No Person could have been tried for the same offence twice at the behest of the the complainant who himself a complainant in both the FIRs. Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. provides as follows: “300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence. (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from 7 the one made against him might have been made under sub­Section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub­Section (2) thereof.” 13. In view of the conclusion that the substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging any general power of attorney of the respondent, we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent prosecution of the appellant in FIR No. 114 of 2008 dated 09.10.2008 is completely unsustainable. In the result, the FIR dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside. The appeal is allowed.

NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 237 OF 2020
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4592 of 2017)
PREM CHAND SINGH ……….APPELLANT(s)
Versus
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND ANOTHER ……RESPONDENT(s)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
Leave granted.

  1. The appellant has challenged the order dated 18.12.2015
    rejecting his application for discharge and the affirmation of
    the same on 31.05.2016 in Criminal Revision No. 70 of 2016
    by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Gonda (U.P.).
    1
  2. The respondent no.2 is stated to have given a general
    power of attorney to the appellant on 02.05.1985 and on the
    basis of which the appellant sold certain lands belonging to
    the respondent. The respondent lodged FIR No. 160 of 1989
    on 14.09.1989 that he had never executed any general power
    of attorney in favour of the appellant and that the appellant
    has forged general power of attorney to sell his lands illegally.
    The appellant was acquitted in the trial as the charge could
    not be established. Though no records are available, the
    acquittal is not disputed by counsel for respondent. The
    respondent then filed Civil Suit No. 353 of 2007 to cancel the
    general power of attorney. On 09.10.2008, the respondent
    filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the
    court which was forwarded to the police leading to registration
    of FIR No. 114 of 2008 on 09.10.2008 alleging that the
    appellant had forged general power of attorney and on the
    basis of the same had sold certain lands of the respondent.
    2
    That earlier also the appellant had sold lands of the
    respondent in like manner.
  3. The appellant filed an application for discharge referring
    to his acquittal dated 07.08.1998 under Section 419 or 420
    Cr.P.C. pleading that he could not be tried for the same
    offence twice and that the FIR was based on concealment of
    facts with regard to the earlier acquittal. The Judicial
    Magistrate Class II Gonda rejected the discharge application
    simplicitor on the ground that the order of acquittal dated
    07.08.1998 had not been brought on record. Revision against
    the same was dismissed holding that the grounds urged on
    behalf of the appellant can more appropriately be urged at the
    time of framing of the charges.
  4. Mr. Pradeep Kant, learned senior counsel appearing for
    the appellant, submitted that the order of acquittal dated
    07.08.1998 and the subsequent institution of Civil Suit
    No.353 of 2007 for the cancellation of the general power of
    attorney executed by the respondent is not in dispute. The
    3
    subsequent FIR on 09.10.2008 itself refers to the general
    power of attorney which was the subject matter of FIR No. 160
    of 1989 but conceals the order of acquittal of the appellant. It
    is submitted that in the facts of the case, the institution of the
    FIR on 09.10.2008 long years after execution of general power
    of attorney dated 02.05.1985 is, therefore, a complete abuse of
    the process of law and the proceedings are fit to be quashed.
    Referring to Section 300 Cr.P.C. it is submitted that the
    appellant could not have been tried for the same offence twice
    at the behest of the respondent who is the complainant
    himself in both the FIRs.
  5. Mr. Amit Yadav, learned Counsel for the respondentcomplainant, submits that the High Court has declined
    interference since the ingredients of the two FIRs were
    different. While the FIR No. 160 of 1989 was under Section
    419 or 420 IPC the second FIR was under Sections 467, 468
    and 471 also. Furthermore, the second FIR contains
    allegations that the appellant put up an imposter in place of
    4
    the respondent before the registration authorities and
    collusively executed sale deed in respect of his lands along
    with Sushil Kumar Singh and Arvind in pursuance of a
    general power of attorney which respondent had never
    executed. The discharge application was, therefore, rightly
    rejected and interference declined in revision.
  6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
  7. The FIR No. 160 of 1989 alleges that the respondent on
    account of his job invariably stayed outside. The appellant
    had created a forged general power of attorney from the
    respondent in his name with regard to his lands bearing Gata
    no. 77/0.87 decimal and sold it on the basis of the forged
    general power of attorney which the respondent became aware
    of on 25.07.1989. The respondent denied having ever
    executed any general power of attorney in favour of the
    appellant. The respondent does not dispute that the appellant
    was acquitted of the charge by judgment dated 07.08.1998.
    5
    The fact that the judgement may not have been made available
    is therefore inconsequential.
  8. The institution of Civil Suit No. 353 of 2007 by the
    respondent for cancellation of the general power of attorney,
    after the acquittal of the appellant, is nothing but an
    acknowledgment of the genuineness of the general power of
    attorney executed by the respondents which he now wished to
    revoke.
  9. The respondent then filed an application under Section
    156(3) Cr.P.C. which was forwarded by the Magistrate to the
    police leading to registration of FIR dated 09.10.2008. The
    allegations are similar that the appellant put up an imposter
    in place of the respondent and along with one Sushil Kumar
    Singh and Arvind on the basis of a general power of attorney,
    which the respondent had never executed, sold his lands. The
    FIR itself recites that earlier also the appellant had sold the
    lands of the respondent on the basis of same general power of
    6
    attorney, but conceals the order of acquittal dated 07.08.1998,
    and also the institution of Civil Suit No. 353 of 2007 for
    annulment of the same.
  10. It is, therefore, apparent that the subject matter of both
    the FIRs is the same general power of attorney dated
    02.05.1985 and the sales made by the appellant in pursuance
    of the same. If the substratum of the two FIRs are common,
    the mere addition of Sections 467, 468 and 471 in the
    subsequent FIR cannot be considered as different ingredients
    to justify the latter FIR as being based on different materials,
    allegations and grounds.
  11. Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. provides as follows:
    “300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be
    tried for same offence.
    (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of
    competent jurisdiction for an offence and
    convicted or acquitted of such offence shall,
    while such conviction or acquittal remains in
    force, not be liable to be tried again for the
    same offence, nor on the same facts for any
    other offence for which a different charge from
    7
    the one made against him might have been
    made under sub­Section (1) of Section 221, or
    for which he might have been convicted under
    sub­Section (2) thereof.”
  12. In view of the conclusion that the substratum of the two
    FIRs are the same and that the appellant has already stood
    acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging
    any general power of attorney of the respondent, we are of the
    considered opinion that the subsequent prosecution of the
    appellant in FIR No. 114 of 2008 dated 09.10.2008 is
    completely unsustainable. In the result, the FIR dated
    09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the
    impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside. The appeal is
    allowed.
    ……….………………………..J.
    (Navin Sinha)
    ………………………………….J.
    (Krishna Murari)
    New Delhi,
    February 07, 2020
    8