Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 = mere abuses are not sufficient to attract section 3[1][x] = Going by the version of the complainant Deshiram himself, the expressions used by the appellant during the course of vertical altercation, did not refer to the caste or tribe that the complainant belonged though such assertion finds place in the testimony of the other witnesses. the appellant abused the complainant Deshiram is quite clear and as such his conviction and sentence recorded under Section 294 IPC was fully justified. However, going by the version of the complainant Deshiram according to which there was no reference to the caste or tribe of the complainant, there is a doubt as regards charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In the circumstances, while affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 294 IPC, we grant him benefit of doubt and acquit him of the charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. …. OF 2019 @ SLP(CRL.) NO. 1907 OF 2019 NARAD PATEL VS. SATE OF CHHATTISGARH 1 Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 883 OF 2019 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.1907 of 2019) NARAD PATEL …Appellant VERSUS STATE OF CHHATTISGARH …Respondent J U… Read More Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 = mere abuses are not sufficient to attract section 3[1][x] = Going by the version of the complainant Deshiram himself, the expressions used by the appellant during the course of vertical altercation, did not refer to the caste or tribe that the complainant belonged though such assertion finds place in the testimony of the other witnesses. the appellant abused the complainant Deshiram is quite clear and as such his conviction and sentence recorded under Section 294 IPC was fully justified. However, going by the version of the complainant Deshiram according to which there was no reference to the caste or tribe of the complainant, there is a doubt as regards charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In the circumstances, while affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 294 IPC, we grant him benefit of doubt and acquit him of the charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.

Whether a common complaint by seeking permission under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act , can be filed by all the consumers against their common reliefs against the common respondent before the comsumer court ? Apex court held yes

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019 ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS. 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1676 OF 2019 ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. …Appellant(s) VERSUS INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS. …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N… Read More Whether a common complaint by seeking permission under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act , can be filed by all the consumers against their common reliefs against the common respondent before the comsumer court ? Apex court held yes

when civil suit for eviction became final, basing on the permission given by slum Authorities – it can not be questioned byway of writ without pleading his case in civil suit =In Vidarbha part of the State of Maharashtra, before the enactment of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1989, there had to be two rounds of litigation to seek eviction of a tenant. The first round had to be before the Rent Controller seeking permission to issue a quit notice under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. If such permission was granted, then only the landlord could issue a notice of termination of tenancy and file a civil suit seeking eviction of a tenant. In the present case the first roundbefore the Rent Controller was gone into. Bona fide need as a ground for eviction may, in a given case, have an additional facet of comparative hardship and whether the tenant has any alternative accommodation or not. In any case, the matter had attained finality. The permission was granted by the Rent Controller and the civil suit was filed only thereafter in which an objection was taken that the premises being governed by the provisions of the Act, the requisite permission of the Slum Authority was mandatory In the proceedings so initiated the Slum Authority granted that permission. The matter was carried in appeal and the issue whether the requirements under Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was also considered by the Appellate Authority. It must also be noted that the Civil Suit seeking eviction also attained finality. In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the High Court was not correct. The respondent had opportunity at every stage to present his case and whether the requirements of Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was a matter which was dealt with by the Appellate Authority in sufficient detail. In the circumstances there was no reason for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Civil Appeal NO. __ of 2019 @ SLP(C) No. 10469 of 2016 Kumud w/o Mahadeorao Salunke vs. Shri Pandurang Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors. 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO._4873 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.10469 of 2015) KUMUD W/O MAHADEORAO SALUNKE …Appellant(s) VERSUS SHRI… Read More when civil suit for eviction became final, basing on the permission given by slum Authorities – it can not be questioned byway of writ without pleading his case in civil suit =In Vidarbha part of the State of Maharashtra, before the enactment of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1989, there had to be two rounds of litigation to seek eviction of a tenant. The first round had to be before the Rent Controller seeking permission to issue a quit notice under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. If such permission was granted, then only the landlord could issue a notice of termination of tenancy and file a civil suit seeking eviction of a tenant. In the present case the first roundbefore the Rent Controller was gone into. Bona fide need as a ground for eviction may, in a given case, have an additional facet of comparative hardship and whether the tenant has any alternative accommodation or not. In any case, the matter had attained finality. The permission was granted by the Rent Controller and the civil suit was filed only thereafter in which an objection was taken that the premises being governed by the provisions of the Act, the requisite permission of the Slum Authority was mandatory In the proceedings so initiated the Slum Authority granted that permission. The matter was carried in appeal and the issue whether the requirements under Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was also considered by the Appellate Authority. It must also be noted that the Civil Suit seeking eviction also attained finality. In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the High Court was not correct. The respondent had opportunity at every stage to present his case and whether the requirements of Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was a matter which was dealt with by the Appellate Authority in sufficient detail. In the circumstances there was no reason for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Mere mentioning of the pleadings , arguments and list of authorities and criptic conclusion – can not be cosidered as reasoned order = The need to remand the case to the High Courthas occasioned because on perusal of the impugned order, we find that paras 1 to 4 contain facts of the case, paras 5 and 6 contain the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, paras 7 to 9 refer to 3 what transpired in the Trial Court, paras 10 and 11 contain quotation from two decisions of this Court and para 12 contains the conclusion, which reads as under: “12. After giving analytical thought to the facts and circumstances of the case, the instant petition is found devoid of merit, consequent thereupon is dismissed.” In the entire impugned order, which consists of 13 paras, we find that the High Court did not assign any reason as to why the petition is liable to be dismissed. In other words, neither there is any discussion and nor the reasoning on the submissions urged by the learned counsel for the parties.

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 888 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.3502 of 2019) Jitender Kumar @ Jitender Singh  ….Appellant(s) VERSUS The State of Bihar       ….Respondent(s)                   J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final judgment and order dated 28.03.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.5293 of 2019 whereby the High 1 Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellant herein. 3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point. 4. By   impugned   order,   the   High   Court   (Single Judge) dismissed the petition filed by the appellant herein under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal… Read More Mere mentioning of the pleadings , arguments and list of authorities and criptic conclusion – can not be cosidered as reasoned order = The need to remand the case to the High Courthas occasioned because on perusal of the impugned order, we find that paras 1 to 4 contain facts of the case, paras 5 and 6 contain the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, paras 7 to 9 refer to 3 what transpired in the Trial Court, paras 10 and 11 contain quotation from two decisions of this Court and para 12 contains the conclusion, which reads as under: “12. After giving analytical thought to the facts and circumstances of the case, the instant petition is found devoid of merit, consequent thereupon is dismissed.” In the entire impugned order, which consists of 13 paras, we find that the High Court did not assign any reason as to why the petition is liable to be dismissed. In other words, neither there is any discussion and nor the reasoning on the submissions urged by the learned counsel for the parties.

“method of recruitment” and “employer’s capacity to pay” = Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, introduction of Article 21A in the Constitution and coming into force of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsion Education Act, 2009 (‘RTE Act’, for short), the State was required to Civil Appeal No…… of 2019 @ SLP(C)No.20 of 2018 etc. 3 State of Bihar and Ors. vs. The Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, Munger & Ors. induct large number of teachers in order to meet the required obligations. These teachers employed at Panchayat, Nagar Panchayat and Municipal levels were not given same salaries and emoluments like the teachers who were paid at the Government scales. The petitions seeking same salaries and emoluments on the principle of “equal pay for equal work” filed by the latter category of teachers, were allowed by the High Court.= We, therefore, have to proceed on the following basic premise:- a) It was open to the State to have two distinct cadres namely that of ‘Government Teachers’ and ‘Niyojit Teachers’ with Government Teachers being a dying or vanishing cadre. The incidents of these two cadres could be different. The idea by itself would not be discriminatory. b) The pay structure given to the Niyojit Teachers was definitely lower than what was given to Government Teachers but the number of Government Teachers was considerably lower than the number of Niyojit Teachers. As stated above, presently there are just about 66,000 Government Teachers in the State as against nearly 4 lakh Niyojit Teachers. There is scope for further appointment of about 1 lakh teachers which could mean that as against 5 lakh teachers the number of State Teachers would progressively be going down. c) The parity that is claimed is by the larger group with the lesser group as stated above which itself is a dying or a vanishing cadre. d) The mode of recruitment of Niyojit Teachers is completely different from that of the Government Teachers as stated above. If a pay structure is normally to be evolved keeping in mind factors such as “method of recruitment” and “employer’s capacity to pay” and if the limitations or qualifications to the applicability of the doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ admit inter alia the distinction on the ground of process of recruitment, the stand taken on behalf of the State Government is not unreasonable or irrational. – allowed the appeals filed by state

Civil Appeal No…… of 2019 @ SLP(C)No.20 of 2018 etc. 1 State of Bihar and Ors. vs. The Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, Munger & Ors. REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4862 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.20 OF 2018) STATE OF BIHAR… Read More “method of recruitment” and “employer’s capacity to pay” = Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, introduction of Article 21A in the Constitution and coming into force of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsion Education Act, 2009 (‘RTE Act’, for short), the State was required to Civil Appeal No…… of 2019 @ SLP(C)No.20 of 2018 etc. 3 State of Bihar and Ors. vs. The Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, Munger & Ors. induct large number of teachers in order to meet the required obligations. These teachers employed at Panchayat, Nagar Panchayat and Municipal levels were not given same salaries and emoluments like the teachers who were paid at the Government scales. The petitions seeking same salaries and emoluments on the principle of “equal pay for equal work” filed by the latter category of teachers, were allowed by the High Court.= We, therefore, have to proceed on the following basic premise:- a) It was open to the State to have two distinct cadres namely that of ‘Government Teachers’ and ‘Niyojit Teachers’ with Government Teachers being a dying or vanishing cadre. The incidents of these two cadres could be different. The idea by itself would not be discriminatory. b) The pay structure given to the Niyojit Teachers was definitely lower than what was given to Government Teachers but the number of Government Teachers was considerably lower than the number of Niyojit Teachers. As stated above, presently there are just about 66,000 Government Teachers in the State as against nearly 4 lakh Niyojit Teachers. There is scope for further appointment of about 1 lakh teachers which could mean that as against 5 lakh teachers the number of State Teachers would progressively be going down. c) The parity that is claimed is by the larger group with the lesser group as stated above which itself is a dying or a vanishing cadre. d) The mode of recruitment of Niyojit Teachers is completely different from that of the Government Teachers as stated above. If a pay structure is normally to be evolved keeping in mind factors such as “method of recruitment” and “employer’s capacity to pay” and if the limitations or qualifications to the applicability of the doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ admit inter alia the distinction on the ground of process of recruitment, the stand taken on behalf of the State Government is not unreasonable or irrational. – allowed the appeals filed by state

Industiral disputes – labour court – worked continuously for 240 days.= Store Watchman on daily wages under NMR basis temporarily in newly created Sectional stores in various Sub Divisions under the control of Rural Water Supply (RWS) Divisions, Nagercoil = Burden lies on whom = It is to be pointed out that the initial burden is upon the respondents-workmen to adduce evidence showing that they have worked continuously for 240 days. Only when the initial burden is discharged by the respondentsworkmen, the burden can be shifted upon the appellant-Board. Both the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench were not right in placing the burden upon the appellant-Board to prove that the respondents-workmen had not worked continuously for 240 days in a year.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4875-4884 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.21962-21971 OF 2018) THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER …Appellants TWAD BOARD & ANOTHER VERSUS M. NATESAN ETC. …Respondents J U D G M E N T R. BANUMATHI, J. Leave granted. These appeals arise out of the… Read More Industiral disputes – labour court – worked continuously for 240 days.= Store Watchman on daily wages under NMR basis temporarily in newly created Sectional stores in various Sub Divisions under the control of Rural Water Supply (RWS) Divisions, Nagercoil = Burden lies on whom = It is to be pointed out that the initial burden is upon the respondents-workmen to adduce evidence showing that they have worked continuously for 240 days. Only when the initial burden is discharged by the respondentsworkmen, the burden can be shifted upon the appellant-Board. Both the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench were not right in placing the burden upon the appellant-Board to prove that the respondents-workmen had not worked continuously for 240 days in a year.

Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial with respect to other co­accused has ended and the judgment of conviction rendered on the same date before pronouncing the summoning order? II. Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of the CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial in respect of certain other absconding accused (whose presence is subsequently secured) is ongoing/pending, having been bifurcated from the main trial? III. What are the guidelines that the competent court must follow while exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C? 15 28. In light of the same, we direct the Registry to place these matters before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a Bench of appropriate strength for considering the aforesaid questions.

                   NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 885 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9063 of 2017) SUKHPAL SINGH KHAIRA                                         …APPELLANT (S) VERSUS THE STATE OF PUNJAB                                             …RESPONDENT (S) with CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 886 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9150 of 2017) JOGA SINGH AND ANOTHER                                         ….APPELLANT (S) VERSUS THE STATE OF PUNJAB                                            …RESPONDENT (S)     O R D E R 1. Leave granted. 2. These Criminal Appeals are filed against the impugned judgment and   order   of   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   and   Haryana,   dated 17.11.2017, passed in Criminal Revision No. 4070 of 2017 and Criminal  … Read More Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial with respect to other co­accused has ended and the judgment of conviction rendered on the same date before pronouncing the summoning order? II. Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of the CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial in respect of certain other absconding accused (whose presence is subsequently secured) is ongoing/pending, having been bifurcated from the main trial? III. What are the guidelines that the competent court must follow while exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C? 15 28. In light of the same, we direct the Registry to place these matters before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a Bench of appropriate strength for considering the aforesaid questions.