No injunction suit against the purchasers of one of co sharers = In our view, even assuming that the plaintiffs claimed to be in possession of the suit property (which the two Courts below did not find in their favour) for claiming injunction, yet they were not entitled to claim injunction against the other cosharers over the suit property. It is a settled principle of law that the possession of one co­sharer is possession of all co­sharers, it cannot be adverse to them, unless there is a denial of their right to 6 their knowledge by the person in possession, and exclusion and ouster following thereon for the statutory period. [See Mohammad Baqar & Ors. vs. Naim­un­Nisa Bibi & Ors.(AIR 1956 SC 548)] 18. So far as the claim of the plaintiffs as being in exclusive possession to the exclusion of others was concerned, the same was held not proved by the two Courts below. 19. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 (appellants herein) being the purchasers of the suit property from one of the co­sharers stepped into the shoes of their vendor (co­sharer) and, therefore, had a right to defend their title and possession against the other co­sharer. 20. In the light of the aforesaid admitted position arising in the case, in our view, the plaintiffs had no case to claim injunction against defendant Nos.1 and 2 in relation to the suit property. The two 7 Courts below, therefore, rightly declined it and we affirm the same. 21. As noted above, the High Court failed to appreciate the factual and legal controversy in its proper perspective and, therefore, erred in interfering in the concurrent findings of the fact without recording a finding as to why the concurrent findings of fact are bad in law and why it requires interference in its second appellate jurisdiction.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 3408 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23575 of 2011)
T. Ramalingeswara Rao (Dead)
Thr. LRs. & Anr. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
N. Madhava Rao & Ors. ….Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

  1. Leave granted.
  2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
    and order dated 23.11.2010 passed by the High
    Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
    in Second Appeal No.1036 of 2006 whereby the
    High Court allowed the second appeal filed by
    respondent Nos.1 to 3 herein.
    1
  3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the
    disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point.
  4. The appellants herein are defendant Nos.1 and
    2, respondent Nos.1­3 herein are the plaintiffs and
    respondent Nos.5­9 are the defendant Nos.4­8 of
    the civil suit out of which this appeal arises.
  5. Respondent Nos.1­3 (plaintiffs) filed a civil suit
    against the appellants (defendant Nos.1 and 2) and
    respondent Nos.5 to 9 (defendant Nos.4 to 8)
    seeking perpetual injunction against the defendants
    restraining them from interfering in his peaceful
    possession over the suit properties.
  6. The appellants (defendant Nos.1 and 2)
    contested the suit whereas the remaining
    defendants (4 to 8) remained ex parte. The Trial
    Court by judgment/decree dated 20.08.2001
    dismissed the suit. Respondent Nos.1­3 (plaintiffs)
    felt aggrieved and filed first appeal before the
    Additional District & Sessions Judge(Fast Track
    2
    Court), Visakhapatnam. By judgment dated
    07.11.2005, the First Appellate Court dismissed the
    appeal and upheld the judgment/decree of the Trial
    Court.
  7. The plaintiffs (respondent Nos.1­3) felt
    aggrieved and filed second appeal in the High Court
    of Andhra Pradesh. By impugned order, the High
    Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment
    impugned therein and decreed the plaintiffs’ suit by
    passing a decree for perpetual injunction against
    the defendants in relation to the suit property,
    which has given rise to filing of the present appeal
    by way of special leave in this Court by defendant
    Nos.1 and 2.
  8. So, the short question, which arises for
    consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
    Court was justified in allowing the plaintiffs’ second
    appeal and thereby was justified in decreeing their
    suit by granting a decree of perpetual injunction
    3
    against defendant Nos.1 and 2 in relation to the suit
    property.
  9. Having heard the learned counsel for the
    parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
    are constrained to allow the appeal and while
    setting aside the impugned order restore the
    judgment/decree of the First Appellate Court and
    the Trial Court which resulted in dismissal of the
    plaintiffs’ suit.
  10. In our considered opinion, the High Court
    erred in interfering in the concurrent findings of
    facts of the two Courts below, which dismissed the
    plaintiffs’ suit.
  11. In our view, the Trial Court and the First
    Appellate Court on appreciating the evidence of the
    parties had rightly come to a conclusion that the
    plaintiffs failed to prove the ingredients necessary
    for the grant of perpetual injunction.
    4
  12. When the two Courts below have recorded
    concurrent findings of fact against the plaintiffs,
    which are based on appreciation of facts and
    evidence, in our view, such findings being
    concurrent in nature are binding on the High Court.
    It is only when such findings are found to be
    against any provision of law or against the pleading
    or evidence or are found to be wholly perverse, a
    case for interference may call for by the High Court
    in its second appellate jurisdiction.
  13. Such was not the case made out in the High
    Court. It is for this reason, we are of the view that
    the High Court should not have interfered in the
    findings of the two Courts below and instead, the
    findings should have been upheld by the High
    Court.
  14. Coming now to the facts of the case, we find
    that the plaintiffs (respondent Nos.1­3) have no case
    5
    much less prima facie for grant of perpetual
    injunction.
  15. The suit property is a part of big chunk of land
    owned by several brothers who inherited the same
    after the death of their father, namely, Poornayya.
  16. The appellants (defendant Nos.1 and 2) are the
    purchasers of the suit land from one of the cosharers (one of the brothers) by a registered sale
    deed. Respondent Nos.1­3 (plaintiffs) are the sons of
    another co­sharer (brother).
  17. In our view, even assuming that the plaintiffs
    claimed to be in possession of the suit property
    (which the two Courts below did not find in their
    favour) for claiming injunction, yet they were not
    entitled to claim injunction against the other cosharers over the suit property. It is a settled
    principle of law that the possession of one co­sharer
    is possession of all co­sharers, it cannot be adverse
    to them, unless there is a denial of their right to
    6
    their knowledge by the person in possession, and
    exclusion and ouster following thereon for the
    statutory period. [See Mohammad Baqar & Ors. vs.
    Naim­un­Nisa Bibi & Ors.(AIR 1956 SC 548)]
  18. So far as the claim of the plaintiffs as being
    in exclusive possession to the exclusion of others
    was concerned, the same was held not proved by
    the two Courts below.
  19. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 (appellants herein)
    being the purchasers of the suit property from one
    of the co­sharers stepped into the shoes of their
    vendor (co­sharer) and, therefore, had a right to
    defend their title and possession against the other
    co­sharer.
  20. In the light of the aforesaid admitted position
    arising in the case, in our view, the plaintiffs had no
    case to claim injunction against defendant Nos.1
    and 2 in relation to the suit property. The two
    7
    Courts below, therefore, rightly declined it and we
    affirm the same.
  21. As noted above, the High Court failed to
    appreciate the factual and legal controversy in its
    proper perspective and, therefore, erred in
    interfering in the concurrent findings of the fact
    without recording a finding as to why the
    concurrent findings of fact are bad in law and why it
    requires interference in its second appellate
    jurisdiction.
  22. In view of the foregoing discussion, we allow
    the appeal, set aside the impugned order and
    restore the judgment/decree of the Trial Court/First
    Appellate Court which dismissed the suit filed by
    respondent Nos.1­3 (Plaintiffs).
    .……………………………………..J.
    [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] ……………………………………….J.
    [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
    New Delhi;
    April 05, 2019
    8
    9