Non-ReportableIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCivil Appeal No. 1226 of 2020[Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 23701 of 2019]Mukesh Kumar & Anr.…. Appellant(s)VersusThe State of Uttarakhand & Ors.…. Respondent(s)WITHCivil Appeal No. 1227 of 2020[Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 22640 of 2019]Civil Appeal No. 1228 of 2020[Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 25508… Read More Controversy – to the reservations to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions in the posts of Assistant Engineer (Civil) in Public Works Department, Government of Uttarakhand. ? Apex court held that There is no fundamental right which inheres in an individual to claim reservation in promotions. No mandamus can be issued by the Court directing the State Government to provide reservations. – the High court order directing that all future vacancies that are to be filled up by promotion in the posts of Assistant Engineer, should only be from the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, is wholly unjustifiable and is hence set aside.- The submission made on behalf of the reserved category candidates that the judgment of this Court in Suresh Chand Gautam (supra) needs reconsideration is without substance in view of the findings recorded above. We are in agreement with the decision of this Court in Suresh Chand Gautam (supra) in which it was held that no mandamus can be issued by the Court to the State to collect quantifiable data relating to adequacy of representation of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in public services.
REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONSPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 21341 OF 2019INFINITY INFOTECH PARKS LIMITED …PETITIONER(S)VERSUSSHIVA JUTE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITEDTHROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE(AUTHORISED SIGNATORY) & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)O R D E RDeepak Gupta, J.This petition is directed against the order passed by theHigh Court of Calcutta dated 31.07.2019 in C.O. No.541 of 2019whereby it… Read More Whether the respondent no. 1 who is occupying the 16th floor of the building in question,has not paid a single rupee onaccount of lease rent, maintenance charges, electricity chargesand other charges and, therefore, the order directing restorationof electricity without requiring the tenantsub lessee to pay the requisite charges is totally without jurisdiction. ? In view of the aforesaid discussion we set aside the order of the Calcutta High Court and direct as under: I. We are of the view that respondent no. 1 must pay the following amounts for the restoration of electricity: i) Lease Rent of Rs.7,29,240 (for the period from 01.02.2012 to 02.12.2019). ii) Maintenance charges of Rs.2,11,20,000 (@ Rs.2,20,000 per month from 01.02.2012 to 31.01.2020). iii) Electricity charges of Rs.1,05,60,000 (@ Rs.1,10,000 per month from 01.02.2012 to 31.01.2020). II. Out of the total of Rs. 3,24,09,240 payable by respondent no.1, we direct it to pay Rs.1,00,00,000 within one month from today. Respondent no.1 shall pay the rest of the amount in three equal instalments of Rs.74,69,746, Rs.74,69,747, and Rs. Rs.74,69,747 to be paid on 15.03.2020, 15.04.2020 and 15.05.2020 respectively. III. In case the respondent no.1 pays the amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/ to the petitioner then within 3 days of this payment, the petitioner shall restore the electricity. IV. With respect to the lease rent, electricity charges, maintenance charges and other charges, the petitioner shall raise a bill on or before 10th day of each month. The first such bill shall be raised on 10th March, 2020 and the amount shall be paid by respondent no.1 latest by 20th March, 2020. Even in case of any dispute, it shall deposit a sum of Rs.3,50,000/ every month without prejudice to the rights of the parties. The dispute with regard to the remaining amount can be decided in accordance with law. V. The respondent no.1 through its Chief Executive (Authorised Signatory) shall file an affidavit undertaking to comply with the aforesaid direction within 2 weeks from today. VI. If any of these conditions are violated, the petitioner shall be entitled to disconnect the electricity.
REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 505-531 OF 2020(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 27922-27948 OF 2017)PARMESHWAR NANDA ETC. …..APPELLANT(S)VERSUSTHE STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH CHIEFSECRETARY & ORS. ETC. …..RESPONDENT(S)W I T HCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 532-542 OF 2020(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 32135-32145 OF 2017)CIVIL APPEAL NO. 543 OF 2020(ARISING OUT… Read More Whether the services rendered by the appellants under the Adult Education and Non-Formal Education Project1 cannot be counted under a Government scheme for the purpose of pensionary benefits after the appellants were appointed by the State.?
REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1042 OF 2020(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 20393 OF 2018)CANARA BANK …APPELLANT(S)VersusM/S UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTD. & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)WITHCIVIL APPEAL NO. 10431051 OF 2020(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2477424782 OF 2018CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10521059 OF 2020(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2595725964 OF 2018)CIVIL APPEAL NO.… Read More Fire Accident – Framers Produce was destroyed in cold storage – Insurance Claim – Whether the farmers are consumers under the Act ? ‘the farmers’, had grown Byadgi Chilli Crop during the year 20122013. Some of the farmers had some other crops. These farmers had stored their agricultural produce in a cold store run by a partnership firm under the name and style of Sreedevi Cold Storage, hereinafter referred to as ‘the cold store’. These farmers also obtained loans from Canara Bank, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Bank’. The loan was advanced by the Bank to each one of the farmers on security of the agricultural produce stored in the cold store. The cold store was insured with the United India Insurance Company Limited, hereinafter referred to as ‘the insurance company’. A fire took place in the cold store on the night intervening 13.01.2014 and 14.01.2014. The entire building of the cold store and the entire stock of agricultural produce was destroyed. -but the claim of the cold store was repudiated by the insurance company mainly on the ground that the fire was not an accidental fire – Since the claims of the farmers were either rejected or not answered, they filed claim petitions against the cold store, the Bank and the insurance company in which the primary relief claimed was the value of the agricultural produce as on the date of fire and interest thereupon and each of the farmers also claimed damages of Rs.1,00,000/ per head..- The insurance company resisted the complaint mainly on the ground that the ‘farmers’ were not consumers’ within the meaning of Consumer Protection Act, 1986,- apex court held the fire was an accidental fire and occurred due to a short circuit. These are pure findings of fact which, in our view, cannot be challenged in these proceedings. – The definition of consumer under the Act is very wide and it includes beneficiaries who can take benefit of the insurance availed by the insured. As far as the present case is concerned, under the tripartite agreement entered between the Bank, the cold store and the farmers, the stock of the farmers was hypothecated as security with the Bank and the Bank had insisted that the said stock should be insured with a view to safeguard its interest. We may refer to the penultimate clause of the tripartite agreement which reads as follows: “WHEREAS the Third Party has agreed to insure the produce/goods stored in the cold storage to indemnify the produce in case of any casualty or accident by any means to cover the risk and also to cover the loan amount to avoid loss at the cost of the Second Party till the release order or repayment of the loan amount.” The aforesaid clause in unambiguous terms binds the cold store to insure the goods, to indemnify the produce, to cover the risk and cover the loan amount. This insurance policy has to be taken at the cost of the second party which is the farmer. Therefore, there can be no manner of doubt that the farmer is a beneficiary under the policy. The farmer is, therefore, definitely a consumer and we uphold the orders of both the Commissions that the complaint under the Act is maintainable.
REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 735 OF 2020(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.15504 OF 2019)KAJAL …APPELLANT(S)VersusJAGDISH CHAND & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)J U D G M E N TDeepak Gupta, J. Kajal was a bright young girl. She used to attend school,play with her friends and lead a normal life… Read More Cout can grant compensation more than claimed when the claimant is a minor In view of the above, we award a sum of Rs.62,27,000/ to the claimant under the following heads : S.No Heads Amount (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation and transportation Rs. 2,50,000/ (ii) Loss of earnings (family members) Rs. 51,000/ (iii) Loss of future earnings Rs.14,66,000/ (iv) Attendant charges Rs.21,60,000/ (v) Pain, suffering, loss of amenities Rs.15,00,000/ (vi) Loss of Marriage prospects Rs. 3,00,000/ (vii) Future medical treatment Rs. 5,00,000/ This amount shall carry an interest @7.5% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition till payment/deposit of the amount. Obviously, the insurance company shall be entitled to adjust the amount already paid. Further, the insurance company shall also be entitled to recover the amount from the owner in terms of the award of the MACT, which has not been challenged either before the High Court or us. We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount claimed. However, it is well settled law that in motor accident claim petitions, the Court must award just compensation and, in case, the just compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the claimant is a minor.
NONREPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 237 OF 2020(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4592 of 2017)PREM CHAND SINGH ……….APPELLANT(s)VersusTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESHAND ANOTHER ……RESPONDENT(s)JUDGMENTNAVIN SINHA, J.Leave granted. The appellant has challenged the order dated 18.12.2015rejecting his application for discharge and the affirmation ofthe same on 31.05.2016 in Criminal Revision No. 70 of… Read More No Person could have been tried for the same offence twice at the behest of the the complainant who himself a complainant in both the FIRs. Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. provides as follows: “300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence. (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from 7 the one made against him might have been made under subSection (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under subSection (2) thereof.” 13. In view of the conclusion that the substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging any general power of attorney of the respondent, we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent prosecution of the appellant in FIR No. 114 of 2008 dated 09.10.2008 is completely unsustainable. In the result, the FIR dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside. The appeal is allowed.
(Non-Reportable)IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 8153 OF 2009M/s. S.K.J. Coke Industries Ltd.& Anr. ..….AppellantsVersusCoal India Ltd. & Ors. …..RespondentsJ U D G M E N TANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.The core dispute in this appeal involves the question as towhether the appellants were required to pay the price of coalconsumed in their… Read More whether the appellants were required to pay the price of coal consumed in their manufacturing process at a preferential rate, known in the trade parlance as “linked price”, or the price under a Liberalised Sales Scheme (LSS).
REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 8425 OF 2009C.S. VENKATESH … APPELLANTVERSUSA.S.C. MURTHY (D) BYLRS. & ORS. … RESPONDENTSJ U D G M E N TS. ABDUL NAZEER, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in RFA No.626 of2001 dated 21.08.2006 passed by the High Court of Karnataka… Read More The suit filed by the plaintiff was for specific performance of the agreement of reconveyance dated 23.04.1975. Alternatively, he had also sought for a declaration that the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 was null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. whether the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants is a nominal sale deed obtained as security for the loan advanced by the defendants.?The deed of re-conveyance, contains a clause for payment of interest on the consideration amount of Rs.35,000/-. However, the plaintiff has pleaded that there is no agreement to pay the interest. This shows that the plaintiff was not ready to perform his part of the obligation as per the agreement. Further, the plaintiff had mortgaged the property with the bank and the bank had obtained an award against the plaintiff. When the suit property was put up for auction, the defendants paid the entire amount to the bank which was payable by the plaintiff under this award. This aspect also indicates the conduct of the plaintiff.Taking an overall view of the matter, the trial court has rightly held that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The High Court, in our view, was not justified in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the trial court. In the result, this appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court in R.F.A. No.626 of 2001 dated 21.08.2006 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in O.S. No.3308 of 1988 dated 12.04.2001 is restored.
1REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO(S).10680-10683 OF 2011M/S HIGH RANGE COFFEE CURING PVT.LTD. APPELLANT(S)VERSUSTHE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.ETC. RESPONDENT(S)WITHCIVIL APPEAL NO.10684 OF 2011O R D E R Heard counsel for the parties. The opening ground urged by theappellant is that the High Court ought not tohave entertained the appeals on… Read More Corporate Laws :- Sales Tax -Sales Tax Holidays = whether the Government Order No.CI 30 SPC 96 dated 15th March, 1996, namely, the Industrial Policy merely provides for sales tax concession and incentives and nothing more.? The core issue raised in these appeals, in our opinion, is no more res integra. It has been answered in the decision of this Court in “Malnad Areca Processing and Marketing Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Assessment) and Others”, reported in (2008) 11 SCC 536. This very Industrial Policy, 1996 was considered by the Court. The Court opined that the same provides for exemption only in respect of sales tax and not for purchase tax as such. As observed in the case of Malnad (supra), the State can levy tax both at the sale point and/or at the purchase point. That distinction being clear, the question of assuming that the purchase tax was also part of the industrial policy under consideration cannot be countenanced. As a result, we find no reason to deviate from the view taken by the High Court in following the principle expounded in the decision of Malnad (supra).
NONREPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTIONWRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 59 OF 2019BRAHMA SINGH AND OTHERS …PETITIONER(S)VersusUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)J U D G M E N TDEEPAK GUPTA, J.The short issue involved in this case is whether the servicerendered by the petitioners in the Supreme Court Legal AidCommittee and Supreme Court Legal… Read More whether the service rendered by the petitioners in the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee and Supreme Court Legal Services Committee prior to the promulgation of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee Rules, 2000 is to be counted while calculating their qualifying service for determination of pension. ? The Union of India has raised a twofold submission. It is first submitted that the service of the petitioners rendered prior to 03.07.2000 cannot be taken into consideration while quantifying the qualifying service or determining their retiral benefits. It is secondly contended that this plea could have been taken in the earlier writ petition and, in fact, such a plea was raised but finally the Court did not grant this relief and, therefore, they cannot file the second petition. From the facts narrated above, it is apparent that the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee was created under administrative instructions of the Government. Thereafter, the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 came into force. The services of the officers and employees were governed by Rule 3A and after 2000, they are governed by the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee Regulations, 2000. They have been rendering service uninterruptedly as employees of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee and no distinction can be made between the service prior to 03.07.2000 and the service rendered thereafter. The petitioners have been regular employees of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee and their entire service must be counted for determining their pension and other retiral benefits. This entire service is to be treated as their qualifying service in accordance with the Rules. As far as the second submission made on behalf of the Union of India is concerned, we have carefully gone through the earlier order and the writ petition. Though it is correct that in the writ petition there was a general claim to grant all the benefits under Rule 6 which would include retiral benefits but it appears that the Court did not go into the same. There is no rejection of the plea and as such we are of the considered view that this petition is maintainable and cannot be rejected on this hypertechnical ground. In relation to applicability of Order II Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 this Court has held in Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others1 as follows: 1 AIR 1962 SC 1334 7 “12. …The bar of O.2 R. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code on which the High Court apparently relied may not apply to a petition for a high prerogative writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution, but the High Court having disallowed the claim of the appellant for salary prior to the date of the suit, we do not think that we would be justified in interfering with the exercise of its discretion by the High Court.” Placing reliance on the case of Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma (supra), this Court in Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat2 in relation to Order II Rule 2 held as follows: “23. …By its very language, these provisions do not apply to the contents of a writ petition and consequently do not apply to the contents of a subsequent suit…” In view of the above, we allow the petition and direct that the entire service rendered by the petitioners in the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee and the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee shall be treated as qualifying service for the purpose of pension and shall be taken into consideration for calculating their retiral benefits. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.