No person can be deprived to his job for which he was selected on the groud that he was a Juvniel offender In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of her hand. However, the girl and her parents finally decided to pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him, resulting in the acquittal of the respondent. In the aforesaid facts, even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered under the definition of moral turpitude, specially when the respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he was a minor. 9. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth is 05.09.1991. Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal on 24.11.2011. Even if the allegations were found to be true, then too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime committed by such person as a juvenile. This is with the clear object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal person, without any stigma. Further, the case against the respondent is not with regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been framed against him. The respondent had very fairly disclosed about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the basis of no evidence having been adduced by the complainant against the respondent. In our considered view, the same can also not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected after following the due process and appointment having been offered to him.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.9109 OF 2019
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.26395 OF 2018]
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS …..APPELLANTS
VERSUS
RAMESH BISHNOI ……RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
Vineet Saran, J.
Leave granted.

  1. This appeal pertains to the appellants (Union of India)
    denying appointment to the respondent, (even though selected) on
    the post of Sub­Inspector, on the ground of a criminal case having
    been registered in the past against the respondent.
  2. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of this case are that
    in response to an advertisement dated 28.03.2015, for recruitment
    on the post of Sub­Inspector in the Central Industrial Security
    2
    Force (for short ‘CISF’) issued by the Staff Selection Commission
    (SSC), the respondent had appeared in the written examination
    and physical endurance test and was thus selected and offered
    appointment on 15.09.2016. The respondent was then required to
    submit a form, wherein there was a column relating to whether
    any First Information Report (for short ‘FIR’) had been lodged
    against the respondent in the past. The respondent had given the
    details of the FIR (No.70/2009) under Sections 354, 447 and 509
    of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) having been lodged
    against the respondent and in the further column of the
    questionnaire form, the respondent had clearly mentioned that on
    the matter having been compromised, he was acquitted of the
    aforesaid offence on 24.11.2011, as there was no evidence
    adduced against the respondent. The respondent had thus
    rendered all necessary information regarding the criminal case
    lodged against him and did not conceal any material fact. The
    case was then referred to the Standing Screening Committee,
    which found the respondent unsuitable for appointment in CISF
    on the aforesaid ground that a criminal case had been lodged
    against him in the past. Consequently, on 03.06.2017 the
    National Industrial Security Academy cancelled the appointment of
    3
    the respondent, on the ground of registration of a criminal case in
    the past.
  3. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed Writ
    Petition No.7522 of 2017, which was allowed by a learned Single
    Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur vide judgment
    dated 06.12.2017, and the case of the respondent was directed to
    be decided afresh within 15 days in the light of the guidelines
    issued by this Court in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India
    (2016) 8 SCC 471. The case of the respondent was then reexamined by the Standing Screening Committee on 02.01.2018,
    which by an order dated 16.01.2018, again rejected the claim of
    the respondent, holding that the respondent was acquitted merely
    for due to lack of adequate evidence and compromise, and that the
    offence in the charge sheet falls in the category of serious offence,
    and thus the respondent was not considered suitable for
    appointment on the post of Sub­Inspector in CISF.
  4. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed Writ
    Petition No.1310 of 2018, which was allowed by an order dated
    08.03.2018 with the following directions:
    4
    “……….. the impugned Order
    dated 16.1.2018 (communicated
    vide letter dated 17.01.2018)
    (Annex.1) is recashed and set
    aside; the respondents are
    directed to activate offer of
    appointment of the petitioner
    earlier made to the Petitioner for
    the post of Sub­Inspector in
    Central Industrial Security Force.
    The order may be operated upon
    within a period of thirty days
    from today and all notional
    benefits shall be prospectively
    given.”
  5. The appellants herein, challenged the order of the
    learned Single Judge dated 08.03.2018 before the Division Bench
    of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in Special Appeal Writ
    No.702 of 2018, which was dismissed by the Division Bench by
    judgment dated 08.05.2018. Aggrieved by the said orders dated
    08.03.2018 and 08.05.2018, passed by the learned Single Judge
    and Division Bench respectively of the High Court of Rajasthan at
    Jodhpur, this appeal has been filed by way of Special Leave
    Petition.
  6. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length
    and have perused the material on record.
    5
  7. In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against
    the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had
    teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of
    her hand. However, the girl and her parents finally decided to
    pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him,
    resulting in the acquittal of the respondent. In the aforesaid facts,
    even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the
    respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered
    under the definition of moral turpitude, specially when the
    respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he
    was a minor.
  8. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the
    charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the
    respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth
    is 05.09.1991. Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were
    never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents
    did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal
    on 24.11.2011. Even if the allegations were found to be true, then
    too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job
    on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed
    while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e.
    6
    The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as
    well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
    2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be
    obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime
    committed by such person as a juvenile. This is with the clear
    object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal
    person, without any stigma. Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice
    (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 lays down guidelines
    for the Central Government, State Governments, the Board and
    other agencies while implementing the provisions of the said Act.
    In clause (xiv) of Section 3, it is clearly provided as follows:
    “……………..
    (xiv) Principle of fresh start: All
    past records of any child under
    the Juvenile Justice system
    should be erased except in
    special circumstances.
    ………………”
    In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the respondent
    was a minor when the charges had been framed against him of
    offences under Sections 354, 447 and 509 of IPC. It is also not
    disputed that he was acquitted of the charges. However, even if he
    7
    had been convicted, the same could not have been held against
    him for getting a job, as admittedly he was a minor when the
    alleged offences were committed and the charges had been framed
    against him. Section 3(xiv) provides for the same and the exception
    of special circumstances does not apply to the facts of the present
    case.
  9. Further, the case against the respondent is not with
    regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been
    framed against him. The respondent had very fairly disclosed
    about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the
    basis of no evidence having been adduced by the complainant
    against the respondent. In our considered view, the same can also
    not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of
    which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected
    after following the due process and appointment having been
    offered to him.
  10. For the reasons given hereinabove, we do not find any
    ground for interference with the orders passed by the learned
    Single Judge as well as the Division bench of the High Court of
    Rajasthan at Jodhpur. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed.
    8
    The respondent shall be entitled to all the benefits of the judgment
    of the writ Court within 30 days from today.
    No orders as to cost.
    ………………………………..J
    (UDAY UMESH LALIT)
    ……………………………….J
    (VINEET SARAN)
    New Delhi
    Dated: November 29, 2019