level co-operative housing finance society and a primary co-operative housing society which constructs apartments or buildings for its Members or in respect of the allottees of such apartments or buildings; or (v) any other person who acts himself as a builder, coloniser, contractor, developer, estate developer or by any other name or claims to be acting as the holder of a power of attorney from the owner of the land on which the building or apartment is constructed or plot is developed for sale; or (vi) such other person who constructs any building or apartment for sale to the general public. Explanation.— For the purposes of this clause, where the person who constructs or converts a building into apartments or develops a plot for sale and the persons who sells apartments or plots are different persons, both of them shall be deemed to be the promoters and shall be jointly liable as such for the functions and responsibilities specified, under this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder;” On the basis of the material which is on record, it is not possible for the Court to conclude at the present stage that the second respondent is unconnected with the project or has been impleaded as a party to the proceeding without any reason or basis. The issue as to whether, and if so, what relief can be ultimately granted in the consumer complaint is a matter which will be determined during the course of the hearing of the complaint. Consequently, we are of the view that on the basis of the averments contained in the complaint as well as on the material which has been placed on the record by the second respondent, an order for deletion was not warranted at this stage.

whether the buyer was entitled to seek a refund or was estopped from doing so, having claimed compensation as the primary relief in the consumer complaint.= In terms of the agreement, the date for handing over possession was 31 December 2008, with a grace period of six months. Even in 2011, when the buyer filed a consumer complaint, he was ready and willing to accept possession. It would be manifestly unreasonable to construe the contract between the parties as requiring the buyer to wait indefinitely for possession. By 2016, nearly seven years had elapsed from the date of the agreement. Even according to the developer, the completion certificate was received on 29 March 2016. This was nearly seven years after the extended date for the handing over of possession prescribed by the agreement. A buyer can be expected to wait for possession for a reasonable period. A period of seven years is beyond what is reasonable. Hence, it would have been manifestly unfair to non-suit the buyer merely on the basis of the first prayer in the reliefs sought before the SCDRC. There was in any event a prayer for refund. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the orders passed by the SCDRC and by the NCDRC for refund of moneys were justified. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, we modify the order of the NCDRC by directing that the appellant shall pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum to the respondent instead and in place of 12% as directed by the NCDRC. Save and except for the above modification, we affirm the directions of the NCDRC.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3182 OF 2019 (@SLP(C) No(s). 1795 OF 2017) KOLKATA WEST INTERNATIONAL CITY PVT LTD Appellant(s) VERSUS DEVASIS RUDRA Respondent(s) JUDGMENT Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J. Leave granted. This appeal arises from the judgment dated 21 November 2016 of the National Consumer… Read More whether the buyer was entitled to seek a refund or was estopped from doing so, having claimed compensation as the primary relief in the consumer complaint.= In terms of the agreement, the date for handing over possession was 31 December 2008, with a grace period of six months. Even in 2011, when the buyer filed a consumer complaint, he was ready and willing to accept possession. It would be manifestly unreasonable to construe the contract between the parties as requiring the buyer to wait indefinitely for possession. By 2016, nearly seven years had elapsed from the date of the agreement. Even according to the developer, the completion certificate was received on 29 March 2016. This was nearly seven years after the extended date for the handing over of possession prescribed by the agreement. A buyer can be expected to wait for possession for a reasonable period. A period of seven years is beyond what is reasonable. Hence, it would have been manifestly unfair to non-suit the buyer merely on the basis of the first prayer in the reliefs sought before the SCDRC. There was in any event a prayer for refund. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the orders passed by the SCDRC and by the NCDRC for refund of moneys were justified. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, we modify the order of the NCDRC by directing that the appellant shall pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum to the respondent instead and in place of 12% as directed by the NCDRC. Save and except for the above modification, we affirm the directions of the NCDRC.

Non examination of expert – fatal to claim insurance claim and failure to prove excess rain fall and water logging on road = where damage had been caused by any cause other than what was specifically excluded = among the exclusions provided in the insurance policy was normal wear and tear and gradual deterioration due to atmospheric conditions.= We have adverted to the report of the Surveyor, which found that there was only surface damage and no evidence of the road having been washed out as a result of excessive monsoon rain or inundation. That apart, as we have noted from the findings of the NCDRC, the dates on which the alleged damage is stated to have occurred had not witnessed excessive rainfall and the rain was within normal parameters. The failure of the appellant to examine any expert in regard to the cause of the damage is a significant omission which has been correctly relied upon by the NCDRC. The insurance policy specifically excluded normal wear and tear. In order to establish that this was not a case involving normal wear and tear, the appellant sought to rely upon what it described as abnormal rainfall and water logging. The evidence on the record did not sustain the basis of such a claim.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7315 OF 2016 MAHAVIR ROAD AND INFRASTRUCTURE PVT LTD. APPELLANT(s) VERSUS IFFCO TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD RESPONDENT(s) J U D G M E N T DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J Delay condoned. Admit. This appeal arises from a judgment and order… Read More Non examination of expert – fatal to claim insurance claim and failure to prove excess rain fall and water logging on road = where damage had been caused by any cause other than what was specifically excluded = among the exclusions provided in the insurance policy was normal wear and tear and gradual deterioration due to atmospheric conditions.= We have adverted to the report of the Surveyor, which found that there was only surface damage and no evidence of the road having been washed out as a result of excessive monsoon rain or inundation. That apart, as we have noted from the findings of the NCDRC, the dates on which the alleged damage is stated to have occurred had not witnessed excessive rainfall and the rain was within normal parameters. The failure of the appellant to examine any expert in regard to the cause of the damage is a significant omission which has been correctly relied upon by the NCDRC. The insurance policy specifically excluded normal wear and tear. In order to establish that this was not a case involving normal wear and tear, the appellant sought to rely upon what it described as abnormal rainfall and water logging. The evidence on the record did not sustain the basis of such a claim.

five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence = (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 519 OF 2019 (@ SLP(Crl)No.856 OF 2018) Pavan Vasudeo Sharma vs. State of Maharashtra through Secretary 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.591 OF 2019 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.856 of 2018) PAVAN VASUDEO SHARMA …Appellant VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH SECRETARY… Read More five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence = (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

Imbalance of a case = when defendant not filed written statment and participated in cross examination of plaintiff’s witness = In our considered opinion, the need to remand the case to the Senior Civil Judge for trying the civil suit afresh on merits has occasioned for more than one reason. 14. First, we find that the trial in the suit has not been done satisfactorily inasmuch as the defendant was not afforded an adequate opportunity to file his written statement. 15. Second, in the absence of any written statement, the defendant could neither adduce proper evidence nor file any documentary evidence in support of his case. 5 16. Third, the rights of the parties were, therefore, decided by the two Courts (Trial Court and First Appellate Court) by decreeing the suit and the High Court by dismissing the suit on the basis of insufficient evidence. In our view, it caused prejudice to both the parties. 17. Fourth, we do not find any justifiable reason to deny the defendant of his right to file the written statement. He was entitled to file the written statement and to adduce oral and documentary evidence for contesting the suit on merits. 18. It is a settled law that all the contesting parties to the suit must get fair opportunity to contest the suit on merits in accordance with law. A decision rendered by the Courts in an unsatisfactory conducting of the trial of the suit is not legally sustainable. It is regardless of the fact that in whose favour the decision in the trial may go. 6 19. It is for these reasons, we are of the view that these appeals deserve to be allowed and matter is remitted to the Trial Court for deciding the civil suit afresh on merits in accordance with law It is a settled law that all the contesting parties to the suit must get fair opportunity to contest the suit on merits in accordance with law. A decision rendered by the Courts in an unsatisfactory conducting of the trial of the suit is not legally sustainable. It is regardless of the fact that in whose favour the decision in the trial may go.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos.3282­3283 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.20295­20296 of 2017) Rajinder Tiwari ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Kedar Nath(Deceased) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted. These appeals are directed against the final judgment… Read More Imbalance of a case = when defendant not filed written statment and participated in cross examination of plaintiff’s witness = In our considered opinion, the need to remand the case to the Senior Civil Judge for trying the civil suit afresh on merits has occasioned for more than one reason. 14. First, we find that the trial in the suit has not been done satisfactorily inasmuch as the defendant was not afforded an adequate opportunity to file his written statement. 15. Second, in the absence of any written statement, the defendant could neither adduce proper evidence nor file any documentary evidence in support of his case. 5 16. Third, the rights of the parties were, therefore, decided by the two Courts (Trial Court and First Appellate Court) by decreeing the suit and the High Court by dismissing the suit on the basis of insufficient evidence. In our view, it caused prejudice to both the parties. 17. Fourth, we do not find any justifiable reason to deny the defendant of his right to file the written statement. He was entitled to file the written statement and to adduce oral and documentary evidence for contesting the suit on merits. 18. It is a settled law that all the contesting parties to the suit must get fair opportunity to contest the suit on merits in accordance with law. A decision rendered by the Courts in an unsatisfactory conducting of the trial of the suit is not legally sustainable. It is regardless of the fact that in whose favour the decision in the trial may go. 6 19. It is for these reasons, we are of the view that these appeals deserve to be allowed and matter is remitted to the Trial Court for deciding the civil suit afresh on merits in accordance with law It is a settled law that all the contesting parties to the suit must get fair opportunity to contest the suit on merits in accordance with law. A decision rendered by the Courts in an unsatisfactory conducting of the trial of the suit is not legally sustainable. It is regardless of the fact that in whose favour the decision in the trial may go.

High Court has no jurisdiction to allow the second appeal without framing a substantial question of law as provided under Section 100 of the Code.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 3276­3281 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.30383­30388 of 2011) Chand Kaur (D) Thr.Lrs. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Mehar Kaur (D) Thr.Lrs ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted. These appeals are directed against the final… Read More High Court has no jurisdiction to allow the second appeal without framing a substantial question of law as provided under Section 100 of the Code.