Doctrine of blending of properties in joint family properties = Even the reasons given by the High Court that as the loans were taken on the suit properties for borewell, crop loan, electric motor pump set loan, jewel loan by all the three joint family members, namely Sengoda Gounder, Ramasamy and Subramanian and, therefore, there was a blending of the suit properties into join family properties also, cannot be accepted. As all the three were residing together and some loans might have been taken by the family members residing together, by that itself, it cannot be said that there was a blending of the suit properties into joint family properties. The law on the aspect of blending is well settled that property separate or self­acquired of a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein; but to establish such abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be established. Clear intention to abandon the separate rights in the property must be proved. Even abandonment cannot be inferred from mere allowing other family members also to use the property or utilisation of income of the separate property out of generosity to support the family members. At this stage, it is required to be noted that there was a serious dispute regarding who repaid the loan. It was the plaintiff who claimed that he only discharged that loan, however, the defendant Subramanian contended that the loan was discharged by Sengoda Gounder from out of the income derived by him from the suit properties itself. In any case, when on appreciation of evidence on record including the documentary evidence which came to be reappreciated by the High Court, both the Courts below came to the conclusion that there was no blending of the suit properties into joint family properties, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 100 of the CPC, is not justified in reversing those findings which were on appreciation of evidence on record.

Reportable
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4536­4537  OF 2019
             (Arising out of SLP (C) NOS.31125­26 of 2013)

S.Subramanian ..Appellant
Versus
S. Ramasamy Etc. Etc. ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
Leave granted in both the special leave petitions.

  1. As common question of law and facts arise in both
    these appeals and as such arise out of the impugned common
    Judgment and Order passed by the High Court, both these
    appeals are being decided and disposed of together by this
    common Judgment and Order.
    1
  2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
    common Judgment and Order passed by the High Court of
    Judicature at Madras in Second Appeal Nos.4 and 5 of 2009 by
    which the High Court while exercising powers under Section 100
    of the CPC has allowed the said Second Appeals and has quashed
    and set aside the Judgement and Decree passed by the Trial
    court as well as the First Appellate Court dismissing the suits
    and consequently has decreed the suits preferred by the
    respondent herein­original plaintiff, the original defendant has
    preferred the present appeals.
  3. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as
    under :
    That the original plaintiff (Respondent No.1 herein)­S.
    Ramasamy initially filed a suit being OS No.10 of 2006 in respect
    of the immovable properties described in the schedule of plaint to
    restrain original defendant No.2 (appellant herein) from alienating
    or encumbering or creating any kind of document in respect of
    plaintiff’s common one­third share of the suit properties, till final
    partition takes place between the plaintiff and original defendant
    No.2 by metes and bounds by a decree of permanent injunction.
    2
    That the said suit was filed by the original plaintiff against his
    father Sengoda Gounder (died) as well as his younger brother
    Subramanian. That during the pendency of the said suit, the
    same plaintiff­Ramasamy filed a suit being OS No.19 of 2005
    against his younger brother Subramanian and his father
    Sengoda Gounder for partition of the suit properties. It was the
    case on behalf of the original plaintiff that the plaintiff and his
    father and his younger brother constituted a Hindu Joint Family
    which owned ancestral properties. It was further the case on
    behalf of the plaintiff that the father of the plaintiff, namely,
    Sengoda Gounder, by way of settlement, got the suit properties,
    vide Ex­A1 dated 07.04.1956­the Settlement Deed executed by
    one Kumarasamy Gounder in favour of Sengoda Gounder. It was
    the case on behalf of the plaintiff that since that time, the suit
    properties along with the ancestral properties were treated as
    joint family properties and all the three coparceners were
    enjoying them together. It was alleged that since the father and
    the younger brother of the plaintiff, in collusion with each other
    were attempting to alienate the suit properties, the first
    injunction suit (OS No.19 of 2005) was filed.
    3
    4.1 The suit was resisted by the original defendant­younger
    brother of the plaintiff Ramasamy. It was the case on behalf of
    the original defendant that no joint family at all ever existed
    amongst Sengoda Gounder and his two sons, namely Ramasamy
    and Subramanian. That the suit properties were obtained by
    Sengoda Gounder as per Ex­A1­the Settlement Deed during the
    year 1956 as his self­acquired properties. That Sengoda
    Gounder’s sons, namely Ramasamy and Subramanian had
    nothing to do with the suit properties and they had no
    proprietary right or share in that and that they were never
    treated as joint family properties. It was the specific case on
    behalf of the defendant that, in fact, the Sengoda Gounder,
    during his lifetime, executed two settlement deeds Ex­ A13 and
    A14 in favour of Subramanian and subsequently he also
    executed Ex­B24, a will dated 08.11.2004 in favour of
    Subramanian. It was the case on behalf of the defendant that as
    such, Subramanian­the defendant became absolute owner of the
    suit properties. It was also contended on behalf of the defendant
    that the second suit is also barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. It
    was the case on behalf of the defendant that before filing the
    injunction suit (first suit) the plaintiff issued notice seeking
    4
    partition and despite the same he initially filed the injunction
    suit only and thereafter, without any rhyme or reason and
    without obtaining any permission from the Court at the time of
    filing the injunction suit to file a partition suit subsequently, he
    simply filed the second suit, which was barred by Order 2 Rule 2
    of CPC.
    4.2 That the Trial Court framed the issues. Both the suits were
    tried jointly. The plaintiff­Ramasamy examined himself as PW1
    along with PWs 2 to 4 and Exs. A1 to A46 were brought on
    record. Subramanian­the defendant examined himself as DW1
    along with DWs 2 to 4 and he brought on record Exs. B1 to B31.
    That thereafter, on appreciation of evidence, the learned Trial
    Court dismissed both the suits. The appeals by the unsuccessful
    plaintiff came to be dismissed by the learned First Appellate
    Court.
    4.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common
    Judgment and Order passed by the First Appellate Court
    dismissing the appeals and confirming the Judgment and Decree
    passed by the learned Trial Court dismissing the suits, the
    original plaintiff filed two second appeals before the High Court.
    5
    The High Court formulated and framed the following questions of
    law as substantial questions of law :
    “(1) Whether both the Courts below were
    justified in holding that the generosity shown by
    Sengoda Gounder should not be treated as an
    act of blending of the sit properties with the
    ancestral properties and whether the Courts
    below were justified in ignoring the factum of
    describing the properties found in Ex.A1 as
    “Pidhirajyam” (Ancestral property) and also
    Exs.A19, 24, 45 and 46 and in deciding the lis by
    holding as though there was no blending or
    treating the suit properties as joint family
    properties?
    (2) Whether the courts below were justified in
    upholding Exs.A13 and A14­the settlement deeds
    and Ex.B24­the Will as valid, even though those
    documents according to the plaintiff were not
    allegedly proved by the propounder of those
    documents as per law?
    (3) Whether the Courts below were justified in
    rendering judgment, without referring to Order 2
    Rule 2 of CPC despite a plea taken in that regard
    in the written statement?
    (4) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in
    the judgments of both the fora below?”
    That thereafter, by the impugned Judgment and Order and
    after re­appreciating the entire evidence on record, the High
    Court has answered the aforesaid questions of law/substantial
    questions of law as under :
    6
    “Substantial Question of Law (1) is decided to the
    effect that both the Courts below were not
    justified in holding that the generosity shown by
    Sengoda Gounder should not be treated as an
    act of blending of the suit properties with the
    ancestral properties and the Courts below were
    not justified in ignoring the factum of describing
    the properties found in Ex.A1 as “Pidhirajyam”
    (Ancestral property) and also Exs. A19, 24, 45
    and 46 in deciding the lis by holding as though
    there was no blending or treating the suit
    property as a joint family property.
    Substantial Question of Law No.(2) is decided to
    the effect that the courts below were justified in
    upholding the execution of Exs.A13 and A14­ the
    settlement deeds and Ex.A24 the Will, however,
    in view of my discussion supra Sengoda Gounder
    had no competence to execute the settlement
    deeds treating the suit property as self­acquired
    property in entirely, but his 1/3rd share could
    only be considered as the one relinquished by
    him in favour of the remaining two coparceners
    namely, his sons. Wherefore, the suit property
    shall be divided into two shares. The plaintiff and
    the defendant shall be entitled to half share each
    in the suit property.
    Substantial Question of Law No.(3) is decided to
    the effect that the Courts below were justified in
    rendering judgment, without referring to Order 2
    Rule 2 of CPC, in view of my finding supra that
    the cause of action for seeking partition is a
    continuing one.”
    Consequently, the High Court has allowed both the appeals
    and set aside common Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court as
    well as the First Appellate Court and has directed to draw the
    7
    preliminary decree for partition allotting half share each in favour
    of the plaintiff and the defendant.
    4.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
    Judgment and Order passed by the High Court by which, while
    exercising powers under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court
    has re­appreciated the entire evidence on record and has set
    aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below, the
    original defendant has preferred the present appeals.
  4. Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate has appeared on
    behalf of the appellant­original defendant and Shri V Prabhakar,
    learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of the Respondent
    No.1­original plaintiff.
  5. Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
    the original defendant has vehemently submitted that in the facts
    and circumstances of the case, the High Court has manifestly
    committed a grave error in allowing the appeals and interfering
    with the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below.
    6.1 It is vehemently submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
    Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that by
    passing the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has
    8
    exceeded in its jurisdiction while exercising powers under Section
    100 of the CPC.
    6.2 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
    Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that as
    held by this Court in catena of decisions and even as per Section
    100 of the CPC, while exercising powers under Section 100 of the
    CPC, the High Court is not required to re­appreciate the entire
    evidence on record as if the High Court is deciding the first
    appeal.
    6.3 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
    Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that the
    substantial questions of law framed by the High Court cannot be
    said to be the substantial questions of law at all. It is submitted
    that Section 100 of the CPC provides for a second appeal only on
    the substantial questions of law. It is submitted that even second
    appeal is not required to be entertained on question of law only.
    It is submitted that the question of law must be a substantial
    question of law and not mere a question of law. It is submitted
    that the substantial questions of law formulated and framed by
    the High Court, while deciding the second appeals, cannot be
    9
    said to be substantial questions of law at all. It is submitted that
    on the face of it, even the substantial questions of law formulated
    and framed by the High Court, are the questions of fact. It is
    submitted, therefore, the High Court has committed a grave error
    in allowing the Second Appeals.
    6.4 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
    Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that even
    otherwise, the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the
    High Court cannot be sustained in as much as while exercising
    powers under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court has reappreciated the entire evidence on record, which is wholly
    impermissible. It is submitted that so far as the question of fact
    is concerned, the First Appellate Court is the final Court on facts.
    It is submitted that unless and until the findings recorded are
    found to be perverse and/or contrary to the evidence on record,
    the High Court would not be justified in upsetting such findings
    recorded by the Courts below, more particularly, the First
    Appellate Court. It is submitted that in the present case, if we see
    the entire Judgment and Order passed by the High Court, the
    High Court has re­appreciated the entire evidence on record and
    10
    has given its own conclusion and findings and thereafter has
    interfered with the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts
    below, which were on appreciation of evidence, which is wholly
    impermissible. In support of his above submissions and on the
    scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court while
    deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC,
    learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has heavily
    relied upon the decisions of this Court in the case of
    Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, (1997) 4
    SCC 713; Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan
    Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722; Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal,
    (2000) 1 SCC 434.
    6.5 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
    Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that even
    otherwise the grounds on which the High Court has held that
    there was blending of the suit properties with the ancestral
    properties, are not sustainable.
    6.6 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
    Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that
    admittedly and even as per the High Court also, the suit
    11
    properties were self­acquired properties of Sengoda Gounder
    (father) because those properties were obtained by him not from
    his direct male ancestors but from his mother’s sister’s husband.
    It is submitted that therefore, merely because as Sengoda
    Gounder and his two sons were residing together and some loan
    on land might have been taken by all of them, it cannot be said
    that there was a blending of the suit properties with the ancestral
    properties by Sengoda Gounder. It is submitted that it was the
    specific case on behalf of the defendant that the loan was
    repaid/discharged by Sengoda Gounder from out of the income
    derived by him from the suit property itself.
    6.7 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
    Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that the
    fact that the father­Sengoda Gounder, during his lifetime,
    executed two settlement deeds Exhibits A13 & A14 and
    subsequently he also executed Exhibit B24, a will dated
    08.11.2004, the same is suggestive of the fact that there was no
    intention of the father­Sengoda Gounder to blend the suit
    properties with the joint family properties. It is submitted that as
    such the High Court has specifically observed and held that the
    12
    Courts below were justified in upholding the execution of
    Exhibits A13 & A14 ­ the Settlement Deeds and Exhibit B24 ­the
    Will. It is submitted that however, thereafter the High Court has
    erred in holding that the Sengoda Gounder had no competence to
    execute the Settlement Deeds treating the suit property as selfacquired property in entirely, but his one­third share could only
    be considered as the one relinquished by him in favour of the
    remaining two coparceners namely his sons.
    6.8 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
    decisions of this Court, it is prayed to allow the present appeals
    and quash and set aside the impugned Judgement and Order
    passed by the High Court and consequently restore the
    Judgement and Decree passed by the Courts below dismissing
    the suits.
  6. Shri V. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
    the original plaintiff while opposing the present appeals has
    vehemently submitted that as such the High Court was cautious
    of its limitations while deciding the Second Appeals under
    Section 100 of the CPC. It is submitted that however, as the High
    Court found that both the Court below have not properly
    13
    appreciated the relevant material and evidence on record, more
    particularly, Exhibit A1 and also Exhibits A19,24,45, & 46,
    thereafter the High Court has rightly held that there was a
    blending of the suit properties with the joint family
    properties/ancestral properties by Sengoda Gounder.
    7.1 It is submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned counsel
    appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff that cogent reasons
    have been given by the High Court while holding that the
    generosity shown by Sengoda Gounder should be treated as an
    act of blending of the suit properties with the ancestral
    properties/joint family properties.
    7.2 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned
    counsel appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff that after
    considering the Sale Deed dated 05.02.1975­Exhibit A10 and
    Sale Deed dated 25.03.1977­Exhibit A2, by which some of the
    properties specified in Exhibit A1­Settlement Deed dated
    07.04.1956, were sold treating the same as ancestral properties,
    the High Court has rightly held that thereafter there was a
    blending of suit properties with the ancestral properties by
    Sengoda Gounder and all the properties specified in Exhibit A1­
    14
    Settlement Deed dated 07.04.1956 were treated as joint family
    properties. It is submitted that thereafter and having found so,
    the High Court has rightly held that once there was blending of
    the suit properties with the ancestral properties by Sengoda
    Gounder, thereafter it was not open for him and/or Sengoda
    Gounder had no competence to execute the settlement deeds
    and/or will treating the suit properties as self­acquired properties
    in entirely.
    7.3 Now, so far as the submissions made by the learned counsel
    appearing on behalf of the appellants that while passing the
    impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has reappreciated the entire evidence on record is concerned, it is
    submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing on
    behalf of the original plaintiff that while discussing and/or
    deciding the substantial questions of law, the High Court is
    bound to consider and/or appreciate the evidence on record and
    to reach to a conclusion that the findings recorded by the Courts
    below are perverse or contrary to the evidence on record. It is
    submitted therefore that appreciation of evidence by the High
    15
    Court while deciding the second appeals in exercise of its powers
    under section 100 of the CPC, is permissible.
    7.4 Making the above submissions it is prayed to dismiss the
    present appeals.
  7. Heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective
    parties at length.
    8.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that as such, both,
    the learned Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court
    dismissed the suits, more particularly, the suit for partition filed
    by the original plaintiff by holding that the suit properties were
    not ancestral properties of Sengoda Gounder but were selfacquired properties of Sengoda Gounder. That on appreciation of
    evidence, both the Courts below specifically came to the
    conclusion that, as such, there was no blending of the suit
    properties with the ancestral properties by Sengoda Gounder.
    However, the said findings recorded by both the Courts below
    have been upset and set aside by the High Court, while deciding
    the second appeals in exercise of its powers under Section 100 of
    the CPC. We have gone through and considered the findings
    recorded by the learned Trial Court as well as the First Appellate
    16
    Court. On appreciation of entire evidence on record, more
    particularly, the documentary evidence which came to be
    considered by the High Court as Exhibit A1 and Exhibits A 19,
    24, 45 and 46, thereafter both the Courts below came to the
    conclusion that there was no blending or treating of the suit
    property as a joint family property. Despite the above, the High
    Court while passing the impugned common Judgment and Order,
    has re­appreciated the entire evidence on record including the
    documentary evidence which as such were considered by both
    the Courts below and has upset the findings of facts recorded by
    both the Courts below on the blending of suit property as a joint
    family property and has given its own findings, which in exercise
    of its powers under Section 100 of the CPC is wholly
    impermissible. As per catena of decisions of this Court, while
    deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the
    High Court is not required to re­appreciate the entire evidence on
    record and to come to its own conclusion and the High Court
    cannot set aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts
    below when the findings recorded by both the Courts below were
    on appreciation of evidence. That is exactly what is done by the
    17
    High Court in the present case while deciding the second
    appeals, which is not permissible under the law.
    8.2 Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per catena
    of decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100
    of the CPC, the Second Appeal would be maintainable only on
    substantial question of law. The Second Appeal does not lie on
    question of facts or of law. The existence of ‘a substantial
    question of law’ is a sine qua non for the exercise of the
    jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held
    by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (Supra), in a
    second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court
    cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate
    Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower
    Court were erroneous being:
    (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable
    law;
    OR
    (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court;
    OR
    (iii) Based on in­admissible evidence or no evidence.
    It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision
    that if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a
    18
    judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from
    an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in
    Second Appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could
    have decided differently is not a question of law justifying
    interference in Second Appeal.
    8.3 When a substantial question of law can be said to have
    arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in the
    case of Ishwar Dass Jain (Supra). In the aforesaid decision, this
    Court has specifically observed and held :
    “Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 amendment,
    it is essential for the High Court to formulate a
    substantial question of law and it is not permissible
    to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court
    without doing so. There are two situations in which
    interference with findings of fact is permissible. The
    first one is when material or relevant evidence is not
    considered which, if considered, would have led to
    an opposite conclusion. The second situation in
    which interference with findings of fact is
    permissible is where a finding has been arrived at
    by the appellate court by placing reliance on
    inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an
    opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the
    above situations, a substantial question of law can
    arise.”
    8.4 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
    decisions and the substantial questions of law
    19
    formulated/framed and answered by the High Court, reproduced
    hereinabove, it cannot be said that the said questions of law can
    be said to be substantial questions of law. All can be said to be
    questions of law or questions of fact and cannot be said to be
    Substantial Questions of law.
    8.5 As observed hereinabove, while passing the impugned
    Judgment and Order, the High Court has re­appreciated the
    entire evidence on record as if the High Court was deciding the
    first appeal. By the impugned Judgment and Order, while
    exercising the powers under Section 100 of the CPC and on reappreciation of entire evidence on record, the High Court has set
    aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below on
    blending of the suit properties with the joint family properties.
    The same is wholly impermissible. So far as the facts are
    concerned, the First Appellate Court is the final court and unless
    and until the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below are
    found to be manifestly perverse and/or contrary to the evidence
    on record, the High Court would not be justified in setting aside
    the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below which were on
    appreciation of evidence on record. It is not permissible for the
    20
    High Court to re­appreciate the entire evidence on record and
    come to its own finding when the findings recorded by the
    Courts below, more particularly, the First Appellate Court are on
    appreciation of evidence. Therefore, the procedure adopted by
    the High Court while deciding the Second Appeals, is beyond the
    scope and ambit of exercise of its powers under Section 100 of
    the CPC.
  8. Even otherwise, on merits also, the High Court has erred in
    holding that there was blending of the suit properties with the
    joint family properties by Sengoda Gounder. It is an admitted
    position that and even as observed and held by the High Court,
    the suit properties were self­acquired properties of Sengoda
    Gounder pursuant to the Settlement Deed Exhibit A1 dated
    07.04.1956 as the properties were obtained by Sengoda Gounder
    not from his direct male ancestors but from his mother’s sister’s
    husband. High Court also held that when some of the properties
    were sold, some of these properties specified in Exhibit A1 dated
    07.04.1956­Settlement Deed were sold, in the recitals it was
    mentioned that the properties sold for urgent necessity of family
    expenses and farm expenses and it was mentioned that the
    21
    same properties were belonging to them jointly through their
    ancestors However, considering the documentary evidence, more
    particularly, the settlement deeds Exhibits A13 and A14 and
    Exhibit B24, Will, executed by the Sengoda Gounder himself, by
    which the same properties were given to the original defendanthis son Subramanian, the intention of the father­Sengoda
    Gounder was very clear and the suit properties were treated as
    the self­acquired properties and not the joint family properties.
    9.1 Even the reasons given by the High Court that as the loans
    were taken on the suit properties for borewell, crop loan, electric
    motor pump set loan, jewel loan by all the three joint family
    members, namely Sengoda Gounder, Ramasamy and
    Subramanian and, therefore, there was a blending of the suit
    properties into join family properties also, cannot be accepted.
    As all the three were residing together and some loans might
    have been taken by the family members residing together, by
    that itself, it cannot be said that there was a blending of the suit
    properties into joint family properties. The law on the aspect of
    blending is well settled that property separate or self­acquired of
    a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the
    22
    character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by
    the owner into the common stock with the intention of
    abandoning his separate claim therein; but to establish such
    abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be
    established. Clear intention to abandon the separate rights in
    the property must be proved. Even abandonment cannot be
    inferred from mere allowing other family members also to use
    the property or utilisation of income of the separate property out
    of generosity to support the family members. At this stage, it is
    required to be noted that there was a serious dispute regarding
    who repaid the loan. It was the plaintiff who claimed that he only
    discharged that loan, however, the defendant Subramanian
    contended that the loan was discharged by Sengoda Gounder
    from out of the income derived by him from the suit properties
    itself. In any case, when on appreciation of evidence on record
    including the documentary evidence which came to be reappreciated by the High Court, both the Courts below came to
    the conclusion that there was no blending of the suit properties
    into joint family properties, the High Court in exercise of its
    powers under Section 100 of the CPC, is not justified in
    23
    reversing those findings which were on appreciation of evidence
    on record.
    10 In view of the above and as per the reasons stated above,
    both the present appeals are allowed. Impugned common
    Judgment and Order passed by the High Court in S.A. Nos. 4
    and 5 of 2009 is quashed and set aside and common Judgment
    and Decree passed by the Trial Court dismissing the suits are
    hereby restored. However, in the facts and circumstances of the
    case, there shall be no order as to costs.
    ……………………………….J.
    [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
    New Delhi; ……………………………….J.
    May 01, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]
    24