whether the respondent­ who is allegedly a trustee in the Sumandeep Charitable Trust which established and sponsors the said University (‘Deemed to be University’) is a ‘public servant’ covered under Section 2(c) of the PC Act, can be broken up into two parts: first, whether the 7 8 ‘Deemed University’ is covered under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and secondly, whether the ‘respondent­trustee’ can be termed as ‘public servant’ under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act? ii. Whether the accused­respondent can be discharged under Section 227 of CrPC?

1IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL No.989 OF 2018State of Gujarat …APPELLANTVersusMansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah …RESPONDENTJUDGMENTN. V. RAMANA Corruption is the malignant manifestation of a malady menacingthe morality of men. There is a common perception thatcorruption in India has spread to all corners of public life and iscurrently choking the constitutional aspirations enshrined… Read More whether the respondent­ who is allegedly a trustee in the Sumandeep Charitable Trust which established and sponsors the said University (‘Deemed to be University’) is a ‘public servant’ covered under Section 2(c) of the PC Act, can be broken up into two parts: first, whether the 7 8 ‘Deemed University’ is covered under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and secondly, whether the ‘respondent­trustee’ can be termed as ‘public servant’ under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act? ii. Whether the accused­respondent can be discharged under Section 227 of CrPC?

whether as a condition of giving the benefit of Section 6(2) of the said Act, the tax authorities can impose a limit or timeframe within which delivery of the respective goods has to be taken from a carrier when the goods are delivered to a carrier for transmission in course of inter-state sale?

1REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2217 OF 2011COMMERCIAL TAXES OFFICER …APPELLANTVERSUSM/S. BOMBAY MACHINERY STORE …RESPONDENTWITHCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2220 OF 2011CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10000 OF 2017CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10001 OF 2017J U D G M E N TANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.All these four appeals are being dealt with by this judgmentas they… Read More whether as a condition of giving the benefit of Section 6(2) of the said Act, the tax authorities can impose a limit or timeframe within which delivery of the respective goods has to be taken from a carrier when the goods are delivered to a carrier for transmission in course of inter-state sale?

whether any relief can be granted to the appellant in this appeal. – provided temporary accomadation over the disputed property till she established her title over it and subject to the result of the suit in the family court or suitable forum as the respondent No.8 her husband accepted for accomdation of her. whether any relief can be granted to the appellant in this appeal. – provided temporary accomadation over the disputed property till she established her title over it and subject to the result of the suit in the family court or suitable forum as the respondent No.8 her husband accepted for accomdation of her. The Bombay High Court has in substance non-suited her on the ground that the Writ Court was not the appropriate forum for granting her relief. We do not per se find any error in such approach. But, in course of this appeal, the husband (respondent no. 8) has filed an affidavit stating that he has set apart the Flat No. 101 in which the appellant could be accommodated. The appellant on the other hand has asserted that the allocation of the same flat was earmarked for one Mr. Nayak Satam, a tenant, as per the plan Considering the fact that the dispute is pending for a very long time, we shall be giving certain directions in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which we hope will conclude the dispute. We shall do so having regard to the fact that the builder and the husband of the appellant have uniformly stated that Flat No. 101 in Om Apartment is available to accommodate the appellant. For this reason, in our opinion, the appellant should be given the choice 19 of occupying that flat as her residence. For this purpose, however, certain cautionary measures are also necessary to ensure that the said flat is not otherwise parted with or encumbered in any form:- (a) The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shall disclose to the appellant in writing as to whether the Flat no. 101 of “Om Apartment” standing on Plot No.118, Dr. M.B. Raut Road, Shivaji Park, Dadar having 379 sq.ft. carpet area is free for allocation to the respondent no. 8 or not. This disclosure shall be made to the appellant within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. (b) Within one month from the date such disclosure is communicated to the appellant in writing, the appellant shall take a decision as to whether she will accept the offer to be accommodated in said flat no. 101. The appellant shall inform the respondent no. 1, 2, 7 and 8 her decision in writing within the aforesaid timeframe of one month. (c) The husband, that is the respondent no. 8, shall also give an undertaking in the form of 20 an affidavit affirmed before a Judicial Magistrate of First Class stating therein in clear terms the nature of right he exercises over that flat along with copies of documents to establish such right. That affidavit shall also contain an unequivocal undertaking that he would not in any way disturb possession of the appellant in the said flat. The affidavit shall also disclose that the respondent no. 8 has not created any form of encumbrance over the said flat. Such affidavit shall be given within a period of one month from the date the appellant communicates in writing her willingness to be accommodated in flat no. 101. (d) If there is no bar in allocating the said flat to the appellant on the basis of re-development plan or any other instrument supplemental or ancillary thereto, and the appellant accepts the offer of being accommodated in the said flat bearing no.101, then the appellant shall vacate her present accommodation and settle in that flat bearing no.101 in Om Apartment within a further period of four months. This would be subject to the respondent no.8 21 giving undertaking in the form of affidavit as directed in the preceding sub-paragraph. 14. In the event, however, the appellant wants to establish her right to reside in her matrimonial home with her husband, she shall be at liberty to approach the Family Court or any other forum of competent jurisdiction, as she may be advised. But in such a situation, she would not be entitled to claim any right specifically in respect of Flat No.101 at Om Apartment on the basis of directions issued by us in the preceding paragraph including the four sub-paragraphs thereof. 15. The appellant shall vacate her existing accommodation for which expenses appears to have been and continues to be incurred by the Respondent No. 8. The fact of incurring such expense has been pleaded in the additional affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent No. 8, verified on 29th August 2019. We give appellant eight months’ time to vacate her present residence at A/20, Bal Govinddas Society, Manorama Nagarkar Marg, Mahim Mumbai. In the event she chooses to opt for Flat No. 101 in “Om Apartment” as her residence, and the other conditions specified in paragraph 13 and its various sub- 22 paragraphs are satisfied, then she shall vacate her present premises from the date she takes possession of the flat at “Om Apartment”. Respondent No.8 shall give her possession of the said premises on a date mutually convenient to the appellant and the Respondent No.8 within the aforesaid period of eight months. 16. Otherwise, the course to be taken by her shall be guided by the direction that may be given by a Court of competent jurisdiction, which the appellant may approach. Till the time the appellant retains possession of the present residential accommodation, which period shall not exceed eight months, the respondent no.8 shall continue to pay rent thereof and her possession thereof shall not be disturbed. The obligation of the respondent no.8 to pay rent and ensure peaceful possession of the present residential unit of the appellant shall not exceed the eight months period, as stipulated by us. Unless of course, a Court of competent jurisdiction issues any other direction at the instance of the appellant

1REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 7231 OF 2012AISHWARYA ATUL PUSALKAR …APPELLANTVERSUSMAHARASHTRA HOUSING & AREADEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. …RESPONDENTSJ U D G M E N TANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.The original writ petitioner, who is the appellant in thisproceeding seeks to enforce her right to reside in her matrimonial home.The location of the… Read More whether any relief can be granted to the appellant in this appeal. – provided temporary accomadation over the disputed property till she established her title over it and subject to the result of the suit in the family court or suitable forum as the respondent No.8 her husband accepted for accomdation of her. whether any relief can be granted to the appellant in this appeal. – provided temporary accomadation over the disputed property till she established her title over it and subject to the result of the suit in the family court or suitable forum as the respondent No.8 her husband accepted for accomdation of her. The Bombay High Court has in substance non-suited her on the ground that the Writ Court was not the appropriate forum for granting her relief. We do not per se find any error in such approach. But, in course of this appeal, the husband (respondent no. 8) has filed an affidavit stating that he has set apart the Flat No. 101 in which the appellant could be accommodated. The appellant on the other hand has asserted that the allocation of the same flat was earmarked for one Mr. Nayak Satam, a tenant, as per the plan Considering the fact that the dispute is pending for a very long time, we shall be giving certain directions in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which we hope will conclude the dispute. We shall do so having regard to the fact that the builder and the husband of the appellant have uniformly stated that Flat No. 101 in Om Apartment is available to accommodate the appellant. For this reason, in our opinion, the appellant should be given the choice 19 of occupying that flat as her residence. For this purpose, however, certain cautionary measures are also necessary to ensure that the said flat is not otherwise parted with or encumbered in any form:- (a) The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shall disclose to the appellant in writing as to whether the Flat no. 101 of “Om Apartment” standing on Plot No.118, Dr. M.B. Raut Road, Shivaji Park, Dadar having 379 sq.ft. carpet area is free for allocation to the respondent no. 8 or not. This disclosure shall be made to the appellant within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. (b) Within one month from the date such disclosure is communicated to the appellant in writing, the appellant shall take a decision as to whether she will accept the offer to be accommodated in said flat no. 101. The appellant shall inform the respondent no. 1, 2, 7 and 8 her decision in writing within the aforesaid timeframe of one month. (c) The husband, that is the respondent no. 8, shall also give an undertaking in the form of 20 an affidavit affirmed before a Judicial Magistrate of First Class stating therein in clear terms the nature of right he exercises over that flat along with copies of documents to establish such right. That affidavit shall also contain an unequivocal undertaking that he would not in any way disturb possession of the appellant in the said flat. The affidavit shall also disclose that the respondent no. 8 has not created any form of encumbrance over the said flat. Such affidavit shall be given within a period of one month from the date the appellant communicates in writing her willingness to be accommodated in flat no. 101. (d) If there is no bar in allocating the said flat to the appellant on the basis of re-development plan or any other instrument supplemental or ancillary thereto, and the appellant accepts the offer of being accommodated in the said flat bearing no.101, then the appellant shall vacate her present accommodation and settle in that flat bearing no.101 in Om Apartment within a further period of four months. This would be subject to the respondent no.8 21 giving undertaking in the form of affidavit as directed in the preceding sub-paragraph. 14. In the event, however, the appellant wants to establish her right to reside in her matrimonial home with her husband, she shall be at liberty to approach the Family Court or any other forum of competent jurisdiction, as she may be advised. But in such a situation, she would not be entitled to claim any right specifically in respect of Flat No.101 at Om Apartment on the basis of directions issued by us in the preceding paragraph including the four sub-paragraphs thereof. 15. The appellant shall vacate her existing accommodation for which expenses appears to have been and continues to be incurred by the Respondent No. 8. The fact of incurring such expense has been pleaded in the additional affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent No. 8, verified on 29th August 2019. We give appellant eight months’ time to vacate her present residence at A/20, Bal Govinddas Society, Manorama Nagarkar Marg, Mahim Mumbai. In the event she chooses to opt for Flat No. 101 in “Om Apartment” as her residence, and the other conditions specified in paragraph 13 and its various sub- 22 paragraphs are satisfied, then she shall vacate her present premises from the date she takes possession of the flat at “Om Apartment”. Respondent No.8 shall give her possession of the said premises on a date mutually convenient to the appellant and the Respondent No.8 within the aforesaid period of eight months. 16. Otherwise, the course to be taken by her shall be guided by the direction that may be given by a Court of competent jurisdiction, which the appellant may approach. Till the time the appellant retains possession of the present residential accommodation, which period shall not exceed eight months, the respondent no.8 shall continue to pay rent thereof and her possession thereof shall not be disturbed. The obligation of the respondent no.8 to pay rent and ensure peaceful possession of the present residential unit of the appellant shall not exceed the eight months period, as stipulated by us. Unless of course, a Court of competent jurisdiction issues any other direction at the instance of the appellant

Suit for declaration and injunction on the basis of a Will dated 20.05.1991 executed by the owner of the said properties Sri Sangappa son of Pampanna Shettar of Koppal; and that a trust created by the defendants on 28.05.1994, in the name “Shri Sangappa Pampanna Gadagshettar Trust, Koppal” in relation to the suit properties, was illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiffs. The contesting defendants i.e., defendant Nos. 1 to 5 refuted the claim so made by the plaintiffs while questioning the genuineness of the alleged Will dated 20.05.1991. The defendant No. 7, one of the erstwhile trustees of the said trust, however, admitted and endorsed the claim of the plaintiffs. – Trail court decreed the suit – High court dismissed the suit as the will is not proved – Apex court confirmed the same . Will – Suspecious Circumstances – Appreciation of Evidence. VVIP

REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 6076 OF 2009SHIVAKUMAR & ORS. ……… Appellant(s)VersusSHARANABASAPPA & ORS. ………Respondent(s)J U D G E M E N TDinesh Maheshwari, J.PRELIMINARY AND BRIEF OUTLINE By way of this appeal, the plaintiff-appellants have challenged thejudgment and decree dated 26.10.2007 passed by the High Court ofKarnataka at Bangalore… Read More Suit for declaration and injunction on the basis of a Will dated 20.05.1991 executed by the owner of the said properties Sri Sangappa son of Pampanna Shettar of Koppal; and that a trust created by the defendants on 28.05.1994, in the name “Shri Sangappa Pampanna Gadagshettar Trust, Koppal” in relation to the suit properties, was illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiffs. The contesting defendants i.e., defendant Nos. 1 to 5 refuted the claim so made by the plaintiffs while questioning the genuineness of the alleged Will dated 20.05.1991. The defendant No. 7, one of the erstwhile trustees of the said trust, however, admitted and endorsed the claim of the plaintiffs. – Trail court decreed the suit – High court dismissed the suit as the will is not proved – Apex court confirmed the same . Will – Suspecious Circumstances – Appreciation of Evidence. VVIP

It is fairly well settled that in an approved layout, the open spaces which are left, are to be continued in that manner alone and no construction can be permitted in such open spaces. The Development Plan which was submitted in the year 1999, as per the 1991 DCR, will not divest the utility of certain plots which are reserved for open spaces in the approved layout. The appellants cannot plead that such a layout was only temporary and as a stop gap arrangement, the said two plots were shown as open spaces/garden and now they be permitted to use for construction. 2020 [4] advocatemmmohan apex court cases 10

C.A. Nos.6216-6217 of 20191REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NOS.6216-6217 OF 2019Anjuman E Shiate Ali & Anr. …AppellantsvsGulmohar Area Societies WelfareGroup & Ors. etc. …RespondentsJ U D G M E N TR.SUBHASH REDDY,J. Both these civil appeals arise out of a commonjudgment dated 19.07.2017, passed by the High Court ofJudicature at… Read More It is fairly well settled that in an approved layout, the open spaces which are left, are to be continued in that manner alone and no construction can be permitted in such open spaces. The Development Plan which was submitted in the year 1999, as per the 1991 DCR, will not divest the utility of certain plots which are reserved for open spaces in the approved layout. The appellants cannot plead that such a layout was only temporary and as a stop gap arrangement, the said two plots were shown as open spaces/garden and now they be permitted to use for construction. 2020 [4] advocatemmmohan apex court cases 10

whether the husband of the respondent had acquired an indefeasible right to seek for voluntary retirement from service ? and in that light whether the High Court was justified in arriving at the conclusion that the subsequent resignation dated 03.05.2006 submitted by the husband of the respondent be considered as an application for voluntary retirement and treat the cessation of the jural relationship of employer/employee under the provision for Voluntary Retirement. Apex court held that when the application for voluntary retirement was filed on 28.07.2005 and had not been favourably considered by the employer, instead of submitting the resignation on 03.05.2006, if any legal right was available the appropriate course ought to have been to seek for acceptance of the application by initiating appropriate legal proceedings. Instead the respondent’s husband had yielded to the position of nonacceptance of the application for voluntary retirement and has thereafter submitted his resignation. The acceptance of the resignation was acted upon by receiving the terminal benefits. If that be the position, when the writ petition was filed belatedly in the year 2012 and that too after the death of the employee who had not raised any grievance during his life time, consideration of the prayer made by the respondent wasnot justified. The High Court has, therefore, committedan error in passing the concurrent orders. 2020[4]Advocatemmmohan Apex Court Cases 9

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2236 OF 2020(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.5650 of 2019)Rajasthan State Road Transport .… Appellant(s)Corporation Ltd. & Ors.VersusSmt. Mohani Devi & Anr. …. Respondent(s)J U D G M E N TA.S. Bopanna,J. The respondent herein was the Petitioner in S.BCivil Writ Petition No. 2839/2012 filed… Read More whether the husband of the respondent had acquired an indefeasible right to seek for voluntary retirement from service ? and in that light whether the High Court was justified in arriving at the conclusion that the subsequent resignation dated 03.05.2006 submitted by the husband of the respondent be considered as an application for voluntary retirement and treat the cessation of the jural relationship of employer/employee under the provision for Voluntary Retirement. Apex court held that when the application for voluntary retirement was filed on 28.07.2005 and had not been favourably considered by the employer, instead of submitting the resignation on 03.05.2006, if any legal right was available the appropriate course ought to have been to seek for acceptance of the application by initiating appropriate legal proceedings. Instead the respondent’s husband had yielded to the position of nonacceptance of the application for voluntary retirement and has thereafter submitted his resignation. The acceptance of the resignation was acted upon by receiving the terminal benefits. If that be the position, when the writ petition was filed belatedly in the year 2012 and that too after the death of the employee who had not raised any grievance during his life time, consideration of the prayer made by the respondent wasnot justified. The High Court has, therefore, committedan error in passing the concurrent orders. 2020[4]Advocatemmmohan Apex Court Cases 9

Application of law – Misapplication of Law -Non Application of Law – High court misapplied the law to the set of facts and as such liable to be set aside. Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511 Apex court held that in cases where there has been a long period of continuous separation and the marriage becomes a fiction it would be appropriate to dissolve such marriage. On the position of law enunciated it would not be necessary to advert indetail inasmuch as the decision to dissolve the marriageapart from the grounds available, will have to be taken oncase to case basis and there cannot be a strait jacket formula. This Court can in any event exercise the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in appropriate cases. However, in the instant facts, having given our thoughtful consideration to that aspect we notice that the parties hail from a conservative background where divorce is considered a taboo and further they have a female child born on 03.01.2007 who is presently aged about 13 years. In a matter where the differences between the parties are not of such magnitude and is in the nature of the usual wear andtear of marital life, the future of the child and her marital prospects are also to be kept in view, and in such circumstance the dissolution of marriage merely becausethey have been litigating and they have been residingseparately for quite some time would not be justified inthe present facts, more particularly when the restitution of conjugal rights was also considered simultaneously. In that view, having arrived at the conclusion that the very nature of the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court is not justified and the conclusion reached is also not sustainable, the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside 2020 [3]advocatemmmohan apex court cases 16

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1912­1913 OF 2020(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) Nos.2704­2705 of 2019)Mangayakarasi .…Appellant(s)VersusM. Yuvaraj …. Respondent(s)J U D G M E N TA.S. Bopanna,J. The appellant is before this Court assailing thejudgment dated 20.07.2018 passed by the High Court ofJudicature at Madras in CMSA Nos.23 & 24… Read More Application of law – Misapplication of Law -Non Application of Law – High court misapplied the law to the set of facts and as such liable to be set aside. Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511 Apex court held that in cases where there has been a long period of continuous separation and the marriage becomes a fiction it would be appropriate to dissolve such marriage. On the position of law enunciated it would not be necessary to advert indetail inasmuch as the decision to dissolve the marriageapart from the grounds available, will have to be taken oncase to case basis and there cannot be a strait jacket formula. This Court can in any event exercise the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in appropriate cases. However, in the instant facts, having given our thoughtful consideration to that aspect we notice that the parties hail from a conservative background where divorce is considered a taboo and further they have a female child born on 03.01.2007 who is presently aged about 13 years. In a matter where the differences between the parties are not of such magnitude and is in the nature of the usual wear andtear of marital life, the future of the child and her marital prospects are also to be kept in view, and in such circumstance the dissolution of marriage merely becausethey have been litigating and they have been residingseparately for quite some time would not be justified inthe present facts, more particularly when the restitution of conjugal rights was also considered simultaneously. In that view, having arrived at the conclusion that the very nature of the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court is not justified and the conclusion reached is also not sustainable, the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside 2020 [3]advocatemmmohan apex court cases 16

whether the appellant working as Assistant Director in CACEE was entitled to continue till 60 years of age which was the age of retirement of Teacher of the Kerala University or he was to retire at the age of 56 years.? S. Ramamohana Rao vs. A.P. Agricultural University and another, 1997 (8) SCC 350. In the above case the appellant was working as a Director of Physical Director in the Bapatla Agricultural College. The appellant was initially appointed as Physical Director in Agricultural College which was a Government College which College stood transferred to the Andhra Pradesh University, when it was formed, the services of the appellant stood transferred to the Agricultural University and he continued to work as Director in the said University. This Court noted the definition of Teacher in the University Statutes and came to the conclusion that Physical Director is also Teacher within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University Act, 1963. The said judgment has no bearing in the present case since admittedly the appellant in the said case was working in the University as Director of Physical Education. 37. We may also notice one of the letters dated 31.10.2014 brought on record as Annexure-P-17 to the petition which is a communication by the Government of Kerala according sanction for merging the Centre for Adult, Continuing Education & Extension which is to the following effect: “ORDER Sanction is accorded for merging the Centre for Adult, Continuing Education & Extension (CACEE) which is functioning as Self Financing Centre under the University of Kerala, with Institute of Distance Education so that the department can function in dual mode as Institute of Distance and Adult Continuing Education. (By order of the Governor) Dr. K.M. ABRAHAM Additional Chief Secretary.” 38. As per the Government letter Centre has been merged with Institute of Distance Education, what are the consequences of merger of Centre with Institute of Distance Education have neither been explained by the appellant nor there are any material to come to the conclusion that by such merger the Centre shall become Centre maintained by the University. The above letter of the Government also supports our conclusion that Centre is not maintained by the University and it is Self-Financing Centre. The said letter also in no manner supports the case of the appellant as the claim of the appellant as raised in this appeal. 39. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeal which is dismissed accordingly.

1REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO.1641 of 2020(arising out of SLP(C)No.26880 of 2016)P. GOPINATHAN PILLAI …APPELLANT(S)VERSUSUNIVERSITY OF KERALA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)J U D G M E N TASHOK BHUSHAN, J.This appeal has been filed by the appellant forquashing the judgment of Kerala High Court dated08.07.2016 by which Writ Petition (C)No.12179 of… Read More whether the appellant working as Assistant Director in CACEE was entitled to continue till 60 years of age which was the age of retirement of Teacher of the Kerala University or he was to retire at the age of 56 years.? S. Ramamohana Rao vs. A.P. Agricultural University and another, 1997 (8) SCC 350. In the above case the appellant was working as a Director of Physical Director in the Bapatla Agricultural College. The appellant was initially appointed as Physical Director in Agricultural College which was a Government College which College stood transferred to the Andhra Pradesh University, when it was formed, the services of the appellant stood transferred to the Agricultural University and he continued to work as Director in the said University. This Court noted the definition of Teacher in the University Statutes and came to the conclusion that Physical Director is also Teacher within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University Act, 1963. The said judgment has no bearing in the present case since admittedly the appellant in the said case was working in the University as Director of Physical Education. 37. We may also notice one of the letters dated 31.10.2014 brought on record as Annexure-P-17 to the petition which is a communication by the Government of Kerala according sanction for merging the Centre for Adult, Continuing Education & Extension which is to the following effect: “ORDER Sanction is accorded for merging the Centre for Adult, Continuing Education & Extension (CACEE) which is functioning as Self Financing Centre under the University of Kerala, with Institute of Distance Education so that the department can function in dual mode as Institute of Distance and Adult Continuing Education. (By order of the Governor) Dr. K.M. ABRAHAM Additional Chief Secretary.” 38. As per the Government letter Centre has been merged with Institute of Distance Education, what are the consequences of merger of Centre with Institute of Distance Education have neither been explained by the appellant nor there are any material to come to the conclusion that by such merger the Centre shall become Centre maintained by the University. The above letter of the Government also supports our conclusion that Centre is not maintained by the University and it is Self-Financing Centre. The said letter also in no manner supports the case of the appellant as the claim of the appellant as raised in this appeal. 39. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeal which is dismissed accordingly.

Selection dated 10.04.2010 selecting appellants on the post of Physical Training Instructor (PTI) was set aside ! – Apex court considered the equities and modified the orders When the continuance of a person on a post is by virtue of an interim order, the continuance is always subject to outcome of the litigation. The displacement of appellants from their posts is inevitable consequence of upholding of the judgment of the High Court. A Constitution Bench of this Court in C. Channabasavaih Etc. Etc. Vs. State of Mysore and Others, AIR 1965 SC 1293 has made following observations in paragraph 9 in such a situation, which is beneficial to record, is as follows:- “9. It is very unfortunate that these persons should be uprooted after they had been appointed but if equality and equal protection before the law have any meaning and if our public institutions are to inspire that confidence which is expected of them we would be failing in our duty if we did not, even at the cost of considerable inconvenience to Government and the selected candidates do the right thing…………………………” 75. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions, we dispose of these appeals with the following directions: (i) The Commission shall conclude the entire selection process initiated by the advertisement No.6 of 2006 as per criterion notified on 28.12.2006 i.e. holding objective type written test of 200 marks and viva voce of 25 marks. All the applicants who had submitted applications in response to the above advertisement including those who were selected shall be permitted to participate in the fresh selection as directed. (ii) The candidates who have been selected and have worked on the post of PTI shall not be asked to refund any of the salary and other benefits received by them as against their working on the posts. No refund shall also be asked from those candidates who after their selection worked and retired from service. (iii) The entire process be completed by the Commission within a period of five months from the date Commission starts working after the present lockdown is over, which was the time fixed by the learned Single Judge for completing the process. (iv) The costs imposed by the Division Bench in paragraph 54 of the judgment of the High Court are deleted except the costs imposed on the Commission. 76. We, thus, while upholding the judgments of the High Court, subject to the modifications as above, dispose of these appeals.

1REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO.2103 OF 2020(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35373 of 2013)RAMJIT SINGH KARDAM & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)VERSUSSANJEEV KUMAR & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)WITHCivil Appeal No.2104 of 2020[@ SLP(C)No.35471/2013],Civil Appeal No.2105 of 2020[@ SLP(C)No.35466/2013],Civil Appeal No.2107 of 2020[@ SLP(C)No.35857/2013],Civil Appeal No.2106 of 2020[@SLP(C)No.35811/2013],Civil Appeal No.2108 of 2020[@ SLP(C)No.39466/2013],Civil Appeal Nos.2164-2166 of… Read More Selection dated 10.04.2010 selecting appellants on the post of Physical Training Instructor (PTI) was set aside ! – Apex court considered the equities and modified the orders When the continuance of a person on a post is by virtue of an interim order, the continuance is always subject to outcome of the litigation. The displacement of appellants from their posts is inevitable consequence of upholding of the judgment of the High Court. A Constitution Bench of this Court in C. Channabasavaih Etc. Etc. Vs. State of Mysore and Others, AIR 1965 SC 1293 has made following observations in paragraph 9 in such a situation, which is beneficial to record, is as follows:- “9. It is very unfortunate that these persons should be uprooted after they had been appointed but if equality and equal protection before the law have any meaning and if our public institutions are to inspire that confidence which is expected of them we would be failing in our duty if we did not, even at the cost of considerable inconvenience to Government and the selected candidates do the right thing…………………………” 75. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions, we dispose of these appeals with the following directions: (i) The Commission shall conclude the entire selection process initiated by the advertisement No.6 of 2006 as per criterion notified on 28.12.2006 i.e. holding objective type written test of 200 marks and viva voce of 25 marks. All the applicants who had submitted applications in response to the above advertisement including those who were selected shall be permitted to participate in the fresh selection as directed. (ii) The candidates who have been selected and have worked on the post of PTI shall not be asked to refund any of the salary and other benefits received by them as against their working on the posts. No refund shall also be asked from those candidates who after their selection worked and retired from service. (iii) The entire process be completed by the Commission within a period of five months from the date Commission starts working after the present lockdown is over, which was the time fixed by the learned Single Judge for completing the process. (iv) The costs imposed by the Division Bench in paragraph 54 of the judgment of the High Court are deleted except the costs imposed on the Commission. 76. We, thus, while upholding the judgments of the High Court, subject to the modifications as above, dispose of these appeals.