compensate appointment – eleven years after the death of the employee. = whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. The consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The object being to enable thefamily to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over. The recourse to the Tribunal suffered from a delay of over a decade in the first instance. This staleness of the claim took away the very basis of providingcompanssionate appointment. The claim was liable to be rejected on that ground and ought to have been so rejected. The judgment of the High Court is unsustainable. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2425 OF 2019 (@ SLP(C) No.5810 of 2017) THE GOVT. OF INDIA & ANR. APPELLANT(s) VERSUS P. VENKATESH RESPONDENT(s) J U D G M E N T Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J Leave granted. A Division Bench of the High Court of… Read More compensate appointment – eleven years after the death of the employee. = whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. The consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The object being to enable thefamily to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over. The recourse to the Tribunal suffered from a delay of over a decade in the first instance. This staleness of the claim took away the very basis of providingcompanssionate appointment. The claim was liable to be rejected on that ground and ought to have been so rejected. The judgment of the High Court is unsustainable. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court.

Section 482 of the CrPC = Charges were framed for offences punishable under Sections 7, 8,13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.- The first respondent then filed a discharge application under section 239 of the CrPC before the Special Judge, Bengaluru. The trial judge dismissed the application . The respondent instituted a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC The learned Single Judge has quashed the proceedings against the respondent on the ground that (i) in the absence of a certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act, secondary evidence of the electronic record based on the spy camera is inadmissible in evidence; (ii) the prosecution is precluded from supplying any certification at this point of time since that would be an afterthought; and (iii) the case of the prosecution that apart from the electronic evidence, other evidence is available, is on its face unconvincing. The learned judge then held that the second accused who was the subject of the trap proceedings was not shown to have named the respondent as being instrumental in the episode. On this finding the proceedings have been quashed. Apex court held that Wthere is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.

1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.819 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.9009 of 2017) State By Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station, Bengaluru Appellant(S) Versus M. R. Hiremath Respondent(S) J U D G M E N T Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J 1 Leave granted. 2 This… Read More Section 482 of the CrPC = Charges were framed for offences punishable under Sections 7, 8,13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.- The first respondent then filed a discharge application under section 239 of the CrPC before the Special Judge, Bengaluru. The trial judge dismissed the application . The respondent instituted a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC The learned Single Judge has quashed the proceedings against the respondent on the ground that (i) in the absence of a certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act, secondary evidence of the electronic record based on the spy camera is inadmissible in evidence; (ii) the prosecution is precluded from supplying any certification at this point of time since that would be an afterthought; and (iii) the case of the prosecution that apart from the electronic evidence, other evidence is available, is on its face unconvincing. The learned judge then held that the second accused who was the subject of the trap proceedings was not shown to have named the respondent as being instrumental in the episode. On this finding the proceedings have been quashed. Apex court held that Wthere is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.

Section 4 of the Partition Act, 1893 for a right of pre-emption claiming the suit property to be a dwelling house. =,what is dwelling house – if a major part of the suit property is used as a dwelling house the same would not cease to be a dwelling house merely because a portion thereof may be used for commercial purpose.therefore, take the view that in the present case as a major portion of the suit property, namely, 1082 sq. ft. was used as a dwelling house and only 481 sq.ft. was used for commercial purpose the suit property would still remain a dwelling house. -when the right of premption arose = It is only in cases when the transferee sues for partition, which may be by way of initiating proceedings for partition or even claiming partition in execution, that the provision of Section 4 of the Partition Act come into play. The language of Section 4 of the Partition Act was contrasted with the then provision of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act.

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S) 1634 OF 2019 [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 22977/2016] RISHABH KUMAR JAIN …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS GYANCHAND JAIN & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S) ORDER Leave granted. One Nonelal (died in the year 1951) was owner of house property No.25 and 26, Lordganj, Jabalpur.… Read More Section 4 of the Partition Act, 1893 for a right of pre-emption claiming the suit property to be a dwelling house. =,what is dwelling house – if a major part of the suit property is used as a dwelling house the same would not cease to be a dwelling house merely because a portion thereof may be used for commercial purpose.therefore, take the view that in the present case as a major portion of the suit property, namely, 1082 sq. ft. was used as a dwelling house and only 481 sq.ft. was used for commercial purpose the suit property would still remain a dwelling house. -when the right of premption arose = It is only in cases when the transferee sues for partition, which may be by way of initiating proceedings for partition or even claiming partition in execution, that the provision of Section 4 of the Partition Act come into play. The language of Section 4 of the Partition Act was contrasted with the then provision of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act.

no requirement to produce entire contraband material before the Court. to prove seizer= If the seizure of the material is otherwise proved on record and is not even doubted or disputed the entire contraband material need not be placed before this Court. If the seizure is otherwise not in doubt, there is no requirement that the entire material ought to be produced before the Court. At times the material could be so bulky, for instance as in the present material when those 7 bags weighed 223 kgs that it may not be possible and feasible to produce the entire bulk before the Court. If the seizure is otherwise proved, what is required to be proved is the fact that the samples taken from and out of the contraband material were kept intact, that when the samples were submitted for forensic examination the seals were intact, that the report of the forensic experts shows the potency, nature and quality of the contraband material and that based on such material, the essential ingredients constituting an offence are made out.

Criminal Appeal No .1497 of 2019 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.8428 of 2016 State of Rajasthan vs. Sahi Ram 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1497 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.8428 of 2016) STATE OF RAJASTHAN …APPELLANT VERSUS SAHI RAM …RESPONDENT J U D G M… Read More no requirement to produce entire contraband material before the Court. to prove seizer= If the seizure of the material is otherwise proved on record and is not even doubted or disputed the entire contraband material need not be placed before this Court. If the seizure is otherwise not in doubt, there is no requirement that the entire material ought to be produced before the Court. At times the material could be so bulky, for instance as in the present material when those 7 bags weighed 223 kgs that it may not be possible and feasible to produce the entire bulk before the Court. If the seizure is otherwise proved, what is required to be proved is the fact that the samples taken from and out of the contraband material were kept intact, that when the samples were submitted for forensic examination the seals were intact, that the report of the forensic experts shows the potency, nature and quality of the contraband material and that based on such material, the essential ingredients constituting an offence are made out.

When the main defence is that there was a free fight on both sides and that there is no evidence to show that there is prior meeting of minds. The accused had not been convicted under Section 34 or Section 149 IPC and, therefore, each individual accused can only be convicted for the injury attributed to that individual.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1893 OF 2010 GURU @ GURUBARAN & ORS. …APPELLANT(S) Versus STATE REP. BY INSP. OF POLICE …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T Deepak Gupta, J. This appeal is filed by Accused Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 9 against… Read More When the main defence is that there was a free fight on both sides and that there is no evidence to show that there is prior meeting of minds. The accused had not been convicted under Section 34 or Section 149 IPC and, therefore, each individual accused can only be convicted for the injury attributed to that individual.

Appreciation of records = earlier litation which attains finalty is binding on the parties to the lis – it can not be brushed aside by incorrect excuses = Tenanacy rights can be bequthed by way of will.= The appellant is entitled for occupancy rights over it.= on the concluded findings of civil court , the net position obtainable is as follows: The deceased Gutya was the tenant in the land in question. No doubt, Smt. Gauri was the wife of Gutya and, had she retained this status, she would have been his Class I heir, in terms of the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. However, the concluded findings in the civil suit filed by Timma (with the present respondent being parties thereto) are to the effect that Smt. Gauri left Gutya, contacted second marriage with Jatya, and begot two children from such marriage. In sequel to these findings and in view of the other evidence on record, it was held in the said civil suit conclusively that Smt. Gauri was not the heir of Gutya. It was also held conclusively that Timma was the heir of Gutya; that Gutya had executed the Will in favour of Timma bequeathing his rights in the land in question; and that Timma was in possession of the land in question. These findings have attained finality with dismissal of appeals and ultimately, with dismissal of the petition for Special Leave to Appeal in this Court. Moreover, these findings bind the present respondent fair and square, for they were parties to the said suit and in fact, only they had pursued the matter in appeals, though unsuccessfully. In the face of these concluded findings, we find absolutely no justification that the High Court proceeded in the impugned orders on the premise that Smt. Gauri was the heir of Gutya for being his wife. The effect of the abovementioned findings of the civil Court has been brushed aside by the High Court with a few observations that the fact of existence of the wife of Gutya was not mentioned in the application made by Timma for grant of occupancy rights. As noticed, on the date of filing of such application, the suit filed by Timma had already been decreed by the Trial Court with the findings aforesaid, although the matter was pending in appeal. In any case, the concluded and binding findings of the civil Courts did not lose their worth if the fact about erstwhile wife of Gutya was not mentioned in the application made by Timma for grant of occupancy rights; and the High Court could not have treated such findings as nugatory or redundant. So far the legal effect of the said Will by the tenant Gutya in favour of his brother Timma is concerned, as noticed, Timma was definitely related to Gutya by legitimate kinship, being his brother. Hence, the Will is not hit by the embargo, whether that contained in Section 27(1) of the Act of 1948 or in Section 21 of the Act of 1961. A fortiori, the application made by Timma in Form 7 under Section 48-A of the Act of 1961 for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question could not have been denied. the application filed by Timma for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question is allowed. The Land Tribunal shall pass necessary formal orders for grant of occupancy rights in favour of the present appellants, who have acquired such rights as being successors of the rightful legatee of the original tenant.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1300-1301 OF 2008 KANNA TIMMA KANAJI MADIWAL (D) THROUGH LRS. …APPELLANT(S) VS. RAMACHANDRA TIMMAYA HEGDE (D) THROUGH LRS. AND ORS. …RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT Dinesh Maheshwari, J. In the foreground, these appeals are in challenge to the judgment and orders dated 08.08.2001 and 06.12.2004,… Read More Appreciation of records = earlier litation which attains finalty is binding on the parties to the lis – it can not be brushed aside by incorrect excuses = Tenanacy rights can be bequthed by way of will.= The appellant is entitled for occupancy rights over it.= on the concluded findings of civil court , the net position obtainable is as follows: The deceased Gutya was the tenant in the land in question. No doubt, Smt. Gauri was the wife of Gutya and, had she retained this status, she would have been his Class I heir, in terms of the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. However, the concluded findings in the civil suit filed by Timma (with the present respondent being parties thereto) are to the effect that Smt. Gauri left Gutya, contacted second marriage with Jatya, and begot two children from such marriage. In sequel to these findings and in view of the other evidence on record, it was held in the said civil suit conclusively that Smt. Gauri was not the heir of Gutya. It was also held conclusively that Timma was the heir of Gutya; that Gutya had executed the Will in favour of Timma bequeathing his rights in the land in question; and that Timma was in possession of the land in question. These findings have attained finality with dismissal of appeals and ultimately, with dismissal of the petition for Special Leave to Appeal in this Court. Moreover, these findings bind the present respondent fair and square, for they were parties to the said suit and in fact, only they had pursued the matter in appeals, though unsuccessfully. In the face of these concluded findings, we find absolutely no justification that the High Court proceeded in the impugned orders on the premise that Smt. Gauri was the heir of Gutya for being his wife. The effect of the abovementioned findings of the civil Court has been brushed aside by the High Court with a few observations that the fact of existence of the wife of Gutya was not mentioned in the application made by Timma for grant of occupancy rights. As noticed, on the date of filing of such application, the suit filed by Timma had already been decreed by the Trial Court with the findings aforesaid, although the matter was pending in appeal. In any case, the concluded and binding findings of the civil Courts did not lose their worth if the fact about erstwhile wife of Gutya was not mentioned in the application made by Timma for grant of occupancy rights; and the High Court could not have treated such findings as nugatory or redundant. So far the legal effect of the said Will by the tenant Gutya in favour of his brother Timma is concerned, as noticed, Timma was definitely related to Gutya by legitimate kinship, being his brother. Hence, the Will is not hit by the embargo, whether that contained in Section 27(1) of the Act of 1948 or in Section 21 of the Act of 1961. A fortiori, the application made by Timma in Form 7 under Section 48-A of the Act of 1961 for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question could not have been denied. the application filed by Timma for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question is allowed. The Land Tribunal shall pass necessary formal orders for grant of occupancy rights in favour of the present appellants, who have acquired such rights as being successors of the rightful legatee of the original tenant.

mere reproduction of pleadings andevidence and brief reference to the findings of the Trial Court and including the submissions of both sides before it- is not sufficient for delivery of the judgment = find merits in the grievance of the appellant that since the High Court was dealing with the First Appeal, it was expected to answer each of the findings on facts recorded by the Trial Court as well as law. However, the manner in which it has been answered in the impugned judgment is not satisfactory. The High Court has not even adverted to the different reasons assigned by the Trial Court in its judgment. Notably, the impugned judgment runs into thirty two pages but the first twenty nine pages contain only a reproduction of pleadings and evidence and brief reference to the findings of the Trial Court and including the submissions of both sides before it. Thus, effectively, the Trial Court’s judgment has been reversed by the High Court in 2 pages, without reversing each of the reasons weighed with the Trial Court to answer the matters in issue. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and relegate the parties before the High Court for reconsideration of the First Appeal on its own merits in accordance with law afresh.

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPEAL NO.3306 OF 2011 A.P.STATE TRANSPORT CORPN. MAZDOOR CO OPERATIVE BUILDING SOCIETY LTD. Appellant(s) VERSUS LOLUGU ATCHAMMA (DIED PER LRS.) & ORS. Respondent(s) O R D E R Heard learned counsel for the parties. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and order dated 15.06.2009 passed by… Read More mere reproduction of pleadings andevidence and brief reference to the findings of the Trial Court and including the submissions of both sides before it- is not sufficient for delivery of the judgment = find merits in the grievance of the appellant that since the High Court was dealing with the First Appeal, it was expected to answer each of the findings on facts recorded by the Trial Court as well as law. However, the manner in which it has been answered in the impugned judgment is not satisfactory. The High Court has not even adverted to the different reasons assigned by the Trial Court in its judgment. Notably, the impugned judgment runs into thirty two pages but the first twenty nine pages contain only a reproduction of pleadings and evidence and brief reference to the findings of the Trial Court and including the submissions of both sides before it. Thus, effectively, the Trial Court’s judgment has been reversed by the High Court in 2 pages, without reversing each of the reasons weighed with the Trial Court to answer the matters in issue. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and relegate the parties before the High Court for reconsideration of the First Appeal on its own merits in accordance with law afresh.