Review of the order ? =The suit was filed on 16.05.1994 seeking decree with interest, which trial court decreed. Assam Electricity Board filed a first appeal, which was allowed by the High Court holding that bills raised by the appellants were cleared by the Assam Electricity Board prior to commencement of Act, 1993, hence the appellant was not entitled for benefit of Act, 1993. Special leave petition filed against the judgment of the High Court dated 05.04.2001 was permitted to be withdrawn by following order:- “Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks leave to withdraw the special leave petition. He states that he will move the High Court in review stating that it has erred in recording that “all the bills were paid and cleared earlier to the commencement of the Act.” The special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn accordingly.” 28. After the aforesaid judgment of this Court permitting the petitioner to withdraw the special leave petition, a review petition was filed, which was partly allowed on 19.03.2013. A perusal of the judgment dated 19.03.2013 indicates that the grounds on which the petitioner prayed liberty to file review 32 was not proved in the review petition. The High Court in the review judgment did not hold in favour of the petitioner that he was entitled for the benefit of Act, 1993 rather the High Court accepted the submission of the petitioner that plaintiffs are not debarred from claiming cost under Section 34 CPC, Section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 or Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 or in equity only on the ground of principal amount. The High Court granted interest at the rate of 9% per annum. The Civil Appeal No. 8445 of 2016 has been filed against the review judgment but obviously the appeal is not against the 9% interest granted to the petitioner. Review judgment does not grant interest under Act, 1993 since the High Court in the review judgment did not interfere with the earlier finding that petitioner is not entitled for benefit under Act,

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
REVIEW PETITION (C) NOS. 786-787 OF 2019
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8442-8443 Of 2016
M/S SHANTI CONDUCTORS (P) LTD. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
ASSAM STATE ELECTRICITY
BOARD AND ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 789 OF 2019
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8450 Of 2016
M/S BRAHMAPUTRA CONCRETE
PIPE INDUSTRIES …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE ASSAM STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD …RESPONDENT(S)
1
AND
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 788 OF 2019
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8445 Of 2016
M/S TRUSSES AND TOWERS (P) LTD. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
ASSAM STATE ELECTRICITY
BOARD AND ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
These review petitions have been filed against
the common judgment dated 23.01.2019 passed in Civil
Appeal Nos. 8442-8443 of 2016, Civil Appeal No.8450
of 2016 and Civil Appeal No.8445 of 2016, by which
all the Civil Appeals were dismissed, sought to be
reviewed by these applications. All the review
petitions filed have raised different grounds, which
need to be considered separately.
2
Review Petition (C) Nos. 786-787 of 2019

  1. To consider the grounds raised in the review
    petition, few facts need to be noticed.
    2.1 The Assam State Electricity Board, the
    respondent has issued two supply orders to
    the petitioner dated 31.03.1992 and
    13.05.1992 for supply of aluminium electrical
    conductors. Petitioner completed supply in
    pursuance of the above supply orders
    beginning from June, 1992 till 04.10.1993.
    The President of India to provide for and
    regulate payment of interest on delayed
    payment to small scale industries issued an
    Ordinance on 23.09.1992 namely “The interest
    on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and
    Ancillary Industrial Undertaking Ordinance”,
    which subsequently became the Act namely “The
    interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale
    and Ancillary Industrial Undertaking Act,
    1993 (hereinafter referred to as “Act,
    1993”)” w.e.f. 23.09.1992.
    3
    2.2 A Writ Petition (C) No. 1351 of 1993 was
    filed by Assam Conductors Manufacturers
    Association on behalf of its five members,
    which included M/s. Shanti Conductors Private
    Limited also for realisation of its dues and
    for seeking payment. An interim order was
    passed by the Guwahati High Court on
    21.07.1993, in which the High Court observed
    that respondents may settle with the
    outstanding bills of the petitioners. The
    respondent paid an amount of approx. Rs.2.15
    Crores in instalments to the petitioner and
    the last instalment of payment being made on
    05.03.1994. A Money Suit No.21 of 1997 was
    filed by the petitioner in the Court of Civil
    Judge (Sr. Division) No.1 at Guwahati on
    10.01.1997 for a decree of Rs.53,68,492.56
    towards the interest only on the payment of
    the principal amount, which had already been
    received by the petitioner.
    2.3 On 28.08.1997, Writ Petition (C) No.1351 of
    1993 was dismissed observing that writ
    4
    petitioner may go to the Civil Court for
    realisation of its dues.
    2.4 The trial court on 02.02.2000 decreed the
    money suit of the petitioner for
    Rs.51,60,507.42 with future interest @ 23.75%
    on a monthly compounding basis. RFA No.66 of
    2000 was filed by the petitioner against the
    judgment of the trial court. The Division
    Bench made a reference to the Full Bench for
    answering three points as raised by the
    counsel for the appellant. Three-Judge Bench
    answered the reference on 05.03.2002. The
    respondent filed Special Leave Petition (C)
    No. 24577 of 2002, which was subsequently
    converted in Civil Appeal No.2351 of 2003.
    This Court on 10.07.2012 dismissed the Civil
    Appeal No.2351 of 2003 [M/s. Assam State
    Electricity Board Vs. M/s. Shanti Conductors
    Pvt. Ltd.] alongwith another Civil Appeal
    No.2348 of 2003 [M/s. Purbanchal Cables and
    Conductors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Assam State
    Electricity Board]. After dismissal of the
    5
    above Civil Appeals, the Division Bench of
    the High Court allowed the RFA No.66 of 2000
    filed by the respondents and dismissed the
    suit of the petitioner.
    2.5 Against the judgment of the Division Bench
    dated 20.11.2012, Civil appeal Nos.8442-8443
    of 2016 was filed by M/s. Shanti Conductors
    (P) Ltd, the petitioner in the appeal. Two
    judgments were delivered by two Hon’ble
    Judges with two divergent opinion, which
    judgment is reported in (2016) 16 SCC Page
  2. The matter was referred to Three Judge
    Bench, which heard all the appeals and vide
    its judgment dated 23.01.2019 dismissed the
    appeals.
  3. In the suit filed by the petitioners, one of the
    questions, which was framed was “Whether the suit
    filed by the appellants is barred by limitation?” In
    paragraph 27 of the judgment dated 23.01.2019, Seven
    question, which had arisen in these appeals have been
    6
    noticed. Issue No.3 was “Whether money suit by M/s.
    Shanti Conductors was barred by limitation?
  4. Issue No.3 has been dealt from paragraphs 59 to
    76 and we concluded in paragraph 76 that suit filed
    by M/s. Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. was barred by
    time.
  5. Shri Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior
    counsel appearing for petitioner submits that there
    is an apparent error in the judgment dated 23.01.2019
    in holding that suit was barred by time. He
    submitted that according to admitted facts last
    payment made by the respondent was on 05.03.1994 and
    suit having been filed within three years, i.e., on
    10.01.1997 was well within time. It is submitted
    that last supply having been completed on 04.10.1993
    and even though three years period from 04.10.1993
    had lapsed, but the payment having been made on
    05.03.1994 by the respondents, a fresh period of
    limitation shall be available to the petitioner as
    per Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is
    submitted that in the written submission, which was
    7
    submitted on behalf of the petitioner, reliance was
    placed on Section 19 and further in earlier judgment
    of this Court reported in (2016) 15 SCC 13, in
    paragraph 53, Justice Gowda has answered the question
    of limitation in favour of the appellant relying on
    Section 13. It is submitted that Section 19 escaped
    the notice of this Court while answering the question
    of limitation, which is an error apparent, need to be
    corrected and it has to be held that suit was well
    within time. Dr. Singhvi further submits that
    petitioners were also entitled for benefit of Section
    14 of the Limitation Act since Writ Petition No. 1351
    of 1993 was filed in the High Court by Assam
    Conductors manufacturers Association, of which
    petitioner was one of the members, which writ
    petition came to be dismissed on 28.08.1997, the
    period during which the writ petition was pending
    consideration ought to have been excluded while
    computing the limitation for money suit filed by the
    petitioner. Dr. Singhvi submits that although in the
    impugned judgment, this Court has considered claim of
    petitioner of exclusion of time under Section 14 of
    the Limitation Act but the benefit was erroneously
    8
    denied on the ground that writ petition was filed by
    the Assam Conductors Manufacturers Association, which
    is a different entity than the petitioner. He
    submits that the said view is apparently erroneous
    and need to be corrected. In the review petition,
    apart from submissions of limitation, several other
    grounds have been urged touching on the issues, which
    have been considered and decided in the judgment
    dated 23.01.2019. He sought to contend that Act,
    1993 is retroactive and further any outstanding
    amount at the time of commencement of the Act ought
    to attract interest under the Act, 1993.
  6. Shri Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel
    appearing for the respondents refuted the contentions
    of the petitioner and submitted that there is no
    error apparent on record. The question on limitation
    of Suit has been specifically considered and this
    court held that suit is barred by time. Arguments
    made on the strength of Section 14 has been
    specifically considered and rejected. The petitioner
    was not entitled for any benefit of Section 14 of the
    Limitation Act since Section 14 contemplates
    9
    exclusion of time of the proceeding, which the
    plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence.
    He submits that plaintiff in the suit in question is
    M/s. Shanti Conductors whereas petitioner in the writ
    petition, which was filed in the Guwahati High Court
    was association, which is a different entity and it
    cannot be said that plaintiff of suit was the same
    entity, which had filed the writ petition. Shri
    Hansaria further submits that against the dismissal
    of the writ petition, a writ appeal was filed by the
    Association, which writ appeal was also subsequently
    dismissed by the Division Bench, which fact has been
    concealed by the petitioner. When against the
    judgment of learned Single Judge, the appeal was
    filed, no question of bonafide prosecuting the
    earlier proceedings arises. Shri Hansaria further
    submits that for taking benefit under Section 19 of
    the Limitation Act, there has to be specific pleading
    and proof in the suit. Plaintiffs have neither
    pleaded any ground for claiming benefit under Section
    19 nor proved the same in the suit, hence benefit of
    Section 19 cannot be extended. He further submits
    that for taking benefit of Section 19 of the
    10
    Limitation Act, there has to be acknowledgment of the
    payment, which is a question of fact required to be
    pleaded and proved by the plaintiffs.
  7. Learned senior counsel for the parties have also
    placed reliance on various judgments of this Court,
    which shall be referred to while considering the
    submissions.
  8. We may first consider the grounds raised by the
    petitioner on Section 19 of the Limitation Act.
    Although, during oral submissions, no argument was
    raised on Section 19 of the Limitation Act, but the
    question being of limitation of the suit, we
    permitted the learned counsel for the parties to
    advance their submissions.
  9. Section 19 of the Limitation Act is as follows:-
    “19. Effect of payment on account of debt
    or of interest on legacy.—Where payment on
    account of a debt or of interest on a
    legacy is made before the expiration of
    the prescribed period by the person liable
    to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent
    duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh
    period of limitation shall be computed
    from the time when the payment was made:
    11
    Provided that, save in the case of
    payment of interest made before the 1st
    day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of
    the payment appears in the handwriting of,
    or in a writing signed by, the person
    making the payment.
    Explanation.—For the purposes of this
    section,—
    (a) where mortgaged land is in the
    possession of the mortgagee, the
    receipt of the rent or produce of
    such land shall be deemed to be a
    payment;
    (b) “debt” does not include money payable
    under a decree or order of a court.”
  10. In the judgment dated 23.01.2019, it has been
    held that the limitation of the suit filed by the
    petitioner shall be governed by Article 113 of the
    Limitation Act, 1963, which is three years from the
    date when the right to sue accrues. In paragraph 71
    of the judgment, it has been held that last supply
    was completed on 04.10.1993, thus, amount became due
    on 04.11.1993 and the period of three years shall
    start running from 04.11.1993 and suit filed was
    beyond three years. The petitioners on the strength
    of Section 19 contends that since the last payment
    was made on 05.03.1994, a fresh period of limitation
    12
    shall begin from the fresh date, i.e., 05.03.1994 and
    the suit filed on 10.01.1997 was well within time.
    Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with bar
    of limitation. Section 3(1) is as follows:-
    “3. Bar of limitation.—(1) Subject to the
    provisions contained in sections 4 to 24
    (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal
    preferred, and application made after the
    prescribed period shall be dismissed,
    although limitation has not been set up as
    a defence.
    XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX”
  11. The above provision makes it clear that in event,
    a suit is instituted after the prescribed period, it
    shall be dismissed although limitation has not been
    set up as a defence. The Court by mandate of law, is
    obliged to dismiss the suit, which is filed beyond
    limitation even though no pleading or arguments are
    raised to that effect. The provisions of Sections 4
    to 20 are exceptions when suit beyond the period of
    limitation as prescribed in the Schedule shall not be
    dismissed as required by Section 3. In this context,
    we need to refer to Order VII Rule 6 of the Civil
    Procedure Code. Order VII deals with plaint. Order
    VII Rule 6 contains a heading “Grounds of exemption
    13
    from limitation law”. Order VII Rule 6 is as
    follows:-
    “6. Grounds of exemption from limitation
    law. – Where the suit is instituted after
    the expiration of the period prescribed by
    the law of limitation, the plaint shall
    show the ground upon which exemption from
    such law is claimed:
    Provided that the Court may permit the
    plaintiff to claim exemption from the law
    of limitation on any ground not set out in
    the plaint, if such ground is not
    inconsistent with the grounds set out in
    the plaint.”
  12. Order VII Rule 6 uses the words “the plaint shall
    show the ground upon which exemption from such law is
    claimed”. The exemption provided under Sections 4 to
    20 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are based on certain
    facts and events. Section 19, with which we are
    concerned, provide for a fresh period of limitation,
    which is founded on certain facts, i.e., (i) whether
    payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy
    is made before the expiration of the prescribed
    period by the person liable to pay the debt or
    legacy, (ii) an acknowledgement of the payment
    appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed
    14
    by, the person making the payment. We may notice the
    judgment of this Court dealing with Section 20 of the
    Limitation Act, 1908, which was akin to present
    Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In Sant Lal
    Mahton Vs. Kamla Prasad and Others, AIR 1951 SC 477,
    this Court held that for applicability of Section 20
    of the Limitation Act, 1908, two conditions were
    essential that the payment must be made within the
    prescribed period of limitation and it must be
    acknowledged by some form of writing either in the
    handwriting of the payer himself or signed by him.
    This Court further held that for claiming benefit of
    exemption under Section 20, there has to be pleading
    and proof. In paragraphs 9 and 10, following has
    been laid down:-
    “9. It would be clear, we think, from the
    language of s. 20, Limitation Act, that to
    attract its operation two conditions are
    essential : first, the payment must be
    made within the prescribed period of
    limitation and secondly, it must be
    acknowledged by some form of writing
    either in the handwriting of the payer
    himself or signed by him. We agree with
    the Subordinate Judge that it is the
    payment which really extends the period of
    limitation under s. 20, Limitation Act;
    but the payment has got to be proved in a
    particular way and for reason of policy
    the legislature insists on a written or
    15
    signed acknowledgment as the only proof of
    payment and excludes oral testimony.
    Unless, therefore, there is acknowledgment
    in the required from, the payment by
    itself is of no avail. The Subordinate
    Judge, however, is right in holding that
    while the section requires that the
    payment should be made within the period
    of limitation, it does not require that
    the acknowledgment should also be made
    within that period. To interpret the
    proviso in that way would be to import
    into it certain words which do not occur
    there. This is the view taken by almost
    all the High Courts in India and to us it
    seems to be a proper view to take (See Md.
    Moizuddin v. Nalini Bala A.I.R. (24) 1937
    Cal 284 : I.L.R. (1937) 2 Cal. 137; Lal
    Singh v. Gulab Rai 55 All 280, Venkata
    Subbhu v. Appu Sundaram 17 Mad. 92, Ram
    Prasad v. Mohan Lal A.I.R. (10) 1923 Nag
    117 and Viswanath v. Mahadeo 57 Bom. 453.
  13. …………………………………If the plaintiff’s right
    of action is apparently barred under the
    Statute of limitation, O. 7, R. 6, Civil
    P.C. makes it his duty to state
    specifically in the plaint the grounds of
    exemption allowed by the Limitation Act
    upon which he relies to exclude its
    operation; and if the plaintiff has got to
    allege in his plaint the facts which
    entitle him to exemption, obviously these
    facts must be in existence at or before
    the time when the plaint is filed; facts
    which come into existence after the filing
    of the plaint cannot be called in aid to
    revive a right of action which was dead at
    the date of the suit. To claim exemption
    under s. 20. Limitation Act the plaintiff
    must be in a position to allege and prove
    not only that there was payment of
    interest on a debt or part payment of the
    principal, but that such payment had been
    16
    acknowledged in writing in the manner
    contemplated by that section…………………………”
  14. We need to notice as to whether the petitioners
    in plaint have pleaded any exclusion of time under
    Section 19 of the Act or not. The plaint is filed as
    Annexure P/2 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8442-8443 of 2016.
    A perusal of the plaint indicates that there is no
    pleading as to exception of limitation by running any
    fresh period of limitation as per Section 19. In
    paragraph 10, the details of delivery challans have
    been given, last challan being dated 04.10.1993 has
    been mentioned by which supply was made. In
    paragraph 12, details of payments received have also
    been mentioned, in which last being made on
    05.03.1994 has been mentioned, but for the last
    payment made on 05.03.1994, there was no pleading of
    an acknowledgment on the part of the respondents,
    which could result in start of fresh period of
    limitation. Further in paragraph 21, it has been
    further specifically pleaded that provisions of
    Limitation Act do not apply in view of the provisions
    contained in the Act, 1993 as because the Act, 1993
    is having overriding effect over the Limitation Act
    17
    and all other Acts. Paragraph 21 of the plaint is
    referred to for ready reference:-
    “21. That the transaction between the
    plaintiffs and the defendants are duly
    maintained by the plaintiffs in the Books
    of Accounts like ledger, Sale Register
    etc., which are kept in the usual course
    of the business of the plaintiffs and
    those accounts between the plaintiffs and
    the defendants are in continuity and the
    interest payable by the defendants to the
    plaintiffs are carried over till date. As
    such the suit of the plaintiffs is in
    within time. Apart from that the
    provisions of the Limitation Act do not
    apply in view of the provisions contained
    in the Act, 1993 as because the Act of
    1993 is having overriding effect over the
    Limitation Act and all other Acts.”
  15. There being no specific pleading by the
    plaintiffs claiming any start of fresh period of
    limitation, there was no occasion for defendants to
    raise any reply in reference to Section 19. Shri
    Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel has
    relied on two judgments of this Court, which need to
    be noticed: (i) Jiwanlal Achariya Vs. Rameshwarlal
    Agarwalla, AIR 1967 SC 1118, and (ii) Kamla Devi and
    Others Vs. Pt. Mani Lal Tewari and Others, (1976) 4
    SCC 818. In Jiwanlal Achariya (supra), this Court
    had occasion to consider Section 20 of the Limitation
    18
    Act, 1908, which was akin to present Section 19 of
    the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court was considering
    the question as to what shall be the date of a postdated cheque, whether it shall be the date on which
    cheque bears or the date the cheque is handed over to
    compute the start of fresh period of limitation. The
    Court held that the date which post-dated cheque
    bears subject to payment by the bank shall be treated
    as a date for start of the fresh period of
    limitation. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, it was
    observed that the proviso to Section 20 shall be
    treated to be complied with for the cheque itself is
    an acknowledgment of the payment in the handwriting
    of the person giving the cheque. Paragraph 8 of the
    judgment is as follows:-
    “8. This brings us to the question of
    limitation. The facts are not in dispute
    now. The promissory note was executed on
    February 4, 1954. On the same date a postdated cheque bearing the date February 25,
    1954 was given by the defendant-appellant
    to the plaintiff-respondent, the intention
    being that on being realised it would be
    credited towards part payment. It was
    realised sometime after February 25, 1954
    and was credited towards part payment, the
    appellant himself having made an
    endorsement admitting this part payment.
    But it is contended on behalf of the
    appellant that as the post-dated cheque
    19
    was given on February 4, 1954, that must
    be held to be the date on which part
    payment was made. It has been held by the
    High Court that the acceptance of the
    post-dated cheque on February 4, 1954 was
    not an unconditional acceptance. Where a
    bill or note, is given by way of payment,
    the payment may be absolute or
    conditional, the strong presumption being
    in favour of conditional payment. It
    followed from the finding of the High
    Court that the payment was conditional
    i.e. that the payment will be credited to
    the person giving the cheque in case the
    cheque is honoured. In the present case
    the cheque was realised and the question
    is what is the date of payment in the
    circumstances of this case for the purpose
    of Section 20 of the Limitation Act.
    Section 20 inter alia lays down that where
    payment on account of debt is made before
    the expiration of the prescribed period by
    the person liable to pay the debt, a fresh
    period of limitation shall be computed
    from the time when the payment was made.
    Where therefore the payment is by cheque
    and is conditional, the mere delivery of
    the cheque on a particular date does not
    mean that the payment was made on that
    date unless the cheque was accepted as
    unconditional payment. Where the cheque is
    not accepted as an unconditional payment,
    it can only be treated as a conditional
    payment. In such a case the payment for
    purposes of Section 20 would be the date
    on which the cheque would be actually
    payable at the earliest, assuming that it
    will be honoured. Thus if in the present
    case the cheque which was handed over on
    February 4, 1954 bore the date February 4,
    1954 and was honoured when presented to
    the bank the payment must be held to have
    been made on February 4, 1954, namely, the
    date which the cheque bore. But if the
    cheque is post-dated as in the present
    20
    case it is obvious that it could not be
    paid till February 25, 1954 which was the
    date it bore. As the payment was
    conditional it would only be good when the
    cheque is presented on the date it bears,
    namely, February 25, 1954 and is honoured.
    The earliest date therefore on which the
    respondent could have realised the cheque
    which he had received as conditional
    payment on February 4, 1954 was 25th
    February, 1954 if he had presented it on
    that date and it had been honoured. The
    fact that he presented it later and was
    then paid is immaterial for it is the
    earliest date on which the payment could
    be made that would be the date where the
    conditional acceptance of a post-dated
    cheque becomes actual payment when
    honoured. We are therefore of opinion that
    as a post-dated cheque was given on
    February 4, 1954 and it was dated February
    25, 1954 and as this was not a case of
    unconditional acceptance, the payment for
    the purpose of Section 20 of the
    Limitation Act could only be on February
    25, 1954 when the cheque could have been
    presented at the earliest for payment. As
    in the present case the cheque was
    honoured it must be held that the payment
    was made on February 25, 1954. It is not
    in dispute that the proviso to Section 20
    is complied with in this case, for the
    cheque itself is an acknowledgment of the
    payment in the handwriting of the person
    giving the cheque. We are therefore of
    opinion that a fresh period of limitation
    began on February 25, 1954 which was the
    date of the post-dated cheque which was
    eventually honoured.”
  16. In the above case, in the plaint itself it was
    noticed that although the promissory note was
    21
    executed on 04.02.1954 and the suit was filed on
    22.04.1957 but the plaintiff had relied on payment of
    a cheque on 25.02.1954 to bring the suit within time.
    Paragraph 1 of the judgment is to the following
    effect:-
    “Two questions of law arise in this appeal
    by special leave against the judgment of
    the Patna High Court. The facts which have
    been found by the High Court and which are
    necessary for our purposes may be briefly
    narrated. The appellant was the defendant
    in a suit filed by the plaintiffrespondent for recovery of money on the
    basis of a promissory note for Rs 10,000
    executed on February 4, 1954 by the
    defendant-appellant in favour of the
    plaintiff-respondent. 12 per cent per
    annum interest was to run on the
    promissory note which was payable on
    demand or to the order of the plaintiffrespondent. The suit was filed on February
    22, 1957 and was thus obviously beyond
    time from February 4, 1954. The plaintiffrespondent relied on a payment by cheque
    on February 25, 1954 to bring the suit
    within time.”
  17. The judgment of this Court in Jiwanlal Achariya
    (supra) does not lay down that even without pleading
    all facts for claiming start of fresh period of
    limitation, the plaintiff is entitled for the benefit
    of Section 19. The next judgment relied by Shri
    Singhvi is Kamla Devi and Others (supra), in which
    22
    case, this Court was considering Section 19 of the
    Limitation Act, 1963. This Court relied on an
    acknowledgement of payment for holding that from the
    date of acknowledgment of order period of limitation
    shall start. In paragraph 4 of the judgment
    following has been laid down:-
    “4. The last contention pressed was that
    the personal decree should not have been
    granted, because it was barred by
    limitation. The basis for this contention
    is that the payment of Rs 25, which has
    been acknowledged on the registered
    mortgage deed, was not itself by a
    registered endorsement and, therefore, the
    plaintiff was entitled to a period of
    three years only, even if Section 19 may
    give an extension of limitation. We see no
    merit in this contention. The function of
    Section 19 is to provide a later date to
    count the period of limitation afresh, and
    that fresh period of limitation will be
    computed from the time when the
    acknowledgement is signed. Nothing turns
    on whether the acknowledgement is itself
    registered or not. The office of Section
    19 being to postpone the date of reckoning
    limitation and not to create a different
    substantive period of limitation, the
    latter depends upon the appropriate
    article of the Limitation Act which
    applies to the suit. In this case, the
    mortgage document was registered and the
    personal covenant was contained in the
    registered deed. Therefore, Article 116,
    which gives a period of six years,
    applies. Thus, the fresh period of
    limitation will be six years and it has to
    be counted from the date of
    acknowledgement, namely, August 31, 1940.
    23
    In this view, there in no merit in the
    plea of limitation either. This is
    obviously a case where the revisional
    court had missed a fact apparent upon the
    record and, therefore, thought it fit, in
    the exercise of its discretion to review
    its judgment. Justice has thereby been
    furthered rather than frustrated. We are
    not here concerned with an endorsement on
    the deed as constituting a cause of
    action.”
  18. The above judgment noticed the function of
    Section 19, which provides for a later date to count
    the period of limitation afresh. There cannot be
    any dispute to the preposition as laid down by this
    Court in above case.
  19. We may also notice the proviso of Order VII Rule
    6, which has been added by Act 104 of 1976, which
    provided that the Court may permit the plaintiff to
    claim exemption from the law of limitation on any
    ground not set out in the plaint, if such ground is
    not inconsistent with the grounds set out in the
    plaint. The proviso of Order VII Rule 6 cannot come
    to the rescue of the plaintiff since as noticed
    above, the plaintiffs have specifically pleaded in
    paragraph 21 that the provisions of the Limitation
    24
    Act are not applicable since Act, 1993 has overriding
    effect. The trial court in decreeing the suit of the
    plaintiff has accepted the above submission and has
    held that Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable.
  20. We may further notice that paragraph 24 of the
    plaint, which is a paragraph of cause of action for
    the suit, which refers to date beginning from
    31.03.1992 till 05.10.1993, i.e., the beginning from
    the first supply order i.e., 31.03.1992 and date of
    last supply order, i.e., 05.10.1993, but cause of
    action is not claimed from the date 05.03.1994, which
    was the date when the last payment was received by
    the petitioner. The petitioner in the plaint has
    clearly not pleaded for benefit of Section 19 nor has
    brought necessary facts to enable the Court to
    consider the claim under Section 19. We, thus, are
    of the view that petitioner is not entitled for
    benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act and there
    is no error in the judgment of this Court dated
    23.01.2019 holding that the suit of the plaintiff was
    barred by time.
    25
  21. We may also notice few submissions of Dr. Singhvi
    in support of his plea that the petitioner was
    entitled for benefit of Section 14. In our judgment
    dated 23.01.2019, we have already taken the view that
    benefit of Section 14 of Limitation Act cannot be
    claimed by the plaintiff since writ petition, which
    was filed by the Association was by different entity.
    The question of benefit of Section 14 having been
    specifically considered and rejected by this Court in
    its judgment dated 23.01.2019, we do not find any
    error apparent on the aforesaid ground. Moreover,
    present is a case where writ petition filed by
    Association was dismissed on 28.08.1997 subsequent to
    filing of the suit by plaintiff on 10.01.1997.
    Furthermore, after the judgment of the learned Single
    Judge on 28.08.1997 Association has filed a writ
    appeal challenging the said judgment, which facts
    also detracts from fulfilling the conditions as
    required for extending the benefit of Section 14 of
    the Limitation Act.
    26
  22. Insofar as other submissions of Dr. Singhvi that
    Act, 1993 is retroactive in nature and further amount
    due at the time of the commencement of the Act ought
    to attract interest of the Act, 1993, all these
    submissions have been elaborately considered in the
    judgment dated 23.01.2019, which have been considered
    on merits. The scope of review is limited and under
    the guise of review, petitioner cannot be permitted
    to reagitate and reargue the questions, which have
    already ben addressed and decided. The scope of
    review has been reiterated by this Court from time to
    time. It is sufficient to refer the judgment of this
    Court in Parsion Devi and Others Vs. Sumitri Devi and
    Others, (1997) 8 SCC 715, wherein in paragraph 9
    following has been laid down:-
    “9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment
    may be open to review inter alia if there
    is a mistake or an error apparent on the
    face of the record. An error which is not
    self-evident and has to be detected by a
    process of reasoning, can hardly be said
    to be an error apparent on the face of the
    record justifying the court to exercise
    its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1
    CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under
    Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible
    for an erroneous decision to be “reheard
    and corrected”. A review petition, it must
    be remembered has a limited purpose and
    27
    cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in
    disguise”.”
  23. We, thus, do not find any merit in Review
    Petition (C) Nos. 786-787 of 2019, which is
    accordingly dismissed.
    Review Petition (C) No.789 of 2019
  24. Shri Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel in
    support of the review petition contended that there
    is an error apparent on the face of record in
    observation of the Court made in paragraph 85 of the
    judgment. Some of the supplies have been made prior
    to the commencement of the Act, 1993, i.e., prior to
    23.09.1992. It is submitted that some of the
    supplies were made after 23.09.1992, hence the
    petitioner was entitled for the benefit of interest
    under the Act, 1993. He submits that in ground (b),
    it has been mentioned that details of supply and
    reason of corresponding details have been noticed by
    the trial court in the judgment dated 30.09.2002
    passed in Money Suit No.32 of 1996. Reference has
    been made to Annexure – P/3 at Page – 71 @ Page 88 of
    28
    Civil Appeal No.8450 of 2016. We have perused
    Annexure P/3, the judgment of the trial court dated
    30.09.2002, our attention has been invited to page 88
    of the judgment, where reference of 12 bills have
    been made in the judgment, which is to the following
    effect:-
    “Stated specifically, it is the
    plaintiff’s evidence that against the
    supply of poles to the defendants
    different divisions on receipt of orders
    from the defendants, the plaintiff
    submitted a number of twelve bills for the
    payment to the defendants to be reiterated
    as:
    Sl.
    No.
    Bill No. Date Gross Amount of
    Bill
  25. BCPI/31/91/92 20.3.92 Rs.5,02,545.92
  26. BCPI/32/91/92 20.3.92 Rs.2,99,541.65
  27. BCPI/33/91/92 20.3.92 Rs.2,98,344.48
  28. BCPI/3/92/93 7.4.92 Rs.4,67,928.48
  29. BCPI/11/92-93 8.6.92 Rs.1,08,806.45
  30. BCPI/12/92-93 8.6.92 Rs.2,48,459.90
  31. BCPI/26/92-93 29.9.92 Rs.17,729.50
  32. BCPI/27/92-93 – Rs.79,699.77
  33. BCPI/28/92-93 – Rs.1,81,497.98
  34. BCPI/29/92-93 – Rs.87,249.81
  35. BCPI/30/92-93 – Rs.12,782.45
  36. 5% Security
    Deposit Bill
  • Rs.23,738.00
    Total
    Outstanding
    Amount
    Rs.23,28,324.39
    29
  1. A perusal of the above chart given in the
    judgment indicates that the date 29.09.1992 is a date
    of bill for the payment for supply of the materials
    by the plaintiffs. In the judgment dated 23.01.2019,
    we had observed that “there being nothing on record
    to come to the conclusion that any supply was made
    after the enforcement of the Act so as to enable the
    appellant to claim interest under Section 3 read with
    Section 4 of the Act, 1993, we are of the view that
    judgment of the High Court does not need any
    interference in this appeal”.
  2. We, thus, do not find any merit in the submission
    of the learned counsel for the appellant that there
    is error apparent on the face of record in
    observation of the Court made in paragraph 85 of the
    judgment, the said submission is rejected and the
    Review Petition (C) No. 789 of 2019 is dismissed.
    Review Petition (C) No.788 of 2019
    30
  3. Shri Basava S. prabhu Patil, learned senior
    counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that
    this Court in the judgment dated 23.01.2019 has
    dismissed the appeal of the petitioner as not
    maintainable, which is an error apparent on record.
    He submits that the appeal filed by the petitioner
    being Civil Appeal No. 8445 of 2016 against the
    review judgment of the High Court dated 19.03.2013
    was maintainable.
  4. Shri Patil submits that in the judgment dated
    23.01.2019, the Issue No.6 was specifically framed
    regarding maintainability of the Civil Appeal No.8445
    of 2016. The maintainability of the appeal was
    specifically considered and answered in paragraphs
  5. 81 and 82 of the impugned judgment. The
    submission of Shri Patil is that since the Civil
    Appeal No.8445 of 2016 was against the judgment of
    the High Court dated 19.03.2013 by which review
    petition was partly allowed by allowing interest @9%
    p.a., against which judgment, the appeal was
    maintainable and withdrawal of earlier appeal by the
    petitioner was not fatal. The appellants were issued
    31
    two supply orders dated 17.02.1992 and 17.03.1992.
    The suit was filed on 16.05.1994 seeking decree with
    interest, which trial court decreed. Assam
    Electricity Board filed a first appeal, which was
    allowed by the High Court holding that bills raised
    by the appellants were cleared by the Assam
    Electricity Board prior to commencement of Act, 1993,
    hence the appellant was not entitled for benefit of
    Act, 1993. Special leave petition filed against the
    judgment of the High Court dated 05.04.2001 was
    permitted to be withdrawn by following order:-
    “Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks
    leave to withdraw the special leave
    petition. He states that he will move the
    High Court in review stating that it has
    erred in recording that “all the bills
    were paid and cleared earlier to the
    commencement of the Act.” The special
    leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn
    accordingly.”
  6. After the aforesaid judgment of this Court
    permitting the petitioner to withdraw the special
    leave petition, a review petition was filed, which
    was partly allowed on 19.03.2013. A perusal of the
    judgment dated 19.03.2013 indicates that the grounds
    on which the petitioner prayed liberty to file review
    32
    was not proved in the review petition. The High
    Court in the review judgment did not hold in favour
    of the petitioner that he was entitled for the
    benefit of Act, 1993 rather the High Court accepted
    the submission of the petitioner that plaintiffs are
    not debarred from claiming cost under Section 34 CPC,
    Section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 or Section
    3 of the Interest Act, 1978 or in equity only on the
    ground of principal amount. The High Court granted
    interest at the rate of 9% per annum. The Civil
    Appeal No. 8445 of 2016 has been filed against the
    review judgment but obviously the appeal is not
    against the 9% interest granted to the petitioner.
    Review judgment does not grant interest under Act,
    1993 since the High Court in the review judgment did
    not interfere with the earlier finding that
    petitioner is not entitled for benefit under Act,
  7. The review on the ground on which liberty was
    sought was in essence not accepted by the High Court
    in its review judgment. Moreover, in judgment dated
    23.01.2019, the maintainability of appeal having been
    considered and found against the petitioner, we do
    not find any ground to review the petition.
    33
  8. In result, Review Petition (C) Nos. 786-787 of
    2019, Review Petition (C) No. 789 of 2019 and Review
    Petition (C) No. 788 of 2019 are dismissed.

………………….J.
( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
………………….J.
( S. ABDUL NAZEER )
………………….J.
( NAVIN SINHA )
New Delhi,
December 18, 2019.
34