whether throwing of burning stove on the deceased is a rash and negligent ? – No.- What was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the appellant had no enmity with the deceased. He had no intention to kill the deceased as by killing him he could not have recovered the amount of Rs 50,000 which he had advanced to the deceased. He further submitted that the quarrel between the two took place all of a sudden and in the heat of the moment the appellant had picked the stove and had thrown it towards the deceased. He, therefore, submitted that it was merely a rash and negligent act on the part of the appellant. We cannot agree with the submission of the learned counsel. Since the appellant had thrown a burning stove on the deceased, he would have known that his act was likely to cause burns resulting in death. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, he can be said to have committed an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.763 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.9312/2014) KALABAI …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN,J. This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment and order of the… Read More whether throwing of burning stove on the deceased is a rash and negligent ? – No.- What was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the appellant had no enmity with the deceased. He had no intention to kill the deceased as by killing him he could not have recovered the amount of Rs 50,000 which he had advanced to the deceased. He further submitted that the quarrel between the two took place all of a sudden and in the heat of the moment the appellant had picked the stove and had thrown it towards the deceased. He, therefore, submitted that it was merely a rash and negligent act on the part of the appellant. We cannot agree with the submission of the learned counsel. Since the appellant had thrown a burning stove on the deceased, he would have known that his act was likely to cause burns resulting in death. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, he can be said to have committed an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Sec.197 Cr.P.C. – whether a manager of nationalized bank can claim benefit of Section 197 Cr.P.C. is not res integra – no sanction is necessary = An application dated 09.05.2012 was filed by the appellant before the ACMM, Saket Court, New Delhi in FIR No.432 of 2000 stating that appellant is a public servant employed with a nationalized bank as a Manager and it is mandatory to seek prosecution sanction against the appellant in terms of Section 197 Cr.P.C. = No exception can be taken to the proposition as laid down in the above case. We having taken the view that appellant being not removable by or saved with the sanction of the Government was not covered by Section 197 Cr.P.C. There was no necessity to consider any further as to whether acts of the appellant complained of were in discharge of official duty or not. We, thus, upheld the order of the CMM dated 03.12.2014 rejecting the application under Section 197 Cr.P.C. on the ground that appellant was not removable by his office saved by or with the sanction of the Government. We, however, delete the following observations from the order dated 03.12.2014:- “…………………………From the FSL report, it is clear that accused S.K. Mighlani forged the signatures of Sh. Gautam Dhar on account opening form and moreover, the introducer Rajender Kr. is absconding. In view of this Court, an act of forgery done by public servant cannot be considered an act done in discharge of his official duties……………………” Although, we uphold the order of the High Court as well as the order of CMM, but the observations made by CMM in its order, as noted above, are deleted

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.744 OF 2019 (arising out of SLP(CRL.) No.11070 of 2018) S.K. MIGLANI …. APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE NCT OF DELHI …. RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. This appeal has been filed against the judgment of Delhi… Read More Sec.197 Cr.P.C. – whether a manager of nationalized bank can claim benefit of Section 197 Cr.P.C. is not res integra – no sanction is necessary = An application dated 09.05.2012 was filed by the appellant before the ACMM, Saket Court, New Delhi in FIR No.432 of 2000 stating that appellant is a public servant employed with a nationalized bank as a Manager and it is mandatory to seek prosecution sanction against the appellant in terms of Section 197 Cr.P.C. = No exception can be taken to the proposition as laid down in the above case. We having taken the view that appellant being not removable by or saved with the sanction of the Government was not covered by Section 197 Cr.P.C. There was no necessity to consider any further as to whether acts of the appellant complained of were in discharge of official duty or not. We, thus, upheld the order of the CMM dated 03.12.2014 rejecting the application under Section 197 Cr.P.C. on the ground that appellant was not removable by his office saved by or with the sanction of the Government. We, however, delete the following observations from the order dated 03.12.2014:- “…………………………From the FSL report, it is clear that accused S.K. Mighlani forged the signatures of Sh. Gautam Dhar on account opening form and moreover, the introducer Rajender Kr. is absconding. In view of this Court, an act of forgery done by public servant cannot be considered an act done in discharge of his official duties……………………” Although, we uphold the order of the High Court as well as the order of CMM, but the observations made by CMM in its order, as noted above, are deleted

oral dying declaration = The trial court has taken pains to evaluate the entire material on record and has rightly come to the conclusion that the so­called dying declaration (Exh.P­2) is unbelievable and not trustworthy. Valid reasons have also been assigned by the trial court for coming to such a conclusion. Per contra, the High Court while setting aside the said finding has not adverted to any of the reasons assigned by the trial court relating to the authenticity or reliability of the dying declaration. The view taken by the trial court, in our considered opinion, is the only possible view under 9 the facts and circumstances of the case. 14. As far as the oral dying declaration is concerned, the evidence on record is very shaky, apart from the fact that evidence relating to oral dying declaration is a weak type of evidence in and of itself. As per the case of the prosecution, the deceased had made an oral dying declaration before Lalita Sahu (P.W. 2), Pilaram Sahu (P.W. 3), Parvati Bai (P.W. 4), and others. Though P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 have deposed that the deceased did make an oral dying declaration before them implicating the appellant, this version is clearly only an afterthought, inasmuch as the same was brought up before the trial court for the first time. In their statements recorded by the police under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, these witnesses had not made any statement relating to the alleged oral dying declaration of the deceased. These factors have been noted by the trial court in its detailed judgment. Thus, the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 relating to the oral dying declaration is clearly an improved version, and this has been proved by the defence in accordance with law. 15. Since the evidence relating to the dying declarations has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, in 10 our considered opinion, the High Court was not justified in convicting the appellant, inasmuch as there is no other material against the appellant to implicate her. The motive for the offence, as alleged by the prosecution, has also not been proved. 16. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we conclude that the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside, and the same is accordingly set aside and that of the trial court is restored. As the appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against her and she is in custody, we direct that the appellant be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case.

1 NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 903 OF 2018 POONAM BAI … APPELLANT Versus THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. This appeal calls into question the judgment dated 06.04.2018 passed by the High Court of… Read More oral dying declaration = The trial court has taken pains to evaluate the entire material on record and has rightly come to the conclusion that the so­called dying declaration (Exh.P­2) is unbelievable and not trustworthy. Valid reasons have also been assigned by the trial court for coming to such a conclusion. Per contra, the High Court while setting aside the said finding has not adverted to any of the reasons assigned by the trial court relating to the authenticity or reliability of the dying declaration. The view taken by the trial court, in our considered opinion, is the only possible view under 9 the facts and circumstances of the case. 14. As far as the oral dying declaration is concerned, the evidence on record is very shaky, apart from the fact that evidence relating to oral dying declaration is a weak type of evidence in and of itself. As per the case of the prosecution, the deceased had made an oral dying declaration before Lalita Sahu (P.W. 2), Pilaram Sahu (P.W. 3), Parvati Bai (P.W. 4), and others. Though P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 have deposed that the deceased did make an oral dying declaration before them implicating the appellant, this version is clearly only an afterthought, inasmuch as the same was brought up before the trial court for the first time. In their statements recorded by the police under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, these witnesses had not made any statement relating to the alleged oral dying declaration of the deceased. These factors have been noted by the trial court in its detailed judgment. Thus, the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 relating to the oral dying declaration is clearly an improved version, and this has been proved by the defence in accordance with law. 15. Since the evidence relating to the dying declarations has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, in 10 our considered opinion, the High Court was not justified in convicting the appellant, inasmuch as there is no other material against the appellant to implicate her. The motive for the offence, as alleged by the prosecution, has also not been proved. 16. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we conclude that the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside, and the same is accordingly set aside and that of the trial court is restored. As the appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against her and she is in custody, we direct that the appellant be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case.

Corporate laws – compulsory amalgamation of companies- In conclusion, though other wide-ranging arguments were made with respect to the validity of the Central Government amalgamation order, we have not addressed the same as we have held that the order dated 12.02.2016 is ultra vires Section 396 of the Companies Act, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the reasons stated by us hereinabove. The appeals are accordingly allowed, and the impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court is set aside.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4476 OF 2019 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4210 of 2018) 63 MOONS TECHNOLOGIES LTD. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES INDIA LTD.) & ORS. … APPELLANT VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. … RESPONDENT WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4478… Read More Corporate laws – compulsory amalgamation of companies- In conclusion, though other wide-ranging arguments were made with respect to the validity of the Central Government amalgamation order, we have not addressed the same as we have held that the order dated 12.02.2016 is ultra vires Section 396 of the Companies Act, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the reasons stated by us hereinabove. The appeals are accordingly allowed, and the impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court is set aside.

Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC = entitled for acquital = While the handwriting expert testified that the writing in the letter is the same as that of certain notebooks, no independent proof has been led regarding who owned or wrote in the aforesaid notebook. In fact, the only persons who were examined for the purposes of identifying the handwriting of the deceased were her father and cousin. However, how either of them could be said to be acquainted with her writing is unclear. The father of the deceased was her teacher nearly 15 years prior to the incident, and the deceased had admittedly not written any other letter to her father after her marriage. Similarly, the cousin of the deceased also did not have any other letter from the deceased in his possession.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 539­540 OF 2008 JAGDISHRAJ KHATTA … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T N.V. RAMANA, J. These appeals are directed against judgment and order dated 09.01.2008 and 27.02.2008, passed by the Division Bench of… Read More Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC = entitled for acquital = While the handwriting expert testified that the writing in the letter is the same as that of certain notebooks, no independent proof has been led regarding who owned or wrote in the aforesaid notebook. In fact, the only persons who were examined for the purposes of identifying the handwriting of the deceased were her father and cousin. However, how either of them could be said to be acquainted with her writing is unclear. The father of the deceased was her teacher nearly 15 years prior to the incident, and the deceased had admittedly not written any other letter to her father after her marriage. Similarly, the cousin of the deceased also did not have any other letter from the deceased in his possession.

Circumstantial evidence was proved = Though the prosecution case is premised on circumstantial evidence in the absence of any eyewitness, the depositions of prosecution witnesses which have stood the rigour of cross­examination clearly support the prosecution version and establishes enmity between the accused and the deceased. This fact supported by PW1’s last seen evidence, her prompt 10 complaint to the police and the forensic evidence which correlates the recovered weapon to the physical injuries on the body of the deceased proves the prosecution case beyond any reasonable doubt independent of the extrajudicial confession.

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1990 OF 2012 SADAYAPPAN @ GANESAN …APPELLANT VERSUS STATE, REPRESENTED BY …RESPONDENT INSPECTOR OF POLICE J U D G M E N T N.V. RAMANA, J. This appeal is directed against the Judgment dated 13th December, 2011 passed by the High Court… Read More Circumstantial evidence was proved = Though the prosecution case is premised on circumstantial evidence in the absence of any eyewitness, the depositions of prosecution witnesses which have stood the rigour of cross­examination clearly support the prosecution version and establishes enmity between the accused and the deceased. This fact supported by PW1’s last seen evidence, her prompt 10 complaint to the police and the forensic evidence which correlates the recovered weapon to the physical injuries on the body of the deceased proves the prosecution case beyond any reasonable doubt independent of the extrajudicial confession.

discharge application under Section 239 read with Section 245 Cr.P.C for alleged offences under sec.Section 504 and 506 of I.P.C. The allegation is that appellant with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant’s house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him and when some neighbours arrived there the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation taking on its face value does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients – entitled for discharge

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 759 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.4820/2017) VIKRAM JOHAR …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN,J. Leave granted. This appeal has been filed challenging the judgment of… Read More discharge application under Section 239 read with Section 245 Cr.P.C for alleged offences under sec.Section 504 and 506 of I.P.C. The allegation is that appellant with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant’s house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him and when some neighbours arrived there the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation taking on its face value does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients – entitled for discharge