convicted the accused-appellant for the offences under Sections 279 IPC and 304-A IPC; and awarded the punishment of 6 2 months’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- with default stipulation for the offence under Section 279 IPC and 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- with default stipulation for the offence under Section 304-A IPC. = just and adequate punishment do apply to the present case too; and we find no reason to reduce the punishment awarded or to extend the benefit of probation where a 15 year old boy lost his life due to the rash and negligent driving of the truck by the appellant and where, after causing the accident, the appellant fled from the site and was surrendered by his commandant more than 3 weeks later.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1827 OF 2009 SUBHASH CHAND Appellant(s) Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB Respondent(s) JUDGMENT Dinesh Maheshwari, J. In this appeal, the appellant-accused has called in question the order dated 18.04.2009 in Criminal Revision No. 621 of 2009 whereby, the High Court of Punjab &… Read More convicted the accused-appellant for the offences under Sections 279 IPC and 304-A IPC; and awarded the punishment of 6 2 months’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- with default stipulation for the offence under Section 279 IPC and 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- with default stipulation for the offence under Section 304-A IPC. = just and adequate punishment do apply to the present case too; and we find no reason to reduce the punishment awarded or to extend the benefit of probation where a 15 year old boy lost his life due to the rash and negligent driving of the truck by the appellant and where, after causing the accident, the appellant fled from the site and was surrendered by his commandant more than 3 weeks later.

whether we should set aside the entire impugned order or set aside only qua the sole appellant herein because the other four accused though suffered conviction under Section 302/149 IPC alike the appellant herein did not file any appeal against their conviction and secondly, the other accused ­ Kanhai Prasad Chourasia whose conviction and sentence under Section 302/149 IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act was upheld has also not filed any appeal in this Court.= It is a fundamental principle of law that an illegality committed by a Court cannot be allowed to be perpetuated against a person to a Lis merely because he did not bring such illegality to the notice of the Court and instead other person similarly placed in the Lis brought such illegality to the Court’s notice and succeed in his challenge. 31. It will be a travesty of justice delivery system where an accused, who is convicted of a lesser offence (Section 27 of the Arms Act alone) and was acquitted of a graver offence (Section 302/149 IPC) is made to suffer conviction for commission of a 15 graver offence (Section 302/149 IPC) without affording him of any opportunity to defend such charge at any stage of the appellate proceedings. 32. Needless to say, if the other four accused had filed the appeals in this Court, they too would have got the benefit of this order. A fortiori, merely because they did not file the appeals and the case is now remanded for re­hearing of the appeal at the instance of one accused, the benefit of re­hearing of the appeal cannot be denied to other co­accused. In other words, the non­appealing co­accused are also entitled to get benefit of the order of this Court and are, therefore, entitled for re­hearing of their appeals along with the present appellant.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.180 OF 2019 Deep Narayan Chourasia ….Appellant(s) VERSUS State of Bihar ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated 14.11.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature… Read More whether we should set aside the entire impugned order or set aside only qua the sole appellant herein because the other four accused though suffered conviction under Section 302/149 IPC alike the appellant herein did not file any appeal against their conviction and secondly, the other accused ­ Kanhai Prasad Chourasia whose conviction and sentence under Section 302/149 IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act was upheld has also not filed any appeal in this Court.= It is a fundamental principle of law that an illegality committed by a Court cannot be allowed to be perpetuated against a person to a Lis merely because he did not bring such illegality to the notice of the Court and instead other person similarly placed in the Lis brought such illegality to the Court’s notice and succeed in his challenge. 31. It will be a travesty of justice delivery system where an accused, who is convicted of a lesser offence (Section 27 of the Arms Act alone) and was acquitted of a graver offence (Section 302/149 IPC) is made to suffer conviction for commission of a 15 graver offence (Section 302/149 IPC) without affording him of any opportunity to defend such charge at any stage of the appellate proceedings. 32. Needless to say, if the other four accused had filed the appeals in this Court, they too would have got the benefit of this order. A fortiori, merely because they did not file the appeals and the case is now remanded for re­hearing of the appeal at the instance of one accused, the benefit of re­hearing of the appeal cannot be denied to other co­accused. In other words, the non­appealing co­accused are also entitled to get benefit of the order of this Court and are, therefore, entitled for re­hearing of their appeals along with the present appellant.

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, = when the plaintiff’s injunction application stood dismissed by the Trial Court and the same was not carried in appeal at his instance, the same could not have been revived by the High Court in a writ petition filed by the plaintiff. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court as the High Court neither examined the facts of the case properly nor the legal questions arising in the case, therefore such order is legally unsustainable.

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2013 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23249 of 2018) Shri Revansiddeshwar Pattan Sahakari Bank Niyamit ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Taluka Tokrekoli (Ambiga Samaji C Vikas Sangh Indi) (Earlier Gangamath Sangha) & Anr. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar… Read More Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, = when the plaintiff’s injunction application stood dismissed by the Trial Court and the same was not carried in appeal at his instance, the same could not have been revived by the High Court in a writ petition filed by the plaintiff. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court as the High Court neither examined the facts of the case properly nor the legal questions arising in the case, therefore such order is legally unsustainable.

Amendement of plaint rejected = In our view, the Trial Court was right in rejecting the application. This we say for more than one reason. First, it was wholly belated; Second, respondent No.1(plaintiff) filed the application for amendment of the plaint when the trial in the suit was almost over and the case was fixed for final arguments; and Third, the suit could still be decided even without there being any necessity to seek any amendment in the plaint. In our view, 4 4 amendment in the plaint was not really required for determination of the issues in the suit.

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2012 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1873 of 2012) Vijay Hathising Shah & Anr. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Gitaben Parshottamdas Mukhi & Ors. ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted. This appeal is filed against… Read More Amendement of plaint rejected = In our view, the Trial Court was right in rejecting the application. This we say for more than one reason. First, it was wholly belated; Second, respondent No.1(plaintiff) filed the application for amendment of the plaint when the trial in the suit was almost over and the case was fixed for final arguments; and Third, the suit could still be decided even without there being any necessity to seek any amendment in the plaint. In our view, 4 4 amendment in the plaint was not really required for determination of the issues in the suit.

To set aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward- (a)by the ward who has attained majority. (b)by the ward’s legal representative- Three years When the ward attains majority. i) When the ward dies within three years from the date of attaining majority. Three years When the ward attains majority. ii) When the ward dies before attaining majority.” Three years When the ward dies.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1782 OF 2019 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 21091 of 2010) MURUGAN & ORS. …APPELLANTS Vs. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. This is the plaintiff’s appeal challenging the… Read More To set aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward- (a)by the ward who has attained majority. (b)by the ward’s legal representative- Three years When the ward attains majority. i) When the ward dies within three years from the date of attaining majority. Three years When the ward attains majority. ii) When the ward dies before attaining majority.” Three years When the ward dies.

“Whether an assessee who sets up a new industry of a kind mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 80-IC of the Act and starts availing exemption of 100 per cent tax under sub-section (3) of Section 80-IC (which is admissible for five years) can start claiming the exemption at the same rate of 100% beyond the period of five years on the ground that the assessee has now carried out substantial expansion in its manufacturing unit?” = 24.The aforesaid discussion leads us to the following conclusions: (a) Judgment dated 20th August, 2018 in Classic Binding Industries case omitted to take note of the definition ‘initial assessment year’ contained in Section 80-IC itself and instead based its conclusion on the definition contained in Section 80-IB, which does not apply in these cases. The definitions of ‘initial assessment year’ in the two sections, viz. Sections 80-IB and 80-IC are materially different. The definition of ‘initial assessment year’ under Section 80-IC has made all the difference. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the aforesaid judgment does not lay down the correct law. (b) An undertaking or an enterprise which had set up a new unit between 7th January, 2003 and 1st April, 2012 in State of Himachal 25 Pradesh of the nature mentioned in clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 80-IC, would be entitled to deduction at the rate of 100% of the profits and gains for five assessment years commencing with the ‘initial assessment year’. For the next five years, the admissible deduction would be 25% (or 30% where the assessee is a company) of the profits and gains. (c) However, in case substantial expansion is carried out as defined in clause (ix) of sub-section (8) of Section 80-IC by such an undertaking or enterprise, within the aforesaid period of 10 years, the said previous year in which the substantial expansion is undertaken would become ‘initial assessment year’, and from that assessment year the assessee shall been entitled to 100% deductions of the profits and gains. (d) Such deduction, however, would be for a total period of 10 years, as provided in sub-section (6). For example, if the expansion is carried out immediately, on the completion of first five years, the assessee would be entitled to 100% deduction again for the next five years. On the other hand, if substantial expansion is undertaken, say, in 8th year by an assessee such an assessee would be entitled to 100% deduction for the first five years, deduction @ 25% of the profits and gains for the next two years and @ 100% again from 8th year as this year becomes ‘initial assessment year’ once again. 26 However, this 100% deduction would be for remaining three years, i.e., 8th, 9th and 10th assessment years. 25.In view of the aforesaid, we affirm the judgment of the High Court on this issue and dismiss all these appeals of the Revenue. Likewise, appeals filed by the assessees are hereby allowed.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1784 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23172 OF 2018) PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX SHIMLA …..APPELLANT(S) VERSUS M/S. AARHAM SOFTRONICS …..RESPONDENT(S) W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1785 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23176… Read More “Whether an assessee who sets up a new industry of a kind mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 80-IC of the Act and starts availing exemption of 100 per cent tax under sub-section (3) of Section 80-IC (which is admissible for five years) can start claiming the exemption at the same rate of 100% beyond the period of five years on the ground that the assessee has now carried out substantial expansion in its manufacturing unit?” = 24.The aforesaid discussion leads us to the following conclusions: (a) Judgment dated 20th August, 2018 in Classic Binding Industries case omitted to take note of the definition ‘initial assessment year’ contained in Section 80-IC itself and instead based its conclusion on the definition contained in Section 80-IB, which does not apply in these cases. The definitions of ‘initial assessment year’ in the two sections, viz. Sections 80-IB and 80-IC are materially different. The definition of ‘initial assessment year’ under Section 80-IC has made all the difference. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the aforesaid judgment does not lay down the correct law. (b) An undertaking or an enterprise which had set up a new unit between 7th January, 2003 and 1st April, 2012 in State of Himachal 25 Pradesh of the nature mentioned in clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 80-IC, would be entitled to deduction at the rate of 100% of the profits and gains for five assessment years commencing with the ‘initial assessment year’. For the next five years, the admissible deduction would be 25% (or 30% where the assessee is a company) of the profits and gains. (c) However, in case substantial expansion is carried out as defined in clause (ix) of sub-section (8) of Section 80-IC by such an undertaking or enterprise, within the aforesaid period of 10 years, the said previous year in which the substantial expansion is undertaken would become ‘initial assessment year’, and from that assessment year the assessee shall been entitled to 100% deductions of the profits and gains. (d) Such deduction, however, would be for a total period of 10 years, as provided in sub-section (6). For example, if the expansion is carried out immediately, on the completion of first five years, the assessee would be entitled to 100% deduction again for the next five years. On the other hand, if substantial expansion is undertaken, say, in 8th year by an assessee such an assessee would be entitled to 100% deduction for the first five years, deduction @ 25% of the profits and gains for the next two years and @ 100% again from 8th year as this year becomes ‘initial assessment year’ once again. 26 However, this 100% deduction would be for remaining three years, i.e., 8th, 9th and 10th assessment years. 25.In view of the aforesaid, we affirm the judgment of the High Court on this issue and dismiss all these appeals of the Revenue. Likewise, appeals filed by the assessees are hereby allowed.

the professional mis-conduct of IO Puran Singh Mehra (since retired from service), it is most respectfully submitted that even though he filed the charge sheet against the actual culprits, he did not carry out investigation with professional rigour, as brought out in para 9 supra. In view of the above, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue directions to the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh/Director General of Police, (U.P.) to initiate departmental action against him.

1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 188 OF 2015 SMT. SUNITA DEVI AND ANR. ….. PETITIONERS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ….. RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T S.ABDUL NAZEER, J. Smt. Seema Garg, daughter-in-law of petitioner No.1, and her two children… Read More the professional mis-conduct of IO Puran Singh Mehra (since retired from service), it is most respectfully submitted that even though he filed the charge sheet against the actual culprits, he did not carry out investigation with professional rigour, as brought out in para 9 supra. In view of the above, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue directions to the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh/Director General of Police, (U.P.) to initiate departmental action against him.