Section 130 of the Companies Act for re­opening of the books of accounts and re­casting the financial statements of the Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited; IL&FS Financial Services Limited and IL&FS Transportation Networks Limited for the last five years, viz. from Financial Year 2012­13 to the Financial Year 2017­18

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3747 OF 2019 Hari Sankaran … Appellant Versus Union of India & Others … Respondents J U D G M E N T M.R. SHAH, J. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Order dated 31.01.2019 passed by the National Company… Read More Section 130 of the Companies Act for re­opening of the books of accounts and re­casting the financial statements of the Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited; IL&FS Financial Services Limited and IL&FS Transportation Networks Limited for the last five years, viz. from Financial Year 2012­13 to the Financial Year 2017­18

Therefore, identification by Tara Singh (PW-1) and Varun Singh (PW-4) of the appellant- Guman Singh as one of the perpetrators who had fired on Shiv Charan and Babu Singh (PW-3) is unreliable and should not be accepted without substantial corroboration and supporting material/evidence to establish involvement of the appellantGuman Singh. On the aspect of corroboration, prosecution relies upon the FSL report, exhibit P-48, opining that barrel residue examination of ‘8mm/.315’ country-made pistol (W/1) had revealed that pistol had been fired, but, definite time of its last firing could not be ascertained. The FSL report also opines that it was not possible to link definitely the ‘8mm/.315’ Soft Round nose Copper Jacketted Bullet ‘B/1’ from packet ‘D 1’ with the country-made pistol (W/1) from packet ‘E’ due to lack of sufficient evidence.Thus, the bullet ‘B/1’ recovered from the body of Babu Singh (PW3) would not be matched with the country-made pistol. The bullets recovered from the body of deceased Shiv Charan were not sentfor ballistic examination and comparison. This is surprising as bullets were certainly recovered from the body of the deceased Shiv Charan and no explanation is forthcoming why these bullets were not sent for ballistic examination.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1475 OF 2017 GUMAN SINGH ….. APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN ….. RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T SANJIV KHANNA, J. The appellant, Guman Singh impugns judgment dated 10.03.2017 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of… Read More Therefore, identification by Tara Singh (PW-1) and Varun Singh (PW-4) of the appellant- Guman Singh as one of the perpetrators who had fired on Shiv Charan and Babu Singh (PW-3) is unreliable and should not be accepted without substantial corroboration and supporting material/evidence to establish involvement of the appellantGuman Singh. On the aspect of corroboration, prosecution relies upon the FSL report, exhibit P-48, opining that barrel residue examination of ‘8mm/.315’ country-made pistol (W/1) had revealed that pistol had been fired, but, definite time of its last firing could not be ascertained. The FSL report also opines that it was not possible to link definitely the ‘8mm/.315’ Soft Round nose Copper Jacketted Bullet ‘B/1’ from packet ‘D 1’ with the country-made pistol (W/1) from packet ‘E’ due to lack of sufficient evidence.Thus, the bullet ‘B/1’ recovered from the body of Babu Singh (PW3) would not be matched with the country-made pistol. The bullets recovered from the body of deceased Shiv Charan were not sentfor ballistic examination and comparison. This is surprising as bullets were certainly recovered from the body of the deceased Shiv Charan and no explanation is forthcoming why these bullets were not sent for ballistic examination.

Merely because the accused Ramavtar caused the injury on the head by the blunt side of Farsa, the High Court is not justified in altering the conviction to Section 304 Part II of the IPC. As held by this Court in catena of decisions, even in a case of a single blow, but on the vital part of the body, the case may fall under Section 302 of the IPC and the accused can be held guilty for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly that it was a case of free fight, considering the fact that the weapon used by the accused Ramavtar was Farsa and he caused the injury on the vital part of the body i.e. head which proved to be fatal, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in altering the conviction of the accused Ramavtar from Sections 302/149 of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

1 NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1411 OF 2013 State of Madhya Pradesh .. Appellant Versus Kalicharan & Ors. .. Respondents J U D G M E N T M. R. Shah, J. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 18.11.2008 passed by… Read More Merely because the accused Ramavtar caused the injury on the head by the blunt side of Farsa, the High Court is not justified in altering the conviction to Section 304 Part II of the IPC. As held by this Court in catena of decisions, even in a case of a single blow, but on the vital part of the body, the case may fall under Section 302 of the IPC and the accused can be held guilty for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly that it was a case of free fight, considering the fact that the weapon used by the accused Ramavtar was Farsa and he caused the injury on the vital part of the body i.e. head which proved to be fatal, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in altering the conviction of the accused Ramavtar from Sections 302/149 of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, we are of the opinion that Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against the order of conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed prior to amendment Act No. 20/2018 i.e., prior to 01.09.2018

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.917­944 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(Criminal) Nos. 4948­4975/2019 Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S.Deswal and others …Appellants versus Virender Gandhi …Respondent J U D G M E N T M.R. SHAH, J. Leave granted. As common question of law and facts arise… Read More Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, we are of the opinion that Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against the order of conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed prior to amendment Act No. 20/2018 i.e., prior to 01.09.2018

Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 = mere abuses are not sufficient to attract section 3[1][x] = Going by the version of the complainant Deshiram himself, the expressions used by the appellant during the course of vertical altercation, did not refer to the caste or tribe that the complainant belonged though such assertion finds place in the testimony of the other witnesses. the appellant abused the complainant Deshiram is quite clear and as such his conviction and sentence recorded under Section 294 IPC was fully justified. However, going by the version of the complainant Deshiram according to which there was no reference to the caste or tribe of the complainant, there is a doubt as regards charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In the circumstances, while affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 294 IPC, we grant him benefit of doubt and acquit him of the charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. …. OF 2019 @ SLP(CRL.) NO. 1907 OF 2019 NARAD PATEL VS. SATE OF CHHATTISGARH 1 Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 883 OF 2019 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.1907 of 2019) NARAD PATEL …Appellant VERSUS STATE OF CHHATTISGARH …Respondent J U… Read More Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 = mere abuses are not sufficient to attract section 3[1][x] = Going by the version of the complainant Deshiram himself, the expressions used by the appellant during the course of vertical altercation, did not refer to the caste or tribe that the complainant belonged though such assertion finds place in the testimony of the other witnesses. the appellant abused the complainant Deshiram is quite clear and as such his conviction and sentence recorded under Section 294 IPC was fully justified. However, going by the version of the complainant Deshiram according to which there was no reference to the caste or tribe of the complainant, there is a doubt as regards charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In the circumstances, while affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 294 IPC, we grant him benefit of doubt and acquit him of the charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.

Whether a common complaint by seeking permission under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act , can be filed by all the consumers against their common reliefs against the common respondent before the comsumer court ? Apex court held yes

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1676 OF 2019 ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. VS. INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS. 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1676 OF 2019 ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS. …Appellant(s) VERSUS INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT. LTD. & ORS. …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N… Read More Whether a common complaint by seeking permission under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act , can be filed by all the consumers against their common reliefs against the common respondent before the comsumer court ? Apex court held yes

when civil suit for eviction became final, basing on the permission given by slum Authorities – it can not be questioned byway of writ without pleading his case in civil suit =In Vidarbha part of the State of Maharashtra, before the enactment of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1989, there had to be two rounds of litigation to seek eviction of a tenant. The first round had to be before the Rent Controller seeking permission to issue a quit notice under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. If such permission was granted, then only the landlord could issue a notice of termination of tenancy and file a civil suit seeking eviction of a tenant. In the present case the first roundbefore the Rent Controller was gone into. Bona fide need as a ground for eviction may, in a given case, have an additional facet of comparative hardship and whether the tenant has any alternative accommodation or not. In any case, the matter had attained finality. The permission was granted by the Rent Controller and the civil suit was filed only thereafter in which an objection was taken that the premises being governed by the provisions of the Act, the requisite permission of the Slum Authority was mandatory In the proceedings so initiated the Slum Authority granted that permission. The matter was carried in appeal and the issue whether the requirements under Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was also considered by the Appellate Authority. It must also be noted that the Civil Suit seeking eviction also attained finality. In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the High Court was not correct. The respondent had opportunity at every stage to present his case and whether the requirements of Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was a matter which was dealt with by the Appellate Authority in sufficient detail. In the circumstances there was no reason for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Civil Appeal NO. __ of 2019 @ SLP(C) No. 10469 of 2016 Kumud w/o Mahadeorao Salunke vs. Shri Pandurang Narayan Gandhewar Through Lrs. & Ors. 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO._4873 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.10469 of 2015) KUMUD W/O MAHADEORAO SALUNKE …Appellant(s) VERSUS SHRI… Read More when civil suit for eviction became final, basing on the permission given by slum Authorities – it can not be questioned byway of writ without pleading his case in civil suit =In Vidarbha part of the State of Maharashtra, before the enactment of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1989, there had to be two rounds of litigation to seek eviction of a tenant. The first round had to be before the Rent Controller seeking permission to issue a quit notice under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. If such permission was granted, then only the landlord could issue a notice of termination of tenancy and file a civil suit seeking eviction of a tenant. In the present case the first roundbefore the Rent Controller was gone into. Bona fide need as a ground for eviction may, in a given case, have an additional facet of comparative hardship and whether the tenant has any alternative accommodation or not. In any case, the matter had attained finality. The permission was granted by the Rent Controller and the civil suit was filed only thereafter in which an objection was taken that the premises being governed by the provisions of the Act, the requisite permission of the Slum Authority was mandatory In the proceedings so initiated the Slum Authority granted that permission. The matter was carried in appeal and the issue whether the requirements under Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was also considered by the Appellate Authority. It must also be noted that the Civil Suit seeking eviction also attained finality. In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the High Court was not correct. The respondent had opportunity at every stage to present his case and whether the requirements of Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was a matter which was dealt with by the Appellate Authority in sufficient detail. In the circumstances there was no reason for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.