Accused entitled for acquittal = the medical evidence does not support the prosecution -instead of going to the police station the witness went to the milk chilling centre to lodge the report -fire armswere not sent to a ballistic expert to show that these were the guns actually used during the occurrence. A number of authorities were cited to show that ocular evidence should be preferred to medical evidence. We are not referring to those, since in our view each case has to be decided in its own facts. -The doctor was a prosecution witness and the prosecution cannot be heard to say that his statement should not be relied upon when the doctor be declared a hostile witness. In the present case the medical evidence does not support the prosecution and we also find that there are other reasons to discredit the prosecution witnesses. No attempt was made by PW­1 or 2 to take Satinder Pal Singh (deceased) inside the Hospital for treatment. The first reaction of close relatives wouldbe to try and save their relative rather than rush to the police station. This is especially so when the occurrence took place inthe Hospital compound itself. The second doubtful feature is that instead of going to the police station the witness went to the milk chilling centre to lodge the report. There is no reasonable explanation given except that since the police were present at the milk chilling centre when the elections took place, he went to the milk chilling centre. He himself admits that the elections wereover at 3.30 P.M. and the occurrence is of 4.30 P.M. Why would he expect that the police would still be present there at the milk chilling centre even after one hour? Another aspect is that though the licensed fire arms of the accused were seized but they were not sent to a ballistic expertand there is no forensic evidence to show that these were the guns actually used during the occurrence. As far as the recovery of the Tata Sumo vehicle is concerned, it is not proved to be belonging to the accused. It belongs to some other person and the accused have not been linked to this. According to the two eye­witnesses PW­1 and 2, all the four fire arm shots hit the deceased on the head. According to the doctor there were only two entry wounds. This also belies the statement of the so called eye­witnesses according to whom the accused gave four fire arm injuries on the head of the deceased. The doctor was a prosecution witness and the prosecution cannot be heard to say that his statement should not be relied upon. The prosecution did not pray that the doctor be declared a hostile witness. Therefore, we have to go by the statement of the medical expert. In view of the above discussion, we find no merit in the aforesaid appeals and the same are dismissed.

1 NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1560 OF 2019 PREM SINGH …APPELLANT(S) Versus SUKHDEV SINGH & OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1561 OF 2019 J U D G M E N T Deepak Gupta, J. These appeals by the victim as well as by the State… Read More Accused entitled for acquittal = the medical evidence does not support the prosecution -instead of going to the police station the witness went to the milk chilling centre to lodge the report -fire armswere not sent to a ballistic expert to show that these were the guns actually used during the occurrence. A number of authorities were cited to show that ocular evidence should be preferred to medical evidence. We are not referring to those, since in our view each case has to be decided in its own facts. -The doctor was a prosecution witness and the prosecution cannot be heard to say that his statement should not be relied upon when the doctor be declared a hostile witness. In the present case the medical evidence does not support the prosecution and we also find that there are other reasons to discredit the prosecution witnesses. No attempt was made by PW­1 or 2 to take Satinder Pal Singh (deceased) inside the Hospital for treatment. The first reaction of close relatives wouldbe to try and save their relative rather than rush to the police station. This is especially so when the occurrence took place inthe Hospital compound itself. The second doubtful feature is that instead of going to the police station the witness went to the milk chilling centre to lodge the report. There is no reasonable explanation given except that since the police were present at the milk chilling centre when the elections took place, he went to the milk chilling centre. He himself admits that the elections wereover at 3.30 P.M. and the occurrence is of 4.30 P.M. Why would he expect that the police would still be present there at the milk chilling centre even after one hour? Another aspect is that though the licensed fire arms of the accused were seized but they were not sent to a ballistic expertand there is no forensic evidence to show that these were the guns actually used during the occurrence. As far as the recovery of the Tata Sumo vehicle is concerned, it is not proved to be belonging to the accused. It belongs to some other person and the accused have not been linked to this. According to the two eye­witnesses PW­1 and 2, all the four fire arm shots hit the deceased on the head. According to the doctor there were only two entry wounds. This also belies the statement of the so called eye­witnesses according to whom the accused gave four fire arm injuries on the head of the deceased. The doctor was a prosecution witness and the prosecution cannot be heard to say that his statement should not be relied upon. The prosecution did not pray that the doctor be declared a hostile witness. Therefore, we have to go by the statement of the medical expert. In view of the above discussion, we find no merit in the aforesaid appeals and the same are dismissed.

Whether the accused are entitled for discharge due to noncompliance of Section 20­A(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ‘TADA Act”) ?. As pointed out by us above, the situation may be different where, to give an example, the police official finds a dead body, sees that a murder has taken place, apprehends a person, who is running away after committing the murder and from that person a prohibited arm is recovered in a notified area. In such a situation, the main offence is the offence of murder and the offence of carrying a prohibited weapon in a notified area is the secondary offence under TADA Act. Here, the police official can record the information and arrest the person for committing an offence under Indian Penal Code,1860 but before proceeding under TADA Act he will have to take sanction under Section 20­ A(1) of TADA Act. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed, the order of the Designated TADA Court is set aside and the appellants are discharged from the offences under TADA Act but they may be proceeded against under other provisions of law.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1692 OF 2009 EBHA ARJUN JADEJA & ORS. …APPELLANT(S) Versus THE STATE OF GUJARAT …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T Deepak Gupta, J. This appeal by the accused is directed against the order passed by the Designated TADA Court… Read More Whether the accused are entitled for discharge due to noncompliance of Section 20­A(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ‘TADA Act”) ?. As pointed out by us above, the situation may be different where, to give an example, the police official finds a dead body, sees that a murder has taken place, apprehends a person, who is running away after committing the murder and from that person a prohibited arm is recovered in a notified area. In such a situation, the main offence is the offence of murder and the offence of carrying a prohibited weapon in a notified area is the secondary offence under TADA Act. Here, the police official can record the information and arrest the person for committing an offence under Indian Penal Code,1860 but before proceeding under TADA Act he will have to take sanction under Section 20­ A(1) of TADA Act. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed, the order of the Designated TADA Court is set aside and the appellants are discharged from the offences under TADA Act but they may be proceeded against under other provisions of law.

Whether the Labour Court or the Tribunal while exercising their jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) are empowered to permit the parties to lead evidence in respect of the legality and propriety of the domestic enquiry held into the misconduct of a workman, such evidence would be taken into consideration by the Labour Court or the Tribunal only if it is found that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management on the scale that the standard of proof required therein can be `preponderance of probability’ and not a `proof beyond all reasonable doubts’ suffers from inherent defects or is violative of principles of natural justice. In other words, the Labour Court or the Tribunal cannot without first examining the material led in the domestic enquiry jump to a conclusion and mechanically permit the parties to lead evidence as if it is an essential procedural part of the enquiry to be held under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.- = Consequently, the Labour Court shall in the instant case re-visit the matter afresh within the limit and scope of Section 33(2)(b), as explained above and keeping in mind that the exercise in hand is not adjudication of an `industrial dispute’ under Section 10(1)(c) or (d) read with Section 11A of the Act. However, if the Labour Court finds that the domestic inquiry held against the appellant is suffering from one of the incurable defects as illustrated by this Court in Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. or Lalla Ram’s cases, then it may look into the evidence adduced by the parties for the purpose of formation of its prima facie opinion.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8042 OF 2019 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C)No. 6371 OF 2019] John D’Souza ….. Appellants(s) VERSUS Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation …..Respondents(s) JUDGMENT SURYA KANT, J. Leave granted. The instant appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment and order… Read More Whether the Labour Court or the Tribunal while exercising their jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) are empowered to permit the parties to lead evidence in respect of the legality and propriety of the domestic enquiry held into the misconduct of a workman, such evidence would be taken into consideration by the Labour Court or the Tribunal only if it is found that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management on the scale that the standard of proof required therein can be `preponderance of probability’ and not a `proof beyond all reasonable doubts’ suffers from inherent defects or is violative of principles of natural justice. In other words, the Labour Court or the Tribunal cannot without first examining the material led in the domestic enquiry jump to a conclusion and mechanically permit the parties to lead evidence as if it is an essential procedural part of the enquiry to be held under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.- = Consequently, the Labour Court shall in the instant case re-visit the matter afresh within the limit and scope of Section 33(2)(b), as explained above and keeping in mind that the exercise in hand is not adjudication of an `industrial dispute’ under Section 10(1)(c) or (d) read with Section 11A of the Act. However, if the Labour Court finds that the domestic inquiry held against the appellant is suffering from one of the incurable defects as illustrated by this Court in Mysore Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. or Lalla Ram’s cases, then it may look into the evidence adduced by the parties for the purpose of formation of its prima facie opinion.

Whether the Black Money Act retrospectively applicable from 01.07.2015 ? =Apex court held that we find that the High Court was not right in holding that, by the notification/order impugned before it, the penal provisions were made retrospectively applicable. The Black Money Act has been passed by the Parliament on 11.05.2015 and it has received Presidential assent on 26.05.2015. Sub­section (3) of Section 1 provides, that save as otherwise provided in the said Act, it shall come into force on the 1st day of April, 2016. However, by the notification/ order notified on 01.07.2015, which have been impugned before the High Court, it has been provided, that the Black Money Act shall come into force on 01.07.2015, i.e., the date on which the order is issued under the provisions of sub­section (1) of Section 86 of the Black Money Act. However, the scheme of the Black Money Act also provided one time opportunity to make a declaration in respect of any undisclosed asset located outside India and acquired from income chargeable to tax under the Income­tax Act. Section 59 of the Black Money Act provided that such a declaration was to be made on or after the date of commencement of the Black Money Act, but on or before a date notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette. The date so notified for making a declaration is 30.09.2015 whereas, the date for payment of tax and penalty was notified to be 31.12.2015. As such, an anomalous situation was arising if the date under sub­section (3) of Section 1 of the Black Money Act was to be retained as 01.04.2016, then the period for making a declaration would have been lapsed by 30.09.2015 and the date for payment of tax and penalty would have also been lapsed by 31.12.2015. However, in view of the date originally prescribed by sub­section (3) of Section 1 of the Black Money Act, such a declaration could have been made only after 01.04.2016. Therefore, in order to give the benefit to the assessee(s) and to remove the anomalies the date 01.07.2015 has been substituted in sub­section (3) of Section 1 of the Black Money Act, in place of 01.04.2016. This is done, so as to enable the assessee desiring to take benefit of Section 59 of the Black Money Act. By doing so, the assessees, who desired to take the benefit of one time opportunity, could have made declaration prior to 30th September, 2015 and paid the tax and penalty prior to 31st December, 2015. The date has been changed only for the purpose of enabling the assessee(s) to take benefit of Section 59 of the Black Money Act. The power has been exercised only in order to remove difficulties. The penal provisions under Sections 50 and 51 of the Black Money Act would come into play only when an assessee has failed to take benefit of Section 59 and neither disclosed assets covered by the Black Money Act nor paid the tax and penalty thereon. As such, we find that the High Court was not right in holding that, by the notification/order impugned before it, the penal provisions were made retrospectively applicable.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1563 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 4911 of 2019) UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. …. APPELLANT(S) GAUTAM KHAITAN …. RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. Leave granted. The present appeal challenges the interim order… Read More Whether the Black Money Act retrospectively applicable from 01.07.2015 ? =Apex court held that we find that the High Court was not right in holding that, by the notification/order impugned before it, the penal provisions were made retrospectively applicable. The Black Money Act has been passed by the Parliament on 11.05.2015 and it has received Presidential assent on 26.05.2015. Sub­section (3) of Section 1 provides, that save as otherwise provided in the said Act, it shall come into force on the 1st day of April, 2016. However, by the notification/ order notified on 01.07.2015, which have been impugned before the High Court, it has been provided, that the Black Money Act shall come into force on 01.07.2015, i.e., the date on which the order is issued under the provisions of sub­section (1) of Section 86 of the Black Money Act. However, the scheme of the Black Money Act also provided one time opportunity to make a declaration in respect of any undisclosed asset located outside India and acquired from income chargeable to tax under the Income­tax Act. Section 59 of the Black Money Act provided that such a declaration was to be made on or after the date of commencement of the Black Money Act, but on or before a date notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette. The date so notified for making a declaration is 30.09.2015 whereas, the date for payment of tax and penalty was notified to be 31.12.2015. As such, an anomalous situation was arising if the date under sub­section (3) of Section 1 of the Black Money Act was to be retained as 01.04.2016, then the period for making a declaration would have been lapsed by 30.09.2015 and the date for payment of tax and penalty would have also been lapsed by 31.12.2015. However, in view of the date originally prescribed by sub­section (3) of Section 1 of the Black Money Act, such a declaration could have been made only after 01.04.2016. Therefore, in order to give the benefit to the assessee(s) and to remove the anomalies the date 01.07.2015 has been substituted in sub­section (3) of Section 1 of the Black Money Act, in place of 01.04.2016. This is done, so as to enable the assessee desiring to take benefit of Section 59 of the Black Money Act. By doing so, the assessees, who desired to take the benefit of one time opportunity, could have made declaration prior to 30th September, 2015 and paid the tax and penalty prior to 31st December, 2015. The date has been changed only for the purpose of enabling the assessee(s) to take benefit of Section 59 of the Black Money Act. The power has been exercised only in order to remove difficulties. The penal provisions under Sections 50 and 51 of the Black Money Act would come into play only when an assessee has failed to take benefit of Section 59 and neither disclosed assets covered by the Black Money Act nor paid the tax and penalty thereon. As such, we find that the High Court was not right in holding that, by the notification/order impugned before it, the penal provisions were made retrospectively applicable.

Whether the State Legislature can enact a law providing an appeal directly to the Supreme Court of India? We, therefore, have no doubt in our mind that Section 13(2) of the Act, in so far as it provides an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, is totally illegal, ultra vires the Constitution and beyond the scope of the powers of the State Legislature. Section 13(2) of the Act is accordingly struck down. we hold that an appeal under Section 13 (2) of the Act directly to the Supreme Court is not maintainable. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. However, we leave it open to the appellant to approach the High Court for redressal of his grievance under Article 227 of the Constitution. If the appellant does so, the High Court shall decide the matterstrictly in accordance with law.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 5153 OF 2019 H. S. YADAV …APPELLANT(S) Versus SHAKUNTALA DEVI PARAKH …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T Deepak Gupta, J. “Whether the State Legislature can enact a law providing an appeal directly to the Supreme Court of India?” is… Read More Whether the State Legislature can enact a law providing an appeal directly to the Supreme Court of India? We, therefore, have no doubt in our mind that Section 13(2) of the Act, in so far as it provides an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, is totally illegal, ultra vires the Constitution and beyond the scope of the powers of the State Legislature. Section 13(2) of the Act is accordingly struck down. we hold that an appeal under Section 13 (2) of the Act directly to the Supreme Court is not maintainable. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. However, we leave it open to the appellant to approach the High Court for redressal of his grievance under Article 227 of the Constitution. If the appellant does so, the High Court shall decide the matterstrictly in accordance with law.

“Institutional Preference” for Post Graduate Medical Admissions is the core issue involved in these appeal/petitions. = The decision of this Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar (Dr. )(II) (supra) permitting 25% Institutional Preference has been distinguished by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Saurabh Chaudri(supra). Therefore, once the Institutional Preference to the extent of 50% of the total number of open seats has held to be permissible, in that case, thereafter it will be for the appropriate authority/State to consider how much percentage seats are to be reserved for Institutional Preference/Reservation. It will be in the realm of a policy decision and this Court cannot substitute the same, unless it is held to be arbitrary and/or mala fide and/or not permissible. As observed hereinabove, a five Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Saurabh Chaudri (supra) has categorically allowed/permitted/approved the Institutional Preference/Reservation in the post graduate medical courses to the extent of 50% of the total number of open seats. Therefore, for the reasons stated above and considering the decisions of this Court in the cases of Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra); a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Saurabh Chaudri (supra); and Saurabh Dwivedi (supra), Institutional Preference to the extent of 50% is approved and it is observed and held that introduction of the NEET Scheme shall not affect such Institutional Preference/Reservation. Such a regulation providing 50% Institutional Preference/Reservation shall not be in any way ultra vires to Section 10D of the MCI Act. Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, even in the case of Institutional Preference/Reservation, the admissions in the post graduate courses are to be given on the basis of the merits and marks obtained in the NEET examination result only.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7939 OF 2019 (Arising from SLP(C) No. 7003 of 2017) Yatinkumar Jasubhai Patel and others …Appellants Versus State of Gujarat and others …Respondents WITH WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 122 OF 2018 WRIT PETITION(C) NO. 1479 OF 2018 WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 1142 OF 2019 J U D G M E N T M.R. SHAH, J. Leave granted in the special leave petition. 1 2. The   “Institutional   Preference”   for   Post   Graduate   Medical Admissions is the core issue involved in these appeal/petitions.   3. Pursuant to the order passed by a two Judge Bench of this Court dated 12.09.2018, all these appeal/petitions are placed before the larger Bench. 4. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment and order dated 22.02.2017 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No. 19918/2016, by which the Division Bench has dismissed the said writ petition upholding the vires of Rules 2, 3, 4.1 and 4.3… Read More “Institutional Preference” for Post Graduate Medical Admissions is the core issue involved in these appeal/petitions. = The decision of this Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar (Dr. )(II) (supra) permitting 25% Institutional Preference has been distinguished by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Saurabh Chaudri(supra). Therefore, once the Institutional Preference to the extent of 50% of the total number of open seats has held to be permissible, in that case, thereafter it will be for the appropriate authority/State to consider how much percentage seats are to be reserved for Institutional Preference/Reservation. It will be in the realm of a policy decision and this Court cannot substitute the same, unless it is held to be arbitrary and/or mala fide and/or not permissible. As observed hereinabove, a five Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Saurabh Chaudri (supra) has categorically allowed/permitted/approved the Institutional Preference/Reservation in the post graduate medical courses to the extent of 50% of the total number of open seats. Therefore, for the reasons stated above and considering the decisions of this Court in the cases of Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra); a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Saurabh Chaudri (supra); and Saurabh Dwivedi (supra), Institutional Preference to the extent of 50% is approved and it is observed and held that introduction of the NEET Scheme shall not affect such Institutional Preference/Reservation. Such a regulation providing 50% Institutional Preference/Reservation shall not be in any way ultra vires to Section 10D of the MCI Act. Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, even in the case of Institutional Preference/Reservation, the admissions in the post graduate courses are to be given on the basis of the merits and marks obtained in the NEET examination result only.