Suit for declaration and injunction on the basis of a Will dated 20.05.1991 executed by the owner of the said properties Sri Sangappa son of Pampanna Shettar of Koppal; and that a trust created by the defendants on 28.05.1994, in the name “Shri Sangappa Pampanna Gadagshettar Trust, Koppal” in relation to the suit properties, was illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiffs. The contesting defendants i.e., defendant Nos. 1 to 5 refuted the claim so made by the plaintiffs while questioning the genuineness of the alleged Will dated 20.05.1991. The defendant No. 7, one of the erstwhile trustees of the said trust, however, admitted and endorsed the claim of the plaintiffs. – Trail court decreed the suit – High court dismissed the suit as the will is not proved – Apex court confirmed the same . Will – Suspecious Circumstances – Appreciation of Evidence. VVIP

REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 6076 OF 2009SHIVAKUMAR & ORS. ……… Appellant(s)VersusSHARANABASAPPA & ORS. ………Respondent(s)J U D G E M E N TDinesh Maheshwari, J.PRELIMINARY AND BRIEF OUTLINE By way of this appeal, the plaintiff-appellants have challenged thejudgment and decree dated 26.10.2007 passed by the High Court ofKarnataka at Bangalore… Read More Suit for declaration and injunction on the basis of a Will dated 20.05.1991 executed by the owner of the said properties Sri Sangappa son of Pampanna Shettar of Koppal; and that a trust created by the defendants on 28.05.1994, in the name “Shri Sangappa Pampanna Gadagshettar Trust, Koppal” in relation to the suit properties, was illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiffs. The contesting defendants i.e., defendant Nos. 1 to 5 refuted the claim so made by the plaintiffs while questioning the genuineness of the alleged Will dated 20.05.1991. The defendant No. 7, one of the erstwhile trustees of the said trust, however, admitted and endorsed the claim of the plaintiffs. – Trail court decreed the suit – High court dismissed the suit as the will is not proved – Apex court confirmed the same . Will – Suspecious Circumstances – Appreciation of Evidence. VVIP

It is fairly well settled that in an approved layout, the open spaces which are left, are to be continued in that manner alone and no construction can be permitted in such open spaces. The Development Plan which was submitted in the year 1999, as per the 1991 DCR, will not divest the utility of certain plots which are reserved for open spaces in the approved layout. The appellants cannot plead that such a layout was only temporary and as a stop gap arrangement, the said two plots were shown as open spaces/garden and now they be permitted to use for construction. 2020 [4] advocatemmmohan apex court cases 10

C.A. Nos.6216-6217 of 20191REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NOS.6216-6217 OF 2019Anjuman E Shiate Ali & Anr. …AppellantsvsGulmohar Area Societies WelfareGroup & Ors. etc. …RespondentsJ U D G M E N TR.SUBHASH REDDY,J. Both these civil appeals arise out of a commonjudgment dated 19.07.2017, passed by the High Court ofJudicature at… Read More It is fairly well settled that in an approved layout, the open spaces which are left, are to be continued in that manner alone and no construction can be permitted in such open spaces. The Development Plan which was submitted in the year 1999, as per the 1991 DCR, will not divest the utility of certain plots which are reserved for open spaces in the approved layout. The appellants cannot plead that such a layout was only temporary and as a stop gap arrangement, the said two plots were shown as open spaces/garden and now they be permitted to use for construction. 2020 [4] advocatemmmohan apex court cases 10

whether the husband of the respondent had acquired an indefeasible right to seek for voluntary retirement from service ? and in that light whether the High Court was justified in arriving at the conclusion that the subsequent resignation dated 03.05.2006 submitted by the husband of the respondent be considered as an application for voluntary retirement and treat the cessation of the jural relationship of employer/employee under the provision for Voluntary Retirement. Apex court held that when the application for voluntary retirement was filed on 28.07.2005 and had not been favourably considered by the employer, instead of submitting the resignation on 03.05.2006, if any legal right was available the appropriate course ought to have been to seek for acceptance of the application by initiating appropriate legal proceedings. Instead the respondent’s husband had yielded to the position of nonacceptance of the application for voluntary retirement and has thereafter submitted his resignation. The acceptance of the resignation was acted upon by receiving the terminal benefits. If that be the position, when the writ petition was filed belatedly in the year 2012 and that too after the death of the employee who had not raised any grievance during his life time, consideration of the prayer made by the respondent wasnot justified. The High Court has, therefore, committedan error in passing the concurrent orders. 2020[4]Advocatemmmohan Apex Court Cases 9

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 2236 OF 2020(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.5650 of 2019)Rajasthan State Road Transport .… Appellant(s)Corporation Ltd. & Ors.VersusSmt. Mohani Devi & Anr. …. Respondent(s)J U D G M E N TA.S. Bopanna,J. The respondent herein was the Petitioner in S.BCivil Writ Petition No. 2839/2012 filed… Read More whether the husband of the respondent had acquired an indefeasible right to seek for voluntary retirement from service ? and in that light whether the High Court was justified in arriving at the conclusion that the subsequent resignation dated 03.05.2006 submitted by the husband of the respondent be considered as an application for voluntary retirement and treat the cessation of the jural relationship of employer/employee under the provision for Voluntary Retirement. Apex court held that when the application for voluntary retirement was filed on 28.07.2005 and had not been favourably considered by the employer, instead of submitting the resignation on 03.05.2006, if any legal right was available the appropriate course ought to have been to seek for acceptance of the application by initiating appropriate legal proceedings. Instead the respondent’s husband had yielded to the position of nonacceptance of the application for voluntary retirement and has thereafter submitted his resignation. The acceptance of the resignation was acted upon by receiving the terminal benefits. If that be the position, when the writ petition was filed belatedly in the year 2012 and that too after the death of the employee who had not raised any grievance during his life time, consideration of the prayer made by the respondent wasnot justified. The High Court has, therefore, committedan error in passing the concurrent orders. 2020[4]Advocatemmmohan Apex Court Cases 9

Application of law – Misapplication of Law -Non Application of Law – High court misapplied the law to the set of facts and as such liable to be set aside. Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511 Apex court held that in cases where there has been a long period of continuous separation and the marriage becomes a fiction it would be appropriate to dissolve such marriage. On the position of law enunciated it would not be necessary to advert indetail inasmuch as the decision to dissolve the marriageapart from the grounds available, will have to be taken oncase to case basis and there cannot be a strait jacket formula. This Court can in any event exercise the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in appropriate cases. However, in the instant facts, having given our thoughtful consideration to that aspect we notice that the parties hail from a conservative background where divorce is considered a taboo and further they have a female child born on 03.01.2007 who is presently aged about 13 years. In a matter where the differences between the parties are not of such magnitude and is in the nature of the usual wear andtear of marital life, the future of the child and her marital prospects are also to be kept in view, and in such circumstance the dissolution of marriage merely becausethey have been litigating and they have been residingseparately for quite some time would not be justified inthe present facts, more particularly when the restitution of conjugal rights was also considered simultaneously. In that view, having arrived at the conclusion that the very nature of the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court is not justified and the conclusion reached is also not sustainable, the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside 2020 [3]advocatemmmohan apex court cases 16

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1912­1913 OF 2020(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) Nos.2704­2705 of 2019)Mangayakarasi .…Appellant(s)VersusM. Yuvaraj …. Respondent(s)J U D G M E N TA.S. Bopanna,J. The appellant is before this Court assailing thejudgment dated 20.07.2018 passed by the High Court ofJudicature at Madras in CMSA Nos.23 & 24… Read More Application of law – Misapplication of Law -Non Application of Law – High court misapplied the law to the set of facts and as such liable to be set aside. Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511 Apex court held that in cases where there has been a long period of continuous separation and the marriage becomes a fiction it would be appropriate to dissolve such marriage. On the position of law enunciated it would not be necessary to advert indetail inasmuch as the decision to dissolve the marriageapart from the grounds available, will have to be taken oncase to case basis and there cannot be a strait jacket formula. This Court can in any event exercise the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in appropriate cases. However, in the instant facts, having given our thoughtful consideration to that aspect we notice that the parties hail from a conservative background where divorce is considered a taboo and further they have a female child born on 03.01.2007 who is presently aged about 13 years. In a matter where the differences between the parties are not of such magnitude and is in the nature of the usual wear andtear of marital life, the future of the child and her marital prospects are also to be kept in view, and in such circumstance the dissolution of marriage merely becausethey have been litigating and they have been residingseparately for quite some time would not be justified inthe present facts, more particularly when the restitution of conjugal rights was also considered simultaneously. In that view, having arrived at the conclusion that the very nature of the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court is not justified and the conclusion reached is also not sustainable, the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside 2020 [3]advocatemmmohan apex court cases 16

whether the appellant working as Assistant Director in CACEE was entitled to continue till 60 years of age which was the age of retirement of Teacher of the Kerala University or he was to retire at the age of 56 years.? S. Ramamohana Rao vs. A.P. Agricultural University and another, 1997 (8) SCC 350. In the above case the appellant was working as a Director of Physical Director in the Bapatla Agricultural College. The appellant was initially appointed as Physical Director in Agricultural College which was a Government College which College stood transferred to the Andhra Pradesh University, when it was formed, the services of the appellant stood transferred to the Agricultural University and he continued to work as Director in the said University. This Court noted the definition of Teacher in the University Statutes and came to the conclusion that Physical Director is also Teacher within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University Act, 1963. The said judgment has no bearing in the present case since admittedly the appellant in the said case was working in the University as Director of Physical Education. 37. We may also notice one of the letters dated 31.10.2014 brought on record as Annexure-P-17 to the petition which is a communication by the Government of Kerala according sanction for merging the Centre for Adult, Continuing Education & Extension which is to the following effect: “ORDER Sanction is accorded for merging the Centre for Adult, Continuing Education & Extension (CACEE) which is functioning as Self Financing Centre under the University of Kerala, with Institute of Distance Education so that the department can function in dual mode as Institute of Distance and Adult Continuing Education. (By order of the Governor) Dr. K.M. ABRAHAM Additional Chief Secretary.” 38. As per the Government letter Centre has been merged with Institute of Distance Education, what are the consequences of merger of Centre with Institute of Distance Education have neither been explained by the appellant nor there are any material to come to the conclusion that by such merger the Centre shall become Centre maintained by the University. The above letter of the Government also supports our conclusion that Centre is not maintained by the University and it is Self-Financing Centre. The said letter also in no manner supports the case of the appellant as the claim of the appellant as raised in this appeal. 39. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeal which is dismissed accordingly.

1REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO.1641 of 2020(arising out of SLP(C)No.26880 of 2016)P. GOPINATHAN PILLAI …APPELLANT(S)VERSUSUNIVERSITY OF KERALA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)J U D G M E N TASHOK BHUSHAN, J.This appeal has been filed by the appellant forquashing the judgment of Kerala High Court dated08.07.2016 by which Writ Petition (C)No.12179 of… Read More whether the appellant working as Assistant Director in CACEE was entitled to continue till 60 years of age which was the age of retirement of Teacher of the Kerala University or he was to retire at the age of 56 years.? S. Ramamohana Rao vs. A.P. Agricultural University and another, 1997 (8) SCC 350. In the above case the appellant was working as a Director of Physical Director in the Bapatla Agricultural College. The appellant was initially appointed as Physical Director in Agricultural College which was a Government College which College stood transferred to the Andhra Pradesh University, when it was formed, the services of the appellant stood transferred to the Agricultural University and he continued to work as Director in the said University. This Court noted the definition of Teacher in the University Statutes and came to the conclusion that Physical Director is also Teacher within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University Act, 1963. The said judgment has no bearing in the present case since admittedly the appellant in the said case was working in the University as Director of Physical Education. 37. We may also notice one of the letters dated 31.10.2014 brought on record as Annexure-P-17 to the petition which is a communication by the Government of Kerala according sanction for merging the Centre for Adult, Continuing Education & Extension which is to the following effect: “ORDER Sanction is accorded for merging the Centre for Adult, Continuing Education & Extension (CACEE) which is functioning as Self Financing Centre under the University of Kerala, with Institute of Distance Education so that the department can function in dual mode as Institute of Distance and Adult Continuing Education. (By order of the Governor) Dr. K.M. ABRAHAM Additional Chief Secretary.” 38. As per the Government letter Centre has been merged with Institute of Distance Education, what are the consequences of merger of Centre with Institute of Distance Education have neither been explained by the appellant nor there are any material to come to the conclusion that by such merger the Centre shall become Centre maintained by the University. The above letter of the Government also supports our conclusion that Centre is not maintained by the University and it is Self-Financing Centre. The said letter also in no manner supports the case of the appellant as the claim of the appellant as raised in this appeal. 39. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeal which is dismissed accordingly.

Selection dated 10.04.2010 selecting appellants on the post of Physical Training Instructor (PTI) was set aside ! – Apex court considered the equities and modified the orders When the continuance of a person on a post is by virtue of an interim order, the continuance is always subject to outcome of the litigation. The displacement of appellants from their posts is inevitable consequence of upholding of the judgment of the High Court. A Constitution Bench of this Court in C. Channabasavaih Etc. Etc. Vs. State of Mysore and Others, AIR 1965 SC 1293 has made following observations in paragraph 9 in such a situation, which is beneficial to record, is as follows:- “9. It is very unfortunate that these persons should be uprooted after they had been appointed but if equality and equal protection before the law have any meaning and if our public institutions are to inspire that confidence which is expected of them we would be failing in our duty if we did not, even at the cost of considerable inconvenience to Government and the selected candidates do the right thing…………………………” 75. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions, we dispose of these appeals with the following directions: (i) The Commission shall conclude the entire selection process initiated by the advertisement No.6 of 2006 as per criterion notified on 28.12.2006 i.e. holding objective type written test of 200 marks and viva voce of 25 marks. All the applicants who had submitted applications in response to the above advertisement including those who were selected shall be permitted to participate in the fresh selection as directed. (ii) The candidates who have been selected and have worked on the post of PTI shall not be asked to refund any of the salary and other benefits received by them as against their working on the posts. No refund shall also be asked from those candidates who after their selection worked and retired from service. (iii) The entire process be completed by the Commission within a period of five months from the date Commission starts working after the present lockdown is over, which was the time fixed by the learned Single Judge for completing the process. (iv) The costs imposed by the Division Bench in paragraph 54 of the judgment of the High Court are deleted except the costs imposed on the Commission. 76. We, thus, while upholding the judgments of the High Court, subject to the modifications as above, dispose of these appeals.

1REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO.2103 OF 2020(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35373 of 2013)RAMJIT SINGH KARDAM & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)VERSUSSANJEEV KUMAR & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)WITHCivil Appeal No.2104 of 2020[@ SLP(C)No.35471/2013],Civil Appeal No.2105 of 2020[@ SLP(C)No.35466/2013],Civil Appeal No.2107 of 2020[@ SLP(C)No.35857/2013],Civil Appeal No.2106 of 2020[@SLP(C)No.35811/2013],Civil Appeal No.2108 of 2020[@ SLP(C)No.39466/2013],Civil Appeal Nos.2164-2166 of… Read More Selection dated 10.04.2010 selecting appellants on the post of Physical Training Instructor (PTI) was set aside ! – Apex court considered the equities and modified the orders When the continuance of a person on a post is by virtue of an interim order, the continuance is always subject to outcome of the litigation. The displacement of appellants from their posts is inevitable consequence of upholding of the judgment of the High Court. A Constitution Bench of this Court in C. Channabasavaih Etc. Etc. Vs. State of Mysore and Others, AIR 1965 SC 1293 has made following observations in paragraph 9 in such a situation, which is beneficial to record, is as follows:- “9. It is very unfortunate that these persons should be uprooted after they had been appointed but if equality and equal protection before the law have any meaning and if our public institutions are to inspire that confidence which is expected of them we would be failing in our duty if we did not, even at the cost of considerable inconvenience to Government and the selected candidates do the right thing…………………………” 75. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions, we dispose of these appeals with the following directions: (i) The Commission shall conclude the entire selection process initiated by the advertisement No.6 of 2006 as per criterion notified on 28.12.2006 i.e. holding objective type written test of 200 marks and viva voce of 25 marks. All the applicants who had submitted applications in response to the above advertisement including those who were selected shall be permitted to participate in the fresh selection as directed. (ii) The candidates who have been selected and have worked on the post of PTI shall not be asked to refund any of the salary and other benefits received by them as against their working on the posts. No refund shall also be asked from those candidates who after their selection worked and retired from service. (iii) The entire process be completed by the Commission within a period of five months from the date Commission starts working after the present lockdown is over, which was the time fixed by the learned Single Judge for completing the process. (iv) The costs imposed by the Division Bench in paragraph 54 of the judgment of the High Court are deleted except the costs imposed on the Commission. 76. We, thus, while upholding the judgments of the High Court, subject to the modifications as above, dispose of these appeals.

GUIDELINES FOR COURT FUNCTIONING THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING DURING COVID-19 PANDEMIC 5. Faced with the unprecedented and extraordinary outbreak of a pandemic, it is necessary that Courts at all levels respond to the call of social distancing and ensure that court premises do not contribute to the spread of virus. This is not a matter of discretion but of duty. Indeed, Courts throughout the country particularly at the level of the Supreme Court and the High Courts have employed video conferencing for dispensation of Justice and as guardians of the Constitution and as protectors of individual liberty governed by the rule of law. Taking cognizance of the measures adopted by this court and by the High Courts and District Courts, it is necessary for this court to issue directions by taking recourse to the jurisdiction conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution. 6. Therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred on the Supreme Court of India by Article 142 of the Constitution of India to make such orders as are necessary for doing complete justice, we direct that: i. All measures that have been and shall be taken by this Court and by the High Courts, to reduce the need for the physical presence of all stakeholders within court premises and to secure the functioning of courts in consonance with social distancing guidelines and best public health practices shall be deemed to be lawful; ii. The Supreme Court of India and all High Courts are authorized to adopt measures required to ensure the robust functioning of the judicial system through the use of video conferencing technologies; and iii. Consistent with the peculiarities of the judicial system in every state and the dynamically developing public health situation, every High Court is authorised to determine the modalities which are suitable to the temporary transition to the use of video conferencing technologies; iv. The concerned courts shall maintain a helpline to ensure that any complaint in regard to the quality or audibility of feed shall be communicated during the proceeding or immediately after its conclusion failing which no grievance in regard to it shall be entertained thereafter. v. The District Courts in each State shall adopt the mode of Video Conferencing prescribed by the concerned High Court. vi. The Court shall duly notify and make available the facilities for video conferencing for such litigants who do not have the means or access to video conferencing facilities. If necessary, in appropriate cases courts may appoint an amicus-curiae and make video conferencing facilities available to such an advocate. vii. Until appropriate rules are framed by the High Courts, video conferencing shall be mainly employed for hearing arguments whether at the trial stage or at the appellate stage. In no case shall evidence be recorded without the mutual consent of both the parties by video conferencing. If it is necessary to record evidence in a Court room the presiding officer shall ensure that appropriate distance is maintained between any two individuals in the Court. viii. The presiding officer shall have the power to restrict entry of persons into the court room or the points from which the arguments are addressed by the advocates. No presiding officer shall prevent the entry of a party to the case unless such party is suffering from any infectious illness. However, where the number of litigants are many the presiding officer shall have the power to restrict the numbers. The presiding officer shall in his discretion adjourn the proceedings where it is not possible to restrict the number. 7. The above directions are issued in furtherance of the commitment to the delivery of justice. The cooperation of all courts, judges, litigants, parties, staff and other stakeholders is indispensable in the successful implementation of the above directions to ensure that the judiciary rises to face the unique challenge presented by the outbreak of COVID-19. These directions shall operate until further orders. 8. List the matter after four weeks.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTIONSUO MOTU WRIT (CIVIL) NO.5/2020IN RE: GUIDELINES FOR COURT FUNCTIONING THROUGH VIDEOCONFERENCING DURING COVID-19 PANDEMICO R D E R The recent outbreak of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) inseveral countries, including India, has necessitated theimmediate adoption of measures to ensure socialdistancing in order to prevent the transmission of thevirus. The Supreme… Read More GUIDELINES FOR COURT FUNCTIONING THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING DURING COVID-19 PANDEMIC 5. Faced with the unprecedented and extraordinary outbreak of a pandemic, it is necessary that Courts at all levels respond to the call of social distancing and ensure that court premises do not contribute to the spread of virus. This is not a matter of discretion but of duty. Indeed, Courts throughout the country particularly at the level of the Supreme Court and the High Courts have employed video conferencing for dispensation of Justice and as guardians of the Constitution and as protectors of individual liberty governed by the rule of law. Taking cognizance of the measures adopted by this court and by the High Courts and District Courts, it is necessary for this court to issue directions by taking recourse to the jurisdiction conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution. 6. Therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred on the Supreme Court of India by Article 142 of the Constitution of India to make such orders as are necessary for doing complete justice, we direct that: i. All measures that have been and shall be taken by this Court and by the High Courts, to reduce the need for the physical presence of all stakeholders within court premises and to secure the functioning of courts in consonance with social distancing guidelines and best public health practices shall be deemed to be lawful; ii. The Supreme Court of India and all High Courts are authorized to adopt measures required to ensure the robust functioning of the judicial system through the use of video conferencing technologies; and iii. Consistent with the peculiarities of the judicial system in every state and the dynamically developing public health situation, every High Court is authorised to determine the modalities which are suitable to the temporary transition to the use of video conferencing technologies; iv. The concerned courts shall maintain a helpline to ensure that any complaint in regard to the quality or audibility of feed shall be communicated during the proceeding or immediately after its conclusion failing which no grievance in regard to it shall be entertained thereafter. v. The District Courts in each State shall adopt the mode of Video Conferencing prescribed by the concerned High Court. vi. The Court shall duly notify and make available the facilities for video conferencing for such litigants who do not have the means or access to video conferencing facilities. If necessary, in appropriate cases courts may appoint an amicus-curiae and make video conferencing facilities available to such an advocate. vii. Until appropriate rules are framed by the High Courts, video conferencing shall be mainly employed for hearing arguments whether at the trial stage or at the appellate stage. In no case shall evidence be recorded without the mutual consent of both the parties by video conferencing. If it is necessary to record evidence in a Court room the presiding officer shall ensure that appropriate distance is maintained between any two individuals in the Court. viii. The presiding officer shall have the power to restrict entry of persons into the court room or the points from which the arguments are addressed by the advocates. No presiding officer shall prevent the entry of a party to the case unless such party is suffering from any infectious illness. However, where the number of litigants are many the presiding officer shall have the power to restrict the numbers. The presiding officer shall in his discretion adjourn the proceedings where it is not possible to restrict the number. 7. The above directions are issued in furtherance of the commitment to the delivery of justice. The cooperation of all courts, judges, litigants, parties, staff and other stakeholders is indispensable in the successful implementation of the above directions to ensure that the judiciary rises to face the unique challenge presented by the outbreak of COVID-19. These directions shall operate until further orders. 8. List the matter after four weeks.