when civil suit for eviction became final, basing on the permission given by slum Authorities – it can not be questioned byway of writ without pleading his case in civil suit =In Vidarbha part of the State of Maharashtra, before the enactment of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1989, there had to be two rounds of litigation to seek eviction of a tenant. The first round had to be before the Rent Controller seeking permission to issue a quit notice under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. If such permission was granted, then only the landlord could issue a notice of termination of tenancy and file a civil suit seeking eviction of a tenant. In the present case the first roundbefore the Rent Controller was gone into. Bona fide need as a ground for eviction may, in a given case, have an additional facet of comparative hardship and whether the tenant has any alternative accommodation or not. In any case, the matter had attained finality. The permission was granted by the Rent Controller and the civil suit was filed only thereafter in which an objection was taken that the premises being governed by the provisions of the Act, the requisite permission of the Slum Authority was mandatory In the proceedings so initiated the Slum Authority granted that permission. The matter was carried in appeal and the issue whether the requirements under Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was also considered by the Appellate Authority. It must also be noted that the Civil Suit seeking eviction also attained finality. In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the High Court was not correct. The respondent had opportunity at every stage to present his case and whether the requirements of Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was a matter which was dealt with by the Appellate Authority in sufficient detail. In the circumstances there was no reason for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Civil Appeal NO. __ of 2019 @ SLP(C) No. 10469 of 2016 Kumud w/o Mahadeorao Salunke vs. Shri Pandurang Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors. 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO._4873 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.10469 of 2015)
KUMUD W/O MAHADEORAO SALUNKE …Appellant(s)
VERSUS
SHRI PANDURANG NARAYAN GANDHEWAR
THROUGH LRS. & ORS. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

  1. Leave granted.
  2. This appeal arises out of Judgment and Order dated 19.06.2014
    passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench,
    Nagpur in Writ Petition No.2199 of 2003.
  3. The appellant, landlord of the premises in question sought
    permission of the Rent Controller under the provisions of C.P. and
    Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 seeking
    eviction of the respondent on the grounds that he bona fide
    required the premises and that the respondent was habitual
    defaulter in paying rent to the appellant. After the Rent
    controller granted the permission, the appellant terminated the
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    tenancy by issuing notice under Section 108 of the Transfer of
    Property Act, 1982. Thereafter, he filed Civil Suit No.334 of 1996
    seeking eviction of the respondent. However, an objection was
    taken by the respondent that the premises were governed by the
    Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, clearance and Re-development)
    Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Act’) and as such the
    requisite permission of the Slum Authority under Section 22 had to
    be obtained. The suit was therefore withdrawn by the appellant,
    and application was preferred by him before the Slum Authority
    seeking required permission.
  4. The Slum Authority vide its order dated 28.11.2000 granted the
    permission. In an appeal arising therefrom, an order of remand was
    passed by the Appellate Authority. The matter was gone into by the
    Slum Authority afresh and by its order dated 30.05.2002 the
    permission was granted to the appellant to file the suit for
    eviction. The appeal preferred by the respondent challenging the
    order passed by the Slum Authority was dismissed by the Appellate
    Authority on 31.10.2002 after giving opportunity to the parties and
    after scrutinising the material on record. While considering the
    submission made on behalf of the respondent as regards alternative
    accommodation, it was observed by the Appellate Authority as under:
    “5-4. U/s 22 (4) of Maharashtra Slum
    (Improvement & Re-development Act, 1971 the
    competent authority should have seen that
    whether the alternative accommodation is
    available to the occupied within his means it
    does not mean that the competent Authority
    should search the accommodation. The wife of
    appellant as in service in mentioned in para 15
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    Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors.
    3
    of written notes of arguments. Under the
    circumstances whether alternative accommodation
    is available and can be made available, the
    burden of proof lies with the appellant.
    However, the appellant failed to prove the same
    and hence there is no substance in the point.
  5. On the basis of above discussion and
    verifying the record of lower court and
    provisions of Maharashtra Slum (Improvement &
    Re-development) Act, 1971, therefore I come to
    the conclusion that no substantial proof is
    presented by the appellant to interfere with the
    finding of lower court & hence I pass the
    following order.
    ORDER
    The appeal is rejected and the order passed by
    lower court dt.30th May, 2002 is confirmed.”
  6. Having secured the permission from the Slum Authority, Civil
    Suit No.113 of 2003 was filed by the appellant seeking decree of
    eviction of the respondent. The suit was however dismissed by the
    Trial Court on 27.09.2007. Regular Civil Appeal No.444 of 2007
    arising therefrom was allowed by the Appellate Court and by its
    judgment and order dated 17.08.2010 it passed decree for eviction
    of the respondent and also passed order as regards payment of
    arrears. It is undisputed that the decree passed by the Appellate
    Court was not challenged in any manner and has attained finality.
  7. In the meantime, Writ Petition No.2199 of 2003 was filed by
    the respondent challenging the permission granted by the Slum
    Authority as confirmed by the Appellate Authority vide its order
    dated 31.10.2002. This Writ Petition was allowed by the High
    Court by its judgment and order dated 19.06.2014. It was observed
    that the Slum Authority had not considered the relevant factors
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    Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors.
    4
    enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 22(4) of the Slum Act,
    1971 and consideration of those factors by the Appellate Authority
    would not legalize the absence of such consideration by the
    competent authority. It was observed as under:-
    “7. In the present case, it is undisputed that
    he competent authority has not applied its mind
    and has not taken into consideration the
    relevant factors enumerated in clause (a) to (c)
    of section 22(4) of the Slum Act, 1971. The
    consideration of these factors by the appellate
    authority does not legalize the order passed by
    the competent authority. It is settled law that
    if anything has to be done according to the
    provisions of law, then it should be done in
    that manner only. The competent authority has
    passed the cryptic order. The appellate order
    cannot substitute its reasoning to legalize the
    order passed by the fact-finding authority.”
    With this view, the writ petition was allowed and the matter
    was again remitted to the authority for inquiry.
  8. We heard Dr. A. Rajeev B. Masodkar, learned Advocate in
    support of the appeal and Mr. Kishor Lambat, learned Advocate for
    the respondents.
  9. In Vidarbha part of the State of Maharashtra, before the
    enactment of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1989, there had to be
    two rounds of litigation to seek eviction of a tenant. The first
    round had to be before the Rent Controller seeking permission to
    issue a quit notice under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property
    Act. If such permission was granted, then only the landlord could
    issue a notice of termination of tenancy and file a civil suit
    seeking eviction of a tenant. In the present case the first round
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    Kumud w/o Mahadeorao Salunke vs. Shri Pandurang
    Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors.
    5
    before the Rent Controller was gone into. Bona fide need as a
    ground for eviction may, in a given case, have an additional facet
    of comparative hardship and whether the tenant has any alternative
    accommodation or not. In any case, the matter had attained
    finality. The permission was granted by the Rent Controller and
    the civil suit was filed only thereafter in which an objection was
    taken that the premises being governed by the provisions of the
    Act, the requisite permission of the Slum Authority was mandatory.
  10. In the proceedings so initiated the Slum Authority granted
    that permission. The matter was carried in appeal and the issue
    whether the requirements under Section 22(4) of the Act stood
    satisfied or not was also considered by the Appellate Authority.
    It must also be noted that the Civil Suit seeking eviction
    also attained finality.
  11. In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the High
    Court was not correct. The respondent had opportunity at every
    stage to present his case and whether the requirements of Section
    22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was a matter which was
    dealt with by the Appellate Authority in sufficient detail. In
    the circumstances there was no reason for the High Court to
    interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
    Constitution of India.
  12. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and
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    Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors.
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    order dated 19.06.2014 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition
    No.2199 of 2003 and restore the order dated 31.10.2002 passed by
    the Appellate Authority.
  13. This appeal stands allowed. No order as to costs.
    …………………………….J.
    (Uday Umesh Lalit)
    ………………………….J.
    (Indu Malhotra)
    New Delhi;
    May 10, 2019.