whether the contents of a memory card/pen­drive being electronic record as predicated in Section 2(1)(t) of the Information and Technology Act, 2000 (for short, ‘the 2000 Act’) would, thereby qualify as a “document” within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, ‘the 1872 Act’) and Section 29 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the 1860 Code’)? whether it is obligatory to furnish a cloned copy of the contents of such memory card/pen­drive to the accused facing prosecution for an alleged offence of rape and related offences since the same is appended to the police report submitted to the Magistrate and the prosecution proposes to rely upon it against the accused, in terms of Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the 1973 Code’)? whether it is open to the Court to decline the request of the accused to furnish a cloned copy of the contents of the subject memory card/pendrive in the form of video footage/clipping concerning the alleged incident/occurrence of rape on the ground that it would impinge upon the privacy, dignity and identity of the victim involved in the stated offence(s) and moreso because of the possibility of misuse of such cloned copy by the accused (which may attract other independent offences under the 2000 Act and the 1860 Code)? we hold that the contents of the memory card/pen drive being electronic record must be regarded as a document. If the prosecution is relying on the same, ordinarily, the accused must be given a cloned copy thereof to enable him/her to present an effective defence during the trial. However, in cases involving issues such as of privacy of the complainant/witness or his/her identity, the Court may be justified in providing only inspection thereof to the accused and his/her lawyer or expert for presenting effective defence during the trial.

1REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1794 OF 2019(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 10189/2018)P. Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep ..…Appellant(s)VersusState of Kerala and Anr. ….Respondent(s)J U D G M E N TA.M. Khanwilkar, J. Leave granted. The conundrum in this appeal is: whether the contents of amemory card/pen­drive being electronic record as predicated inSection… Read More whether the contents of a memory card/pen­drive being electronic record as predicated in Section 2(1)(t) of the Information and Technology Act, 2000 (for short, ‘the 2000 Act’) would, thereby qualify as a “document” within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, ‘the 1872 Act’) and Section 29 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the 1860 Code’)? whether it is obligatory to furnish a cloned copy of the contents of such memory card/pen­drive to the accused facing prosecution for an alleged offence of rape and related offences since the same is appended to the police report submitted to the Magistrate and the prosecution proposes to rely upon it against the accused, in terms of Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the 1973 Code’)? whether it is open to the Court to decline the request of the accused to furnish a cloned copy of the contents of the subject memory card/pendrive in the form of video footage/clipping concerning the alleged incident/occurrence of rape on the ground that it would impinge upon the privacy, dignity and identity of the victim involved in the stated offence(s) and moreso because of the possibility of misuse of such cloned copy by the accused (which may attract other independent offences under the 2000 Act and the 1860 Code)? we hold that the contents of the memory card/pen drive being electronic record must be regarded as a document. If the prosecution is relying on the same, ordinarily, the accused must be given a cloned copy thereof to enable him/her to present an effective defence during the trial. However, in cases involving issues such as of privacy of the complainant/witness or his/her identity, the Court may be justified in providing only inspection thereof to the accused and his/her lawyer or expert for presenting effective defence during the trial.

No person can be deprived to his job for which he was selected on the groud that he was a Juvniel offender In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of her hand. However, the girl and her parents finally decided to pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him, resulting in the acquittal of the respondent. In the aforesaid facts, even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered under the definition of moral turpitude, specially when the respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he was a minor. 9. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth is 05.09.1991. Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal on 24.11.2011. Even if the allegations were found to be true, then too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime committed by such person as a juvenile. This is with the clear object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal person, without any stigma. Further, the case against the respondent is not with regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been framed against him. The respondent had very fairly disclosed about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the basis of no evidence having been adduced by the complainant against the respondent. In our considered view, the same can also not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected after following the due process and appointment having been offered to him.

1REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO.9109 OF 2019[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.26395 OF 2018]UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS …..APPELLANTSVERSUSRAMESH BISHNOI ……RESPONDENTJ U D G M E N TVineet Saran, J.Leave granted. This appeal pertains to the appellants (Union of India)denying appointment to the respondent, (even though selected) onthe… Read More No person can be deprived to his job for which he was selected on the groud that he was a Juvniel offender In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of her hand. However, the girl and her parents finally decided to pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him, resulting in the acquittal of the respondent. In the aforesaid facts, even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered under the definition of moral turpitude, specially when the respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he was a minor. 9. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth is 05.09.1991. Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal on 24.11.2011. Even if the allegations were found to be true, then too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime committed by such person as a juvenile. This is with the clear object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal person, without any stigma. Further, the case against the respondent is not with regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been framed against him. The respondent had very fairly disclosed about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the basis of no evidence having been adduced by the complainant against the respondent. In our considered view, the same can also not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected after following the due process and appointment having been offered to him.

The casual labourers shall be entitled to the wages according to the rates specified in the order dated 14.01.2010 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473/2003 and the contractor shall not be entitled to 471% ASOR basis with respect to supply of casual labourers as claimed by him. Therefore, it is specifically observed and held that the FCI shall be liable to pay the wages payable to the casual labourers under the subject contract according to the rates specified in the judgment and order dated 14.01.2010 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473/2003 and not on 471% ASOR basis. It goes without saying that the contractor shall be entitled to reimburse the wages paid by him, i.e., Rs.106.38 per labourer, if the same is not reimbursed/paid to the contractor.

REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO.9127 OF 2019(Arising from SLP(C) No.21970 of 2019)Food Corporation of India …AppellantVersusPratap Kundu …RespondentWITHCIVIL APPEAL NO.9128 OF 2019(Arising from SLP(C) No.28248 of 2019)@ Diary No.35242/2019Pratap Kundu …AppellantVersusFood Corporation of India …RespondentJ U D G M E N TM.R. SHAH, J.Delay condoned. Leave granted.1 Both these appeals… Read More The casual labourers shall be entitled to the wages according to the rates specified in the order dated 14.01.2010 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473/2003 and the contractor shall not be entitled to 471% ASOR basis with respect to supply of casual labourers as claimed by him. Therefore, it is specifically observed and held that the FCI shall be liable to pay the wages payable to the casual labourers under the subject contract according to the rates specified in the judgment and order dated 14.01.2010 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473/2003 and not on 471% ASOR basis. It goes without saying that the contractor shall be entitled to reimburse the wages paid by him, i.e., Rs.106.38 per labourer, if the same is not reimbursed/paid to the contractor.

if one of accused is acquitted, the same reasoning is apply to the other accused, in the absence other material evidence

1NON­REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1779 OF 2019[Arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 8410 of 2016]Jodhraj & Anr. .. Appellant(s)VersusState of Rajasthan .. Respondent(s)WITHCRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1780 OF 2019[Arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 5350 of 2017]J U D G M E N TM. R. Shah, J.Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with… Read More if one of accused is acquitted, the same reasoning is apply to the other accused, in the absence other material evidence

Whether in mediations [ lokadalat etc., ] other than the subject matter of the suit can be added and the award/decree to that effect is valid and excutable ? yes Now so far as the submission on behalf of Ramu Ram that as the disputed properties in question were not the subject matter of original suit proceedings and therefore the same could not have been the subject matter of Settlement Agreement entered into between the Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram and/or the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that being the dispute between father and daughter the matter was referred to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre to explore an amicable settlement between the parties. Both the parties agreed to settle all the disputes between the parties in the Mediation. In the Mediation it is always open for the parties to explore the possibility of an overall amicable settlement including the disputes which are not the subject matter of the proceedings before the Court. That is the benefit of the Mediation. In the Mediation parties may try for amicable settlement, which is reduced into writing and/or a Settlement Agreement and thereafter it becomes the part of the Court’s Order and the Court disposes of the matter in terms of the Settlement Agreement. Thereafter the order in terms of the Settlement Agreement is executable irrespective of the fact whether the Settlement Agreement is with respect to the properties which was/were not the subject matter of the proceedings before the Court. Thereafter the order passed by the Court in terms of the Settlement is binding to the parties and is required to be acted upon and/or complied with and as observed above the same is executable. Under the circumstances, the submission on behalf of Ramu Ram and Rampal that as the properties in question were not the subject matter of the suit before the Trial, the same could have been the subject matter of the Settlement Agreement and/or the order dated 05.05.2017 cannot be accepted. The order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 is required to be complied with and the same is executable. Under the circumstances the Executing Court has to execute the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 in its true spirit. In view of the reasons stated above, M.A. No.2485 of 2018 stands dismissed. I.A. No.30045 of 2019 is hereby allowed. In exercise of powers conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and to see that the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 is fully complied with, we direct all the concerned persons claiming to be in possession of the disputed properties in questions including Plot Nos. 29 and 29A of the Jodha House to handover the peaceful and vacant possession to Jodha Ram as per the order passed by this Court on 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016, within a period of four weeks from today. Executing Court is hereby directed to see that the present order passed by this Court and its earlier order dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 is fully complied with. Both the parties Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram ­ parties to the Settlement Agreement dated 10.02.2017 are hereby directed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement dated 10.02.2017 and the order passed by this Court on 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 fully and in its true spirit.

1 NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ORIGINAL CONTEMPT JURISDICTION CONTEMPT PETITION NO. 1868 OF 2018 WITH I.A. NO.30045 OF 2019 WITH M.A. NO.2485 OF 2018 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.10022 OF 2016 KAUSHALIYA …Petitioner (s) Versus JODHA RAM & ORS. … Respondent (s) J U D G M E N T M.… Read More Whether in mediations [ lokadalat etc., ] other than the subject matter of the suit can be added and the award/decree to that effect is valid and excutable ? yes Now so far as the submission on behalf of Ramu Ram that as the disputed properties in question were not the subject matter of original suit proceedings and therefore the same could not have been the subject matter of Settlement Agreement entered into between the Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram and/or the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that being the dispute between father and daughter the matter was referred to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre to explore an amicable settlement between the parties. Both the parties agreed to settle all the disputes between the parties in the Mediation. In the Mediation it is always open for the parties to explore the possibility of an overall amicable settlement including the disputes which are not the subject matter of the proceedings before the Court. That is the benefit of the Mediation. In the Mediation parties may try for amicable settlement, which is reduced into writing and/or a Settlement Agreement and thereafter it becomes the part of the Court’s Order and the Court disposes of the matter in terms of the Settlement Agreement. Thereafter the order in terms of the Settlement Agreement is executable irrespective of the fact whether the Settlement Agreement is with respect to the properties which was/were not the subject matter of the proceedings before the Court. Thereafter the order passed by the Court in terms of the Settlement is binding to the parties and is required to be acted upon and/or complied with and as observed above the same is executable. Under the circumstances, the submission on behalf of Ramu Ram and Rampal that as the properties in question were not the subject matter of the suit before the Trial, the same could have been the subject matter of the Settlement Agreement and/or the order dated 05.05.2017 cannot be accepted. The order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 is required to be complied with and the same is executable. Under the circumstances the Executing Court has to execute the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 in its true spirit. In view of the reasons stated above, M.A. No.2485 of 2018 stands dismissed. I.A. No.30045 of 2019 is hereby allowed. In exercise of powers conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and to see that the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 is fully complied with, we direct all the concerned persons claiming to be in possession of the disputed properties in questions including Plot Nos. 29 and 29A of the Jodha House to handover the peaceful and vacant possession to Jodha Ram as per the order passed by this Court on 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016, within a period of four weeks from today. Executing Court is hereby directed to see that the present order passed by this Court and its earlier order dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 is fully complied with. Both the parties Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram ­ parties to the Settlement Agreement dated 10.02.2017 are hereby directed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement dated 10.02.2017 and the order passed by this Court on 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 fully and in its true spirit.

When the agreement is not that of assingment of rights by Vendees of earlier agreement of sale , he can not file a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale = Upon considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is evident that there is no privity of contract between the Appellants and Respondent Nos. 1. Respondent Nos. 1 were not party to the 1986 agreement. Vice versa, the Appellants were not party to the 1987 agreements, though whether or not they had knowledge of the same is disputed. Hence Respondent Nos. 1cannot seek specific performance of the 1986 agreement, or for that matter, the 1987 agreements, against the Appellants, except by suing as ‘representatives-in-interest’ of the original vendees under Section 15(b) of the Specific Relief Act.

When the agreement is not that of assingment of rights by Vendees of earlier agreement of sale , he can not file a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale = Upon considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is evident that there is no privity of contract between the… Read More When the agreement is not that of assingment of rights by Vendees of earlier agreement of sale , he can not file a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale = Upon considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is evident that there is no privity of contract between the Appellants and Respondent Nos. 1. Respondent Nos. 1 were not party to the 1986 agreement. Vice versa, the Appellants were not party to the 1987 agreements, though whether or not they had knowledge of the same is disputed. Hence Respondent Nos. 1cannot seek specific performance of the 1986 agreement, or for that matter, the 1987 agreements, against the Appellants, except by suing as ‘representatives-in-interest’ of the original vendees under Section 15(b) of the Specific Relief Act.

Whether Section 149 IPC applies ? “47. … It is well settled that once a membership of an unlawful assembly is established it is not incumbent on the prosecution to establish whether any specific overt act has been assigned to any accused. In other words, mere membership of the unlawful assembly is sufficient and every member of an unlawful assembly is vicariously liable for the acts done by others either in the prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or such which the members of the unlawful assembly knew were likely to be committed.”

Crl. Appeal Nos. 1709-1710 of 2019 (@ SLP [Crl.]Nos.2497-2498 of 2019) The State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Killu @ Kailash & Ors. 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1709-1710 OF 2019 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.)Nos.2497-2498 of 2019) STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …Appellant VERSUS KILLU… Read More Whether Section 149 IPC applies ? “47. … It is well settled that once a membership of an unlawful assembly is established it is not incumbent on the prosecution to establish whether any specific overt act has been assigned to any accused. In other words, mere membership of the unlawful assembly is sufficient and every member of an unlawful assembly is vicariously liable for the acts done by others either in the prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or such which the members of the unlawful assembly knew were likely to be committed.”