Benami Tansaction – liable for partition – burden lies on whom (1)the burden of showing that a transfer is a benami transaction lies on the person who asserts that it is such a transaction; (2) it is proved that the purchase money came from a person other than the person in whose favour the property is transferred, the purchase is prima facie assumed to be for the benefit of the person who supplied the purchase money, unless there is evidence to the contrary; ( 3) the true character of the transaction is governed by the intention of the person who has contributed the purchase money and (4) the question as to what his intention was has to be decided on the basis of the surrounding circumstances, the relationship of the parties, the motives governing their action in bringing about the transaction and their subsequent conduct, etc. ”The ancestral property was sold by the Narayanasamy Mudaliar (Exh. A3) was on dated 11.11.1951. However, the Sale Deeds at Exh. B3, B4, B5, B6 and B7 which are in favour of defendant no.1 were much prior to the sale of the property at Exh. A3. Therefore, also it cannot be said that the suit properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1 by Narayanasamy Mudaliar from the funds received by selling of the ancestral properties. Even considering the observations made by this Court in paragraph 10 in the case of Om Prakash Sharma (Supra) it can be said that Narayanasamy Mudaliar might have purchased the properties in the name of defendant no.1 in order to provide his wife with a secured life in the event of his death. It is required to be noted that it was the specific case on behalf of the defendant no.1 that the suit properties were purchased by her from the Stridhana and on selling of the jewellery. It is required to be noted that the benami transaction came to be amended in the year 2016. As per Section 3 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act 1988, there was a presumption that the transaction made in the name of the wife and children is for their benefit. By Benami Amendment Act, 2016, Section 3 (2) of the Benami Transaction Act, 1988 the statutory presumption, which was rebuttable, has been omitted. It is the case on behalf of the respondents that therefore in view of omission of Section 3(2) of the Benami Transaction Act, the plea of statutory transaction that the purchase made in the name of wife or children is for their benefit would not be available in the present case. Aforesaid cannot be accepted. As held by this Court in the case of Binapani Paul (Supra) the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act would not be applicable retrospectively. Even otherwise and as observed hereinabove, theplaintiff has miserably failed to discharge his onus to prove that the Sale Deeds executed in favour of defendant no.1 were benami transactions and the same properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1 by Narayanasamy Mudaliar from the amount received by him from the sale of other ancestral properties. Once it is held that the Sale Deeds in favour of defendant no.1 were not benami transactions, in that case, suit properties, except property nos. 1 and 3, which were purchased in her name and the same can be said to be her self­acquired properties and therefore cannot be said to be Joint Family Properties, the plaintiffs cannot be said to have any share in the suit properties (except property nos. 1 and 3).

CORRECTED Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4805 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.29642 OF 2016) Mangathai Ammal (Died) through LRs and Others ..Appellant(s) Versus Rajeswari & Others ..Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T M.R. SHAH, J. Leave granted. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied… Read More Benami Tansaction – liable for partition – burden lies on whom (1)the burden of showing that a transfer is a benami transaction lies on the person who asserts that it is such a transaction; (2) it is proved that the purchase money came from a person other than the person in whose favour the property is transferred, the purchase is prima facie assumed to be for the benefit of the person who supplied the purchase money, unless there is evidence to the contrary; ( 3) the true character of the transaction is governed by the intention of the person who has contributed the purchase money and (4) the question as to what his intention was has to be decided on the basis of the surrounding circumstances, the relationship of the parties, the motives governing their action in bringing about the transaction and their subsequent conduct, etc. ”The ancestral property was sold by the Narayanasamy Mudaliar (Exh. A3) was on dated 11.11.1951. However, the Sale Deeds at Exh. B3, B4, B5, B6 and B7 which are in favour of defendant no.1 were much prior to the sale of the property at Exh. A3. Therefore, also it cannot be said that the suit properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1 by Narayanasamy Mudaliar from the funds received by selling of the ancestral properties. Even considering the observations made by this Court in paragraph 10 in the case of Om Prakash Sharma (Supra) it can be said that Narayanasamy Mudaliar might have purchased the properties in the name of defendant no.1 in order to provide his wife with a secured life in the event of his death. It is required to be noted that it was the specific case on behalf of the defendant no.1 that the suit properties were purchased by her from the Stridhana and on selling of the jewellery. It is required to be noted that the benami transaction came to be amended in the year 2016. As per Section 3 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act 1988, there was a presumption that the transaction made in the name of the wife and children is for their benefit. By Benami Amendment Act, 2016, Section 3 (2) of the Benami Transaction Act, 1988 the statutory presumption, which was rebuttable, has been omitted. It is the case on behalf of the respondents that therefore in view of omission of Section 3(2) of the Benami Transaction Act, the plea of statutory transaction that the purchase made in the name of wife or children is for their benefit would not be available in the present case. Aforesaid cannot be accepted. As held by this Court in the case of Binapani Paul (Supra) the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act would not be applicable retrospectively. Even otherwise and as observed hereinabove, theplaintiff has miserably failed to discharge his onus to prove that the Sale Deeds executed in favour of defendant no.1 were benami transactions and the same properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1 by Narayanasamy Mudaliar from the amount received by him from the sale of other ancestral properties. Once it is held that the Sale Deeds in favour of defendant no.1 were not benami transactions, in that case, suit properties, except property nos. 1 and 3, which were purchased in her name and the same can be said to be her self­acquired properties and therefore cannot be said to be Joint Family Properties, the plaintiffs cannot be said to have any share in the suit properties (except property nos. 1 and 3).

Death Penalty converted in to life imprisonment till natural death Trial court imposed the extreme penalty of death without deciding the question of whether there was no alternative to imposing death sentence on the accused-appellant. There is no finding that in the absence of death sentence, the accusedappellant would continue to be a threat to the society. The question of whether the accused-appellant could be reformed, had not at all been considered.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1110-1111 OF 2015 Dattatraya @ Datta Ambo Rokade …Appellant VERSUS The State of Maharashtra …Respondent J U D G M E N T INDIRA BANERJEE, J. These appeals are against the final judgment and order dated 21/24/25-3-2014 of the High Court… Read More Death Penalty converted in to life imprisonment till natural death Trial court imposed the extreme penalty of death without deciding the question of whether there was no alternative to imposing death sentence on the accused-appellant. There is no finding that in the absence of death sentence, the accusedappellant would continue to be a threat to the society. The question of whether the accused-appellant could be reformed, had not at all been considered.

When the khasar entries are manipulated and doubtful – no adverse possession be claimed If the plaintiff’s possession itself originated in 1960­1961 it is difficult to appreciate how the Khasra entries in its name came to be made in the very same year. Section 115 of the Code provides that if the Tehsildar finds that a wrong or incorrect entry has been made in the land records prepared under Section 114 by an officer subordinate to him, he shall direct necessary changes to be made therein in red ink after making such enquiry from the person concerned as he may deem fit after due notice. The plaintiff led no evidence whatsoever when the application for correction in the khasra entry was made and that the original land owner was heard before the corrections were made. The entries in the name of the purchaser pursuant to the sale deed dated 11.10.1972 are in blue ink. The corrections in the khasra entry, the sheet anchor of the respondents claim therefore remains unexplained and doubtful.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 1090 OF 2008 BRIJESH KUMAR AND ANOTHER …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS SHARDABAI (DEAD) BY LRS. AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 1091 OF 2008 RAMAN LAL AND OTHERS …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS BHAGIRATH (DEAD) THR. LRS. AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. The appellants… Read More When the khasar entries are manipulated and doubtful – no adverse possession be claimed If the plaintiff’s possession itself originated in 1960­1961 it is difficult to appreciate how the Khasra entries in its name came to be made in the very same year. Section 115 of the Code provides that if the Tehsildar finds that a wrong or incorrect entry has been made in the land records prepared under Section 114 by an officer subordinate to him, he shall direct necessary changes to be made therein in red ink after making such enquiry from the person concerned as he may deem fit after due notice. The plaintiff led no evidence whatsoever when the application for correction in the khasra entry was made and that the original land owner was heard before the corrections were made. The entries in the name of the purchaser pursuant to the sale deed dated 11.10.1972 are in blue ink. The corrections in the khasra entry, the sheet anchor of the respondents claim therefore remains unexplained and doubtful.

When the agreement of sale was excuted in the capacity of power of attorney holder of his father alone even though in respect of joint property, it never operates as estoppel in the absence of specific agreement of sale and also in the absence of specific pleadings. Suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of an agreement of sale -suit scheduled property inherited by Princess Leelavathi, wife of late K. Basavaraja Urs – The suit scheduled property along with adjoining properties devolved on late K. Basavaraja Urs, father of K.B. Ramachandra Raj Urs, defendant No.1, in terms of section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act-On 24.4.1979, late K. Basavaraja Urs, represented by his son, i.e., defendant No.1 as power of attorney, entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiffs for a consideration-After the demise of Princess Leelavathi, the suit property devolved on late K. Basavaraja Urs and defendant No.1. The 1st defendant has not conveyed his interest in the suit property in favour of plaintiffs. Defendants contended that no agreement was entered into with the plaintiffs. The suit is barred by time.- Trial court held that Defendant No.1 for himself and as a power of attorney holder of late K. Basavaraja Urs, executed the suit agreement and, therefore, he cannot be permitted to contend that he is not a party to the suit agreement in his individual capacity. – The High Court has found that defendant No.1 has executed the agreement not only as power of attorney for his father but also as a son of late K. Basavaraja Urs. -The High Court has also held that the property was held by Princess Leelavathi, wife of late K. Basavaraja Urs, and after her death, the suit property devolved on late K. Basavaraj Urs and defendant No.1 under section 15 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.- Apex court held that A bare reading of the agreement described above makes it clear that agreement is between late K. Basavaraja Urs through power of attorney, K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. The “Vendors” is mentioned as K. Basavaraja Urs and not K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. Thus, it cannot be said that K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs had executed the agreement on his behalf, concerning his share in the property. There is no whisper about the same in the agreement. doubt about it that defendant No.1 has acted as a power of attorney, but at the same time, did not act in his capacity as the owner of the property. The ownership of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs was known to the plaintiffs. In spite of that the plaintiffs have not set up the case to bind the share of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. They have not pleaded in the plaint that K.B Ramchandra Raj Urs owned the property. There is no whisper as to the title of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs in the plaint. They needed to plead the facts to attract the plea of estoppel. That has not been done. Thus, the agreement which had been executed was not concerning share of defendant No.1, but of late K. Basavaraja Urs as his power of attorney.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6049 OF 2007 SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. ..APPELLANT(S) VERSUS SARAH C. URS & ORS. ..RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.6050 OF 2007 J U D G M E N T ARUN MISHRA, J. The appeals are preferred against the… Read More When the agreement of sale was excuted in the capacity of power of attorney holder of his father alone even though in respect of joint property, it never operates as estoppel in the absence of specific agreement of sale and also in the absence of specific pleadings. Suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of an agreement of sale -suit scheduled property inherited by Princess Leelavathi, wife of late K. Basavaraja Urs – The suit scheduled property along with adjoining properties devolved on late K. Basavaraja Urs, father of K.B. Ramachandra Raj Urs, defendant No.1, in terms of section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act-On 24.4.1979, late K. Basavaraja Urs, represented by his son, i.e., defendant No.1 as power of attorney, entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiffs for a consideration-After the demise of Princess Leelavathi, the suit property devolved on late K. Basavaraja Urs and defendant No.1. The 1st defendant has not conveyed his interest in the suit property in favour of plaintiffs. Defendants contended that no agreement was entered into with the plaintiffs. The suit is barred by time.- Trial court held that Defendant No.1 for himself and as a power of attorney holder of late K. Basavaraja Urs, executed the suit agreement and, therefore, he cannot be permitted to contend that he is not a party to the suit agreement in his individual capacity. – The High Court has found that defendant No.1 has executed the agreement not only as power of attorney for his father but also as a son of late K. Basavaraja Urs. -The High Court has also held that the property was held by Princess Leelavathi, wife of late K. Basavaraja Urs, and after her death, the suit property devolved on late K. Basavaraj Urs and defendant No.1 under section 15 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.- Apex court held that A bare reading of the agreement described above makes it clear that agreement is between late K. Basavaraja Urs through power of attorney, K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. The “Vendors” is mentioned as K. Basavaraja Urs and not K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. Thus, it cannot be said that K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs had executed the agreement on his behalf, concerning his share in the property. There is no whisper about the same in the agreement. doubt about it that defendant No.1 has acted as a power of attorney, but at the same time, did not act in his capacity as the owner of the property. The ownership of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs was known to the plaintiffs. In spite of that the plaintiffs have not set up the case to bind the share of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. They have not pleaded in the plaint that K.B Ramchandra Raj Urs owned the property. There is no whisper as to the title of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs in the plaint. They needed to plead the facts to attract the plea of estoppel. That has not been done. Thus, the agreement which had been executed was not concerning share of defendant No.1, but of late K. Basavaraja Urs as his power of attorney.

absence of any credible or cogent ground for Re­call of the exparte judgment the ground urged that the Chartered Accountant was suffering from an advanced stage of cataract, and hence was constrained from informing his clients is again not worthy of credence. The dasti Notice was admittedly served on him on 13.12.2018 at his office, which was much prior to his surgery which he states took place on 04.01.2019. Mr. Narayan had sufficient time to inform the Applicant – Company of the proceedings, prior to his surgery. Furthermore, Mr. Narayan appeared before the Income Tax Authorities to represent the Applicant – Company and its sister concerns on various dates prior to his surgery i.e. on 14.12.2018, 21.12.2018, 28.12.2018 and 29.12.2018. 9 14. Keeping in view the above­mentioned facts and circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the Applicant – Company was duly served through their authorized representative, and were provided sufficient opportunities to appear before this Court, and contest the matter. The Applicant – Company chose to let the matter proceed exparte. The grounds for Re­call of the Judgment are devoid of any merit whatsoever

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION M.A. No. 814 of 2019 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2463 OF 2019 Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) ­ 1 …Appellant Versus NRA Iron & Steel Pvt. Ltd. …Respondent J U D G M E N T INDU MALHOTRA, J. The present Application has been… Read More absence of any credible or cogent ground for Re­call of the exparte judgment the ground urged that the Chartered Accountant was suffering from an advanced stage of cataract, and hence was constrained from informing his clients is again not worthy of credence. The dasti Notice was admittedly served on him on 13.12.2018 at his office, which was much prior to his surgery which he states took place on 04.01.2019. Mr. Narayan had sufficient time to inform the Applicant – Company of the proceedings, prior to his surgery. Furthermore, Mr. Narayan appeared before the Income Tax Authorities to represent the Applicant – Company and its sister concerns on various dates prior to his surgery i.e. on 14.12.2018, 21.12.2018, 28.12.2018 and 29.12.2018. 9 14. Keeping in view the above­mentioned facts and circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the Applicant – Company was duly served through their authorized representative, and were provided sufficient opportunities to appear before this Court, and contest the matter. The Applicant – Company chose to let the matter proceed exparte. The grounds for Re­call of the Judgment are devoid of any merit whatsoever

whether the 2nd respondent by clicking inappropriate pictures of the appellant has blackmailed her or not, and further the 2nd respondent has continued to interfere by calling Shoukin Malik or not are the matters for investigation.? – High court order quashing criminal proceedings are set aside. Apex court held that In view of the serious allegations made in the complaint, we are of the view that the High Court should not have made a roving inquiry while considering the application filed under Section 482 CrPC. Though the learned counsels have made elaborate submissions on various contentious issues, as we are of the view that any observation or findings by this Court, will affect the investigation and trial, we refrain from recording any findings on such issues. From a perusal of the order of the High Court, it is evident that the High Court has got carried away by the agreement/settlement arrived at, between the parties, and recorded a finding that the physical relationship of the appellant with the 2nd respondent was consensual. When it is the allegation of the appellant, that such document itself is obtained under threat and coercion,it is a matter to be investigated. Further, the complaint of the appellant about interference by the 2nd respondent by calling Shoukin Malik and further interference is also a matter for investigation. By looking at the contents of the Crl.A. @ SLP(Crl.)No.4294 of 2019 10 complaint and the serious allegations made against the 2 nd respondent, we are of the view that the High Court has committed error in quashing the proceedings. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant, brought to our notice provision/Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with the presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape. A reading of the aforesaid Section makes it clear that, where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped, and such woman states in her evidence before the Court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent. Whether in a given case power under Section 482 is to be exercised or not, depends on the contents of the complaint, and the material placed on record. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that it is a fit case to set aside Crl.A. @ SLP(Crl.)No.4294 of 2019 11 the order passed by the High Court and allow the investigating agency to proceed with the further investigation in accordance with law.

Crl.A. @ SLP(Crl.)No.4294 of 2019 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1619 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4294 of 2019) Miss XYZ …Appellant Versus State of Gujarat & Anr …Respondents J U D G M E N T R.Subhash Reddy,J. Leave granted. This appeal is filed by the… Read More whether the 2nd respondent by clicking inappropriate pictures of the appellant has blackmailed her or not, and further the 2nd respondent has continued to interfere by calling Shoukin Malik or not are the matters for investigation.? – High court order quashing criminal proceedings are set aside. Apex court held that In view of the serious allegations made in the complaint, we are of the view that the High Court should not have made a roving inquiry while considering the application filed under Section 482 CrPC. Though the learned counsels have made elaborate submissions on various contentious issues, as we are of the view that any observation or findings by this Court, will affect the investigation and trial, we refrain from recording any findings on such issues. From a perusal of the order of the High Court, it is evident that the High Court has got carried away by the agreement/settlement arrived at, between the parties, and recorded a finding that the physical relationship of the appellant with the 2nd respondent was consensual. When it is the allegation of the appellant, that such document itself is obtained under threat and coercion,it is a matter to be investigated. Further, the complaint of the appellant about interference by the 2nd respondent by calling Shoukin Malik and further interference is also a matter for investigation. By looking at the contents of the Crl.A. @ SLP(Crl.)No.4294 of 2019 10 complaint and the serious allegations made against the 2 nd respondent, we are of the view that the High Court has committed error in quashing the proceedings. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant, brought to our notice provision/Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with the presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape. A reading of the aforesaid Section makes it clear that, where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped, and such woman states in her evidence before the Court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent. Whether in a given case power under Section 482 is to be exercised or not, depends on the contents of the complaint, and the material placed on record. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that it is a fit case to set aside Crl.A. @ SLP(Crl.)No.4294 of 2019 11 the order passed by the High Court and allow the investigating agency to proceed with the further investigation in accordance with law.

Whether sec. 5 of limitation Act applies whiling filing revision under Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (‘the Act of 2005’)? whether the High Court while exercising revisional power under Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (‘the Act of 2005’), condone the delay in case a revision under Section 48 of the Act of 2005, is filed beyond 90 days from the date of communication of the order or it excludes the applicability of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and in consequence of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.= As the revision under the Act of 2005 lies to the High Court, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable, and there is no express exclusion of the provisions of section 5 and as per section 29(2), unless a special law expressly excludes the provision, sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are applicable. When we consider the scheme of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005, it is apparent that its scheme is not ousting the provisions of the Limitation Act from its ken which makes principles of section 5 applicable even to an authority in the matter of filing an appeal but for the said provision the authority would not have the power to condone the delay. By implication also, it is apparent that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act have not been ousted; they have the play for condoning the limitation under Section 48 of the Act of 2005. Suo motu provision of revisional power is also provided to the Commissioner within 5 years. Thus, the intendment is not to exclude the Limitation Act. We condone the delay in filing of revision. we are of the considered view that the decision of the High Court cannot be said to be sustainable. The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are held applicable to the revisional provision under Section 48 of the Act of 2005.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8276­8277 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NOS.15280­15281 OF 2019) SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER/ DEHAR POWER HOUSE CIRCLE BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD (PW) SLAPPER & ANOTHER ….APPELLANTS VERSUS EXCISE AND TAXATION OFFICER, SUNDER NAGAR/ASSESSING AUTHORITY ….RESPONDENTS WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8278 OF… Read More Whether sec. 5 of limitation Act applies whiling filing revision under Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (‘the Act of 2005’)? whether the High Court while exercising revisional power under Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (‘the Act of 2005’), condone the delay in case a revision under Section 48 of the Act of 2005, is filed beyond 90 days from the date of communication of the order or it excludes the applicability of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and in consequence of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.= As the revision under the Act of 2005 lies to the High Court, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable, and there is no express exclusion of the provisions of section 5 and as per section 29(2), unless a special law expressly excludes the provision, sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are applicable. When we consider the scheme of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005, it is apparent that its scheme is not ousting the provisions of the Limitation Act from its ken which makes principles of section 5 applicable even to an authority in the matter of filing an appeal but for the said provision the authority would not have the power to condone the delay. By implication also, it is apparent that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act have not been ousted; they have the play for condoning the limitation under Section 48 of the Act of 2005. Suo motu provision of revisional power is also provided to the Commissioner within 5 years. Thus, the intendment is not to exclude the Limitation Act. We condone the delay in filing of revision. we are of the considered view that the decision of the High Court cannot be said to be sustainable. The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are held applicable to the revisional provision under Section 48 of the Act of 2005.

Suit for Declaration and injunction – when the mutation of entiries in the name of collector with out following the procedure – the pujaries of the temple filed the suit on behalf of the temple – trial court dismissed – Appeal court allowed and decreed the suit -High court confirmed the same – Apex court held that the entry in the revenue record could not have been changed by the Tahsildar without holding a proper enquiry and giving an opportunity to the affected persons, namely respondents herein, in this regard. The suit was filed by the Deity through the Pujaris claiming ownership to the lands received from Syed Mohammad Ali, Manager of the landlord Hakim situated in Village Kharsod Kalan, District Ujjain. The Pujaris did not lay any claim to ownership of the lands in them. The Temple was constructed by the forefather of the Pujaris, who continued to perform puja and enjoy the usufructs of the lands also. They were suddenly made aware of the correction made in column 3 of the land records in the year 1979­80 when the collector published notice for auction settlement of the lands, leading to the institution of the suit. the present case the name of the Deity finds place in the revenue entries for the years 1969­70, 1970­71 and 1972­73. The same is the position with regard to the revenue entries for 1973 to 1977. The defence is that The revenue records were therefore rightly corrected by recording the name of the collector as ‘Vyawasthapak’ (Manager) which was done for better management of the temple properties. Respondent nos.2 and 3 were only “Pujaris”. It is not the case of the appellants that the correction in the revenue entries in 1979­80 was made in compliance with the provisions of Section 115 of the Code. Section 115 reads as follows: “115. Correction of wrong or incorrect entry in land record­ (1) A Sub­Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on application of an aggrieved person, after making such enquiry as he deems fit, correct any wrong or incorrect entry including an unauthorised entry in the land records prepared under section 114 other than Bhoo­Adhikar Pustika and record of rights, and such corrections shall be authenticated by him: Provided that no action shall be initiated for correction of any entry pertaining to a period prior to five years without the sanction in writing of the Collector. (2) No order shall be passed under sub­section (1) without­ (a) getting a written report from the Tahsildar concerned; and (b) giving an opportunity of hearing to all parties interested: Provided that where interest of Government is involved, the Sub­Divisional Officer shall submit the case to the Collector. (3) On receipt of a case under sub­section (2), the Collector shall make such enquiry and pass such order as he deems fit.” There is a concurrent finding by the First Appellate Court and the High Court that the procedure not having been followed, the correction made in the revenue records and on basis of which the Temple was claimed to be a public temple and the Collector as the Manager thereof was unsustainable.

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s).956 OF 2010 STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS ….APPELLANT(S) VERSUS MURTI SHRI CHATURBHUJNATH AND OTHERS ….RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. The defendants are in appeal consequent to the dismissal of their second appeal. The respondent filed a suit for declaration and permanent… Read More Suit for Declaration and injunction – when the mutation of entiries in the name of collector with out following the procedure – the pujaries of the temple filed the suit on behalf of the temple – trial court dismissed – Appeal court allowed and decreed the suit -High court confirmed the same – Apex court held that the entry in the revenue record could not have been changed by the Tahsildar without holding a proper enquiry and giving an opportunity to the affected persons, namely respondents herein, in this regard. The suit was filed by the Deity through the Pujaris claiming ownership to the lands received from Syed Mohammad Ali, Manager of the landlord Hakim situated in Village Kharsod Kalan, District Ujjain. The Pujaris did not lay any claim to ownership of the lands in them. The Temple was constructed by the forefather of the Pujaris, who continued to perform puja and enjoy the usufructs of the lands also. They were suddenly made aware of the correction made in column 3 of the land records in the year 1979­80 when the collector published notice for auction settlement of the lands, leading to the institution of the suit. the present case the name of the Deity finds place in the revenue entries for the years 1969­70, 1970­71 and 1972­73. The same is the position with regard to the revenue entries for 1973 to 1977. The defence is that The revenue records were therefore rightly corrected by recording the name of the collector as ‘Vyawasthapak’ (Manager) which was done for better management of the temple properties. Respondent nos.2 and 3 were only “Pujaris”. It is not the case of the appellants that the correction in the revenue entries in 1979­80 was made in compliance with the provisions of Section 115 of the Code. Section 115 reads as follows: “115. Correction of wrong or incorrect entry in land record­ (1) A Sub­Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on application of an aggrieved person, after making such enquiry as he deems fit, correct any wrong or incorrect entry including an unauthorised entry in the land records prepared under section 114 other than Bhoo­Adhikar Pustika and record of rights, and such corrections shall be authenticated by him: Provided that no action shall be initiated for correction of any entry pertaining to a period prior to five years without the sanction in writing of the Collector. (2) No order shall be passed under sub­section (1) without­ (a) getting a written report from the Tahsildar concerned; and (b) giving an opportunity of hearing to all parties interested: Provided that where interest of Government is involved, the Sub­Divisional Officer shall submit the case to the Collector. (3) On receipt of a case under sub­section (2), the Collector shall make such enquiry and pass such order as he deems fit.” There is a concurrent finding by the First Appellate Court and the High Court that the procedure not having been followed, the correction made in the revenue records and on basis of which the Temple was claimed to be a public temple and the Collector as the Manager thereof was unsustainable.