whether any relief can be granted to the appellant in this appeal. – provided temporary accomadation over the disputed property till she established her title over it and subject to the result of the suit in the family court or suitable forum as the respondent No.8 her husband accepted for accomdation of her. whether any relief can be granted to the appellant in this appeal. – provided temporary accomadation over the disputed property till she established her title over it and subject to the result of the suit in the family court or suitable forum as the respondent No.8 her husband accepted for accomdation of her. The Bombay High Court has in substance non-suited her on the ground that the Writ Court was not the appropriate forum for granting her relief. We do not per se find any error in such approach. But, in course of this appeal, the husband (respondent no. 8) has filed an affidavit stating that he has set apart the Flat No. 101 in which the appellant could be accommodated. The appellant on the other hand has asserted that the allocation of the same flat was earmarked for one Mr. Nayak Satam, a tenant, as per the plan Considering the fact that the dispute is pending for a very long time, we shall be giving certain directions in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which we hope will conclude the dispute. We shall do so having regard to the fact that the builder and the husband of the appellant have uniformly stated that Flat No. 101 in Om Apartment is available to accommodate the appellant. For this reason, in our opinion, the appellant should be given the choice 19 of occupying that flat as her residence. For this purpose, however, certain cautionary measures are also necessary to ensure that the said flat is not otherwise parted with or encumbered in any form:- (a) The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shall disclose to the appellant in writing as to whether the Flat no. 101 of “Om Apartment” standing on Plot No.118, Dr. M.B. Raut Road, Shivaji Park, Dadar having 379 sq.ft. carpet area is free for allocation to the respondent no. 8 or not. This disclosure shall be made to the appellant within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. (b) Within one month from the date such disclosure is communicated to the appellant in writing, the appellant shall take a decision as to whether she will accept the offer to be accommodated in said flat no. 101. The appellant shall inform the respondent no. 1, 2, 7 and 8 her decision in writing within the aforesaid timeframe of one month. (c) The husband, that is the respondent no. 8, shall also give an undertaking in the form of 20 an affidavit affirmed before a Judicial Magistrate of First Class stating therein in clear terms the nature of right he exercises over that flat along with copies of documents to establish such right. That affidavit shall also contain an unequivocal undertaking that he would not in any way disturb possession of the appellant in the said flat. The affidavit shall also disclose that the respondent no. 8 has not created any form of encumbrance over the said flat. Such affidavit shall be given within a period of one month from the date the appellant communicates in writing her willingness to be accommodated in flat no. 101. (d) If there is no bar in allocating the said flat to the appellant on the basis of re-development plan or any other instrument supplemental or ancillary thereto, and the appellant accepts the offer of being accommodated in the said flat bearing no.101, then the appellant shall vacate her present accommodation and settle in that flat bearing no.101 in Om Apartment within a further period of four months. This would be subject to the respondent no.8 21 giving undertaking in the form of affidavit as directed in the preceding sub-paragraph. 14. In the event, however, the appellant wants to establish her right to reside in her matrimonial home with her husband, she shall be at liberty to approach the Family Court or any other forum of competent jurisdiction, as she may be advised. But in such a situation, she would not be entitled to claim any right specifically in respect of Flat No.101 at Om Apartment on the basis of directions issued by us in the preceding paragraph including the four sub-paragraphs thereof. 15. The appellant shall vacate her existing accommodation for which expenses appears to have been and continues to be incurred by the Respondent No. 8. The fact of incurring such expense has been pleaded in the additional affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent No. 8, verified on 29th August 2019. We give appellant eight months’ time to vacate her present residence at A/20, Bal Govinddas Society, Manorama Nagarkar Marg, Mahim Mumbai. In the event she chooses to opt for Flat No. 101 in “Om Apartment” as her residence, and the other conditions specified in paragraph 13 and its various sub- 22 paragraphs are satisfied, then she shall vacate her present premises from the date she takes possession of the flat at “Om Apartment”. Respondent No.8 shall give her possession of the said premises on a date mutually convenient to the appellant and the Respondent No.8 within the aforesaid period of eight months. 16. Otherwise, the course to be taken by her shall be guided by the direction that may be given by a Court of competent jurisdiction, which the appellant may approach. Till the time the appellant retains possession of the present residential accommodation, which period shall not exceed eight months, the respondent no.8 shall continue to pay rent thereof and her possession thereof shall not be disturbed. The obligation of the respondent no.8 to pay rent and ensure peaceful possession of the present residential unit of the appellant shall not exceed the eight months period, as stipulated by us. Unless of course, a Court of competent jurisdiction issues any other direction at the instance of the appellant

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7231 OF 2012
AISHWARYA ATUL PUSALKAR …APPELLANT
VERSUS
MAHARASHTRA HOUSING & AREA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
The original writ petitioner, who is the appellant in this
proceeding seeks to enforce her right to reside in her matrimonial home.
The location of the house where she wants to establish her right to
reside is comprised in two flats (nos.601 and 602) in a building situated
on plot No.118, Dr. M.B. Raut Road, Shivaji Park, Dadar, in the
metropolis of Mumbai. The family of her husband (respondent no. 8)
were originally the owners of the said plot, on which stood a residential
building known as “Usha”. We find from an additional affidavit filed
2
in this proceeding affirmed on 29th August 2019 by the respondent no.
8 that the said building was originally owned by three branches of the
“Pusalkar” family in equal proportion. The branch of the respondent
no. 8 stemmed from Shivram Dattatryea Pusalkar, carpet area of 1100
sq.ft. comprised of their share. On death of said Shivram Dattatreya
Pusalkar, his share devolved in equal proportion to his widow
Shobhana Shivram Pusalkar (since deceased), their daughter Gayatri
Pratap Puranik and the respondent no. 8. That building upon demolition
was redeveloped by a firm of builders, BUILDARCH. Such
redevelopment was done after obtaining a no objection certificate from
the Mumbai Building Reforms and Reconstruction Board (Board) in
terms of the provisions of Maharashtra Housing and Area Development
Act, 1976 (1976 Act). Under a scheme approved under the provisions
of the said Act, during the period of redevelopment, the occupants were
required to shift to transit or temporary accommodations. The
appellant’s contention is that such exercise of redevelopment had been
undertaken in pursuance of a statutory scheme framed under Section
79 of the 1976 Act which has provisions for rehabilitation of dishoused
occupiers. The members of the family of the appellant after her
3
marriage, comprising of her husband and mother-in-law appear to have
had shifted to the transit accommodation in the year 2000. The
appellant-writ petitioner remained in the original building with her two
minor sons. Respondent No. 8, Atul Shivram Pusalkar, however, has
claimed that both their sons are major by age now and are working with
him in his business. Respondent No. 8 has also stated that one of his
two sons is residing with him.

  1. As the appellant had continued to reside in the old building, the
    MHADA authorities issued a notice upon her under Section 95-A of
    the 1976 Act. The said provision stipulates:-
    “95-A. (1) Where the owner of a building or
    the members of the proposed co-operative
    housing society of the occupiers of the said
    building, submits a proposal to the Board for
    reconstruction of the building, after
    obtaining the written consent of not less than
    70 per cent of the total occupiers of the
    building and a No Objection Certificate for
    such reconstruction of the building is issued
    by the Board to the owner or to the proposed
    co-operative housing society of the
    occupiers, as the case may be, then it shall be
    binding on all the occupiers to vacate the
    premises:
    Provided that, it shall be incumbent upon the
    holder of such No Objection Certificate to
    make available to all the occupants of such
    4
    building alternate temporary
    accommodation.
    (2) On refusal by any of the occupant to
    vacate the premises as provided in subsection (1), on being approached by the
    holder of such No Objection Certificate for
    eviction of such occupiers, it would be
    competent for the Board, notwithstanding
    anything contained in Chapters VI and VII
    of this Act, be liable for summary eviction.
    (3) Any person occupying any premises,
    land, building or structure of the Board
    unauthorisely or without specific written
    permission of the Board in this behalf shall,
    notwithstanding anything contained in
    Chapter VI and VII of this Act, be liable for
    summary eviction.
    (4) Any person who refuses to vacate such
    premises or obstructs such eviction shall, on
    conviction, be punishable with
    imprisonment for a term which may extend
    to one year or with fine which may extend to
    five thousand rupees, or with both.”
  2. The appellant thereafter had shifted to a temporary
    accommodation as directed by an order of a Single Judge of the
    Bombay High Court in Civil Application No. 2967 of 2000. This
    application was taken out in connection with an appeal arising out of a
    matrimonial proceeding pending between the appellant and respondent
    5
    no. 8 at that point of time. We shall refer to that proceeding later in this
    judgment. On her vacating the premises, redevelopment work stood
    completed and the new building constructed on the said land was given
    its identity as “Om Apartment”.
  3. The mother of the respondent no. 8 passed away before institution
    of the present appeal. Her interest in this proceeding is being
    represented by the respondent no. 8 himself and his sister, Gayatri
    Pratap Puranik (respondent no.9 in this appeal). From the counteraffidavit of the MHADA Authorities, we find that certain arrangement
    was entered into between the builder and the family of the appellant’s
    husband. Relevant particulars of such arrangement would appear from
    paragraphs 8 (a) to (e) of the said affidavit of MHADA and the
    authorities constituted under the 1976 Act (respondent nos. 1 to 4) in
    this appeal. These paragraphs read:-
    “8. (a) The Petitioner’s husband (i.e the
    Respondent No.8 herein), her mother in law
    and her sister in law (the Respondent No.9
    herein) were co-owners of collective 1/3rd
    undivided share, right, title and interest in
    the property bearing Plot No. 118, Dr. M.B.
    Raut Road, Shivaji Park, Dadar Mumbai
    400028 and in the old building standing
    thereon. As such, the petitioner along with
    6
    her two sons and the said co-owners was in
    common occupation of a residential
    premises admeasuring around 1100 sq. ft
    (carpet) in the old building standing on the
    said property.
    The Petitioner has referred to the said old
    residential tenement as her matrimonial
    home.
    (b) It is learnt that vide an agreement dated
    1.07.1999 executed between the said coowners and the Respondent No. 7, the coowners had agreed to sell, convey and
    transfer their collective 1/3rd
    undivided
    share, right, title and interest in the said
    property for the consideration and on terms
    and conditions recorded therein. Under the
    terms of the said agreement, the Respondent
    No.7 had agreed to provide to the co-owners
    as and by way of permanent alternative
    accommodations, three premises,
    collectively admeasuring 1100 sq.ft. (carpet)
    in lieu of area occupied by them in the old
    building standing on the said property.
    Being the legally wedded wife of the
    Respondent No.8, the Petitioner had a right
    to reside along with her husband in the
    temporary alternate accommodation and
    permanent alternate accommodation allotted
    to him either along with the remaining coowners or independently.
    (c) As the matrimonial dispute between the
    Petitioner and Respondent No.8 was going
    on when the aforesaid agreement was
    executed, the Respondent No. 7 at the
    7
    insistence of the Petitioner and the
    Respondent No.8, provided her an
    independent temporary alternate
    accommodation at Room No.20, 1
    st floor,
    Balgovinddas Society, Manorama Nagarkar
    Marg, Matunga, Mumbai 400016.
    (d) The answering respondent has learnt that
    in pursuance to an Agreement for
    Assignment dated 16.6.2004 executed
    between two amongst the said co-owners
    viz. Smt. Shobhana Shivram Pusalkar
    (Petitioner’s mother-in-law) and Mrs.
    Gayatri Pratap Puranik (the Respondent
    No.9 herein) being the Assignors and the
    Respondent No.7 being the Assignee, the
    said Assignors have forever and absolutely
    assigned and transferred in favour of the
    Respondent No.7, their respective share i.e.
    733 sq.ft.(carpet) area out of 1100 sq.ft.
    (carpet) area agreed to be allotted to them
    under the said agreement for consideration
    and on the terms and conditions recorded
    therein. The aforesaid facts have also been
    deposed by the Respondent No.7 in an
    affidavit dated 20th October, 2004 filed in
    Civil Application No.183 of 2004 in Family
    Court Appeal No.72 of 1997 and Family
    Court Appeal No.87 of 1997 (Aishwarya
    Atul Pusalkar Vs. Atul Shivram Pusalkar &
    Anr.).
    (e) In view of assignment of area by two coowners, the Respondent No.7 had to provide
    one flat admeasuring 379 sq. ft. (carpet) to
    the Petitioner’s husband i.e. the Respondent
    8
    No.8 herein. The Respondent No. 7 has
    accordingly allotted to the Respondent No. 8
    a flat bearing No. 101 admeasuring 379 sq.
    ft. (carpet) on the 1st floor of the said
    building “Om Apartment”, constructed as
    per the plans lastly approved by the
    M.C.G.M.(hereinafter referred to as “the
    said new flat”).
  4. There is dispute as regards actual area of allocation to the
    respondent no. 8 and his family by the respondent no. 7 in the new
    building. The appellant contends such area to be 1816.61 sq. ft., out of
    which her husband’s share would have been 605.53 sq. ft. in “Om
    Apartment” during the period his mother was alive. The appellant,
    appearing in-person, has also submitted that such area was comprised
    in two flats in the sixth floor of the said building, being flat nos. 601
    and 602. Her assertion as regards the area of the two flats is based on
    an approved plan bearing no. EEBP/8145/GN/A of 15th October 2004.
    An architect’s certificate to that effect forms part of Affidavit-inRejoinder of the appellant filed in the writ petition before the Bombay
    High Court, from which this appeal originates. That petition was
    registered as writ petition No.1398 of 2008. The stand of the respondent
    no. 7, the builder, however is that the plan dated 15th October 2004 was
    9
    subsequently amended on 17th February 2006 and 22nd November 2006
    and “Om Apartment” had not been constructed in accordance with the
    plan of 15th October 2004. Both the respondent nos. 7 and 8 have
    argued that in the new building also, carpet area allocation was 1100
    sq. ft. to the branch of the family of respondent no. 8. Out of that area,
    the deceased mother and sister of the respondent no. 8 had assigned to
    the respondent no. 7 for valuable consideration their respective shares
    coming to 733 sq.ft. According to the builder and the respondent no.
    8, the latter has been allotted a flat bearing no. 101 having 379 sq.ft.
    carpet area in the same building. The respondent no. 8 wants the
    appellant to shift to that flat and in this regard he has affirmed an
    affidavit on 29th August, 2019 forming part of records of this
    proceeding. In the verification portion of this affidavit, the residential
    address of the respondent no. 8 is shown to be “Matushree Pearl,
    Sitaram Keer Road, Mahim, Mumbai.” The appellant at present appears
    to be residing at 20, Balgovindas Society, Manorama Nagarkar Marg,
    Mumbai 400016. The Respondent no. 8 has pleaded that this residence
    was initially provided by the builder as transit accommodation to her
    but at present he is paying rent for the same. In the writ petition, out
    10
    of which this appeal arises, she had asked for direction upon MHADA
    authorities to rehouse her in the said two flats. The other prayers in the
    writ petition included a mandatory direction for compliance with the
    plan of 15th October 2004.
  5. There have been certain parallel developments pertaining to the
    appellant’s matrimonial dispute with her husband. In the Family Court,
    the husband- respondent no. 8 had been granted a decree of judicial
    separation in the year 1997. His plea for divorce was not accepted by
    the Family Court. The decree of judicial separation was passed on 30th
    July, 1997. Both the appellant and the respondent no.8 appealed
    against the said judgment and decree before the Bombay High Court.
    The High Court in a common judgment delivered on 2nd July, 2001 had
    allowed the appellant’s appeal, registered as FCA No. 72 of 1997 and
    set aside the decree of judicial separation. The appeal of her husband
    (registered as FCA No. 87 of 1997) against the Family Court’s
    judgment refusing to grant divorce was dismissed. This decision was
    delivered by the Bombay High Court after she had shifted to her
    temporary accommodation. The complaint of the appellant is that after
    the decree of judicial separation was invalidated, her husband and his
    11
    family have not allowed her to reside in the flats allocated to them in
    the redeveloped building. She claims in substance that such refusal is
    in breach of her right to reside in her matrimonial home. It is also her
    case that as she had vacated the original residential unit on the basis of
    a statutory notice, she has her right to be rehoused in those flats as part
    of statutory rehabilitation measure. The appellant thereafter filed the
    writ petition in the Bombay High Court. The present appeal has been
    resisted by the MHADA Authorities, the builder (respondent no. 7), her
    husband (respondent no.8) and the appellant’s sister-in-law, respondent
    no. 9. She was impleaded in this appeal after the demise of original
    appellant’s mother-in-law. These respondents had taken the same stand
    before the Bombay High Court.
  6. The Bombay High Court in the judgment under appeal sustained
    the plea of the respondents that the right which the writ petitioner
    (appellant before us) was seeking to establish could not be enforced
    invoking jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
    12
    of India. It was, inter-alia, observed and held by the Bombay High
    Court :-
    “6. In our view, the claim of the petitioner is
    based on her contention that she being
    legally wedded wife of the 8th respondent
    and the daughter-in-law of the 9th
    respondent, the petitioner is entitled to
    occupy flat Nos. 601 & 602 in the newly
    constructed building. She is claiming such a
    right on the basis that Flat No. 601 & 602
    constitute her matrimonial home. In our
    opinion, the present Writ Petition is not an
    appropriate remedy for the petitioner for
    ventilating her such a grievance and that she
    can agitate such a claim and make such
    grievances, by adopting appropriate course
    of action in the Family Court and/or civil
    Court for the enforcement of her right that
    she is claiming herein. In view of the nature
    of controversy involved between the parties,
    we hold that it is not possible for us to try,
    entertain and decide the same in exercise of
    our writ jurisdiction.
  7. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the
    conclusions drawn by us, the present writ
    petition is dismissed. However, we make it
    clear that dismissal of this petition will not
    be a hurdle for the petitioner to seek
    appropriate relief to which she may be
    entitled in law, before appropriate form, in a
    properly constituted proceeding. In case if
    the petitioner is advised to adopt any such
    remedy, the observations herein will not be
    13
    considered one way or the other, while
    determining the entitlement of the
    petitioner.”
  8. Smt. Pusalkar has argued before us in-person that she was
    removed from her matrimonial home through the statutory mechanism
    contained in Section 95A of the 1976 Act, which bore the threats of
    penal measure and summary eviction process. But this was during the
    time the decree of judicial separation remained operative. She traces the
    root of her ‘dishousing’ to a notice dated 10th July 2000 (bearing no.
    MBR & RB/FN/GN/2136 of 2000) issued by the Board under the 1976
    Act. Her case is that it is composite statutory obligation of MHADA,
    the builder and her husband to rehouse her in her matrimonial home. It
    is a fact that the said respondents functioned under a statutory scheme
    while redeveloping the property, commencing from approval of the
    development scheme, vacating the old building and re-entry into the
    allocated portion of the redeveloped premises by her husband’s family.
    The appellant was also dishoused from the said building under that
    scheme. But in our opinion, when a builder has discharged his
    obligation by accommodating the original owners in the redeveloped
    14
    portion as per such a scheme, a lady married into that family would not
    be entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce
    her right to matrimonial home citing the provisions of the said statute,
    if her husband does not permit her to reside in the allocated portion. She
    does not have any independent claim on title or interest to that property
    having its genesis in that statute. Her claim of right to reside in her
    matrimonial home is sought to be projected by her as collateral to the
    statutory right of her husband to be rehoused or rehabilitated in the new
    building. But her right to reside in her matrimonial home stands
    detached from and is independent of the statutory scheme under the said
    Act. Neither MHADA, nor the builder can have any further legal
    obligation to rehouse her. She is staking her claim as a constructive
    beneficiary of the redevelopment scheme. But our opinion is that the
    right she is seeking to enforce, though flows from a set of events on the
    basis of which her husband can claim rehabilitation, is actually
    anchored to an independent legal principle under the Family Law. We
    accept that she was an occupier under Section 2 (25) of the 1976 Act,
    but such occupier status was dependent upon her husband’s
    independent right as part owner of the property. Her right flowing from
    15
    her matrimonial status cannot get diffused with her right of rehousing
    or rehabilitation under the statutory scheme. Her right to reside in her
    matrimonial home does not flow from the 1976 Act.
  9. We recognise the appellant’s right to reside in her matrimonial
    home. Such right has a legitimate basis. Though in our view the
    enforcement mechanism adopted by her to enforce her right is not
    legally acceptable, a brief discussion on the right she is seeking to
    enforce is necessary to understand the scope of her claim. A married
    woman is entitled to live, subsequent to her marriage, with rest of her
    family members on the husband’s side, in case it is a joint-property. If
    she resides in an accommodation as an independent family unit with her
    husband and children, the matrimonial home would be that residential
    unit. This right is embedded in her right as a wife. It is implicit under
    the provisions of Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance
    Act, 1956 in situations that statute is applicable. The Protection of
    Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has recognised the concept
    of “shared household” in terms of Section 2(s) of this statute.
    Alienating an immovable asset to defeat the right of a victim lady under
    the said Act can constitute domestic violence, coming, inter-alia, within
    16
    the ambit of the expression “economic abuse” under Section 3(iv) of
    2005 Act. A Magistrate having jurisdiction under Section 19 of the
    said Act is empowered to pass a residence order to protect a victim of
    domestic violence from being removed from her shared household. But
    for a husband to compel his wife to live in a separate household, which
    is not her matrimonial home, an order from appropriate legal forum
    would be necessary. There cannot be forcible dishousing of a wife from
    her matrimonial home.
  10. The respondent no. 8 claims that the appellant could be
    accommodated in Flat no. 101 of the same building. But the appellant’s
    stand is that the said flat stands allocated to another tenant and she is
    being offered that flat with malafide intention. She has staked her claim
    on her right to residence in the matrimonial home, which according to
    her is comprised in the said two flats bearing nos. 601 and 602. From
    the materials available, it appears that interest in those flats have been
    surrendered by the paternal family members of the respondent no.8.
  11. There appears to be some matters pending in different fora in
    relation to the matrimonial dispute between the appellant and the
    respondent no.8. But we have not been apprised of particulars of such
    17
    matters. The position as it stands now is that the decree of judicial
    separation stands invalidated and as of now, the appellant is the legally
    wedded wife of the respondent no.8. She has been out of her
    matrimonial home since the year 2000. But such right cannot be
    enforced invoking the writ jurisdiction. Moreover, the original building
    that constituted her matrimonial home has been demolished. Large
    portions of the redeveloped building on the same plot has been parted
    with. Now going by its traditional meaning, her matrimonial home at
    present would be the premises in which her husband is residing. In this
    complex perspective, a judicial forum having fact-finding jurisdiction
    would be the proper forum for adjudicating her claim of this nature. The
    appellant drew our attention to Section 177 of the 1976 Act to contend
    that disputes arising out of the said Act cannot be adjudicated upon by
    a Civil Court. But as we have already observed, the dispute raised by
    her does not arise out of any of the provisions of the 1976 Act. Though
    she was dishoused as an occupier applying the provisions of the 1976
    Act, claim of her rehousing is based on her status as wife of the
    respondent no. 8. In our opinion, such claim has to be adjudicated upon
    by the Civil Court or the Family Court or any other forum the law may
    18
    prescribe. Such right of the appellant cannot be diffused with the right
    of her husband under the 1976 Act, whose family property, part of
    which he is the owner, has been reconstructed.
  12. Now the question arises as to whether any relief can be granted to
    the appellant in this appeal. The Bombay High Court has in substance
    non-suited her on the ground that the Writ Court was not the appropriate
    forum for granting her relief. We do not per se find any error in such
    approach. But, in course of this appeal, the husband (respondent no. 8)
    has filed an affidavit stating that he has set apart the Flat No. 101 in
    which the appellant could be accommodated. The appellant on the other
    hand has asserted that the allocation of the same flat was earmarked for
    one Mr. Nayak Satam, a tenant, as per the plan.
  13. Considering the fact that the dispute is pending for a very long
    time, we shall be giving certain directions in exercise of our jurisdiction
    under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which we hope will
    conclude the dispute. We shall do so having regard to the fact that the
    builder and the husband of the appellant have uniformly stated that Flat
    No. 101 in Om Apartment is available to accommodate the appellant.
    For this reason, in our opinion, the appellant should be given the choice
    19
    of occupying that flat as her residence. For this purpose, however,
    certain cautionary measures are also necessary to ensure that the said
    flat is not otherwise parted with or encumbered in any form:-
    (a) The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shall disclose
    to the appellant in writing as to whether the
    Flat no. 101 of “Om Apartment” standing on
    Plot No.118, Dr. M.B. Raut Road, Shivaji
    Park, Dadar having 379 sq.ft. carpet area is
    free for allocation to the respondent no. 8 or
    not. This disclosure shall be made to the
    appellant within a period of two months
    from the date of communication of this order
    to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
    (b) Within one month from the date such
    disclosure is communicated to the appellant
    in writing, the appellant shall take a decision
    as to whether she will accept the offer to be
    accommodated in said flat no. 101. The
    appellant shall inform the respondent no. 1,
    2, 7 and 8 her decision in writing within the
    aforesaid timeframe of one month.
    (c) The husband, that is the respondent no. 8,
    shall also give an undertaking in the form of
    20
    an affidavit affirmed before a Judicial
    Magistrate of First Class stating therein in
    clear terms the nature of right he exercises
    over that flat along with copies of documents
    to establish such right. That affidavit shall
    also contain an unequivocal undertaking that
    he would not in any way disturb possession
    of the appellant in the said flat. The affidavit
    shall also disclose that the respondent no. 8
    has not created any form of encumbrance
    over the said flat. Such affidavit shall be
    given within a period of one month from the
    date the appellant communicates in writing
    her willingness to be accommodated in flat
    no. 101.
    (d) If there is no bar in allocating the said flat to
    the appellant on the basis of re-development
    plan or any other instrument supplemental or
    ancillary thereto, and the appellant accepts
    the offer of being accommodated in the said
    flat bearing no.101, then the appellant shall
    vacate her present accommodation and settle
    in that flat bearing no.101 in Om Apartment
    within a further period of four months. This
    would be subject to the respondent no.8
    21
    giving undertaking in the form of affidavit as
    directed in the preceding sub-paragraph.
  14. In the event, however, the appellant wants to establish her right
    to reside in her matrimonial home with her husband, she shall be at
    liberty to approach the Family Court or any other forum of competent
    jurisdiction, as she may be advised. But in such a situation, she would
    not be entitled to claim any right specifically in respect of Flat No.101
    at Om Apartment on the basis of directions issued by us in the
    preceding paragraph including the four sub-paragraphs thereof.
  15. The appellant shall vacate her existing accommodation for which
    expenses appears to have been and continues to be incurred by the
    Respondent No. 8. The fact of incurring such expense has been
    pleaded in the additional affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent
    No. 8, verified on 29th August 2019. We give appellant eight months’
    time to vacate her present residence at A/20, Bal Govinddas Society,
    Manorama Nagarkar Marg, Mahim Mumbai. In the event she chooses
    to opt for Flat No. 101 in “Om Apartment” as her residence, and the
    other conditions specified in paragraph 13 and its various sub-
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    paragraphs are satisfied, then she shall vacate her present premises
    from the date she takes possession of the flat at “Om Apartment”.
    Respondent No.8 shall give her possession of the said premises on a
    date mutually convenient to the appellant and the Respondent No.8
    within the aforesaid period of eight months.
  16. Otherwise, the course to be taken by her shall be guided by the
    direction that may be given by a Court of competent jurisdiction,
    which the appellant may approach. Till the time the appellant retains
    possession of the present residential accommodation, which period
    shall not exceed eight months, the respondent no.8 shall continue to
    pay rent thereof and her possession thereof shall not be disturbed. The
    obligation of the respondent no.8 to pay rent and ensure peaceful
    possession of the present residential unit of the appellant shall not
    exceed the eight months period, as stipulated by us. Unless of course,
    a Court of competent jurisdiction issues any other direction at the
    instance of the appellant.
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  17. With these directions, the appeal shall stand disposed of. All
    connected applications are disposed of. Interim orders, if any, shall
    stand dissolved. There shall be no order as to costs.
    …..………………………….J.
    (Deepak Gupta)

……………..……………….J.
(Aniruddha Bose)
New Delhi,
Dated: 27 April, 2020.