suit for specific performance – essential pleadings of facts and proof is mandatory = It was for the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness to pay the stipulated amount and it was not for the appellants to raise such question…” 16. When the pleadings in the present case are examined with reference to the principle aforesaid, it is but apparent that in the plaint, the plaintiff referred to the agreement in question whereby, the defendant had allegedly agreed to sell the house in question to him for a sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/- and averred that the defendant received a sum of Rs. 15,000/- from him. The plaintiff stated that the agreement was executed on 16/17.04.1975. Thereafter, the plaintiff straight away referred to the fact that subsequent to the execution of agreement, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was promulgated; and Section 27 thereof prohibited transfer of property without prior permission of the Competent Authority. The plaintiff further averred that he served notice dated 06.05.1979 on the defendant asking him to seek permission and to execute the sale deed; that the notice was personally served on the defendant on 17.05.1979; and that the defendant in his reply dated 06.07.1979, feigned ignorance about the agreement. The plaintiff further averred that the defendant was bound to execute the sale deed of the house after seeking necessary permission and for the defendant having failed to do so, the suit was being filed. There is not even a remote suggestion in the plaint averments that the plaintiff had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Even in the plaintiff’s testimony as PW-1, it is difficult to find a 13 categorical assertion that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The testimony of the plaintiff as PW-1 is essentially directed towards the existence and validity of the alleged agreement and the surrounding dealings of the parties; but is lacking in those material assertions on readiness and willingness on his part, which remain essential for grant of the relief of the specific performance.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8199 OF 2009 MEHBOOB-UR-REHMAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. Appellant(s) VS. AHSANUL GHANI Respondent(s) JUDGMENT Dinesh Maheshwari, J. The appellant herein (since deceased and represented by his legal representatives) had filed the suit for specific performance of Agreement to Sell, being O.S. No.… Read More suit for specific performance – essential pleadings of facts and proof is mandatory = It was for the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness to pay the stipulated amount and it was not for the appellants to raise such question…” 16. When the pleadings in the present case are examined with reference to the principle aforesaid, it is but apparent that in the plaint, the plaintiff referred to the agreement in question whereby, the defendant had allegedly agreed to sell the house in question to him for a sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/- and averred that the defendant received a sum of Rs. 15,000/- from him. The plaintiff stated that the agreement was executed on 16/17.04.1975. Thereafter, the plaintiff straight away referred to the fact that subsequent to the execution of agreement, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was promulgated; and Section 27 thereof prohibited transfer of property without prior permission of the Competent Authority. The plaintiff further averred that he served notice dated 06.05.1979 on the defendant asking him to seek permission and to execute the sale deed; that the notice was personally served on the defendant on 17.05.1979; and that the defendant in his reply dated 06.07.1979, feigned ignorance about the agreement. The plaintiff further averred that the defendant was bound to execute the sale deed of the house after seeking necessary permission and for the defendant having failed to do so, the suit was being filed. There is not even a remote suggestion in the plaint averments that the plaintiff had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Even in the plaintiff’s testimony as PW-1, it is difficult to find a 13 categorical assertion that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The testimony of the plaintiff as PW-1 is essentially directed towards the existence and validity of the alleged agreement and the surrounding dealings of the parties; but is lacking in those material assertions on readiness and willingness on his part, which remain essential for grant of the relief of the specific performance.

Right to Information Act, 2005 = GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR CIC & SCICs 67) (i) Insofar as transparency in appointment of Information Commissioners is concerned, pursuant to the directions given by this Court, the Central Government is now placing all necessary information including issuance of the advertisement, receipt and applications, particulars of the applicants, composition of Selection Committee etc. on the website. All States shall also follow this system. (ii) Insofar as terms and conditions of appointment are concerned, no doubt, Section 13(5) of RTI Act states that the CIC and Information Commissioners shall be appointed on the same terms and conditions as applicable to the Chief Election Commissioner/Election Commissioner. At the same time, it would also be appropriate if the said terms and conditions on which such appointments are to be made are specifically stipulated in the advertisement and put on website as well. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 436 of 2019 Page 49 of 52 (iii) Likewise, it would also be appropriate for the Search Committee to make the criteria for shortlisting the candidates, public, so that it is ensured that shortlisting is done on the basis of objective and rational criteria. (iv) We also expect that Information Commissioners are appointed from other streams, as mentioned in the Act and the selection is not limited only to the Government employee/exgovernment employee. In this behalf, the respondents shall also take into consideration and follow the below directions given by this Court in Union of India vs. Namit Sharma6 “32. … (iii) We direct that only persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in the fields mentioned in Ss. 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act be considered for appointment as Information Commissioner and Chief Information Commissioner. (iv) We further direct that persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in all the fields mentioned in Ss. 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act, namely, law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance, be considered by the Committees under Ss. 12(3) and 15(3) of the Act for appointment as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioners. (v) We further direct that the Committees under Ss. 12(3) and 15(3) of the Act while making recommendations to the President or to the Governor, as the case may be, for appointment of Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners must mention against the name of each candidate recommended, the facts to indicate his eminence in public life, his knowledge in the 6 (2013) 10 SCC 359 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 436 of 2019 Page 50 of 52 particular field and his experience in the particular field and these facts must be accessible to the citizens as part of their right to information under the Act after the appointment is made.” (v) We would also like to impress upon the respondents to fill up vacancies, in future, without any delay. For this purpose, it would be apposite that the process for filling up of a particular vacancy is initiated 1 to 2 months before the date on which the vacancy is likely to occur so that there is not much time lag between the occurrence of vacancy and filling up of the said vacancy. 68) We would like to place on record that aforesaid directions are given keeping in view the salient purpose which RTI Act is supposed to serve. This Act is enacted not only to sub-serve and ensure freedom of speech. On proper implementation, it has the potential to bring about good governance which is an integral part of any vibrant democracy. Attaining good governance is also one of the visions of the Constitution. It also has vital connection with the development. All these aspects are highlighted above.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 436 OF 2018 ANJALI BHARDWAJ AND OTHERS …..PETITIONER VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS …..RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T A.K. SIKRI, J. This writ petition is filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, as a… Read More Right to Information Act, 2005 = GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR CIC & SCICs 67) (i) Insofar as transparency in appointment of Information Commissioners is concerned, pursuant to the directions given by this Court, the Central Government is now placing all necessary information including issuance of the advertisement, receipt and applications, particulars of the applicants, composition of Selection Committee etc. on the website. All States shall also follow this system. (ii) Insofar as terms and conditions of appointment are concerned, no doubt, Section 13(5) of RTI Act states that the CIC and Information Commissioners shall be appointed on the same terms and conditions as applicable to the Chief Election Commissioner/Election Commissioner. At the same time, it would also be appropriate if the said terms and conditions on which such appointments are to be made are specifically stipulated in the advertisement and put on website as well. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 436 of 2019 Page 49 of 52 (iii) Likewise, it would also be appropriate for the Search Committee to make the criteria for shortlisting the candidates, public, so that it is ensured that shortlisting is done on the basis of objective and rational criteria. (iv) We also expect that Information Commissioners are appointed from other streams, as mentioned in the Act and the selection is not limited only to the Government employee/exgovernment employee. In this behalf, the respondents shall also take into consideration and follow the below directions given by this Court in Union of India vs. Namit Sharma6 “32. … (iii) We direct that only persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in the fields mentioned in Ss. 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act be considered for appointment as Information Commissioner and Chief Information Commissioner. (iv) We further direct that persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in all the fields mentioned in Ss. 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act, namely, law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance, be considered by the Committees under Ss. 12(3) and 15(3) of the Act for appointment as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioners. (v) We further direct that the Committees under Ss. 12(3) and 15(3) of the Act while making recommendations to the President or to the Governor, as the case may be, for appointment of Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners must mention against the name of each candidate recommended, the facts to indicate his eminence in public life, his knowledge in the 6 (2013) 10 SCC 359 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 436 of 2019 Page 50 of 52 particular field and his experience in the particular field and these facts must be accessible to the citizens as part of their right to information under the Act after the appointment is made.” (v) We would also like to impress upon the respondents to fill up vacancies, in future, without any delay. For this purpose, it would be apposite that the process for filling up of a particular vacancy is initiated 1 to 2 months before the date on which the vacancy is likely to occur so that there is not much time lag between the occurrence of vacancy and filling up of the said vacancy. 68) We would like to place on record that aforesaid directions are given keeping in view the salient purpose which RTI Act is supposed to serve. This Act is enacted not only to sub-serve and ensure freedom of speech. On proper implementation, it has the potential to bring about good governance which is an integral part of any vibrant democracy. Attaining good governance is also one of the visions of the Constitution. It also has vital connection with the development. All these aspects are highlighted above.

contempt proceedings=daily wagers= Under certain circumstances, namely, on completion of specified number of years of service on daily wage basis, these daily wage workers are entitled to become permanent.On attaining the status of permanency/regular employees, they become at par with those employees who were appointed on permanent basis from beginning, after undergoing the proper selection procedure on proving their merit. These daily wagers cannot be given the pay scales which are even better than the pay scales given to regularly appointed employees.; all those daily wagers who become entitled to get the status of regular/permanent employees before April 01, 2005 has to be given the benefit of GPF. To put it otherwise, April 01, 2005 would be treated as cut-off date. All those persons who would be entitled to regularisation/permanent status prior to April 01, 2005 shall be given the benefit of earlier scheme i.e. GPF. However, those who attain this status after April 01, 2005 shall be governed by CPF Scheme/NPS.; The respondents workers who have been working on daily wage basis cannot be given casual leave which is more than the entitlement extended to regular Government employees. We accept the plea of the appellant that GR dated October 17, 1988 which provides for 14 days casual leave including 2 days of voluntary/optional leave is the result of inadvertent transaction error. Even otherwise, as pointed out above, the casual leave for daily wagers cannot be more than the regular Government employees. We, therefore, hold that the respondents employees shall be entitled to 12 days of casual leave and 2 days of voluntary leave/restricted leave

NON REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 1684-1686 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 5028-5030 OF 2019) ARISING OUT OF DIARY NO. 43592 OF 2018) THE STATE OF GUJARAT …..APPELLANT(S) VERSUS PWD AND FOREST EMPLOYEES UNION & ORS. …..RESPONDENT(S) W I T H CIVIL… Read More contempt proceedings=daily wagers= Under certain circumstances, namely, on completion of specified number of years of service on daily wage basis, these daily wage workers are entitled to become permanent.On attaining the status of permanency/regular employees, they become at par with those employees who were appointed on permanent basis from beginning, after undergoing the proper selection procedure on proving their merit. These daily wagers cannot be given the pay scales which are even better than the pay scales given to regularly appointed employees.; all those daily wagers who become entitled to get the status of regular/permanent employees before April 01, 2005 has to be given the benefit of GPF. To put it otherwise, April 01, 2005 would be treated as cut-off date. All those persons who would be entitled to regularisation/permanent status prior to April 01, 2005 shall be given the benefit of earlier scheme i.e. GPF. However, those who attain this status after April 01, 2005 shall be governed by CPF Scheme/NPS.; The respondents workers who have been working on daily wage basis cannot be given casual leave which is more than the entitlement extended to regular Government employees. We accept the plea of the appellant that GR dated October 17, 1988 which provides for 14 days casual leave including 2 days of voluntary/optional leave is the result of inadvertent transaction error. Even otherwise, as pointed out above, the casual leave for daily wagers cannot be more than the regular Government employees. We, therefore, hold that the respondents employees shall be entitled to 12 days of casual leave and 2 days of voluntary leave/restricted leave

No hard­and­fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated but what is required is that judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct. ;There is no such legal proposition that the evidence of police officials unless supported by independent witness is unworthy of acceptance or the evidence of police officials can be outrightly disregarded.

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 2100 OF 2008 KRIPAL SINGH ….Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Rastogi, J. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 4th February, 2008 passed by the High Court of Judicature… Read More No hard­and­fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated but what is required is that judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct. ;There is no such legal proposition that the evidence of police officials unless supported by independent witness is unworthy of acceptance or the evidence of police officials can be outrightly disregarded.

Section 302/34.= The essential constituent of the vicarious criminal liability prescribed by Section 34 is the existence of common intention. If the common intention in question animates the accused persons and if the said common intention leads to the commission of the criminal offence charged, each of the persons sharing the common intention is constructively liable for the criminal act done by one of them. Just as the combination of persons sharing the same common object is one of the features of an unlawful assembly, so the existence of a combination of persons sharing the same common intention is one of the features of Section 34. It is now well­settled that the common intention required by Section 34 is different from the same intention or similar intention.- whether prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the sharing of common intention to commit the murder of deceased Mohammad Shakil by the accused appellants.=There is no incriminating material which has been placed by the prosecution to have their presence at the time of commission of crime and to caught hold of the deceased Mohammad Shakil and (PW­2) Adilahmed and even their clothes were not recovered in support of the ocular evidence of the interested witnesses, their presence being a holiday do not inspire confidence.-other than the allegation that the accused persons caught hold of deceased Mohammad Shakil, there is no other instigating action or overt act attributed to the present accused appellants actively participating in the commission of crime as alleged and from the conduct of the accused persons, it seems that there was no meeting of minds to form of pre­arranged plan. It is true that it can be developed at the spur of the moment but there must be pre­arrangement and pre­meditated concert which is the requirement of law for applicability under Section 34 IPC and from the case of the prosecution, the mere fact that accused appellants caught hold of deceased Mohammad Shakil facilitating the other accused persons to come with a knife and gupti and gave blows, it cannot be said that the accused appellants shared common intention with the other accused persons keeping note of the fact that in the complaint which was in the first instance registered for the alleged incident by accused no. 1 Iftekharhussain Sabdarhussain, he only recorded the presence of accused no. 2 Shefakathussain Sabdarhussain but the time when the complaint was registered at the instance of the present offence by the Shamimbanu (PW­1) at 2.00 p.m., the present accused appellants were also intentionally implicated. Certainly 18 it creates a doubt of their false implication and their presence from the prosecution evidence on record appears to be clouded with suspicion and in our considered view, the present appellants cannot be held guilty of the offence under Section 302 with the aid of Section 34 IPC. – In our considered view, the High Court has committed a manifest error in holding the appellants guilty under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for participating in the commission of crime. The appellants deserve to be acquitted of the charges filed against them by giving them benefit of doubt.

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 2007 OF 2008 EZAJHUSSAIN SABDARHUSSAIN & ANR. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Rastogi, J. The appellants are assailing their conviction under Section 302 read with section 34 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment… Read More Section 302/34.= The essential constituent of the vicarious criminal liability prescribed by Section 34 is the existence of common intention. If the common intention in question animates the accused persons and if the said common intention leads to the commission of the criminal offence charged, each of the persons sharing the common intention is constructively liable for the criminal act done by one of them. Just as the combination of persons sharing the same common object is one of the features of an unlawful assembly, so the existence of a combination of persons sharing the same common intention is one of the features of Section 34. It is now well­settled that the common intention required by Section 34 is different from the same intention or similar intention.- whether prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the sharing of common intention to commit the murder of deceased Mohammad Shakil by the accused appellants.=There is no incriminating material which has been placed by the prosecution to have their presence at the time of commission of crime and to caught hold of the deceased Mohammad Shakil and (PW­2) Adilahmed and even their clothes were not recovered in support of the ocular evidence of the interested witnesses, their presence being a holiday do not inspire confidence.-other than the allegation that the accused persons caught hold of deceased Mohammad Shakil, there is no other instigating action or overt act attributed to the present accused appellants actively participating in the commission of crime as alleged and from the conduct of the accused persons, it seems that there was no meeting of minds to form of pre­arranged plan. It is true that it can be developed at the spur of the moment but there must be pre­arrangement and pre­meditated concert which is the requirement of law for applicability under Section 34 IPC and from the case of the prosecution, the mere fact that accused appellants caught hold of deceased Mohammad Shakil facilitating the other accused persons to come with a knife and gupti and gave blows, it cannot be said that the accused appellants shared common intention with the other accused persons keeping note of the fact that in the complaint which was in the first instance registered for the alleged incident by accused no. 1 Iftekharhussain Sabdarhussain, he only recorded the presence of accused no. 2 Shefakathussain Sabdarhussain but the time when the complaint was registered at the instance of the present offence by the Shamimbanu (PW­1) at 2.00 p.m., the present accused appellants were also intentionally implicated. Certainly 18 it creates a doubt of their false implication and their presence from the prosecution evidence on record appears to be clouded with suspicion and in our considered view, the present appellants cannot be held guilty of the offence under Section 302 with the aid of Section 34 IPC. – In our considered view, the High Court has committed a manifest error in holding the appellants guilty under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for participating in the commission of crime. The appellants deserve to be acquitted of the charges filed against them by giving them benefit of doubt.

convicted them under Section 302/34 IPC instead of Section 302/149 IPC. = When prosecution did not set up such case at any stage of the proceedings against the appellants nor adduced any evidence against the appellants that they (three) prior to date of the incident had at any point of time shared the “common intention” and in furtherance of sharing such common intention came on the spot to eliminate Mahendro Bai and lastly, the High Court having failed to give any reasons in support of altered conviction except saying in one line that conviction is upheld under Section 302/34 IPC in place of Section 302/149 IPC, the invoking of Section 34 IPC at the appellate stage by the High Court, in our view, cannot be upheld. As per post­mortem report, both the assault made by the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 caused simple injury to Mahendro Bai which did not result in her death and nor could result in her death. (see injury Nos. 2 and 3 in the evidence of PW­3 Dr. P.S. Parihar) 68. In a case of this nature, when there is a fight between the two groups and where there are gun shots exchanged between the two groups against each other and when on evidence eight co­accused are completely let of and where the State does not pursue their plea of Section 149 IPC against the acquitted eight accused which attains finality and where the plea of Section 34 IPC is not framed against any accused and where even at the appellate stage no evidence is relied on by the prosecution to sustain the charge of Section 34 IPC qua the three accused appellants independent of eight acquitted co­accused and when out of two main accused assailants, one has died and the other is acquitted and lastly, in the absence of any reasoning given by the High Court for sustaining the conviction of the three appellants in support of alteration of the charge, we are of the considered view that the two appellants are entitled to claim the benefit of entire scenario and seek alteration of their conviction for commission of the offence punishable under Section 324 IPC simplicitor rather than to suffer conviction under Section 302/34 IPC, if not complete acquittal alike other eight coaccused.= We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that appellant Nos. 2 and 3 could at best be convicted for an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC and not beyond it on the basis of their individual participation in the commission of the crime.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1144 OF 2009 Mala Singh & Ors. …Appellants Versus State of Haryana …Respondent J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. This appeal is filed by the three accused persons against the final judgment and order dated 11.02.2008 passed… Read More convicted them under Section 302/34 IPC instead of Section 302/149 IPC. = When prosecution did not set up such case at any stage of the proceedings against the appellants nor adduced any evidence against the appellants that they (three) prior to date of the incident had at any point of time shared the “common intention” and in furtherance of sharing such common intention came on the spot to eliminate Mahendro Bai and lastly, the High Court having failed to give any reasons in support of altered conviction except saying in one line that conviction is upheld under Section 302/34 IPC in place of Section 302/149 IPC, the invoking of Section 34 IPC at the appellate stage by the High Court, in our view, cannot be upheld. As per post­mortem report, both the assault made by the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 caused simple injury to Mahendro Bai which did not result in her death and nor could result in her death. (see injury Nos. 2 and 3 in the evidence of PW­3 Dr. P.S. Parihar) 68. In a case of this nature, when there is a fight between the two groups and where there are gun shots exchanged between the two groups against each other and when on evidence eight co­accused are completely let of and where the State does not pursue their plea of Section 149 IPC against the acquitted eight accused which attains finality and where the plea of Section 34 IPC is not framed against any accused and where even at the appellate stage no evidence is relied on by the prosecution to sustain the charge of Section 34 IPC qua the three accused appellants independent of eight acquitted co­accused and when out of two main accused assailants, one has died and the other is acquitted and lastly, in the absence of any reasoning given by the High Court for sustaining the conviction of the three appellants in support of alteration of the charge, we are of the considered view that the two appellants are entitled to claim the benefit of entire scenario and seek alteration of their conviction for commission of the offence punishable under Section 324 IPC simplicitor rather than to suffer conviction under Section 302/34 IPC, if not complete acquittal alike other eight coaccused.= We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that appellant Nos. 2 and 3 could at best be convicted for an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC and not beyond it on the basis of their individual participation in the commission of the crime.

“456. Power to restore possession of immovable property. ­ (1) When a person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation, and it appears to the Court that, by such force or show of force or intimidation, any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that possession of the same be restored to that person after evicting by force, if necessary, any other person who may be in possession of the property: Provided that no such order shall be made by the Court more than one month after the date of the conviction. (2) Where the Court trying the offence has not made an order under sub­section (1), the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision may, if it thinks fit, make such order while disposing of the appeal, reference or revision, as the case may be. (3) Where an order has been made under subsection (1), the provisions of section 454 shall apply in relation thereto as they apply in relation to an order under section 453. (4) No order made under this section shall prejudice any right or interest to or in such immovable property which any person may be able to establish in a civil suit.” A bare reading of the Sub­Section 1 of Section 456 clearly indicates that the Trial Court can pass an order for restoration of the possession of the property to the person who was forcibly dispossessed. The proviso no doubt lays down that no such order shall be passed after one month of the date of conviction. The order of the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.7799 of 1998 dated 19.09.2008, the order of the Sessions Court in Criminal Revision No.234 of 1998 dated 02.09.1998, the order of the Trial Court in M. J. C. No.1 of 1998 dated 01.05.1998 are set aside and the respondents are directed to handover the possession of the property, which is the subject matter of the case and from which the appellant and his father were forcibly dispossessed, to the appellant within one month of the service by a certified copy of this order upon the respondents

1 NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1104 OF 2011 Mahesh Dube …Appellant(s) Versus Shivbodh and Ors. …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Deepak Gupta, J. Shankar Prasad Dube, father of the respondents was a tenant of Prayag Prasad Dube, father of the appellant. A… Read More “456. Power to restore possession of immovable property. ­ (1) When a person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation, and it appears to the Court that, by such force or show of force or intimidation, any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that possession of the same be restored to that person after evicting by force, if necessary, any other person who may be in possession of the property: Provided that no such order shall be made by the Court more than one month after the date of the conviction. (2) Where the Court trying the offence has not made an order under sub­section (1), the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision may, if it thinks fit, make such order while disposing of the appeal, reference or revision, as the case may be. (3) Where an order has been made under subsection (1), the provisions of section 454 shall apply in relation thereto as they apply in relation to an order under section 453. (4) No order made under this section shall prejudice any right or interest to or in such immovable property which any person may be able to establish in a civil suit.” A bare reading of the Sub­Section 1 of Section 456 clearly indicates that the Trial Court can pass an order for restoration of the possession of the property to the person who was forcibly dispossessed. The proviso no doubt lays down that no such order shall be passed after one month of the date of conviction. The order of the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.7799 of 1998 dated 19.09.2008, the order of the Sessions Court in Criminal Revision No.234 of 1998 dated 02.09.1998, the order of the Trial Court in M. J. C. No.1 of 1998 dated 01.05.1998 are set aside and the respondents are directed to handover the possession of the property, which is the subject matter of the case and from which the appellant and his father were forcibly dispossessed, to the appellant within one month of the service by a certified copy of this order upon the respondents